

## Framing the 1980 Coup Films as a Cultural and Cinematographic Discourse

Narrative discourses and artistic representations are informed by material circumstances. Films reconstructing experiences of people who were traumatized and marginalized by the coup of 1980 are no exceptions. There is widespread consensus about 1980 as a turning point—albeit a traumatic one—in Turkey. Coup films which handle this period often underscore personal aspects of this trauma. But what exactly is a trauma? How do representations of trauma interact with material reality?

“Trauma (Psychical) [is an] event in the subject’s life defined by its intensity, by the subject’s incapacity to respond adequately to it, and by the upheaval and long-lasting effects that it brings about in the psychical organization.”<sup>1</sup> Speaking of trauma in cinema, Susannah Radstone underscores the importance of theories by Shohana Feldman, Dori Laub and Cathy Caruth, yet warns us that in memory studies trauma might have become a “popular cultural script” that begs analysis in its own right. Among the questions she poses is the role that imagination plays in the representation of trauma<sup>2</sup> (Fig. 2.1).

The disruptive nature of trauma, which can be visualized as a rupture in chronology and subjectivity, poses a problem for its representation in literature and in film: for the traumatized self, the ordeal experienced is a boundary marker, altering its conceptualization of time and worldview.<sup>3</sup> Trauma sufferers note that there is no going back to the pre-traumatized self, but only moving on with the knowledge of the trauma. Trauma may even be seen as the “impossibility of history as narrative, as an ordered sequence of events, of agents as subjects, as chronology, as cause and



Fig. 2.1 *Zincirbozan*

effect, as rationality or purposiveness of actions.”<sup>4</sup> On the one hand, the state of trauma can only be surmounted by narrating the event(s) to sympathetic witness-interlocutors.<sup>5</sup> On the other hand, horrific life-altering experiences are in essence not narratable.

### THE LOOKING GLASS OF 1980: THE BROKEN CHILDHOOD

Cinema plays an important role in rendering unspeakable experiences perceptible for others. Visualization is capable of capturing trauma peripherally, even when the main point is not its representation; trauma seeps into historicized narratives about war, conflict, and famine as inescapable residue.<sup>6</sup> Films about the 1980 coup reveal the traumas experienced by many people, even when they focus on historical events surrounding the coup. Films have a powerful “ability to make manifest, to exteriorize through visual imagery and sound, and to make collective” the experiences of traumatized individuals or groups.<sup>7</sup> Watching traces of trauma in a motion picture opens up a space for collective reflection, beyond the immediate victims and perpetrators.

It is true that collective traumas affect different groups differently.<sup>8</sup> Military takeovers in 1960 and 1971, as well as a chain of other

intrusions sometimes known as the “postmodern coup” (1997), the “civilian coup” (2015), and the “attempted coup” (2016) might have played devastating roles in people’s lives. Moreover, despite the difficulty of assessing each of these events clinically, they collectively mark a problem by signaling rigid political authoritarianism and deplorable human rights violations. Still, some traumas affect the culture in greater depth and scale than others. As a collective trauma of the late twentieth century, the military takeover of 1980 resonates with today’s conflicts as it does with yesterday’s traumas. First, cruelty did not leave an impression only on one religious minority or ethnic group, although some (for example, the political left, the Kurds, the Alevis) were hurt more than others. Second, by touching multitudes of lives very dramatically, the coup completely realigned Turkey’s economy, politics, arts, and culture. Due to the sheer scale and permanency of its effect, it has towered over other socio-political ruptures since the founding of the Republic in 1923. The process of questioning that it propelled about the nation’s history and identity is still visible today.

Coup films represent a break in historical chronology as an unmatched blow which fell on the country’s infantilized citizens. They commemorate the tragic experiences of young people marginalized during the 1980s. Their narratives either flow towards or become arrested by this historical moment. Sometimes other traumas are measured against it. The cinematic record of the coup continues to arouse strong emotions due to the scale of the event, its continuing impact, and chronological proximity. Children whose parents were detained in the 1980s are writers and filmmakers today. Some audiences remember dissidents plucked from family circles, neighborhoods, and workplaces to be placed in dungeons. People who experienced torture are among Turkey’s political figures today.<sup>9</sup>

Cinema and television’s representations of the 1980 coup reference other traumatic events in Turkey’s modern history. These include mass killings and deportations in the early twentieth century, as well as political conflicts, assassinations, and the mid-century coups of 1960 and 1971. Some films memorialize specific events such as the bloody hostage negotiation in Kızıldere (1972) and well-known youth heroes such as Deniz Gezmiş (1947–1972). Similarly, landmark tragedies such as the May Day killings (1977) and the Maraş (1978) and Çorum (1980) massacres are marked. Thus coverage of the coup is linked to other traumatic episodes—a situation which poses a question about the

possibility of a pre-traumatized past, a national childhood, or a pre-history of innocence.

Rather than depicting a pre-traumatized past, many of these films, including popular serials, use the coup of 1980 as a mirror through which other ruptures of the modern period find reflections. Coup films call attention to 1980 even as they refract various other past traumas and current anxieties. At one end of this historical spectrum lie traumas from the founding of the republic—the silenced memories of Ottoman Armenians—and at the other, the trials and tribulations of the Kurdish conflict since the 1980s. When looking through this glass, childhood is but a broken vision.

As part of their “interpretive” and “reconstructive”<sup>10</sup> functions coup films connect simultaneously to material reality and to fantasy. They seek to authenticate the lived experience of marginalized social groups, giving “shape, texture and voice to a ‘history from below.’”<sup>11</sup> They pursue historical referentiality<sup>12</sup> in order to validate and interpret experiences that have been rendered invisible. They incorporate hybrid styles, particularly in the 2000s, by pairing unlikely devices: archival footage and period music, typically used in documentaries, are paired with dramatic soundtrack and striking *mise-en-scène*, characteristically employed in popular melodramas. Thus they substantiate the historical and emotive reality of the coup. But these devices also help coup films speak across their specific temporal and political boundaries to the present day inviting their own audiences to forge a new sense of history and identity.

### THE HISTORICAL BACKDROP

Coup films cover a forty-year period stretching from the early 1960s to the early 2000s. Since the films reference this period, an overview of the four decades under question might be helpful. The Republican People’s Party (RPP) established by the modern Republic’s founder, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk (1881–1938), remained in power until Turkey’s transition into multi-party politics after World War II. The RPP vigorously worked on building a new nation whose memories of its imperial past, as well as of late-Ottoman inter-communal violence, were expunged. Silenced memories included mass deportations and massacres of Christian communities in Anatolia prior to the founding of the Republic (1923), the population exchange between Greece and Turkey (1924), and the military mobilization against Kurdish uprisings during

the foundational years of the Republic (1925, 1938)<sup>13</sup>—processes which also pugnaciously suppressed a meager anti-Kemalist opposition.

*The 1950s: Multi-Party Politics, Urban Migration,  
and Mass Society*

Turkey had avoided becoming an active war theatre in World War II, only to turn into a zone of lively geopolitical struggle during the Cold War. Under pressure from the growing political opposition<sup>14</sup> and the West, the country opened its political system to multi-party competition (1946). The first main opposition party, Democrat Party (DP), took power in 1950, and ruled for the next decade. Pro-Western and conservative, DP promised to create a “little America” in Turkey, building closer ties with the US, becoming a member of NATO, and pursuing the goal of entering the European Economic Community. All of these policies, representing the political consensus,<sup>15</sup> helped to solidify the country’s ideological alignment with the US and the West during the Cold War.

The 1950s was also a decade of increased geographical and social mobility. It marked a surge of migration from rural communities to urban centers such as Ankara and Istanbul, bringing together provincial and cosmopolitan Turkey. As people from the Black Sea, the Anatolian hinterland, and the rural south flooded into big cities, the percentage of urban population almost doubled over the three decades following 1950.<sup>16</sup> Rural migrants were searching for a better life—for schools, hospitals, jobs—and greater opportunities in urban centers, because resources, albeit limited, had not been adequately extended to the countryside.<sup>17</sup> Furthermore, agricultural mechanization, symbolized by tractors which were imported with the assistance of the Marshall program,<sup>18</sup> were transforming the countryside, giving further impetus to the busy flow of people. As rural migrants poured into major towns, the nation’s population continued to grow, with the segment under the age of 30 reaching distressingly high proportions.<sup>19</sup>

The nation was being reshaped by a surge of youthful dynamism and relentless activity whose political direction was not always easy to predict or control. In an attempt to ride this unsteady horse, DP initiated many projects. It improved the country’s physical infrastructure, connecting provincial towns with big cities, which created a greater flow of people, goods and services between the city and the country. It opened, albeit with limited success, Turkey’s troubled economy to new markets around the world.<sup>20</sup> With the aim of reclaiming historical grandeur and

alleviating the stress caused by rapid urbanization, it initiated urban renewal projects in metropolitan areas such as Istanbul.<sup>21</sup> To meet the educational needs of a growing population and of a modernizing country, it allocated funds to expand universities and build new campuses—some of them modeled after American universities.<sup>22</sup>

DP claimed to represent the popular will of the electorate, comprised of the rising heartland, provincial notables, and petty bourgeoisie, appealing at once to their conservative values and burgeoning financial interests.<sup>23</sup> Under increasingly unpredictable social conditions resulting from urban migration, population growth, and economic hardship,<sup>24</sup> by the late 1950s the country was ripe for social explosions. One such incident took place on September 6–7, 1955, as non-Muslim businesses, particularly in the Beyoğlu district of Istanbul, were attacked by mobs of people, who looted, ransacked, and destroyed property, beat up shop-owners, and in some cases, raped women. Some churches were also damaged. These explosive events were instigated by provocative press coverage about Mustafa Kemal's natal home in Thessaloniki (in contemporary Greece) being bombed, and against the background of negotiations regarding the status of the Turkish minority in Cyprus.<sup>25</sup>

On the one hand, political tensions brewed inside the country. Young men and women with broader access to modern education were participating ever more in politics through student associations and youth organizations. Urban youth were in favor of “conquer(ing) modernity,” for themselves<sup>26</sup> but some were increasingly suspicious of the manner in which DP set out to achieve this goal. As the first generation that had been born and come of age in the modern Republic,<sup>27</sup> they criticized Turkey's Cold War trajectory. They saw in Turkey's unconditional alliance with the West a distasteful compromise to her hard-won independence. They criticized the DP government for forfeiting the country's Kemalist principles, particularly secularism.<sup>28</sup> Their frustrations were shared by academics and bureaucrats who supported the RPP, as well as junior officers and military cadets of the War Academy.

On the other hand, just as the opposition grew vocal, the DP administration, which increasingly viewed democracy simply as majority rule, turned repressive. For example, towards the end of the decade, DP founded the “Fatherland Front” (*Vatan Cephesi*) to advocate its vision and intimidate the opposition. The names of those who joined the Front would be broadcast nationally on state radio. Overall, the news media was strictly controlled. A committee (*Tahkikat Komisyonu*) was set up to

investigate defiant voices and political adversaries. Moreover, members of the opposition were physically harassed. Such attacks included an assault on İsmet İnönü, the RPP leader and one of Turkey's founding fathers, during his tour of the Aegean region, a stronghold of DP.<sup>29</sup>

*The 1960s and 1970s: From Authoritarian  
Modernism to Socio-Economic Instability*

By 1960 Turkey no longer looked like an oasis of Western democracy in the Middle East. The economy had not recovered from the foreign exchange crisis of 1958,<sup>30</sup> threatening the stability of the government. DP had been in power for the entire decade. Its relations with the opposition (RPP) had become sharply confrontational. Not only the political elite, but also students and even the army, were polarized.<sup>31</sup> Hence, in 1960, a rebellion of the junior officers against their loss of status and pay, and the educated urban elite against DP's authoritarian policies, brought about the military coup of May 27, 1960.<sup>32</sup> Subsequently, a new constitution, which captured the anti-authoritarian spirit of the 1960s, was drawn up with the help of academics.<sup>33</sup> Soon afterwards, it was ratified by the Turkish Grand National Assembly.

The 1960 coup ostensibly brought an end to political polarization by force, only to cause other rifts, which remain wide open. Today, unlike the military interventions in 1971 and 1980, which are widely recognized as conservative re-adjustment or even backlash, the legacy of the 1960 coup remains controversial. There are those who view it as a revolutionary moment,<sup>34</sup> overturned only by the coups of 1971 and 1980, just as there are others who consider it an authoritarian turn which introduced military intervention into politics, setting the trend for subsequent military coups. The former group argues that the system overthrown by the military was hardly democratic, since the popular will alone does not make a representational government.<sup>35</sup> From their point of view, the military coup of 1960 put an end to an increasingly abusive majority government. In contrast, critics of the coup highlight new infrastructure and inter-institutional arrangements installed after 1960. They cite the National Security Council's (NSC) growing significance as evidence of increased oversight and influence over elected governments by the military.<sup>36</sup> The polemic owes much to the complicated outcomes of the coup, which offer some vindication to both positions.

Authoritarian by nature, the coup suspended the 1924 constitution, leading to the imprisonment and public trial of hundreds of parliamentarians and elected officials. Many were imprisoned on Yassıada, an island in the Sea of Marmara, only to be transported to the provincial town of Kayseri, where they remained captive until the mid-1960s when the political tide turned once again. Some were banned from politics even after their release.<sup>37</sup> Following the public humiliation and guilty verdict passed by the military tribunal, Prime Minister Menderes and two other members of his cabinet were hung in 1961. Hundreds of generals and thousands of colonels and majors were purged from the army while 147 university professors were removed from their positions.<sup>38</sup>

The 1960s were defined by high modernism, the ideals of which demanded unconditional belief in grand projects for the good of the public for as long as they were rooted in science and industry.<sup>39</sup> The military leadership was confident in the nation's ability to transform and be transformed for the better—dramatically yet also seamlessly. The changes instituted with this spirit of optimism created an environment ripe for political participation, initiating a period of mass politics.

Despite the authoritarianism with which it was instituted, the 1961 constitution expanded civil liberties to an unprecedented degree. The foundation of the nation was reconstructed so as to build new, more cosmopolitan political engagements. The new constitution devised an electoral system based on proportional representation and increased checks and balances, augmenting principles of a pluralistic democracy. Expanded liberties for political organizations led to the founding of various student associations, as well as to the rise of the Turkish Workers Party, a pro-labor socialist party. Recognition of labor rights, the right to strike, and collective bargaining spread trade union activities. The creation of an autonomous public broadcasting organization, Turkish Radio and Television (TRT), revitalized appreciation of modern arts, culture, and politics. With relative freedoms accorded to the press came translations of Marxist and Islamist classics, which had been previously outlawed.<sup>40</sup> The founding of the State Planning Organization led to the creation of five-year plans, which aimed to invest the country's limited resources into its growing industries deliberately and efficiently.<sup>41</sup>

During the 1960s, the coup's goal of building new bridges, resolving political polarization, and creating economic stability<sup>42</sup> were not achieved. The two mainstream parties representing the historical divide within the coalition (to the right and to the left of Mustafa Kemal) that



established the Turkish Republic in 1923 continued to struggle with each other. RPP evolved under a younger generation of leadership represented by Bülent Ecevit, who re-fashioned the party as a left-of-center organization. DP's political legacy was inherited by the Justice Party (JP), which was now led by Süleyman Demirel. Both RPP's secular statist Kemalism and DP's conservative neo-liberalism lived on through other coups (1971, 1980), continuing to evolve, while absorbing or partnering with new political groups.

In the 1970s, these new political formations included Necmettin Erbakan's moderate Islamists and Alparslan Türkeş's ultra-nationalists, who either worked with or offered support to Demirel's conservative coalition governments in 1975–1977 and 1977–1978. Erbakan's party and members of Demirel's JP also worked with RPP-led coalitions in 1974, 1977, and 1978–1979. Combined with growing ideological polarization and economic instability, this political diversification meant Turkey would be governed by short-term, unstable coalition governments throughout the 1970s.

### *The 1970s: The Rising Tide of Ideological Politics*

Mass migration, mass education, mass politics, and even mass media emerged as defining themes of the mid-twentieth century. National politics began involving larger segments of society,<sup>43</sup> while global currents galvanized educated urban youth. The 1960s marked the rise of student activism on a previously unseen scale. Universities were turning into hotbeds of unrest, visible across the political spectrum. There were anti-Western and anti-American sentiments in the air. These were fueled by increased media coverage<sup>44</sup> of the 1960s civil rights confrontations, the Algerian struggle against the French colonial system (1954–1962), the Vietnamese resistance to American intervention (1963–1973), and the rise of revolutionary movements everywhere from Europe and Latin America to South Africa.<sup>45</sup>

Despite its marginalization until the 1960s, energized by the global wind in its favor, socialism in Turkey was sailing forward as the main critical current in the 1960s and 1970s.<sup>46</sup> The young were influenced by decolonization movements around the world, including the Algerian War of Independence (1954–1962) and the rise of Arab socialism, which had brought Gamal Abdul Nasser to power in Egypt (1952). They questioned Turkey's inability to take independent positions—particularly in

favor of decolonizing movements—in foreign policy. Stimulated by revolutionary turmoil in places like China (1949) and Cuba (1959), they sought alternative and seemingly less exploitative models of development than the one offered by America.<sup>47</sup> Global revolutionary movements overturning Western hegemony in far-flung corners of the world such as Bolivia (1952) provided them with alternative images of independent nationhood.

The left included not only pro-Soviet and Sinophile groups, but the “neo-Kemalist left,” “Che Gueverians,” and everything in between. Publications such as *Yön* (1961–1967) and youth organizations *Fikir Klüpleri* (Idea Clubs)<sup>48</sup> played important roles in uniting youth around ideological movements and opening new avenues of political discussion. Young revolutionaries<sup>49</sup> were excited by Turkey’s potential similarities and historical ties with decolonizing nations. The re-invention of Kemalism as a left-leaning vision was grounded in Turkey’s anti-imperialist struggle at the end of World War I. The leader of this struggle, Mustafa Kemal, came from the Ottoman political elite, who were influenced by the ideals of the French Revolution.<sup>50</sup>

Criticizing Turkey’s dependence on the West, some socialists took inspiration from the Soviets. While appearing to be on opposite sides of the Cold War, Turkey and the Soviet Union—countries on the periphery of Europe—had fought Western hegemony through aggressive modernization. During the early phases of the Turkish War of Independence, Mustafa Kemal had appealed to the Soviets for help. Intent on supporting anti-colonialist uprisings, the Soviet Union had delivered assistance in gold and ammunition. Memories of collaboration lingered, even as the emerging Turkey had made no promises to style its regime after the Soviets and during the Cold War had opted for the Western alliance.<sup>51</sup> Rounding out these connections was the Turkish–Soviet partnership for state-led industrialization.<sup>52</sup>

Some Maoist groups compared and contrasted agrarian societies such as China and Turkey, debating the role of farmers, peasants, students, and the army in the impending revolution.<sup>53</sup> Active in university campuses, and increasingly violent during the 1970s, they accused the Soviet Union of pacifism and revisionism. They were also involved in publishing, as were other groups. According to one estimation, by the end of the 1970s, the Maoist flagship paper called *Aydınlık* might have been “the largest-circulation pro-Chinese daily in the world outside of Chinese communities.”<sup>54</sup>

Finally, in 1978 a Maoist group called the Kurdistan Workers Party, or the *Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan* in Kurdish (PKK), was launched by Abdullah Öcalan, a political science student studying in Ankara. Ideologically the PKK blended national liberation with a revolutionary ethos. State repression led to PKK escalation. This vicious cycle drew the organization, initially led by an educated urban Kurdish elite, to even more radicalization.<sup>55</sup> During the years immediately preceding the coup, few Turks had heard of it. Only after the coup of 1980 would the PKK formally confront the Turkish state (from 1984 onwards), initiating a bloody struggle spanning more than three decades and claiming tens of thousands of lives on both sides.

In the 1960s and 1970s, oppositional youth currents such as Turkism and Islamism were on their way to becoming mass movements, too. Islamic thought—often deemed reactionary vis-à-vis reform—had remained on the periphery, only to slowly percolate towards the mainstream at the end of the 1960s. The increased assertiveness of Islamists was helped by the spread of *imam hatip* schools, which were institutions of secondary education opened in the 1950s, catering to children of pious Anatolian families. As these schools spread around the country, their growth was complemented by the founding of religious institutes of higher learning and divinity schools.<sup>56</sup>

Like their peers on the left, pious youth were connected more and more to the rest of the world, accessing translations of Islamist works by Indian and Egyptian authors which were becoming available in the 1970s.<sup>57</sup> They were originally politicized in the National Union of Turkish Students (*Milli Türk Talebe Birliği* or MTTB), which had re-invented itself in the 1960s, first as a nationalist, xenophobic organization, then increasingly as a nationalist-Islamist organization. In MTTB young people fought against “Zionists, Communists, and Masons.” They held the anti-communist, Islamist poet Necip Fazıl Kısakürek (1904–1983) and his journal *Great East* (published between 1943–1978) in high esteem, making them the banner of the fight against the communists, who, for their part, hailed the poet Nazım Hikmet as the artistic emblem of their cause. A complex character and a moving poet, Kısakürek criticized Western civilization, Turkish modernization, nationalism, and individualism from an Islamist perspective.<sup>58</sup>

Even though formal Islamist political parties were repeatedly closed by Turkey’s secular elite, they kept re-opening under new names, broadening their base with each new generation. The conservative politician

Necmettin Erbakan's National Order Party (founded in 1969) offered a platform for Islamist youth to participate in mainstream politics.<sup>59</sup> Seasoned intellectually in MTTB and politically in Erbakan's political networks, they grew confrontational in the late-1970s<sup>60</sup> under the youth organization "the Raiders" (*Akıncılar*).

An ideology of a small group of intellectuals, Turkism was either held in check or co-opted by territorial nationalism, but was gaining momentum in the 1970s.<sup>61</sup> Its leader was a Cypriot Turk, Alparslan Türkeş, who was a retired colonel involved in the 1960 coup. Tried in 1945 for "racism-Turanism,"<sup>62</sup> he had been active in politics within and outside the military. But his lasting contribution came with the doctrine of the "Nine Lights," which was adopted by the far-right Nationalist Action Party and its youth organization, known as the "idealist" youth (*Ülkücü Gençlik*).

Some of their rank and file originated in the "Organizations for Combatting Communism" (*Komünizmle Mücadele Dernekleri* or KMD), which was active in the 1950s. Closed after the 1960 coup, the KMD was revived in the late 1960s. The mobilization of youth active in the KMD was inspired by Turkey's traditional rivalry with Russia, rooted in Ottoman history. The feelings of historical rivalry were transformed into anti-communist fervor during the Cold War.<sup>63</sup> Members of the KMD broadened their activities with the help of extra-legal networks within the state during the late 1960s. Their natural allies were the "Grey Wolves," a paramilitary group, which banded around Türkeş's ultra-nationalist doctrine. Trained in commando camps, the Grey Wolves carried out attacks on leftist youth groups, contributing greatly to the escalation of violence around the country.<sup>64</sup>

Both of these distinct strains of right-wing conservatism—Islamism and ultra-nationalism—coalesced in their mutual hatred of socialism during the Cold War. So the fault lines were drawn ideologically and physically between the right and the left across the cultural and political spectrum. Institutional discourse emanating from the very top encouraged the zeal of conservative youth. Associating socialist youth with wealth, materialism, Westernization, atheism, Freemasonry, immorality, and other religions such as Christianity, Judaism, and Zoroastrianism, preachers employed by the directorate of religious affairs (*Diyanet İşleri*) provoked pious youth, some of whom were recent urbanites, against their rebellious cosmopolitan peers.<sup>65</sup>

### *The 1970s: Political Radicalization and Economic Turbulence*

On June 15–16, 1970, labor demonstrations brought into the picture the Confederation of Revolutionary Labor Unions,<sup>66</sup> an organization founded only in 1967, as a major player. Meanwhile student activism intensified, deteriorating into confrontations and urban guerilla-type activities such as bank robberies and abductions. Demonstrations against visits by the US Sixth Fleet to Istanbul, and by US Ambassador Robert W. Komer (service: 1968–1969, known in Turkey for his role in Vietnam) to a university campus,<sup>67</sup> escalated into clashes with security forces. In March 1971, revered student leader Deniz Gezmiş and his co-conspirators kidnapped American military officers, which instigated a campus search at Middle East Technical University, where events spiraled out of control.<sup>68</sup> The abductees were eventually released. But urban warfare aimed at destabilizing the country to bring about the revolution, which seemed inevitable to the radicalized youth, caused grave concern among the populace and in different factions of the establishment.<sup>69</sup>

The emergent radicalization and spectacular acts of violence such as bank robberies and armed clashes, combined with the state's inability to enact effective social and economic legislation, were seen as justifications for the 1971 military coup. This resulted in the resignation of the popularly elected, center-right government of Süleyman Demirel, and led to the institution of government by technocrats (1971–1973),<sup>70</sup> backed up and controlled by the military.<sup>71</sup> Once again, political organizations were closed, publications censored, and martial law imposed.

The 1971 intervention marked a major conservative turn, and increased persecution of the opposition on the left, symbolized by a wave of arrests known popularly as the “Sledgehammer” operation (*Balyoz Harekâtı*). The kidnapping of the Israeli Consul Efraim Elrom Hofstadter in order to secure the release of arrested leftist youth, and the Consul's eventual murder, had unleashed all around the country arrests of journalists and intellectuals who had nothing to do with the incident.<sup>72</sup> Therefore, the 1971 intervention had been defined as a period of captivity and suffering for youth and intellectuals, made visible through testimonials and literary narratives of torture and imprisonment notoriously known as “the March 12 novel.”<sup>73</sup>

The late 1970s brought further radicalization, rampant street violence and political and economic instability. The new government emphasized the security of the state at the cost of civil liberties. Center-right and

center-left politicians, Süleyman Demirel and Bülent Ecevit (who had emerged after 1973 as the new leader of RPP), struggled for the popular vote. Coalitions ruled the country through turbulent times with mixed economic, political, and diplomatic outcomes. Under a coalition led by center-left Bülent Ecevit and the Islamist Necmettin Erbakan, Turkey reacted against a nationalist coup on the Mediterranean island of Cyprus with a military invasion in 1974.<sup>74</sup>

Having had a long history and a sizeable minority on the island where problems had been brewing since at least the 1950s, Turkey took action as one of the legal guarantors<sup>75</sup> of Cypriot independence. Neither the Greek junta nor the third guarantor of Cypriot independence, Great Britain, were roused to action with the toppling of the Cypriot government led by Archbishop Makarios. In fact, the perpetrators were backed by the colonels' junta in Greece, and aimed to unite the island with the mainland. The Turkish army invaded the northern part of the island with the self-stated goal of securing the island's independence and the Turkish minority's safety.<sup>76</sup> The Islamists, who were Ecevit's coalition partner in 1974, were intent on keeping all the captured territory, apparently even that to be used as leverage during peace negotiations, thereby sabotaging the possibility of peace in Cyprus in the coming decades.<sup>77</sup>

The situation on the island not only brought loss and heartache to those on both sides of the conflict, but returned to Turkey in the way of further political and economic hardship at a time when the world was experiencing a major energy crisis. The island was partitioned, and many of its inhabitants were displaced. These outcomes situated Turkey in a difficult international position, as it faced a US arms embargo.<sup>78</sup> The oil crisis of the 1970s further damaged Turkey's vulnerable economy built on import substitution.<sup>79</sup> High oil prices resulted in an energy shortage, increasing foreign debt and causing budget deficits. These difficulties spiraled into inflation and devaluation of the lira in a country with an overwhelmingly young population which was now experiencing high unemployment rates. This picture forced the Turkish leadership to seek more international funds from institutions such as the IMF and World Bank, which in turn, handed Turkey a new recipe for economic reform at the end of the 1970s.<sup>80</sup>

The ideological rift between youth groups on the right and the left deepened. Many agree that violence spiralled out of control in the 1970s. Even with seemingly infinite factions, each busy with in-fighting over obscure ideological differences, the left comprised a powerful and

steadily growing youth movement. But by the late-1970s, some right-wing youth groups were very active in countering and engaging the left through campus fights, street shootings, political assassinations, and even mass terror. Feeling besieged by the left, the “Nationalist Front” coalitions led by Süleyman Demirel in partnership with Necmettin Erbakan and Alparslan Türkeş, encouraged conservative youth to act on their convictions. Prime Minister Demirel famously denied that right-wing groups would ever commit acts of terror. Fascist circles from the Grey Wolves and extra-legal networks organized within the state as part of counter-terrorism measures had penetrated the police and security agencies.<sup>81</sup> But first, political ideology had to give way to even more violence and economic instability.

### *The 1980s and 1990s: The Military Takeover and Its Aftermath*

On the eve of the 1980 coup, political violence and instability had peaked. Street violence was rampant, claiming many lives each day.<sup>82</sup> Some were high-profile murders of journalists, trade unionists, public prosecutors, politicians and academics; other victims were students and workers. There were also attacks on political or sectarian groups which typically identified with the left, such as the Taksim Square shoot-out that led to the killing of over thirty-four people on May Day 1977.<sup>83</sup> In two other notorious cases—Maraş (1978) and Çorum (1980)—the incitement of sectarian divisions by religious militants and ultra-nationalist paramilitary gangs<sup>84</sup> resulted in massacres of Alevis,<sup>85</sup> who generally supported the left.

Coalition governments increased political instability, which bred suspicion and anxiety. As violence escalated political institutions proved incapable of resolving the polarization. Rumors circulated that right-wing militias enjoyed support from the “Nationalist Front” coalitions ruling the country,<sup>86</sup> which were backed by Cold War alliances. There is a growing literature that implicates NATO’s “Stay-Behind” operations known as the “Turkish Gladio” (a.k.a. *kontrgerilla*) in some of the violence in Turkey, which was held up by the West as a member of NATO and a bulwark against communist expansion.<sup>87</sup>

Violence escalated to unprecedented levels. Prominent people on both sides of the political spectrum, as well as public figures with no discernable ideological positions, were made targets. Cases like the murder of Abdi İpekçi (1979), the editor of popular national daily *Milliyet* and a

renowned advocate of Turkish–Greek friendship and internal peace, illustrated the state’s inability or unwillingness to protect its citizens, solve murder cases, keep assassins locked up, and eventually deliver justice.<sup>88</sup> In this environment of social and economic insecurity, under conditions that were hard to predict or control, students walked out, labor unions went on strike, and the parliament could not reach a consensus on who to elect as the next president.

The economic instability was dreadful. The Confederation of Revolutionary Labor Unions (abbreviated as ‘DISK’ in Turkish) felt embattled by the new economic policies. The “January 24 decisions,” or “the Chilean model” as it was known at the time (after the IMF’s reform recipe for Allende’s Chile) aimed at dramatically reshaping the country’s economy. Prime Minister Demirel explained the necessity of reform by stating famously that Turkey was in need of even 70 cents. In return for handsome loans and extensions on debt payments, lending agencies were demanding economic reform, which would pave the way for the privatization of major public industries. The January 24 decisions compelled a transition to a free-market economy by ending protections such as export controls, import subsidies, and regulated interest rates. Fighting for its existence through strikes and factory occupations, DISK staged nationwide resistance.<sup>89</sup>

By September 12, 1980, the country was in the grip of severe economic dislocation, legislative gridlock, intensifying violence, and growing threats from Islamic fundamentalism and Kurdish separatism. The situation had become so dire that there were popular calls for the military to take over, even as parts of the country were already under martial law. Later on, the generals were to explain the period leading up to the coup and the measures taken after the coup in a special book authored in English. In a chapter entitled the “Curtain Opens At Last,” they laid out the grim situation with a comparison to the peak of the National War of Independence (1919–1922). Between 1978 and 1980 the number of people killed by acts of terrorism had approached the number of those who were killed in the final offensive of the war in 1921. The army had to put a stop to this carnage.<sup>90</sup> Thus, on September 12, 1980, it came to power for the third time since the country’s transition to multi-party politics.

It has been more than thirty years since Kenan Evren and his junta, consisting of fellow generals Nurettin Ersin, Nejat Tümer, Tahsin Şahinkaya, and Sedat Celasun, suspended the constitution, dissolved the



parliament, deposed the cabinet, and lifted the immunity of parliamentarians with an operation executed on the night of September 12, 1980.<sup>91</sup> Even though military rule lasted technically only three years, until free elections could be held in 1983, the economic and ideological re-alignment, which instituted the foundations of the neo-liberal economy and Turkish-Islamic synthesis,<sup>92</sup> have continued to shape the country.

The first official communiqué explained that the military aimed to render state functions operative and put an end to the intransigence of political parties which could not even come together to elect a new president, let alone produce solutions to the country's problems. The main culprits of the crisis were identified as "secessionist" (Kurdish), "reactionary" (Islamist) and "perverse" (leftist) movements, which aimed to replace Atatürkism—the last of which appeared to denote, in the junta's jargon, a conservative re-interpretation of Kemalism.<sup>93</sup> The coup was intended to forestall a civil war, which appeared imminent, and empower the state which had been left "powerless and impotent."<sup>94</sup> During the next ten years on many occasions, General Evren cited the high rate of political murders by 1980, along with the inability of the Grand National Assembly to elect the Republic's next president, as the primary reasons that propelled the coup.<sup>95</sup>

Concentrating all power in the hands of the NSC that they ran, the generals and their civilian and military allies placed political party leaders under arrest.<sup>96</sup> They detained 178,565 civilians, putting an additional million-and-a-half under surveillance, even though only 64,505 were arraigned and 41,727 sentenced.<sup>97</sup> They executed 50, including 18 political prisoners from the left (among whom was a 17 year-old), and eight from the right.<sup>98</sup> In a 1984 speech delivered in the eastern city of Muş, General Evren mocked human rights defenders publicly by asking with irony whether they should "feed [the traitors] rather than hang them!?"<sup>99</sup>

The military government arranged mass trials "before military courts and under martial law,"<sup>100</sup> in addition to firing tens of thousands of workers, and deeming thousands of others "undesirable." People who had been arrested, tried, laid off, and branded as undesirables included "respectable trade unionists, legal politicians, university professors, teachers, journalists and lawyers."<sup>101</sup> Anyone was suspect—anyone who might have been affiliated to a wide range of political organizations, particularly on the left. The "objectionable" included ordinary (apolitical) people who had Kurdish and/or Armenian ancestry.<sup>102</sup>

Having witnessed street violence prior to the coup, the press was largely supportive in the aftermath of the takeover. Acclaimed columnist Ali Sirmen of the center-left daily *Cumhuriyet* reminded his audience that the West expected Turkey to avoid turning into Argentina or Iran.<sup>103</sup> On September 13, 1980, the journalist Oktay Akbal depicted the coup as a natural consequence of departing from the path of Atatürkism. The conservative daily *Tercüman*'s headline for September 14, 1980 read "May God Help Them." Writing for the daily *Milliyet* on September 15, 1980, Yılmaz Çetiner expressed the relief that many ordinary people felt.<sup>104</sup> An unsigned editorial in the same paper described the takeover as a sacrifice that the armed forces made in order to restore democracy.<sup>105</sup> Uğur Mumcu, the lead investigative journalist of *Cumhuriyet*, raised the issue of arms smuggling as the root cause of violence prior to the coup, calling the military regime's attention to it.<sup>106</sup> (Mumcu, who investigated connections between Islamist-Kurdish separatist movements and extra-legal networks within the state itself would be slain by a car bomb in 1993.) Writing for the conservative daily *Tercüman* less than a week after the takeover, veteran journalist Rauf Tamer exclaimed that General Evren, whose name meant "universe," had now become "Evrensel," that is, "universal."<sup>107</sup> Some European papers described the takeover as the "coup in velvet boots," since the coup was carried out without any bloodshed.<sup>108</sup>

But the international human rights organization Amnesty International (AI) reported repeatedly that there was widespread, systematic torture.<sup>109</sup> According to one study from January 1981, the coup resulted in massive violations of human rights which grew worse in the following months. Hundreds of people died from torture, armed clashes, and hunger strikes, and from causes that were reported as suicide or natural death.<sup>110</sup> People held in certain prisons, such as Metris in Istanbul and Mamak in Ankara, reported enormous cruelty. Detention centers like the Diyarbakır penitentiary, populated primarily by Kurdish-Marxists inmates, acquired added notoriety for the inhumane treatment of its prisoners.<sup>111</sup> As described by Başak Çalı, "The 1980 coup involved an unprecedented degree of state violence, especially toward the political activity of all left-wing groups," so much so that the magnitude of this particular trauma led to the development of an indigenous human rights discourse, generally supported by the left but independent of any political affiliation.<sup>112</sup>

Visible injustices served to highlight the cost of deviating from the norm, and were personified in high-profile cases such as that of the publisher İlhan Erdost (1944–1980), who was beaten to death under custody by the soldiers who arrested him due to his publication and possession of classics like Friedrich Engels' *Dialectics of Nature*.<sup>113</sup> The junta that oversaw the transition of Turkey to the market economy<sup>114</sup> during the 1980s displayed no respect for the “free market” of ideas: nearly a thousand films were banned. One television series, *Yorgun Savaşçı* [Tired Warrior 1979], based on the 1965 novel by Kemal Tahir and directed by Halit Refiğ, was officially burned in 1983.<sup>115</sup> All political parties, social associations, and labor unions were closed, and their property confiscated. The coup had brought a regime distinguished by its oppressive nature and arbitrary rule, which eliminated most legal recourse.<sup>116</sup>

Hundreds of thousands of those who wanted to leave the country were denied passports. These included the well-known socialist musician Ruhi Su (1912–1985), who unsuccessfully sought cancer treatment abroad. Of those who were able to escape abroad, 30,000 had applied for political asylum. Around 15,000 of these were stripped of their Turkish citizenship because they refused to return to Turkey,<sup>117</sup> thereby crippling their social, familial, and cultural ties to the homeland. Alienated from the economic diasporas that treated political refugees as villains, the exiles could not integrate into existing minority networks with ease, could not go back home, could not speak their language, could “not live like yourself.”<sup>118</sup> The unwanted included popular musicians like the “Anatolian rock”<sup>119</sup> singer and composer Cem Karaca. A large segment of the population was coerced into silence, and still others stood to benefit from the new policies cultivated after the transition to civilian government in 1983 under the watchful eye of the military regime.

In his 2002 work on the dismissal of university professors—some of them tenured—from their positions, Haldun Özen draws a bleak picture of free speech and academic inquiry in Turkey in the aftermath of the 1980 coup. Under Law 1402, dismissals of professors with objectionable political profiles continued all the way into 1983. Seeking legal recourse remained a Kafkaesque process. Founded in 1981, the centralized institution called the Higher Education Council worked in tandem with the generals at imposing new curricula on universities. Some textbooks were declared harmful and destroyed. Many academics were removed from

their positions, and students dismissed. Others left their positions in solidarity with colleagues and in protest against the junta's intrusion into Turkey's intellectual and cultural institutions.<sup>120</sup>

The state was the largest employer in most sectors of the economy, including the universities, which were largely state-run until the 1990s.<sup>121</sup> In schools, ministries, municipalities and many other workplaces, military rule enabled the removal of unwanted employees by their employers, even when the military did not seek their dismissal. Employees could be fired under the pretext of reading certain types of works (e.g. literature by Yaşar Kemal and Aziz Nesin) or listening to certain kinds of music (e.g. songs by Zülfü Livaneli, Ruhi Su, or even İbrahim Tatlıses).<sup>122</sup> For those who were removed from their government positions, re-employment was extremely difficult. In most cases appeals could not be concluded until the 1990s.<sup>123</sup> For example, the ban on leaving the country, sent automatically to passport offices when a court case was brought against a person, was not removed automatically once the case ended in an individual's favor.<sup>124</sup> Re-employment in private, but especially public, sectors took place after extensive investigations by security agencies. One in every thirty-two people was surveilled by the state as late as 1988.<sup>125</sup>

### *1980–2010: The Military, the PKK and the Islamists*

When the generals allowed free elections to take place in 1983, they had anointed two parties, one on the center-left, and the other on the center-right—each represented by a retired general. It was a surprise when Turgut Özal, the architect of the January 24 economic reform packet, was elected as the only seemingly authentic civilian politician. The nation cherished its army, but did not want to make a government out of it.

Özal's Motherland Party prided itself on combining all the major political tendencies of the country during his time in power, first as prime minister (1983–1989), and then as president (1989–1993). Under the watchful eyes of the military, using the restrictive labor laws and prohibitive political system they had created,<sup>126</sup> Özal inaugurated an era of civilian politics. During his tenure the Turkish economy opened to the world: he privatized state-owned industries; allowed for the free import of luxury goods; enticed foreign investment; offered subsidies for export; and invited brokers into the banking system. Overall, he created favorable conditions for a free-market economy. Meanwhile, Turkey's

infrastructure and communications were refurbished, and coastal areas were exploited for tourism.<sup>127</sup> After the Cold War, Özal would also have Turkey participate in the first Gulf War (1990–1991) in order to demonstrate the country's continued strategic importance for the US.<sup>128</sup>

He also had to tackle a festering sore: 1984 Nevruz celebrations marked the beginning of the Kurdish insurgency led by the PKK against the Turkish government.<sup>129</sup> Founded in the late 1970s, the organization aimed at pursuing an independent socialist Kurdistan through armed conflict. With the coming of the coup in 1980, its militants had left the country, but by 1984 they were sufficiently radicalized and seasoned in prisons inside Turkey or in military camps across the border to start cross-border attacks and an insurrection in earnest. PKK's leader, Abdullah Öcalan, was captured in 1999, but the conflict, which has continued on and off since 1984, has cost more than 40,000 lives.<sup>130</sup>

The struggle against the Kurdish insurrection, which had taken thousands of lives, had proved not only trying but also dirty. The military used scorched-earth tactics, emptied villages, and allegedly collaborated with dark networks within the state to eliminate businessmen who were known supporters of the PKK. Critical assessment of many of these strategies, which became better known in the 2000s, sparked a discussion about the role of extra-legal networks within the state.

During the 1990s, as the anxiety of struggling with separatism and reactionary movements escalated, Turkey was ruled once again by unstable coalition governments. Some of the old guard had returned to politics, even as new actors in Islamist politics moved to center stage. Islamists eventually formed a coalition government with Turkey's first female Prime Minister, an academic with a degree in economics, Tansu Çiller (1996).<sup>131</sup> Çiller had taken over the leadership of a center-right political party re-established in 1983 by Demirel, who was back into politics after a decade-long ban, and was elected as president after Özal's death in 1993.

Three events best capture the anxieties of the 1990s. First, in 1993 thirty-five poets and intellectuals participating in an Alevi folk festival in Sivas were burned to death by Muslim fundamentalists who set fire to their hotel.<sup>132</sup> Occurring against the background of assassinations of secular public figures like the journalist Uğur Mumcu (1993), this tragic event confirmed fears that political Islam was emerging as a significant threat. Second, in 1997, the body of a convicted criminal, a veteran right-wing hitman, was discovered at the site of a car accident.

His traveling companions were Istanbul's deputy chief of police and a Kurdish parliamentarian. The accident, which came to be known as the "Susurluk scandal,"<sup>133</sup> revealed how the state cooperated with right-wing criminals in its clandestine operations,<sup>134</sup> thus further inflaming malignant conspiracy theories. Finally, on February 28, 1997, in an operation known as the "postmodern coup," the military forced the resignation of Necmettin Erbakan, whose moderate Islamist party had been serving as the major partner in the governing coalition (1996–1997). Again, the military was in charge, behind the scenes.<sup>135</sup> Taken together these three events reflected the growing sense of insecurity about the future of the Republic. Rising ultra-nationalism, Islamism, Kurdish separatism and Marxism were causes that pre-dated the 1980 coup, rendering legitimacy to its execution. Instead of disappearing after 1980, they had returned in full force by the 2000s, threatening Turkey's ideological certainties.<sup>136</sup>

### *The Legacy*

Most of the information about the 1980 coup is considered common knowledge. The impact of the coup remains evident in various avenues of cultural production. While military rule, instituted in 1980, lasted until the 1983 elections, Turkish education, jurisprudence, and social and political rights continue to be defined by the 1982 constitution, drafted under military rule, and ratified by a people traumatized by pre-coup blood-letting and post-coup state terror. After various amendments and legislative reforms,<sup>137</sup> the 1982 constitution still remains operational as a document that poses problems for freedom of speech, freedom of the press, political representation, and civil liberties.<sup>138</sup> This constitutes a sad historical backdrop to current proposals by no less authoritarian actors for change—and, again under emergency rule.<sup>139</sup> Meanwhile, the generals who carried out the coup vanished from the horizon after relatively peaceful retirements.<sup>140</sup>

Military takeovers (1960, 1971, 1980) mark imperfections in the narrative of the modern, secular nation-state, generating ongoing debate. The 1980 takeover, known initially as an "iron fist in a velvet glove,"<sup>141</sup> receives special mention. This is because of its emblematic role either as the pinnacle of political turmoil in the preceding three decades or as the origin of the incline leading down to present-day problems. Both public and academic circles have tried to explain the reasons for and directions

of the 1980 coup from the moment of its inception, some openly justifying it.<sup>142</sup> Throughout the 1980s and 1990s positive assessments of the coup comprised the mainstream. There were those who would argue that civilian governments had been permissive to radicalized youth out of fear that the military sympathized with student groups on the left,<sup>143</sup> dismissing at the outset right-wing extremism. There were others who suggested that the armed forces sought to protect the state from “intra-elite conflict” and restore “law and order” by re-articulating Kemalism as Atatürkism—an ideology “to battle all ideologies.”<sup>144</sup> Some accounts invoked the well-established role of the armed forces as the guardian of the Republic. Counting on the military’s “impartiality” and General Evren’s “fatherly” approach, they would implicitly infantilize the citizenry, portraying it as an immature collective in need of a stern yet loving father.<sup>145</sup> Others forecast as early as the 1980s that the takeover would precipitate the restoration of a conservative ideological monolith, much like Turkey prior to 1960.<sup>146</sup> But this undercurrent of criticism became visible only recently.

During the 2000s, voices critical of political authoritarianism and military interventions were amplified, sometimes on behalf of rising conservative politics, represented by AKP. Pointing out contradictions within discourses favoring the 1980 coup as a solution to the socio-economic turmoil of the 1970s, critics argued that martial law had already been in effect in large parts of the country for months before the coup had taken place, yet it did not end the street violence; the military had prepared the 1980 coup well in advance, but had waited for conditions to “ripen” as people continued to suffer<sup>147</sup>; political murders and lynchings of minority groups continued well into the 2000s, post-dating the very coup that was supposed to bring an end to violence and conflict.<sup>148</sup>

Some highlighted the role of Western powers in the 1980 coup, indicating that Turkish politicians bore limited responsibility for systemic failure because elected officials’ control over political institutions was not complete during the troubled 1970s. Politics often took place under the watchful eye of the army, which was beholden to its international partnerships with the US and NATO. At the time of the coup, reports noted that the US seemed relieved by the takeover, and indifferent to violations of civil liberties. The CIA Ankara chief, Paul Henze, described the US reception of the news as “relief,” a positive step taken by “the boys in Ankara.”<sup>149</sup> Furthermore, the tide was turning conservative in the US with the election of Ronald Reagan to the presidency.<sup>150</sup> Likely dictators

and oppressive regimes all over the world would interpret Reagan's election as tacit approval for authoritarian policies. Still, it was clear that Turkish coups could not be reduced to foreign meddling, nor were those who supported them mere puppets. The overthrow of the government by military force was not novel or foreign.<sup>151</sup>

Whether or not the situation in Turkey was encouraged by external powers, civil rights advocates mustered only limited help from the outside world. The Western bloc to which Turkey belonged during the Cold War had utilized human rights to criticize the former Soviet bloc, while turning a blind eye to seemingly pro-Western dictatorships.<sup>152</sup> At home in Turkey where such help was direly needed, the generals had large-scale support. Thus, political prisoners were effectively like children disowned by their families—some, battered in a dark back room, and others left to their fate.

### TELECINEMATIC JOURNEYS: VISUALIZING THE COUP

Writing about the world in 1979, Christian Caryl highlights the revolution in Iran, the jihadist war in Afghanistan, and the election of Pope John Paul II as signs of the growing importance of religion in politics. Looking at the rightward turn in multiple geographies from the UK to China, he asserts that the “forces unleashed in 1979 marked the beginning of the end of the great socialist utopias” and announced the return of “the twin forces of markets and religion.”<sup>153</sup> Political actors such as Iran's Ayatollah Khomeini, China's Deng Xiaoping, Britain's Margaret Thatcher, and America's Ronald Reagan represented a “backlash against revolutionary overreach” and the utopian left.<sup>154</sup> In Turkey the new beginning came with a military coup in 1980, followed by a political and economic transformation managed by Turgut Özal.<sup>155</sup>

It is possible to view the cultural impact of the 1980 takeover as a backlash against mid-twentieth-century pluralism and reform-minded utopianism.<sup>156</sup> Coming on the heels of the January 24 (1980) austerity measures, the coup initiated a breakdown in existing socio-economic practices through the swift introduction of neo-liberal policies. As a violent social engineering project, the takeover cleared away organized labor and social opposition in favor of capitalist relationships.<sup>157</sup> It augmented one kind of competition based on rugged individualism, while suppressing another based on communal solidarity. The shift from protectionist “statism” (*devletçilik*) to market economy took place under the watchful



eyes of the generals. This process advocated a new ethos, which combined political authoritarianism with “competitive individualism.”<sup>158</sup>

Representing the dark side of this transformation, coup films are material and symbolic expressions of it. They contain reactions against authoritarianism, social conservatism, consumerism, and “individual competitiveness.” As artistic expressions they belong to, and evolve with, a changing cultural milieu. The cultural environment of the 1980s was exceedingly oppressive to political minorities.<sup>159</sup> Even literature—the last bastion of utopian thinking—had turned away from the questioning of socio-economic arrangements to an interest in the subaltern, explorations of the self, and experimentation with form.<sup>160</sup> Some of this shift produced unexpected consequences such as the growing interest in history, recognition of individual agency, awareness of women’s issues, and concern for the environment. Early coup films represent the language of the artistic avant-garde on the left, and remained marginal for much of the 1980s and 1990s. During the 2000s, they moved from the margin to the center, attesting to a mounting contest over representation of public memory about the coup in particular, and about history in general. The emergence and gradual commodification of the coup theme renders visible the intersections between art-house and popular cinema and crossovers between cinema and television in the form of telecinematic journeys.

Popular Turkish cinema had already been in decline prior to the coup. During the second part of the 1970s economic turmoil raised ticket prices; the spread of television reduced the number of movie-goers; radicalized politics made the streets unsafe; and the industry’s desperation, which led to the proliferation of erotic and light-porn movies, further alienated mainstream audiences.<sup>161</sup> Now the changed environment fostered by military rule unleashed new market forces and technologies. Coming to terms with these forces and technologies, while responding to growing anti-intellectualism and political repression, adversely affected the film industry.

Among the new technologies was the videotape. Video stores, recorders, and tapes saturated middle-class homes with films across the country during the 1980s. Videos substituted for the lack of tolerable television programming; they helped to evade censorship.<sup>162</sup> They enabled the quiet circulation of political films such as Şerif Gören and Yılmaz Güney’s *Yol*<sup>163</sup> which was banned in Turkey, as well as the rental and home viewing of a large number of foreign films. Outside Turkey,

for guest workers and political refugees in Europe, video tapes also answered a visceral longing for one's ancestral home.<sup>164</sup>

As a new technological platform, videotapes might have become a temporary refuge for the Turkish film industry,<sup>165</sup> but the overall picture was bleak. There was a sharp decline in the number of movie theaters,<sup>166</sup> which had been steadily losing their audiences. Moreover, many small-size domestic production companies met their demise in the 1980s.<sup>167</sup> To make matters worse, taking advantage of the changes in foreign capital regulations enacted in 1987,<sup>168</sup> US distribution companies entered the market without intermediaries and overran large parts of the distribution network. Summarizing the impact of military rule on the output and vicissitudes of the local film industry, Savaş Arslan explains that the number of films made annually declined from about 70 in the early 1980s to about 50 during the 1990s, with only 30% of these slated for exhibition in movie theatres—which now were mostly controlled by US production and distribution companies.<sup>169</sup>

Heavy censorship of journalism, arts, and the sciences would hamper the domain of creative expression. Commercial cinema's commentary on political change was limited and indirect. Candid political commentary, such as that contained in Yılmaz Güney's later films, fought an uphill battle with censors even prior to the coup. But artistic investigations into Turkey's social transformation since 1980, let alone the human cost of the 1980 takeover, were sharply prohibited by the censors and precluded by the markets.<sup>170</sup>

Suppression of dissenting voices opened a rift between Turkey's intellectual and popular culture. In the past, art cinema was not entirely disconnected from the popular idiom and economic practices of commercial Greenpine cinema.<sup>171</sup> During the 1980s, cultural production became an extension of the market in new and radical ways, marginalizing some artists and intellectuals who had been active prior to the coup. There were also those who were now marginalized through imprisonment and exile. According to Zahir Atam, the new art-house cinema was born out of this widening rift between popular and intellectual culture, and as an expression of the artist's search to remain creative and relevant.<sup>172</sup>

Writing about the deliverance of Turkish cinema from near oblivion, film critic Atilla Dorsay points out that in the late-1990s, Turkish cinema had to fend for itself in the market.<sup>173</sup> Art-house cinema, with messages on class and ethnicity, was muzzled. Films addressed other prominent themes such as women's roles and issues in order to reconnect

with educated audiences. In contrast, the idiom of popular cinema—of Greenpine melodramas from the 1960s–1970s—survived both in commercial productions and on television.<sup>174</sup> Even commercial cinema was affected by recently privatized broadcast channels. It was seeking to take another path to lost markets through television. But this was a path also fraught with turbulence.

Print media was privately owned.<sup>175</sup> However, as mentioned earlier, Turkish Radio and Television (TRT) was established in 1964 as a state monopoly, whose independence and impartiality were mandated by the 1961 constitution. Statutes securing TRT's autonomy were amended after the 1971 intervention, leaving it vulnerable to political pressure from changing governments.<sup>176</sup> This move was followed by an expansion of the television network in the second half of the 1970s.<sup>177</sup> Now a major force in mass communication, TRT served as the public platform for official communiques from governments, as well as from the military whenever takeovers took place. After the 1980 coup, its programming carried General Evren's speeches and the coup's indoctrination, particularly in relation to the Kurdish insurgency in the southeast.

As part of his privatization policy, Turgut Özal had focused on energy, communications, highway infrastructure, and public works.<sup>178</sup> The first private telecast was launched in 1989 with "Star TV" and "Magic Box"—two companies which began broadcasting, even though formal legalization had not even begun. Broadcasting from Germany, they were owned by President Özal's son Ahmet Özal.<sup>179</sup> This was soon followed by other private stations such as Show TV, Kanal D, and ATV, which were to become major national stations by the end of the 1990s.

The legalization of private broadcasting occurred in 1993<sup>180</sup> under Prof. Tansu Çiller, Turkey's first female prime minister and a Thatcherite economist.<sup>181</sup> Welcomed by a majority of the population, the measure led to the proliferation of private radio stations. This was followed in 1994 by the founding of the Higher Board for Radio and Television (RTUK), which was set up to regulate expanding broadcasting networks nationally.

The boom in commercial radio and television created a colorful media environment which turned its attention to previously uncovered, and at times, controversial topics.<sup>182</sup> Flagship entertainment stations such as Show TV openly blended newscast with sensationalism, unabashedly turning news into commodity as part of their commercial appeal.<sup>183</sup> In fact, entertainment came to define most of the "diversified" coverage

offered by private channels. Sometimes private broadcasting is portrayed as liberalization in the coverage of viewpoints, but there were firm legal (through RTÜK) and commercial (through advertising) limits to new media's freedoms.<sup>184</sup>

Television presented the volatile domestic film market with an opportunity and a challenge. Filmmakers who now had to work with US distribution companies, which increasingly managed the market reach of domestic films, could seek commercial success on television. But competing for ratings posed a challenge for artistic creativity. There were already lessons learned: the language of new art-house cinema, which was inspired by European art-house conventions, did not resonate broadly with local audiences. By the 1990s domestic cinema had "lost its audience to television channels which repeatedly show[ed] old popular films—the frequency of commercial breaks suggest[ed] that these films still appeal[ed] to a mass audience, still contribut[ed] to popular imagery."<sup>185</sup> Working with national broadcast networks required a creative vision, which incorporated familiar conventions.

With heavy television viewing hours by global standards,<sup>186</sup> the Turkish audience constituted a competitive market for production and advertising companies. At the end of the 1990s, as the film industry was recovering from its long winter, the boom in television provided a badly needed infusion of funds. Film production companies turned to lucrative agreements with television stations while the latter became involved in film production in order to meet the rising demand for domestic films, telenovelas, and serials.<sup>187</sup> Television serials were now made by production companies, which partnered with national television stations. These stations marketed and aired their products. Not only were popular films of the early Greenpin cinema purchased in bulk; films that had no hope of earning further proceeds in theaters or on video (a phenomenon of the late 1980s) were now released on television. The latter eventually included feature films on the coup of 1980 such as *Eylül Fırtınası* (September Storm).<sup>188</sup>

At the turn of the twenty-first century, cinema was becoming fraught with political themes in art-house films and in popular productions. Familiar actors like Beren Saat and directors like Çağan Irmak participated in the production of serials and films with political themes. The nation's recent history, including the 1980 coup, would soon become the focal point of the next generation of television ratings.<sup>189</sup> They were

contributing to popular culture's new and unlikely role of offering subversive narratives<sup>190</sup> to a mass audience.<sup>191</sup> For those fascinated by the recent past, serialized films offered popular pastimes; they also staged fictional struggles mimicking real historical battles over national identity.

The first decade of the 2000s marked the domestic film industry's recovery of its competitive edge. The number of movie-goers expanded in the early 2000s. Even with the slight decline experienced in the latter half of the decade, Turkish feature films began competing against Hollywood productions, claiming at least half the domestic audience.<sup>192</sup> An infusion of new funding through *Euroimages*<sup>193</sup> and cooperation with other filmmakers from Europe and the Balkans opened new frontiers. Many art-house/"festival" films and some popular reels were produced like this. Meaningful support rendered by the Ministry of Culture and Tourism resulted in greater visibility for the film industry.<sup>194</sup> Turkish cinema in the 2000s seemed to reverse Roy Armes' captivating analogy about the early twentieth century. Armes had likened the US film industry to the imported Rolls Royce car sold under its market value in other parts of the world in order to capture those markets.<sup>195</sup> It seems as though Hollywood films no longer cost less than the cheapest locally produced counterparts, capturing most audiences and defining local tastes.

In the early 2000s, Turkey turned to exploring itself through domestic films and serials made for television.<sup>196</sup> Coup films were not inherently as popular as comedies: even the light-hearted ones could not avoid political reflection and dramatic suffering. But some achieved greater visibility and higher ratings than others. Commercially successful directors of coup films and serials merged narrative clichés from the producer-driven Greenpine cinema with politically sharp messages of the auteur director-driven new cinema.

Who were the directors associated with coup films? Whether filmmakers came from working-class or elite backgrounds, their political experiences during the latter part of the 1970s and the initial years of the 1980s have shaped thematic interests. Some of the directors and script writers such as Tomris Giritlioğlu and Sırrı Süreyya Önder produced work from personal experience; others came with the necessary formation from an ever-increasing number of television and cinema departments (e.g. Çağan Irmak) founded in the 1980s and 1990s. Both groups found fertile ground in a local, rather than international, festival scene which had been widening throughout the 1990s.

The theme of the 1980 coup, covered by serials like *Embroidered Rose on My Scarf*<sup>197</sup> (2004–2005) offered an opportunity to express contemporary political debates in the recognizable idiom of popular cinema. Films with high box-office returns such as *My Father and My Son*<sup>198</sup> (2005) underscored the growing interest in politics and recent history. In fact, commercial television became a battleground for establishing a narrative about national history and identity, turning “serial texts (...) into political manifestoes.”<sup>199</sup> There was a power struggle, real and imaginary, for the nation’s soul.

Explorations of the nation as an imagined community highlight the agency of the modern state in bringing the nation into existence through celebrations, monuments, and a shared print culture. Until recently, popular media and cinema, produced mainly for internal and regional markets, have not been seen as a realm in which the nation might speak back to its state. Today, media’s significant role in imagining the nation is also widely recognized. Popular media, cinema, and television in particular, explore the nation’s “spiritual,” inner domain.<sup>200</sup> They complicate first impressions and conventional expectations about the uniformity of Turkish culture by reconstructing fictional lives fraught with internal strife and contradiction.<sup>201</sup> The telecinematic private lives watched and debated hotly by local audiences lurked, hidden from outside view, in the family room (*oturma odası*) of popular culture. Coup films offer glimpses into that living room.

Internal contests and compromises rather than radical breaks take place in the family room of popular media. Cultural negotiations, however messy, limited, and outdated, seep into popular media more readily than they do into political reports, economic forecasts, and public relations strategies. In the world of feature and serialized films, sultanas defy magnificent sultans; patriarchs regret their own totalitarian rule; men apologize for their indiscretions; youngsters interrogate family origins; dissidents become counter-heroes that fire the collective imagination. Story lines bring back suppressed ambivalence and ignored ambiguity as alternative perceptions of modernity, disclosing the untidy process of cultural negotiation for broad audiences.

Many film narratives investigated in this book start prior to, or in the wake of, the 1980 military coup. Films and serials about 1980 cover the four decades stretching from the 1960s to 2010s, by diving into the pre-history and then exposing the repercussions of 1980. In their explorations of trauma some films testify to a dark perception of the past, even

as they uphold the child figure as an enduring symbol of a better future. Exploring a troubled past, they uncover popular perceptions about people, places, and experiences, which range from “being incarcerated in Mamak, Metris, or Diyarbakir” prisons to crossing the Aegean Sea in search of a freer life.

In the 1980s when the first guarded coup films were produced as art-house narratives, dire consequences for dissent were considered natural and obvious. Questioning was considered risk-taking behavior. Torture and various forms of mistreatment were either disguised from public view or widely seen as a form of entitlement belonging to the state.<sup>202</sup> Incarceration, whether just or unwarranted, and even abuse were viewed as the necessary cost for security and stability—favored expressions of the time. Censorship and indoctrination had penetrated critical institutions such as academia,<sup>203</sup> hampering artistic and intellectual production. Fax machines and tape players were cutting-edge technology. Disseminating information about what the public believed to be untrue or insignificant was extremely difficult. In a climate of suppression, the first movies about the coup began appearing as contraband or low-budget films recorded for rental on video. They made their way to broad audiences in movie theaters and home screens during the 2000s. They survived into a new era when films and television serials could be consumed at home, on video, on demand, or digitally.

Much of the cultural assessment of the 1980 coup took place in the coup films and serials, which set out to change established perceptions. Today’s widespread assessment of the 1980 coup as a social and cultural trauma indicates a change in public opinion about power and agency. With their increasingly evident concern about the takeover as a trauma and authoritarianism as a problem, coup films become part of the change that they articulate.

## NOTES

1. Jean Laplanche and Jean-Bertrand Pontalis cited in Janet Walker, “Trauma Cinema: False Memories and True Experience,” *Screen* 42:2 (Summer 2001): 211–216, 211.
2. Susannah Radstone, “Trauma and Screen Studies: Opening the Debate,” *Screen* 42:2 (Summer 2001): 188–193, 189.
3. Sien Uytterschout, “Visualized Incomprehensibility of Trauma in Jonathan Safran Foer’s *Extremely Loud and Incredibly Close*,” *ZAA* 56.1

- (2008): 61–74. Uytterschout highlights representation of trauma as disruption in the works of Kacandes, Lacan, Vickroy, Caruth, La Capra, Laub et al.
4. Cathy Caruth cited in Thomas Elsaesser, “Postmodernism as Mourning Work,” *Screen* 42:2 (Summer 2001): 193–201, 200.
  5. Irene Kacandes “9/11/01 = 1/27/01: The Changed Post-Traumatic Self,” in *Trauma at Home: After 9/11*, ed. Judith Greenberg (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2003), 168–186, 171. According to Kacandes the traumatized self is unable to distinguish between the personal and the social. It registers other traumas only through the lens of the earlier trauma.
  6. Ann Kaplan and Ban Wang (eds), *Trauma and Cinema. Cross-Cultural Explorations*. (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2008), 14–15.
  7. Janet Walker, “The Vicissitudes of Traumatic Memory and the Postmodern History Film” in *Trauma and Cinema*, 129.
  8. Ann Kaplan, *Trauma Culture: the Politics of Terror and Loss in Media and Literature* (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 2005), 66, 72–73. According to Kaplan, melodrama was born out of class struggle, and searches for norms in modern society.
  9. Özgür Mutlu Ulus, *The Army and the Radical Left in Turkey* (New York: I.B. Tauris, 2011), 1. The book opens with the experiences of the author’s family: Gültan Kışanak, who was incarcerated and tortured in Diyarbakır Prison and who was incarcerated again at the time of writing (2017), served as a parliamentarian and the mayor of Diyarbakır; conservative writer and academic Mümtaz’er Türköne, also imprisoned recently, served time in Ankara’s Mamak Prison during the 1980s; nationalist politician and former cabinet minister Yaşar Okuyan was tried for capital offenses in the 1980s.
  10. Walker, “Trauma Cinema: False Memories ...,” *Screen*, 42:2, 213.
  11. Elsaesser, “Postmodernism as ...” *Screen* 42:2, 197.
  12. Elsaesser, “Postmodernism as ...,” *Screen* 42:2, 201. According to Elsaesser, the concerns of psychoanalysis with belatedness, of deconstruction with closed-circuit textuality, and of aestheticism with authenticity or performativity may not fully address the contemporary preoccupation with trauma.
  13. Duygu Gül Kaya, “Coming to Terms with the Past,” *International Journal of Middle East Studies* Vol. 47, No. 4 (November 2015): 681–700, 689.
  14. Erik J. Zürcher, *Turkey. A Modern History*. (New York: I.B.Tauris, 1997), 216–217. Among the rising bourgeoisie and large landowners that had kept RPP in power there was discontent with policies like the wealth tax of 1942 and land reform proposal of 1945.



15. Ziya Öniş, "Turkey in the Post-Cold War Era: In Search of Identity," *The Middle East Journal* (1995): 48–68, 52–53.
16. "Turkey Country Report. Third United Nations Conference on Housing and Sustainable Urban Development (Habitat III)," Ankara: Turkish Ministry of Environment and Urbanization, December 2014, iv. <http://unhabitat.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/07/Turkey-national-report.pdf> Access April 3, 2016. Turkey's urban population rose from 25% in 1950 to 44% in 1980, and then from 65% in 2000 to 77% in 2012.
17. Zurcher, *Turkey*, 215; Jenny B. White, "State Feminism, Modernization, and the Turkish Republican Woman," *Feminist Formations NWSA Journal*, Vol. 15, No. 3 (Fall 2003): 145–159, 155–157.
18. Ömer Taşpınar, *Kurdish Nationalism and Political Islam in Turkey* (New York: Routledge, 2005), 86.
19. Feroz Ahmad, *The Making of Modern Turkey* (New York: Routledge, 1993), 144.
20. Zurcher, *Turkey*, 235.
21. DP's legacy of urban renewal continues to be controversial with the PM Adnan Menderes being accused of destroying the city's historical sites, illegally expropriating buildings, initiating renewal projects in an ad hoc manner. Recent scholarship suggests that Menderes was trying to accommodate rural migrants while pursuing a vision of urban renewal laid out earlier by the French designer Henri Prost. See Murat Gül, *Emergence of Modern Istanbul* (New York: I.B. Tauris, 2009), 159–160, 163–164.
22. Some universities such as Atatürk University in Erzurum were modeled after land-grant institutions. Middle East Technical University (METU) in Ankara and Ege University in İzmir were founded in 1956. Erzurum's Atatürk University began offering instruction in 1958. Initiated in 1955, Karadeniz Technical University began offering courses in 1963. Eskişehir's Anadolu University, was initiated as the Academy of Economy and Commerce in 1958. For a broader discussion about these universities, see Hüseyin Korkut, "Türkiye'de Cumhuriyet Döneminde Üniversite Reformları" [Republic Period University Reforms in Turkey], *Milli Eğitim Dergisi*. Vol. 160 (Fall 2003). [http://dhgm.meb.gov.tr/yayimlar/dergiler/Milli\\_Egitim\\_Dergisi/160/korkut.htm](http://dhgm.meb.gov.tr/yayimlar/dergiler/Milli_Egitim_Dergisi/160/korkut.htm). Access April 3, 2016; Güven Arif Sargın and Ayşen Savaş, "A University is a Society": an Environmental History of the METU campus," *The Journal of Architecture* Vol. 18, No. 1 (2013): 79–106; Richard Garlitz, "Land-Grant Education in Turkey: Atatürk University and American Technical Assistance, 1954–68" in *Turkey in the Cold War. Ideology and Culture*, eds. Cangül Örnek and Çağdaş Üngör (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), 177–197.

23. Ömer Taşpınar, *Kurdish Nationalism and Political Islam in Turkey* (New York, Routledge, 2005), 121. Taşpınar explains that the party was founded in 1946 by a dissident group from Atatürk's Republican People's Party. It sought to liberalize the secular tenets of Kemalism, de-bureaucratize government services, and cater to the interests of the peasants.
24. Zürcher, *Turkey*, 239–240. In 1955 economic growth was as low as four percent while the trade deficit was growing. Foreign debt continued to increase. By 1958 inflation had reached 20%. One dollar cost 10 Turkish liras in the black market. Devaluation of the lira had become inevitable, hitting consumers' pockets.
25. For more on the pogroms of 1955 see Tarih Vakfı, 6–7 Eylül Olayları. *Fotoğraflar-Belgeler. Fabri Çoker Arşivi* [September 6–7, 1955 Incidents] (Istanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 2005); Dilek Güven, *Cumhuriyet Dönemi Azınlık Politikaları Bağlamında 6–7 Eylül Olayları* [September 6–7, 1955 Incidents in the Context of Republic Period Minority Policies] (Istanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 2005).
26. Odd Arne Westad, *The Global Cold War* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 79. “[C]onquering modernity for themselves” denotes decolonization movements around the world since World War I.
27. The first generation of the Republic's youth was born under Ottoman rule. They were invested in the Kemalist project of nation building. Criticism was muted during the foundational decades of the Republic, owing in part to regional revolts. During the late 1940s, there were attempts to intimidate, jail, marginalize (and in the case of Sabahattin Ali, kill) dissident literary figures. These attempts sometimes increased the visibility of dissidents. Çimen Günay-Erkol, “Issues of Ideology and Identity in Turkish Literature During the Cold War” in *Turkey in the Cold War*, 109–129, 111.
28. Leyla Neyzi, “Object or Subject? The Paradox of ‘Youth’ in Turkey,” *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, Vol. 33, No. 3 (August, 2001): 411–432, 416–419. Urban youth protesting against DP policies criticized the return of religious education to public schools, and Arabic to the call to prayer.
29. Zürcher, *Turkey*, 250–252.
30. Altan Yalpat, “Turkey's Economy under the Generals,” *MERIP Reports. Turkey under Military Rule*. Vol. 15 (March/April 1984). <http://www.merip.org/mer/mer122/turkeys-economy-under-generals>. Access April 7, 2016.
31. Sabri Sayarı, “Adnan Menderes: Between Democratic and Authoritarian Populism” in *Political Leaders and Democracy in Turkey*, eds. Metin Heper and Sabri Sayarı (New York: Lexington Books, 2002), 65–85, 72–73.
32. Ahmad, *The Making of Modern*, 102–121.

33. P. Nicole Pope and Hugh Pope, *Turkey Unveiled* (New York: The Overlook Press, 2004), 96.
34. Sina Akşin, *Turkey. From Empire to Revolutionary Republic*. trans. Dexter H. Mursaloğlu (New York: New York University Press, 2007), 268–272. The left has viewed the 1960 military takeover as an attempt to stop DP's infringements on secular democracy, defining it as a revolutionary turn that broadened democratic rights and liberties.
35. Akşin, *Turkey. From Empire*, 266.
36. Yeşim Arat, "Süleyman Demirel: National Will and Beyond" in *Political Leaders*, 101. Arat explains that the council was first introduced after 1960 so that military commanders could provide information to political leaders. It was transformed into an advisory board in the aftermath of the 1971 intervention, and then with the 1982 constitution, it was transformed into a body whose recommendations could not be ignored.
37. Pope and Pope, *Turkey Unveiled*, 102.
38. Zurcher, *Turkey*, 253–257.
39. James C. Scott, *Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1998), 88–89. Scott uses this term to describe an unquestioning belief in certain projections of science and industry.
40. *Turkey in the Cold War*, 8.
41. Akşin, *Turkey. From Empire*, 269–270.
42. Yalpat, "Turkey's Economy under the Generals," *MERIP Reports*.
43. Ahmet Samim, "The Left" in *Turkey in Transition. New Perspectives*, eds. Irvin C. Schick and Ertuğrul Ahmet Tonak (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987), 147–176, 152–154. Elsewhere, it was revealed that Ahmet Samim was the penname of Murat Belge. Samim's chapter suggests that during the 1950s, DP's outreach to rural areas politicized the larger population.
44. Todd Gitlin studied the impact of mass media on the New Left in America in his *The Whole World is Watching Mass Media in the Making & Unmaking of the New Left* (Los Angeles: University of Chicago Press, 1980). In Turkey, the emergence of a vibrant press arguably connected Turkish youth with the rest of the world during the 1960s.
45. Christian Caryl, *Strange Rebels. 1979 and the Birth of the 21st Century* (New York: Basic Books, 2013), 9–10.
46. Samim, "The Left," 152–154. This article offers an innovative, leftist re-reading of DP policies.
47. Westad, *The Global Cold War*, 80.
48. Mutlu Ulus, *The Army and*, 29–31, 108.
49. Ahmet Samim, "The Left," 151. Leftist movements used the term "revolutionary" instead of "socialist," because socialism and communism

- were illegal, whereas the term revolutionary could refer to Kemalist reforms. It offered the added advantage of conferring popular legitimacy through Kemalism.
50. Stephane Yerasimos, "The Monoparty Period," trans. Rezan Benatar and Irvin C. Schick in *Turkey in Transition*, 66–100, 67–68, 92.
  51. Samuel J. Hirst, "Anti-Westernism on the European Periphery: The Meaning of Soviet–Turkish Convergence in the 1930s," *Slavic Review*, Vol. 72, No. 1 (Spring 2013): 32–53, 37. See also "Socialism as a Development Model" in Mutlu Ulus, *The Army and*, 26–28.
  52. Hirst, "Anti-Westernism....," 33; Zurcher, *Turkey*, 278.
  53. Zurcher, *Turkey*, 256.
  54. Samim, "The Left," 148.
  55. Martin van Bruinessen, "The Nature and Uses of Violence in the Kurdish Conflict." Paper presented at the international colloquium "Ethnic Construction and Political Violence", organized by the Fondazione Giangiacomo Feltrinelli, Cortona, July 2–3, 1999; Jenny White, *Muslim Nationalism and the New Turks* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2013), 34.
  56. Iren Ozgur, *Islamic Schools in Modern Turkey* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 38–41.
  57. Jenny White, *Muslim Nationalism*, 36.
  58. Günay Erkol, "Issues of Ideology ..." in *Turkey in the Cold War*, 109–129, 114.
  59. Iren Ozgur, *Islamic Schools*, 41–42; Pope and Pope, *Turkey Unveiled*, 319.
  60. Binnaz Toprak, "The Religious Right," in *Turkey in Transition*, 218–235; Ahmet Yildiz, "Transformation of Islamic Thought in Turkey since the 1950s" in *The Blackwell Companion to Contemporary Islamic Thought* (2006): 39–54, 41–44. Yildiz views 1924–1950 as a period of withdrawal for Islamic thought.
  61. Mehmet Ali Ağaoğulları, "The Ultranationalist Right," trans. Rezan Benatar and Irvin C. Schick, *Turkey in Transition*, 177–217, 184–185, 187.
  62. For more on the trial and its implications see Arzu Öztürkmen, "Folklore on Trial: Pertev Naili Boratav and the Denationalization of Turkish Folklore," *Journal of Folklore Research*, Vol. 42, No. 2 (May–August 2005): 185–216; Tanıl Bora, "Alparslan Türkeş," in *Modern Türkiye’de Siyasi Düşünce. Cilt 4. Milliyetçilik* [Political Thought in Modern Turkey. Vol. 4. Nationalism], ed. Tanıl Bora, 686–695.
  63. Ceren Kenar and Doğan Gürpınar, "Cold War in the Pulpit: The Presidency of Religious Affairs and Sermons during the Time of Anarchy and Communist Threat," in *Turkey in the Cold War*, 36–37.

64. Zurcher. *Turkey*, 269–270.
65. Kenar and Gürpınar, “Cold War in the Pulpit...” in *Turkey in the Cold War*, 24.
66. *Devrimci İşçi Sendikaları Konfederasyonu* (DİSK).
67. Middle East Technical University—*Orta Doğu Teknik Üniversitesi* (ODTÜ)—is an institution of higher education founded in 1956 with American expertise in Ankara, Turkey.
68. Akşin, *Turkey. From Empire*, 272.
69. Zurcher. *Turkey*, 267–269.
70. In some sources the type of government is explained as a “supra-party government” to denote the Turkish expression *partiler üstü*. Akşin’s *Turkey: From Empire*, 273.
71. Zurcher. *Turkey*, 270–271.
72. Pope and Pope, *Turkey Unveiled*, 106.
73. Çimen Günay Erkol, “Taş Üstüne Taş Koymak: 12 Mart Romanlarında Görgü Tanığı Belleğinin Yazınsallaştırılması” in *Nasıl Hatırlıyoruz? Türkiye’de Bellek Çalışmaları* [How Do We Remember?], ed. Leyla Neyzi (İstanbul: İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, 2011), 40–63. Çimen Günay-Erkol, *Broken Masculinities. Solitude, Alienation, and Frustration in Turkish Literature After 1970* (Budapest: CEU Press, 2016), 4.
74. Pope and Pope, *Turkey Unveiled*, 107–108, 118–119.
75. Akşin, *Turkey. From Empire*, 275. Turkey pointed to Zurich and London agreements to justify its intervention.
76. For overview of the conflict in 1974, see Pope and Pope, *Turkey Unveiled*, 109–124; Zurcher, *Turkey*, 289–290; Akşin, *Turkey. From Empire*, 275–276.
77. Pope and Pope, *Turkey Unveiled*, 121.
78. Zurcher. *Turkey*, 290.
79. For “import substituting industrialization” (ISI) see Haldun Güllalp, “Modernization Policies and Islamist Politics in Turkey” in *Rethinking Modernity and National Identity in Turkey*, eds. Sibel Bozdoğan and Reşat Kasaba (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1997), 54.
80. Zurcher. *Turkey*, 280.
81. *Ibid.*, 270.
82. Pope and Pope, *Turkey Unveiled*, 127.
83. Feroz Ahmad, “Military Intervention and the Crisis in Turkey,” *MERIP Reports*. No. 93 (January 1981): 21–22.
84. For political violence see Zurcher, *Turkey*, 276–277.
85. The Alevi represent a significant religious minority, which blends Shiite Islam with heterodox religious customs and traditions of Asia Minor.
86. Zurcher, *Turkey*, 276.
87. Örnek and Üngör (eds.), *Turkey in the Cold War*, 10.

88. Akşin, *Turkey. From Empire*, 278.
89. Zurcher, *Turkey*, 280–282.
90. The General Secretary of the National Security Council, *12 September in Turkey. Before and After* (Ankara: Ongun Kardeşler, 1982), 229.
91. Zurcher, *Turkey*, 292.
92. White, *Muslim Nationalism and the New Turks*, 19–20. White describes Muslim nationalism as cultural, rather than ethnic. Muslim nationalists imagine a country culturally and historically larger than the modern-day borders of Turkey. This enables various engagements with former Ottoman territories in the predominantly Muslim Middle East. Sam Kaplan, *The Pedagogical State* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2006), 44–45. Kaplan discusses “Turkish-Islamic synthesis” (*Türk-İslam sentezi*) as taught in schools. The Turkish-Islamic synthesis fuses Sunni Islam with ethnic nationalism, defined in the 1980s, particularly in opposition to Kurdish nationalism. I think that there are degrees of Muslim nationalism, ranging from the “Turkish-Islamic synthesis,” articulated by the military in the 1980s, to the Muslim nationalism prevalent in the 2000s, as identified by Jenny White.
93. Renowned Kemalists like Yunus Nadi denounced *Atatürkism* precisely because it was Kemalism articulated from a conservative viewpoint, and instrumentalized in the authoritarian dissemination of the Turkish-Islamic synthesis. Akşin, *Turkey. From Empire*, 291.
94. Ahmad, “Military Intervention ...,” *MERIP Reports*. No. 93 (January 1981): 5–26, 5. Ahmad relays the first communiqué of the junta in English. See also Pope and Pope, *Turkey Unveiled*, 142–143.
95. Akşin, *Turkey. From Empire*, 278–279.
96. Zurcher, *Turkey*, 292. With the exception of Alparslan Türkeş of the ultra-nationalist Nationalist Action Party, all leaders were detained. Türkeş turned himself in a couple of days later. Akşin, *Turkey. From Empire*, 282. Türkeş and his colleagues felt that they were placed in prison while their ideas had come to power.
97. Pope and Pope, *Turkey Unveiled*, 152–153.
98. Among these were also one Armenian militant involved in the terrorist organization ASALA, and a number of non-political convicts. “Seksen Yılın Utanç Listesi: İdam Kurbanları,” *Bianet, Biamag*. August 3, 2002. <http://bianet.org/biamag/siyaset/12143-80-yilin-utanc-listesi-idam-kurbanlari>. Access March 23, 2016; “Darbenin Bilançosu” [The Coup’s Toll], *Cumhuriyet* newspaper, September 12, 2000, cited in [http://www.belgenet.com/12eylul/12092000\\_01.html](http://www.belgenet.com/12eylul/12092000_01.html). Access Saturday December 19, 2009.
99. Mehmet A. Birand, Hikmet Bila, Rıdvan Akar, *12 Eylül: Türkiye’nin Miladı* [September 12: A Turning Point for Turkey] (İstanbul: Doğan Kitap, 1999), 241. “12 Eylül Belgeleri” [Documents of September

- 12] in *Belgenet* <http://www.belgenet.com/12eylul/12eylidam.html>. Access February 11, 2010; Arda Uskan, “Asmayalım da Besleyelim mi?” [Should We Feed, Rather Than Hang the Traitors?] *Takvim*, January 25, 2010, [http://www.takvim.com.tr/GuneBakis/2010/01/25/asmayalım\\_da\\_besleyelim\\_mi](http://www.takvim.com.tr/GuneBakis/2010/01/25/asmayalım_da_besleyelim_mi). Access February 21, 2010; Yıldırım Türker, “Erdal’ı Unutmadık” [We Have Not Forgotten Erdal] *Radikal*, December 11, 2006. [http://www.sendika.org/yazi.php?yazi\\_no=8788](http://www.sendika.org/yazi.php?yazi_no=8788). Access February 21, 2010. While there is no debate about what Kenan Evren said about the executions, different sources ascribe different dates to Evren’s words.
100. Zurcher, *Turkey*, 295. These trials lasted into the 1990s. Pope and Pope, *Turkey Unveiled*, 153.
  101. Zurcher, *Turkey*, 294.
  102. An example of witness accounts is “Askerde öğrendim nenemin Ermeni olduğunu” [I’ve Learned in Military Service That My Granny Was an Armenian] in *Torunlar* [The Grandchildren], eds. Ayşe Gül Altınay and Fethiye Çetin (İstanbul: Metis Yayınları, 2009), 87–89.
  103. Ali Sirmen, “Batı ne bekliyor?” in *Darbeleri Kalemler* [Writing under the Military Rule], ed. Mine Söğüt (İstanbul: Getto, 2010), 215–216.
  104. İrfan Neziroğlu, *Türkiye’de Askeri Müdahaleler ve Basın (1950–1980)* [Military Interventions and the Press in Turkey] (Ankara: Türk Demokrasi Vakfı Yayınları, 2003), 175–177, 179.
  105. Söğüt (ed.), *Darbeleri Kalemler*, 223–224.
  106. Uğur Mumcu, “Tam Zamanıdır...,” *Cumhuriyet*, September 16, 1980 in Söğüt (ed.), *Darbeleri Kalemler*, 230–232.
  107. Söğüt (ed.), *Darbeleri Kalemler*, 274–275.
  108. Pope and Pope, *Turkey Unveiled*, 141.
  109. Amnesty International cited in Zurcher, *Turkey*, 294.
  110. Numbers coming from the early years of the coup may underestimate the impact. Helmut Oberdiek, “11, 12 Eylül: Darbenin Gerçek Boyutu” [September 11, 12. Real Dimensions of the Coup], *Bianet* September 15, 2007. <http://bianet.org/biamag/biamag/101765-11-12-cylul-darbenin-gercek-boyutu>. Access February 21, 2010.
  111. Pope and Pope, *Turkey Unveiled*, 153.
  112. Başak Çalı, “Human Rights Discourse and Domestic NGOs” in *Human Rights in Turkey*, ed. Zehra F. Kabasakal Arat (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2007), 221.
  113. Celal Başlangıç, “İşte Marx’ı basan arkadaş!” [Here is the Fellow Who Published Marx!] *Radikal Online*, March 20, 1999. <http://www.radikal.com.tr/1999/03/20/yasam/01ist.html>. Access February 12, 2010.
  114. Güllap, “Modernization Policies...” in *Rethinking Modernity*, 56.

115. Turhan Gürkan, "Türk Sinemasının Tepesinde Sallanan Demokles'in Kılıcı: Sansür" [Censorship: the sword of Damocles, Hanging Over Turkish Cinema] in *Türk Sinemasında Sansür* (Ankara: Kitle Yayıncılık, 2000), 31–32.
116. Bülent Tanör, "12 Eylül Rejimi (1980–1983)" in *Türkiye Tarihi 5. Bugünkü Türkiye. 1980–1995* [History of Turkey Vol. 5. Today's Turkey. 1980–1995], ed. Sina Akşin (İstanbul: Cem Yayınevi, 1995), 36.
117. Pope and Pope, *Turkey Unveiled*, 153. "Darbenin Bilançosu" [The Coup's Toll] *Cumhuriyet*, September 12, 2000, also cited in "12 Eylül Belgeleri" in *Belgenet*. [http://www.belgenet.com/12eylul/12092000\\_01.html](http://www.belgenet.com/12eylul/12092000_01.html). Access December 19, 2009.
118. İlknur Hacisoğlu, "Sürgünde İki Kadın" [Two Women in Exile], *Amargi*. Special Issue on September 12, 1980 (Summer 2012): 51–55, 55.
119. On "Anatolian rock" and its foundational figures such as Cem Karaca, see Songül Karahasanoğlu and Gabriel Scoog, "Synthesizing Identity: Gestures of Filiation and Affiliation in Turkish Popular Music," *Asian Music* 40, no. 2 (2009): 52–71, 60–61.
120. Haldun Özen, *Entellektüelin Dramı. 12 Eylül'ün Cadı Kazanı* [The Drama of the Intellectual. The Crucible of the 1980 Coup] (Ankara: İmge Kitabevi, 2002), 155, 159, 163–165, 213–214.
121. Bilkent University was founded in 1984 as the first private university; most private universities were established in the 1990s and 2000s.
122. Özen, *Entellektüelin Dramı*, 125, 148–152.
123. Pope and Pope, *Turkey Unveiled*, 153.
124. Özen, *Entellektüelin Dramı*, 194. For example, the story of Professor Oruç Arioba, who was a participant in the Hume Conference.
125. Özen, *Entellektüelin Dramı*, 56. Özen gets his figure from journalist Erbil Tuşalp.
126. Ertuğrul Mavioğlu, *Apoletli Adalet* [Justice by Epaulette] (İstanbul: İthaki Publishing, 2006), 49, 58–60. In the early 1980s, collective bargaining was effectively abandoned. Activities of major labor unions such as *DİSK*, *MİSK*, *Hak-İş* ceased after the coup. Labor organizations could not stage protests or strikes. All organizing activities were under strict control. Court cases like the one brought against the "Peace Association" (1982–1991) intimidated the population, even when they ended in acquittal.
127. Zurcher, *Turkey*, 316–321.
128. Pope and Pope, *Turkey Unveiled*, 243–244.
129. Zurcher, *Turkey*, 325.



130. Nicole F. Watts, *Activists in Office: Kurdish Politics and Protest in Turkey* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2010), 22.
131. Pope and Pope, *Turkey Unveiled*, 335.
132. Akşin, *Turkey. From Empire*, 297–298.
133. Susurluk is a small town in western Turkey.
134. Ryan Gingeras, “In the Hunt for the ‘Sultans of Smack:’ Dope, Gangsters, and the Construction of the Turkish Deep State,” *The Middle East Journal* Vol. 65, No. 3 (Summer 2011): 426–441, 438–439.
135. Akşin, *Turkey. From Empire to Revolutionary Republic*, 306–307.
136. Reşat Kasaba, “Kemalist Certainties and Modern Ambiguities,” in *Rethinking Modernity*, 15–36, 15–18.
137. Dilruba Çatalbaş, “Freedom of Press and Broadcasting” in *Human Rights*, 27, 30–33.
138. Baskın Oran, “The Minority Concept and Rights in Turkey” in *Human Rights*, 45. For example, quotas against political representation; unacknowledged rights of different linguistic communities such as Turkey’s Kurds; codes that enable prosecution of insults against “Turkishness,” or of acts and/or words of “divisiveness.”
139. The 1982 constitution was amended repeatedly, but its authoritarian characteristics, e.g. election quotas, higher education regulations, etc., remained intact. Many argue that changes proposed in 2017 by the Islamist AKP government aim to replace parliamentary democracy with executive presidency without a secure system of checks and balances, thereby augmenting and even making worse the problem of authoritarianism.
140. “Turkey still awaits to confront with generals of the coup in Sep 12, 1980” in *Hürriyet* English edition online. September 12, 2008. <http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/turkey-still-awaits-to-confront-with-generals-of-the-coup-in-sep-12-1980-9884161>. Access March 23, 2016; Ayça Söylemez, “12 September Indictment. Blame or Defense?” in *Bianet* online. <http://bianet.org/english/human-rights/135412-blame-or-defense>. Access 18 January 2012. After relentless social pressure, the former Chief of General Staff Kenan Evren and the Air Force Commander Tahsin Şahinkaya, the only other surviving member of the generals that orchestrated the takeover, were brought to court, where they faced life sentences in 2010. When General Evren passed away in 2015 at the age of 97 in a military hospital, he was demoted and sentenced to life, yet he was also given a state burial.
141. Mine Söğüt, *Darbeli Kalemler*. The 1980 takeover was often defined as “an iron fist in a velvet glove.” Güneri Civaoglu used the expression in his September 17, 1980 column “Ankara Notları,” published in the conservative daily *Tercüman*.

142. Pope and Pope, *Turkey Unveiled*, 143.
143. George S. Harris, "The Role of the Military in Turkey in the 1980s" in *State, Democracy and the Military*, eds. Metin Heper and Ahmet Evin (New York: de Gruyter, 1988), 186, 194. Harris seems to argue that the role of the military had not grown between 1960 and 1980, and that the 1982 constitution had not given dramatically more powers to the military.
144. Ahmet Evin, "Changing Patterns of Cleavages Before and After 1980" in *State, Democracy*, 204–205, 212.
145. Harris, "The Role of ..." in *State, Democracy*, 196–199.
146. Ahmad, "Military Intervention ...," *MERIP Reports*. No. 93 (January 1981): 11. Ahmad lamented the regression in civil liberties that would come in the aftermath of the 1980 coup.
147. Pope and Pope, *Turkey Unveiled*, 137–140.
148. The slayings of academics, intellectuals, and journalists such as Muammer Aksoy (1990), Çetin Emeç (1990), Turan Dursun (1990), Bahriye Üçok (1990) Uğur Mumcu (1993) continued for a decade after the coup and into the 2000s. Many unsolved murders and thousands of disappeared marked the post-1980 period of "security and tranquility" (*güven ve huzur ortamı*).
149. Mehmet Ali Birand. *12 Eylül* (A documentary film). [http://www.daily-motion.com/video/xmc7g2\\_12-eylul-12-eylul-1980-bolum-7\\_short-films](http://www.daily-motion.com/video/xmc7g2_12-eylul-12-eylul-1980-bolum-7_short-films). Access February 17, 2012.
150. "From the Editors," *MERIP Report* No. 93 (January 1981): 2.
151. Şerif Mardin, "Freedom in an Ottoman Perspective" in *State, Democracy*, 23–35.
152. Gökçen Alpkaya, "The Issue of Human Rights" in *Turkish Foreign Policy 1919–2006*, ed. Baskın Oran, trans. Mustafa Akşin. (Salt Lake City: The University of Utah Press, 2010), 636.
153. Caryl, *Strange Rebels*, xiii.
154. *Ibid.*, xiv–xv.
155. Roni Margulies, "12 Eylül'e Farklı Bir Yaklaşım. Türkiye'de ve Dünyada 1980" [A Different Approach to September 12], *Toplumsal Tarih* No. 142 (October 2005): 46–51, 50.
156. Zahit Atam, *Yakın Plan Yeni Türkiye Sineması. Dört Kurucu Yönetmen* [Close-up on New Cinema of Turkey. Four Foundational Directors] (İstanbul: Cade, 2011), 93–94, 332.
157. Oğuz Dilek, "Türkiye Kapitalizminde Zorun Rolü: Rızasız Bir Toplum Sözleşmesi Olarak 12 Eylül Askeri Darbesi" [The Use of Force in Turkish Capitalism] in *Türkiye'de Siyasal Şiddetin Boyutları*, eds. Güney Çeğin and İbrahim Şirin (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2014), 348.
158. Gülalp, "Modernization Policies ..." in *Rethinking Modernity*, 56

159. Atam, *Yakın Plan*, 94.
160. Günay Erkol, "Issues of Ideology ..." in *Turkey in the Cold War*, 124–125. This survey indicates a few exceptions such as Vedat Türkali, Oya Baydar, and Mehmet Eroğlu.
161. Melis Behlil, "Close Encounters? Contemporary Turkish Television and Cinema," *Wide Screen* Vol. 2, Issue 2 (2010 Special Issue): 1–14, 2–3.
162. İlkin Mehrabov, "Video Activism in Turkey," M.A. Thesis. Middle East Technical University, January 2010, p. 70.
163. *Yol* [The Way]. Dir. Şerif Gören and Yılmaz Güney. Perf. Tarık Akan, Şerif Sezer, Halil Ergün, Meral Orhonsay, Necmettin Çobanoğlu et al. France: Güney Film, Kaktüs Film, 1982.
164. Murat Akser, "Yılmaz Güney's Beautiful Losers," in *Cinema and Politics. Turkish Cinema and the New Europe*, ed. Deniz Bayrakdar (London: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2009), 144.
165. Nilgün Abisel, *Türk Sineması Üzerine Yazılar* [Essays on Turkish Cinema] (Ankara: İmge Kitabevi, 1994), 108–111. Abisel draws attention to Turkish communities in Europe as a new market with implications for the video and film industry.
166. Behlil, "Close Encounters?... " *Wide Screen*, 2.
167. Ibid., 2–3.
168. Burcu Sarı Karademir, "Turkey as a 'Willing Receiver' of American Soft Power: Hollywood Movies in Turkey during the Cold War," *Turkish Studies*, Vol. 13, Issue 4, (2012): 633–645, 640.
169. Savaş Arslan, *Cinema in Turkey: A New Critical History* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), 10.
170. Atam, *Yakın Plan*, 47, 91, 340. Atam sees the 1980 coup as the zenith of oppression, a trauma which caused social regression.
171. Nezih Erdoğan, "Narratives of Resistance: National Identity and Ambivalence in the Turkish Melodrama between 1965 and 1975" in *Asian Cinemas: A Reader and Guide*, eds. Dimitris Eleftheriotis and Gary Needham (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2006), 229–241, 232.
172. Atam, *Yakın Plan*, 82.
173. Atilla Dorsay, "Back From Near Oblivion, Turkish Cinema Gets a New Lease on Life," trans. Lale Can. *Film Comment*, Vol. 34, No. 6 (2004): 11–12.
174. Atam, *Yakın Plan*, 64.
175. Helen Chapin Metz (ed.), *Turkey: A Country Study* (Washington D.C.: Library of Congress, 1996), 282.
176. TRT always presented the public with official interpretations of Kemalism, but removal of the board securing its impartiality was considered a blatant blow against its objectivity.

177. Mahmut Tali Öngören, "Radio and Television in Turkey," in *The Transformation of Turkish Culture*, eds. Günsel Renda and C. Max Kortepeter (Kingston Press, 1986), 188–191, 194.
178. Akşin, *Turkey. From Empire*, 290.
179. Ayda Özlü Çevik, "90'ların Hak Mücadeleleri," [The Struggle for Rights during the '90s] *Bianet* December 19, 2015. <http://bianet.org/bianet/medya/160908-ozal-in-sinyaliyle-kurulan-ilk-ozel-televizyonlar>. Access March 24, 2016. Ahmet Özal and businessman Cem Uzan partnered in this endeavor.
180. Metz (ed.), *Turkey: A Country Study*, 284–285.
181. Zürcher, *Turkey*, 322.
182. Ece Algan, "Privatization of Radio and Media Hegemony in Turkey," in *The Globalization of Corporate Media Hegemony*, eds. Lee Artz and Yahya R. Kamalipour (New York: SUNY Press, 2003), 175.
183. E. Neziha Orhon, *Değişim Değeri Açısından Televizyon Haberleri: Teknolojik ve İdeolojik Boyutuyla Metalaşan Televizyon Haberleri* [TV News in Terms of Their Exchange Value: Technological and Ideological Commodification] (Eskişehir: Anadolu Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2004), p. 112.
184. Tezcan Durna and Ayşe İnal, "12 Eylül, Medya ve Demokratikleşme Sorunu" [12 September, Media and the Problem of Democratization], *Mülkiye* Vol. 34, No. 268 (Fall 2010): 147–183, 135.
185. Erdoğan, "Narratives of Resistance ...," 231.
186. Miyase Christensen and Christian Christensen, "Genre Blending in Turkish Television" in *European Film and Media Culture*, eds. Lennard Højbjerg and Henrik Søndergaard (Copenhagen: University of Copenhagen Press and Museum Tusculanum Press, 2006), 159–178, 159.
187. Behlil, "Close Encounters?..." *Wide Screen*, 3–4.
188. *Eylül Fırtınası* [September Storm]. Dir. Atif Yılmaz. Perf. Tarkan Akan, Zeynep Kültür, Deniz Türkalı, Hazım Körmükçü, et al. İstanbul: Delta Film, 2000. Suggested English language title is listed as "After the Fall." At the time of its release the film grossed around 125,664, but it continues to be available online through the Show TV website. See "Eylül Fırtınası" in *Türk Sineması Araştırmaları*. Bilim ve Sanat Vakfı, 2015. <http://www.tsa.org.tr/film/filmgoster/2135/eylul-firtinasi>. Access March 26, 2016.
189. A coup serial *Remember, My Darling* achieved high ratings in 2007 on the national station ATV. See "1 Milyon YTL'lik Dizi Ekonomisi" [Soap Economy Worth a Million Liras], İstanbul Chamber of Commerce Press Release. October 4, 2008, 13.
190. *Süper Baba*. Dir. Kartal Tibet (1993–1997). Serials like *Süper Baba* portrayed benign patriarchy, which protected the motherless family.

191. Christensen and Christensen, "Genre Blending ..." in *European Film*, 174.
192. Rekin Teksoy, *Turkish Cinema*. Trans. Martin K. Thomen and Ozde Celiktemel, ed. Rezan Benatar (Istanbul: Oglak Yayıncılık, 2008), 102.
193. *Ibid.*, 101.
194. Behlil, "Close Encounters?... " *Wide Screen*, 6.
195. Roy Armes, "Twelve Propositions on the Inaccessibility of Third World Cinema" in *Turkish Cinema: An Introduction*, ed. Christine Woodhead (London: University of London, SOAS Turkish Area Study Group Publications, 1989), 1–9.
196. "Playing to Home Audiences Keeps Turkey's Cinema Scene Cooking," *The Guardian*. November 22, 2011, amended on November 29, 2011. <http://www.theguardian.com/film/filmblog/2011/nov/22/turkey-cinema-scene-turkish-film>. Access March 26, 2016.
197. *Çemberimde Gül Oya* [Embroidered Rose on My Scarf]. Dir. Çağan Irmak. Screenplay Çağan Irmak and Kuledibi. Music Kamil Nizam Bigalı and Ahmet Yamacı. Perf. Selda Alkor, Özge Özberk, Mehmet Ali Nuroğlu, Melisa Sözen, et al. Production Avşar Film. Kanal D, 2004–2005. It consists of 40 episodes with run time ranging between 60 to 110 min.
198. *Babam ve Oğlum* [My Father and My Son]. Dir. Çağan Irmak. Screenplay Çağan Irmak. Music Evanthia Reboutsika. Perf. Çetin Tekindor, Fikret Kuşkan, Hümeýra, Ege Tanman, et al. İstanbul: Avşar Film, 2005.
199. Berfin Emre Çetin, *The Paramilitary Hero on Turkish Television: A Case Study on Valley of the Wolves* (London: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2015), 159–160.
200. Partha Chatterjee, *The Nation and Its Fragments* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993), 6.
201. On internal dynamics and plurality of cultures see Edward W. Said, "The Clash of Ignorance," *The Nation*, October 4, 2001. <https://www.thenation.com/article/clash-ignorance/>. Access January 17, 2017.
202. Hüsnü Öndül (ed.), "İşkence Raporu" [Torture Report]. İHD Ankara Şubesi Yayınları, 1989, cited in Özen, *Entellektüelin Dramı*, p. 156.
203. Özen, *Entellektüelin Dramı* draws a tragic picture of suppression based on the work of Turkey's Human Rights Association (*İnsan Hakları Derneği, İHD*), and on interviews with academics removed from their positions with article 1402 of the emergency law.

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