

## Situating Heidegger for the Study of Mobile Media Technology Use

The introductory chapter included a quote from Anne Light that contained the word *absorption*. In my view this word provides an avenue to explore what is most fundamental about Heidegger's entire philosophical project. Heidegger uses *absorbed intentionality* to show that human beings are not only in a perpetual mode of *being-in*, but also capable of comprehending this state via *ground concepts*. Heidegger desires to show that in becoming absorbed, the world is disclosed in a way that can productively reveal an intertwining of investment and involvement while *being-in*. Through this sort of phenomenological disclosure, we are better equipped, as Dreyfus argues, "to raise the question of being—to make sense of our ability to make sense of things—and to reawaken in people a feeling for the importance of this very obscure question" (1991, p. 10). By raising this question, we are thus able to recognize how *poiēsis*, the term Aristotle used to describe creative production/cultivation, is a constitutive feature of our everyday being-in-the-world.

For Heidegger, being has largely been misinterpreted throughout the annals of philosophy. Dreyfus writes that it has been studied as (1) the most universal concept, (2) indefinable abstract entity, and (3) as self-evident since every preposition contains the copula "is" (ibid., pp. 10–11). The concern with these perspectives is that each adopts a bracketed approach and thus ignores the most fundamental nature of being—we are always within it and always enduring it. Every human activity is conducted in an understanding of being. As Heidegger writes:

The meaning of Being must already be available to us in some way ... we always conduct our activities in an understanding of Being. Out of this understanding arise both the explicit question of the meaning of Being and the tendency that leads us towards its conception. We do not know what "Being" means. But even if we ask "What is 'Being'?", we keep within an understanding of the "is," though we are unable to fix conceptually what the "is" signifies. We do not even know the horizon in terms of which that meaning is to be grasped and fixed. But this vague average understanding of Being is still a Fact. (1962 [1927], p. 25)

In order to make explicit our living in Being, Heidegger repositions the human being not as rational animal, but as Dasein (there-being). Such a reconfiguration is intended to draw attention to a human being's primal mode of existence, dwelling, and how in dwelling Dasein is perpetually trying to make sense of being because it is always existing in some average understanding of it. As Dreyfus proposes, "Dasein is constantly, in its activities, making sense of itself and everything else" (Dreyfus 1991, p. 29). The methodology Heidegger utilizes to explore Being through Dasein is phenomenology. This is from where this chapter departs.

### HEIDEGGER'S PHENOMENOLOGY

Heidegger's ontological project required him to dramatically reconceptualize Edmund Husserl's phenomenology, which at the time was a continuation of Cartesian rationalism.<sup>1</sup> Although phenomenology had existed for several centuries through various Kantian and Hegelian implementations, the modern perception of phenomenology ripened with Husserl during his tenure in Freiburg im Breisgau. The term phenomenology, in its modern context, was initially coined by Franz Brentano with an emphasis on cognitive intentionality. Brentano proposed that each mental act is inherently intentional and each act of intention possesses an object. In short, all consciousness is consciousness of something. It is through this line of thought that phenomenology becomes directly associated with a person's experiences and conscious understanding of their experiences within the world, a notion that Husserl adopts and ultimately declares allegiance to in *Logical Investigations* (1970 [1913]). For Husserl, all perception and action involves mental activity and, for this to become apparent, Husserl famously proposed that we should go "to the things in themselves."

According to Josef Siefert, “the call ‘back to things’ was heard at a time when practically the entire modern philosophical world, mainly under the influence of Hume’s empiricism, on the one hand, and under that of Kant’s transcendental critical idealism, on the other, was dominated by one form or other of skepticism or relativism” (1987, p. 8). Husserl was venturing into an entirely new method of philosophical investigation. Merleau-Ponty, in reviewing Husserl’s work, suggests that:

The philosophical task to which he devoted himself was ... the establishment of an integral philosophy which would be compatible with the development of all the different investigations on the condition of man. On the one hand it is a struggle against psychologism and historicism, so far as they reduce the life of man to a mere result of external conditions acting on him and see the philosophizing person as entirely determined from the outside, lacking any contact with his own thought and therefore destined to skepticism. But on the other hand it is also a struggle against logicism, in so far as this is attempting to arrange for us an access to the truth lacking any contact with contingent experience. (1964, p. 51)

Husserl envisioned phenomenology as a science of the sciences, a method of sheer presentations to consciousness without any presuppositions or metaphysical augmentations. For this vision of phenomenology, Husserl drew upon an ancient Greek method called *epoché*, a process in which one attempts to suspend judgment about everything in the external world; Husserl called this philosophical technique *bracketing*.

The core of Husserl’s phenomenological method rests on the conviction that when a person experiences the world, a presupposition exists that experience occurs within a physical world explained by objective science; the physical world is one with sets of laws that cause our experiences. For Husserl, this notion should be bracketed (or suspended) for a proper phenomenological investigation. When a person brackets the world, the “essential feature is always to effect an alteration or change of attitude, to move away from naturalistic assumptions about the world, assumptions both deeply embedded in our everyday behavior towards objects” (Moran 2000, p. 147). It is imperative to recognize that Husserl’s bracketing is far more than simple psychological introspection because of his critical inclusion of the eidetic reduction, the attempt to understand the essence of each type of intentional act or object:

The famous reduction, which gives us access to phenomenology, is not a mere return to the psychological subject ... this reduction is the decision not to suppress but to place in suspense, or out of action, all the spontaneous affirmations in which I live, not to deny them but rather to understand them and make them explicit ... When I carry out the phenomenological reduction, I do not bring back information concerning an external world to a self that is regarded as part of being, nor do I substitute an internal for an external perception. I attempt rather to reveal and to make explicit in me that pure source of all the meanings which constitute the world around me and my empirical self. (Merleau-Ponty 1964, p. 56)

With the inclusion of the eidetic reduction, the phenomenological method provides a foundational approach which all other methodologies and areas of study rely upon—it is the groundwork for all other disciplines because it is non-empiricist, non-naturalist, and an ideal clarification of the objective meanings that compose experience or consciousness.

For Heidegger, however, Husserl's phenomenology raised many troubling issues. Opposite his mentor, Heidegger expressed little interest in using phenomenology to explore how the world manifests itself to consciousness due to this undeniable continuation of the Cartesian tradition. Heidegger believed that phenomenology ought not to make consciousness primary, but rather being itself. As stated in this chapter's introduction, Heidegger prefers a phenomenology that centers the concept of intentionality in terms of absorption or pre-reflective involvement rather than a detached consciousness where things show up in an occurrent state, the way which Husserl prefers:

To break out of the epistemological tradition, we must begin with everyday involved phenomena and then see where consciousness and its intentional content fit in. Heidegger holds that human experience (*Erfahrung*) discloses the world and discovers entities in it – and yet this does not entail the traditional conclusion that human beings relate to objects by means of their experience (*Erlebnisse*), that is, by way of mental states. This view defies common sense and a long philosophical tradition ... Before raising the question of ontological and phenomenological status of consciousness, one must reinterpret Dasein's everyday way of being-in. Heidegger's analysis of the natural situation of everyday activities is meant to show that the traditional epistemic situation of a mind distinct from objects, whether observing or acting upon them, is a deficient mode of being-in-the-world. (Dreyfus 1991, pp. 45–46, 54)

With these ideas, Heidegger believes he overcomes the problematic Cartesian dualism of subject/object maintained throughout Husserl's interpretation of intentionality.

While Heidegger does believe that human beings encounter objects with intentionality, he proposes that the concept is fundamentally misconceived in Husserl's arguments:

Against the *erroneous objectivizing* of intentionality it must be said that intentionality is not an extant relation between an extant subject and object but a structure that constitutes the *comportmental character* of Dasein's behavior as such. Secondly, in opposition to the erroneous *subjectivizing* of intentionality, we must hold that the intentional structure of comportments is not something which is immanent to the so-called subject and which would first of all be in need of transcendence; rather, the intentional constitution of the Dasein's comportments is precisely the *ontological condition of the possibility of every and any transcendence*. (Heidegger 1982, p. 65)

The key distinctions between Heidegger and his mentor is that intentionality is ascribed directly to Dasein itself, rather than to consciousness. Thus, when discussing Dasein as being-in-the-world, Heidegger at times relies on the word comportment rather than intentionality because, as Dreyfus notes, "the term has no mentalistic overtones" (1991, p. 51). The term comportment is intended to emphasize a more basic way of being-in-the-world, one predicated on simply being-there, in order to guarantee that "the limitations of the earlier interpretation and function of the concept of intentionality become clear, as does its fundamental significance" (Heidegger 1982, p. 134).

In the end, with words like comportment and absorption, Heidegger equates our mode of being-in as inhabitation; "when we inhabit something, it is no longer an object for us but becomes part of us and pervades our relation to other objects in the world" (Dreyfus 1991, p. 45). In an inhabited world, the things within the world become known to Dasein, taken-for-granted; a world that Dasein inhabits becomes, in short, his homeworld. The next section highlights how one's state of being-in/inhabitation becomes further evident once Dasein finds the self claimed by what Heidegger refers to as ground concepts.

EREIGNIS, *GROUND CONCEPTS*, AND *DWELLING*

In Heidegger's work post *Being and Time*, there is a noticeable shift away from the existential structure of Dasein. Instead, his focus transitions to the historical disclosure of being through Dasein's interactions with art, poetry, and technology. Heidegger comes to recognize that while Dasein, in being absorbed and faced with the there (the Da of Dasein), is the site of disclosure but not necessarily the ground; the disclosure of being itself is not grounded in Dasein. Dasein plays but a mere part in the unfolding of the event (*Ereignis*) that is being's disclosure. Heidegger's later thinking, therefore, "consists in probing this primordial *event* which first opens up the space in which there can be a Da of Sein" (Di Pippo 2000, p. 21).

In order to understand what Heidegger means by the event (*Ereignis*) of being's disclosure, we must first give brief consideration to Periander, who prudently advised for us to *take into care beings as a whole*, a statement meant to encourage the consideration of the whole of beings through the lens of the vast difference between being and beings. For Heidegger, what distinctly separates human beings from other beings is not their ability to make prepositional distinctions about things and states, à la Platonic and Cartesian traditions, but rather their unique capacity to grasp the temporality of their *being-there*. Our attentiveness to the temporality of experience can demonstrate how we, as beings absorbed in our there, are drawn into a congruent unity with the whole. Other entities within that whole equally come to take on new meaning temporarily as their relationship to each other and ourselves becomes further solidified. In essence, we, and the entities that surround us, become swept away into the whole of being's embrace. By drawing attention to this event-like delivering, Heidegger attempts to draw further attention to the temporal quality that grounds our inhabitation.

In Heidegger's estimation, a common sense or metaphysical framework for inhabitation is typically concerned with beings alone, and being, in addition to the difference between being and beings, is neglected or considered in an insufficient manner. We must, therefore, adopt a perspective that jettisons the customary and the comfortable, and acquire an attitude that is neither directed nor clouded by specific knowledges, for instance the philosophical or scientific. The task to recover an original experience of inhabitation, one unclouded by metaphysics, begins first by recovering an original, temporal-based experience of ourselves;

“this means that we must overcome our tendency to see ourselves as just another being in the totality of beings. We must instead remember that being addresses us and no other being, and that this address is a unique occurrence that distinguishes us amongst beings” (Aylesworth 1993 [1981], p. xiii).

The address of being shows itself to us with the most clarity via ground concepts. These are described by Heidegger as a gentle invitation “for us to grasp the ground, [to] reach the foundation ... [ground concepts] call us to come to a stand where a footing and a permanence are granted, where all decisions are made, but also from where all indecisiveness borrows its hiding place” (Heidegger 1993 [1981], p. 3). Warranting these concepts a stay can provide a unique avenue of self-discovery and realization not permissible with the common, everyday, metaphysically fueled understanding of the world, one grounded in detached consciousness.

In my view, *poiēsis* is the most fundamental of the ground concepts, as it is the original site of our encounter with being’s disclosure. Although often translated with the modern word poetry, *poiēsis* is best equated with its original Ancient Greek meaning of to make. When Heidegger revisits the pre-Socratics, a critical juncture in his supposed turning, he discovers that *poiēsis* was always situated against a backdrop of *phusis*; “for the Greeks, physis [*phusis*] is the first and the essential name for being themselves and as a whole. For them the being is what flourishes on its own, in no way compelled, what rises and comes forward, and what goes back into itself and passes away” (Heidegger 1979 [1961], p. 81). In essence, *phusis* was a word interchangeable with the word being and “was the name for the way the most real things in the world present themselves to us” (Dreyfus and Kelly 2011, p. 200). Instrumental to the pre-Socratic use of *phusis* is that it “contains an intrinsic absencing dimension which, therefore, is not reducible to pure presence” (Di Pippo 2000, p. 17). This can be seen explicitly in the Heraclitus phrase, *Φύσις κρύπτεσθαι φιλεῖ* (nature loves to hide itself). For the pre-Socratic Greeks to be (*phusis*) was to emerge, blossom, or dawn. Conversely, what emerged, blossomed, or dawned would inevitably wither away. Such a happening (*Ereignis*) again illustrates being’s unique temporal quality. Whatever emerges must, by definition, eventually fade from view.

How does *phusis* relate to *poiēsis*? Let us consider what occurs when a person engages with things situated in their immediate vicinity. As spring ushers in and winter fades from view, an event demarcated by warmer

weather, blooming flowers, and longer days, people respond to the meanings that gradually emerge. You could say that things begin to look and feel different; the surroundings seem to take on a distinctive quality, one that people both respond to and nurture via the way they enthusiastically open their windows, tend to their gardens, and interact with their friends in parks and the city center. When a person pre-reflectively moves and interacts with their immediate locale and the things that populate it, particularly with motivation and confidence, what occurs is a co-creative event-like phenomenon. In being seized, or appropriated, by the unfolding world, these individuals, upon reflection, find themselves as instrumental players in the arrival of spring. Each responds to meanings in ways that nurture or sustain what lies before them, at least until such meaning inevitably falls away. In Heideggerian terms, “we must experience simply this owning in which man and being are delivered over to each other, that is, we must enter into what we call *the event of appropriation*” (Heidegger 1969, p. 36).

Frame the methodical progressions associated with cooking as an event occurring within a meaningful locale. When one thinks about a dinner party, it behooves one to compare it to a play—there are props, players, a director of sorts, and distinctly separate acts and beats. As with a play, consider the way that rhythmic moods emerge and fade as the dinner party progresses through its stages. One (the chef) begins with an array of tools and ingredients situated throughout the inhabited arena. Separated and abstracted from their daily uses, they exist as objects in-themselves that the chef can designate with properties and appropriate uses. However, when the chef begins to use them, particularly with skill, suddenly this person finds the self engulfed in a flow of meaningful activity; they experience being delivered into a meaningful alignment with their situation. The tools and ingredients, instead of being isolated entities abstracted from use, take on newfound value as they are purposefully put to use within the kitchen.

When operated by what appears to be a skilled chef, the instruments become likened to those used by an artist. The cook moves fluidly about the kitchen with care, confidently tending to his or her work, knowing exactly the precise measurements and methods necessary to procure the best qualities from the ingredients being utilized. The cook, like an artist with a brush or a carpenter with a saw, uses the instruments with eloquence, knowing precisely the proper speed to stir and the ideal time to leave something to set. When considering the practice of cooking in



this particular light, it comes as no surprise that we demarcate proficient cooks as masterful and equate their work as a sort of craft.

Furthermore, whereas an artist displays their work in a gallery, a cook presents their creative concoction before a dinner party. While the encounters with each are ontically different, each is still consumed in a way that ignites energy and appreciation. Like those perusing an art gallery or sitting before a theatrical performance, those sitting together at a dinner party may find themselves as participants in a collective experience, responding to meanings that emerge from their active engagement. In being together, they demonstrate a culmination of many factors: the food, the company, the wine, the tenor of the conversation, the décor, the specific dining rituals being practiced, and so on. In being-delivered over to the whole, they may find that they care about the continuation of that dinner party and thus pre-reflectively nurture its progression through their manners, their handling of cutlery, and the volume of their voices. They find themselves caught up in how they bond with the instruments, the people, and the communal environment as a whole, until it inevitably fades away.

Our unique responses to being's address equally permit us the capacities to recognize practices that distinguish the subtle nuances that differentiate existential importance from instrumental importance. Whereas instrumental importance is distinguishable:

anytime we take up some of the purposes made available by the intelligible structure of the world ... existential importance, by contrast, would consist in some practice or object or person having an importance for our self-realization. That is, the object or person or practice is something without which we would cease to be who we are. Such objects or persons or practices thus make a demand on us – require of us what we value them, respect them, respond to them on pain of losing ourselves. (Wrathall 2011, p. 200)

As chefs nimbly move throughout the kitchen preparing food, they ought to be able easily to recognize how their pre-reflective movements relate to existential importance. In being receptive to the unique tastes that emerge from the combined ingredients, the chef can witness how their specific behaviors are unique to them, not just in this situational moment, but also for themselves as invested and motivated beings involved in a particular situation located in a specific place. This is the work poets perform:

The artist or poet cannot do his work in any normal human way, in any way that already presupposes the world that he is to set up. He must be something like the vehicle of an impersonal force ... the artist must be “resolute”, *entschlossen*, ecstatically “opened up” to this force. (Inwood 1997, p. 127)

To nonchalantly belittle these practices as nothing more than learned behavior does them a disservice. As Dreyfus and Kelly suggest, “the achievement of skill involves more than the mere acquisition of a physical ability. Learning a skill is learning to see the world differently” (2011, p. 207).

Conversely, there can be a negative aspect. Dreyfus and Kelly proclaim that we ought to be aware of being overtaken by a compelling, if not intoxicating, force, such as what may occur when attending an exhilarating dinner party. The danger of being swept away and seemingly no longer in control speaks to a specific value of the Enlightenment tradition, one grounded in the conscious power of the individual and the need for a single mature entity to rise above the conformity that often accompanies enchanting communal forces:

To be immature, in the Kantian sense, just is to allow oneself to act in ways that one has not chosen freely on one’s own. Failing to resist the madness of crowds is a prime example. Maturity, by contrast, is having the resolve and courage to use one’s own understanding in choosing how to act, without guidance from anyone or anything external to one’s self. (Dreyfus and Kelly 2011, p. 203)

It should be obvious that this warning may not necessarily apply to the losing of one’s self at a dinner party, but what about at a political rally littered with racist utterances? Dreyfus and Kelly draw from two mass assemblies, best distinguished by their stark contrasts. The first of these is Lou Gehrig’s touching farewell speech at Yankee Stadium in 1939 and the second is Hitler’s rally at Nuremburg. At each of these, those in attendance were engulfed in a communal affair, proudly affirming the spouted rhetoric. Not all in attendance were brainless zealots blindly swept up in an ecstatic mood. Surely there were varying levels of engagement within the ranks, and in some cases, outright dissension. Still, historical images from these events showcase an affirmative and cooperative populace.

What lessons can we take from these two examples? According to Dreyfus and Kelly, the whooshing up of *phusis*, being temporarily seized

by a moment, or engulfed within an invested practice, can be alarmingly dangerous and, to counter, *poiēsis*, as the recognizable manifestation of our cultivating practices, the practices that are equally our response to being's call, is the crucial unfolding that permits us to recognize and respond to both constructive and dangerous distinctions. Therefore, *poiēsis*, as both an unfolding event and cultivating force, offers us a choice of condemning or affirming an experiential act. If *poiēsis* can best be seen in our everyday life as the "higher-order skill for responding to meaningful distinctions between dangerous and benign ways of being swept away" (ibid., p. 211), then its importance is remarkably clear. Thus, my reasoning for positioning *poiēsis* as the most instrumental of ground concepts is because, as a ground concept, we are privileged to recognize its initial disclosure and claim, and thus respond accordingly to its temporal presencing.

The foremost reason ground concepts like *poiēsis* remain overlooked can be witnessed (and experienced) via a very specific claim imposed upon Dasein. Heidegger refers to this as the needing claim. In being claimed by needing, Dasein becomes drawn to an endless series of conquerable desires. It is necessary to understand that such desires should not be confused with cravings or greed, but acknowledged as a byproduct of mere life, of being alive. Heidegger draws from the basic characteristics of plants and animals to exhibit how this sort of needing is best considered a method of self-sustainment. The danger occurs, of course, when desires become elevated to markers of progress and development. In this instance, Heidegger proposes that, "if we attend only to what we need, we are yoked into the compulsive unrest of mere life" (1993 [1981], p. 4), tempered only by becoming satiated in the possibilities permissible in the everyday public world. Such impulsive tendencies increasingly cloud our being-delivered from view, and results in the forgetting of ground concepts. Without ground concepts, we are thus stuck in an inauthentic state of existence, neglecting what is most essential about us as human beings, as Dasein.

Moreover, when we have an explicit eye towards satisfying a desire, typically the most efficient, functionally rational avenue will be taken, often in a way that correlates to another, interrelated desire. Alternative options are not just disregarded, but forgotten entirely. Warranting them even a smidgen of consideration is not a conceivable possibility because they have been entirely concealed over. They do exist, but cannot be granted even a whisper. Rather, the options that presence themselves

directly relate to the system of requirements for completing the task. According to Heidegger, when consistently pursuing needs to satisfy a driving thirst for progress, “the appearance of freedom exists precisely where man attends only to what he needs” (ibid.) and, thus, “from these man takes his standards, forgetting being as a whole. He persists in them and continually supplies himself with new standards, yet without considering either the ground for taking up standards or the essence of what gives the standard” (Heidegger 1977b [1949], p. 134).

Opposite this understanding stands being claimed by *the essence of historical man*. When succumbing to this claim, consideration is given to Periander’s fruitful advice. Human beings do not appear as calculable beings seeking to satisfy a craving, but are instead entities that consider their experiences in an essential sense. This claim may initially show itself as a restriction, but, as Heidegger advises, “in truth it is a release into the expanse of those demands that befit man’s essence” (1993 [1981], p. 4). This claiming is opposed to needing because of its openness; it is the simultaneous disclosure of what presences and what is absent (or, what can at some point presence itself depending on the proper conditions—such is what can occur when one takes risks, or engages in behaviors that push the scope of one’s world). Whereas needing is a claim driving Dasein to complete an achievable goal (one that Heidegger bemoans as replaceable and dispensable), this claiming permits him the capacity to rule in an essential sense, to be truly free. Moreover, the observable presence of *poiēsis* in this claim invites Dasein to respond in ways that highlight its temporal place within the whole of beings, as well as a unique lens to recognize any constructive or dangerous distinctions that might accompany our being-delivered over.

If *poiēsis* is the intertwining of manifestation and cultivation that nourishes being’s embrace, then dwelling is the tangible practice that allows *poiēsis* to become apparent. In the essay *Building Dwelling Thinking*, Heidegger draws inspiration from the poetry of Hölderlin and Rilke to argue that it is a grave mistake to classify dwelling as a mere constructed entity, or as an activity that man performs alongside a variety of others (Heidegger 1977a [1954], p. 325). To conceive of dwelling in these terms neglects the entire essence of how humanity fundamentally involves itself with an open and available world where, through their responses to being-delivered over, the disclosures of new worlds are possible.

As expressed in the book’s opening paragraphs, dwelling is our innate way of being-in-the-world. Dwelling is the basic way that we orient

ourselves to the world; it is the method by which we forge a feeling of at-homeness within the various inhabitable worlds that manifest themselves to us. Regardless of whether that world appears as a kitchen, a workshop, or the pitch inside a football stadium, the mere fact that we respond to manifestations indicates that we care about them in some way. In those instances when we experience the self delivered over, particularly in ways that ignite a sense of comfortableness, we may equally find that we also try to safeguard that world until the driving force that spurs our involvement fades. Thus, it should be clear, as David Seamon suggests, “dwelling ... is more than attractive buildings or surroundings, or needs defined by physical criteria—amount of floor space, lighting or whatever. Rather, dwelling involves less tangible qualities and processes—caring for the place where one lives, feeling at home in and a part of that place” (Seamon 1979, p. 93). Anne Buttimer provides further commentary, arguing that dwelling “means to live in a manner which is attuned to the rhythms of nature, to see one’s ecological and social milieu” (Buttimer 1976, p. 277). This phenomenon can be seen in the ancient context of the word *συννοικισμός* (literally meaning dwelling together). This phrase hints at the work conducted by populations to strengthen their belonging together, the macro and micro work performed that first establishes, and then nurtures and strengthens, similar ideologies.

For Heidegger, however, because we are, in essence, temporal creatures, such shared worlds can never be permanent; simply recall the various epochs throughout western history: Greek, Roman, Medieval Christian, Enlightenment, and our current technological age. In each of these epochs, individuals were delivered over “perceiving things in advance in such a way that they are allowed to stand out as essentially structured” (Wrathall 2011, p. 31). As dwellers, there will always be different ways of relating to things, the distinct properties they possess, and how such things associate with other things in the world. Thus, when the world unfolds itself within our phenomenological horizon, it does so via an experiential scenario Heidegger refers to as *Lichtung*, a German word that translates in English as a clearing (in the forest). The word has been used to suggest, as Dreyfus states, “an open space in which one can encounter objects” (Dreyfus 1991, p. 163). Although *Lichtung* and *poiēsis* might appear somewhat similar at first glance, the two are different. Whereas *poiēsis* is the cultivating force that reveals the emergence of *phusis*, *Lichtung* is meant to signify the open space from where the fruits of that cultivation can emerge; “Heidegger uses the clearing as the means to

make it possible for any one of a plurality of understandings of being or essence to prevail” (Wrathall 2011, p. 33).

This possible plurality of understandings offers both an upside and a downside. The upside is that “it allows human beings to inhabit a world” (ibid.). Because a human being’s understandings of its being can be self-concealed, they are thus capable of completing their world on the basis of practical needs and whatever comportmental capacities appear as possible. However, the downside, as Wrathall suggests, is that “having lost sight of the concealment that makes it all possible, we become convinced of the necessity and unique correctness of our way of inhabiting the world” (ibid.). The negative, as shown with the needing claim from the previous section, is that human beings tend to restrict meaning based on the increasingly limited ways the world becomes available to them.

I assert that the academic community should revisit these pre-Socratic concepts in order to properly situate practice with the disclosure of phenomena taking place within our current technological epoch. Ingold suggests that too often this community heavily favors the rational mind with regard to matters of world building and, subsequently, disregards dwelling practices:

The assumption has persisted that people construct the world, or what for them is reality, by organizing the data of sensory perception in terms of received and culturally specific conceptual schemata. But in recent anthropology, this assumption has been challenged by advocates of practice theory, who argue that cultural knowledge, rather than being imported into the settings of practical activity, is constituted within these settings through the development of specific dispositions and sensibilities that lead people to orient themselves in relation to their environment and to attend to its features in the particular ways that they do. (Ingold 2000, p. 153)

This mistaken approach, where researchers take worlds as being made and constituted prior to interaction, is coined by Ingold as “the building perspective” (ibid., p. 173). The problematic dilemma that stems from the employment of this perspective is that, at its fundamental level, the research prioritizes *form* over *process*, *eidos* over *morphe*; “whereas the building perspective sets the maker, as a bearer of prior intentions, over and against the material world, the dwelling perspective situates the weaver in amongst a world of materials, which he literally draws out in bringing forth the work. He is, in that regard, a producer in the original


sense of the term” (Ingold 2011, p. 10). The dwelling perspective, as conceived by Ingold, is an anthropological approach that prioritizes the manner in which a material creature exists with an unfinished world, one that we continually work to bring out; “since the person is a being-in-the-world, the coming-into-being of the person is part and parcel of the process of coming-into-being of the world” (Ingold 2000, p. 168).

To conclude this section, we have seen that Heidegger’s initial philosophical goal was to produce a fundamentally different understanding about the human being and its place in the world. Rather than understand human being as a rational animal standing over objects attempting to make sense of their properties, we are encouraged to understand humans as entities that become involved with things through invested interaction. By configuring human being as *Dasein*, Heidegger makes explicit that the world matters to us by way of our absorption into worlds. In his later work, however, Heidegger moves away from *Dasein* and instead focuses on ground concepts, particularly *poiēsis*, to discover ways for being to make itself apparent to us as we dwell. The crux of Heidegger’s late philosophy is that being’s address to us occurs through ground concepts and our response to this address is, ultimately, the history of being itself.

## DWELLING AS PRACTICE

While it ought to be evident that this book is both inspired by and indebted to Heidegger, I find that he often paints in broad strokes with intent to elucidate grand ideas. What lacks thus far is actual practice; what comportmental practices are necessary for the opening of worlds and revelation of our being-there? This omission is common in the bulk of Heidegger’s writings, although this should not come as a surprise. Heidegger was not interested in practice per se, but rather how practices permit the unveiling of being. This section attempts to fill this gap by expounding upon the practices that *belong* to dwelling, the practices of inhabitation that permit the formation of worldhood to manifest with clarity.

In my view, a person’s everyday dwelling consists of three interconnected concepts: wayfaring, bodily hybridizing, and being-affected, what Heidegger referred to as *Stimmung*, or our being-attuned—“ways of finding things that matter” (Dreyfus 1991, p. 169). None of the three concepts overshadow or take precedence over the other. They rather



**Fig. 2.1** The dwelling triad

work in concert and collectively form a dwelling triad. I have chosen to illustrate dwelling with a triad because, drawing from David Seamon, a triad “suggests a working relationship among the parts—as in a chord triad of music” (1979, p. 131). With this triad, my hope is to configure dwelling as an amalgamative, never-ending process that permits the unobtrusive revealing of *poiēsis* (see Fig. 2.1).

Wayfaring, the first concept to be explored, was proposed by Ingold as an alternative to his dwelling perspective. In recent texts, Ingold has expressed regret for the way that he initially centered the concept dwelling (see Ingold 2011, p. 12); however, I believe wayfaring is best conceived as a part of dwelling and is not, as Ingold states, our fundamental way of being in the world (ibid., p. 152). Ingold’s decision to sideline dwelling is because the concept invites possible connotations of localism or snug feelings. While it is true that Heidegger often incorporates his own experiences of a local and soothing rural life into his works, I find that commentators sometimes overstate its prominence. To concentrate extensively on Heidegger’s rural examples misses the principal point of his argument (see also Gunkel and Taylor 2014, p. 130). Heidegger’s work is not grounded by rural nostalgia nor does it advocate that one ought to live, cultivate, and remain, as he did, in a Walden-like farmhouse in Germany’s Black Forest! Heidegger even writes that the “reference to the Black Forest farm in no way means that we should or could go back to building such houses; rather it illustrates by a dwelling that *has been* how *it* was able to build” (Heidegger 1977a [1954], p. 338). Additionally, I must confess that I see no problems with the connotations Ingold finds so worrisome. The fundamental nature of dwelling is



the way it permits an active Dasein to poetically nurture a homeworld. Does the practice of dwelling not allow us to inhabit a world with established rules and limits? We bracket a seemingly endless number of extraneous things and perspectives to make sense of our lives and thus achieve ontological security, a concept that recognizes the importance of a person's sense of place and the ordinary recursive taken-for-granted patterns of social life (see Giddens 1984).

The second concept, bodily hybridizing, is inspired by Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology of the body and Nigel Thrift's call for a non-representational geography. Thrift suggests that that hybridity is one of the most imperative concepts to consider when exploring issues associated with pre-reflective activity and embodiment (see Thrift 2008). With a combination of wayfaring and bodily-hybridity, emphasis is placed on how people pre-reflectively understand and make sense of their active engagement, in addition to how various tools and objects contribute to that engagement. Moreover, Thrift's statement that "probably ninety-five percent of embodied thought is non-cognitive, yet probably ninety-five percent of academic thought has concentrated on the cognitive dimension of the conscious I" (Thrift 2001, p. 36), in my opinion, holds merit.

The last concept, being-affected (*Stimmung*/mood), is described by Dreyfus as "our being-at-tuned [with the world] ... *Stimmung* seems to name any of the ways Dasein can be affected" (Dreyfus 1991, p. 169). For Dermot Moran, "one of Heidegger's most original contributions in *Being and Time* is his analysis of moods (*Stimmung*), not as a psychological subjective state, but as a way the world itself appears. Heidegger thinks of 'mood' as a way of being tuned into the world, attuned" (2000, pp. 241–242). As part of Heidegger's ontological account of Dasein, he proposed that we are capable of encountering things that matter only because we are already in a mood where those things make sense and are in tune with us. Therefore, for Heidegger, only through our mood are we permitted to encounter things in the world. Each of these is discussed below.

In *Perception of the Environment* (2000), Ingold introduces the concept of wayfaring, a term that emphasizes "the embodied experience of pre-ambulatory movement" (Ingold 2011, p. 148).<sup>2</sup> Ingold defines wayfaring as "a skilled performance in which the traveller, whose powers of perception and action, have been finely tuned through previous experience, 'feels his way' towards his goal, continually adjusting his movements in response to an ongoing perceptual monitoring of his

surroundings” (Ingold 2011, p. 220). Wayfaring thus emphasizes not only a human being’s investment with the world, but also their ongoing mobility; “the wayfarer is continually on the move. More strictly, he is his movement” (Ingold 2011, p. 150). This is a proclamation that I am willing to grant sympathy due to the way it contributes to what Ingold coins as a storied world.

In a chapter titled “To journey along a way of life,” Ingold draws from a number of authors to discuss how people get around in the world. For both strangers and those familiar with surroundings, how is it that they know which direction to take? What methods are employed by a traveler to accomplish their goal? Ingold notes that for numerous disciplines, no difference exists between the stranger and the familiar inhabitant; both are essentially map users; “the difference is that the native inhabitant’s map is held not in the hand but in the head” (2000, p. 219). However, Ingold finds this distinction problematic; he suggests that:

There is no such map ... indeed the native inhabitant may be able to specify his location in space, in terms of any independent system of coordinates, and yet will still insist with good cause that he knows where he is. This is ... because places do not have locations, but histories. Bound together by the itineraries of their inhabitants, places exist not in space but as nodes in a matrix of movement. (ibid.)

Ingold suggests that when moving about in an environment and crafting histories, a human being is not necessarily map-making, but instead is engaged in the practice of mapping. Map-making, as opposed to mapping, is concerned with strategically moving across space in a meticulous fashion. Mapping, as with wayfaring, “might be understood not as following a course from one spatial location to another, but as a movement in time, more akin to reading or storytelling than reading a map” (ibid., p. 238).<sup>3</sup>

When relying on a map, the user adopts a presupposed bird’s eye view, much like Michael de Certeau’s vantage point from atop the World Trade Center (see de Certeau 1984). Conversely, when wayfaring, or mapping, one proceeds along a path of involved observation. This is a key distinction. When skilled chefs move about the kitchen concocting their creations, they do not rely on a cognitive map. Neither are their movements a conditional response to environmental stimuli. As explained in the previous section, when the person moves, “the structure

of the environment is progressively disclosed to the moving observer” (ibid., p. 238). Rather than be situated as an outside participant from above, the observer is instead a participant playing a crucial role in the event-like happening that is disclosure.

Wayfaring has been included as a part of the dwelling triad for two reasons. First, wayfaring allows for the reconceptualization of life as lived not inside restrictive places, defined as both physical locations and designations like one’s social class, but along expansive, developing paths, a distinction that not only implies a perpetual, flowing absorption, but also the inevitability of intersections with other paths; “places then, are like knots, and the threads from which they are tied are lines of wayfaring” (Ingold 2011, p. 149). The concept of place, as either a social position or geographic locale, too often draws upon dualisms or, even more problematically, is positioned as an experiential achievement. This can be seen via the work of Yi-Fu Tuan, who proposes that “when space feels thoroughly familiar to us, it has become place” (Tuan 1977, p. 73). The principal issue of treating place as an experiential achievement is that it fails to accentuate the intimate way in which a person is perpetually dwelling and fostering at-homeness while being-there *in place*. We are always orienting ourselves to the world as it unfolds, pulling from understandings generated by a recognition of our being-in-place in order to progress. We are never free-floating within space, nor do we ever lack a complete sense of place. Because we exist factically and carry our past experience with us, we are always in some way familiar with our surroundings and thus capable of projecting a future world suitable for our continued inhabitation. Therefore, to return to Ingold, life is not necessarily place-bound in the sense that we seek place, but rather is place binding, progressing along a path of constant becoming (Ingold 2011, p. 148). As such, any finiteness and concreteness associated with space gradually transforming into place, in my estimation, becomes problematic.

Secondly, as a wayfarer, a person is in a constant mode of mobility, always in motion along a path. However, it is also crucial to remember that this path is not necessarily following a strict, closed, linear development; rather, wayfaring occurs within a meshwork-like structure. As one moves along a path, encounters with unforeseen entities will inevitably occur, thus altering the trajectory of the initial path. A path is always a potential path to another path, an open incomplete meshwork of becoming with interconnecting links. This form of open, improvisational travel

should be contrasted with transport, which, somewhat similar to the practice of map-making, possesses a previously specified destination. When this occurs, Ingold proposes that the passenger is not necessarily moving; rather, he is being moved, and often by something that “can extend or replace the body’s powers of propulsion” (ibid., p. 150). Ingold suggests that readers attempt an experiment. First, Ingold requests the reader take a pencil and draw a line. Following this first line, he then instructs readers to draw a series of dotted lines. The primitiveness of this exercise offers a striking lesson. For Ingold, the movement is in the marked dots, not the drawn line. He states, “whatever movements you might make between drawing each dot serve merely to carry the pencil tip from one point to the next, and are entirely incidental of the line itself. During these intervals the pencil is inactive, out of use” (ibid.). Ingold even goes on to suggest that the pencil, when inactive, could be sat down on a desk and returned to later. This short exercise is intended to demonstrate that, “whereas the wayfarer signs his presence on the land as the ever-growing sum of his trails, the passenger carries his signature about with him as he is transported from place to place” (ibid., p. 151). The example of using a pencil provides not only an illustration of our movement as fostering our being absorbed into a pre-reflective flow, the most fundamental aspect of wayfaring, but also how our movements are influenced by the objects we encounter. This phenomenon, which I have coined as *bodily hybridization*, is the focus of the next section.

Including the body is imperative because, as the philosophy of Merleau-Ponty explores, “our insertion into the world is through the body with its motor and perceptual acts” (Moran 2000, p. 403). As dwellers, we are always interacting with objects that surround us and, provided our activity seamlessly occurs, we eventually generate a rapport with them and the unfolding world simply continues to flow unabated. This taken-for-granted feeling comes about because, when we engage with objects, particularly with confidence, it appears as though we have blended with them. Nigel Thrift warns that it is unwise to assume that the make-up of the human body stops with a person’s flesh; he suggests that “the human body is what it is because of its unparalleled ability to co-evolve with things, taking them in and adding them to different parts of the biological body to produce something which, if we could see it, would resemble a constantly evolving distribution of different hybrids with different reaches” (Thrift 2008, p. 10). For example, one’s hybrid nature becomes evident when asked to describe a mobile

media technology. Initially, I may take the present-at-hand object and describe it in terms of its ontic properties—weight, color, texture and so on. This sort of description, however, tells me nothing about the instrument in terms of what it may mean to me. Like the cook in the kitchen surrounded by an assortment of interrelated utensils, it is only when I actually use the instrument that I come to know what it truly is in the sense of how it fits into my world. At the moment of operation, from when I pick it up and begin effortlessly tapping my fingers on the touch-screen, I merge with the instrument and the definitive line that distinguishes flesh and material in terms of movements and abilities begins to blur. As movements become routine and are performed without reflective contemplation, the object becomes a part of my bodily habitus (see Bourdieu 2000, pp. 128–163). Additionally, how I use the instrument in terms of bodily positioning and hand placement shares a relationship to the other objects within my immediate vicinity. For instance, if operating this instrument on a sofa, the way in which I sit is influenced by the presence of the instrument. Collectively, we merge together. If the sofa and mobile technology are known entities, in the sense that I encounter each daily, then this intertwining will most likely occur instantaneously, as a taken-for-granted, embodied action.

Consider, again, the reference made to Merleau-Ponty's example of the blind man's cane. How does the blind man regard this cane? How does this cane allow him to inhabit world? Moreover, how does the world unfold for him because of his motivated use of the cane? In summarizing Merleau-Ponty's philosophy, Carman writes:

The body is a primitive constituent of perceptual awareness as such, which in turn forms the permanent background of intentionality at large. The intentional constitution of the body is not the product of a cognitive process whose steps we might trace back to the founding acts of a pure I. Rather, the body in its perceptual capacity just is the I in its most primordial aspect. For Merleau-Ponty, then, strictly speaking, we do not have bodies, rather we are our body, which is to say, we are in the world through our body, and insofar as we perceive the world with our body. (1999, p. 224)

Thus summation highlights Merleau-Ponty's proposition that a person's perceptual awareness is not necessarily wrapped up in either the isolated mind or the mere physical body with an emphasis on motor responses.

Such a distinction would impose a Cartesian dualism, or what Charles Taylor refers to as a disengaged subject (Taylor 1995, p. 7). We are anything but disengaged. In taking an object and putting it to use, like the blind man's cane, we bring it nearer to us, and subsequently the world with which that object is put to use equally is brought nearer. Therefore, such nearing should be thought of as "not oriented towards the I thing encumbered with a body, but towards the concerned being-in-the-world" (Heidegger 1962 [1927] p. 142). Our bringing near makes itself clear by the ease with which we are capable of encountering objects as both accessible and available. In taking them without thought, we demonstrate an understanding of how they fit within a meshwork of meaningful activity—a harmonious alignment between the hybrid-self and its world.

Initially, I was somewhat hesitant to include being-affected (*Stimmung*/mood) as a component of this triad because it comes dangerously close to instilling a Cartesian divide. Dreyfus notes how in the Macquarrie and Robinson translation of *Being and Time*, the term state-of-mind is used for *Stimmung*. For philosophers this term can suggest a mental state (see Dreyfus 1991, p. 169). However, as we shall see, *Stimmung* is not a mental state, but a special way in which we can be affected by the world. Think back to the aforementioned cook who, upon reflection, finds the self affected by their being in the kitchen, engulfed in the flow of preparing food for others. This affectedness, as Dreyfus proclaims, "determine[s] not just what we *do* but *how things show up for us*" (ibid., p. 172). The notion of affectedness furthers the idea that things inherently matter. The world and the things that populate it are fundamentally of concern to Dasein.

While *Stimmung* translates from German to English as mood, Dreyfus notes that what Heidegger most likely meant was affect (ibid.). Therefore, perhaps it is useful to characterize mood as a practical state, one where we are both open and receptive to the ways that the world can appear and affect us; "Dasein's openness to the world is constituted existentially by the attunement of a state-of-mind [or, for Dreyfus, affectedness]" (Heidegger 1962 [1927], p. 176). Our being-affected, us having a mood, like the practices of bodily hybridizing and wayfaring, is pre-reflective. Why this is the case, Heidegger suggests, is beyond our capacity for comprehension; "we cannot know anything of the sort because the possibilities of disclosure which belong to cognition reach far too short in a way compared with the primordial disclosure belonging to moods"

(*ibid.*, p. 173). As such, because of such pre-reflectiveness, Heideggerian *mood* should never be viewed or interpreted “as a psychological subjective state, but as a way the world appears itself. Heidegger thinks of ‘mood’ as a way of being tuned into the world, attuned” (Moran 2000, pp. 241–242). Therefore, as Dreyfus states, Heidegger “rejects the traditional view that moods are private feelings that we project onto the world and that we discover by reflecting upon our experience” (*ibid.*, p. 170). A mood is not a private mental state that colors the world for us in a particular way but rather, in short, allows us a purview to see how our being-there matters. In Heidegger’s words, being-affected “brings Being to its there” (1962 [1927], p. 173).

Our being-affected, or our having a mood, becomes most evident through the utterance of the proclamation: “I am in a mood.” Using this particular phrase establishes two crucial aspects. First, mood demonstrates that things matter. To utter that you are in a mood reveals that you are not an isolated, disengaged entity; instead you demonstrate that you are in some way receptive to being-affected by the world’s disclosure, by how you find yourself situated in the *Lichtung*. Second, by stating that one is in a mood, the implication is that this specific mood is but one mood, and that we are capable of adopting a number of moods.

The first component, our receptivity, involves the manifestation of the there; we never find ourselves affected by the world per se, but rather the there within that world, the immediacy of our inhabitation. When contemplating our existence, we should be mindful that our “affectedness is not a structure of the world, but rather a structure of the there” (Dreyfus 1991, p. 170). Particularly when involved with objects, we are afforded a chance to see our affectedness as a sort of clearing activity. Heidegger writes, “by its very nature, Dasein brings its ‘there’ along with it. If it lacks its ‘there’, it is not factically the entity which is essentially Dasein; indeed, it is not this entity at all. *Dasein is its disclosedness*” (Heidegger 1962 [1927], p. 171). When Heidegger uses the phrase Dasein is its disclosedness, he indicates that for the inhabitant an immediacy exists in all situations (the Da of Dasein) and, “at the same time, that the Being which is an issue for this entity in its very Being is to be its ‘there’” (*ibid.*). While this Heideggerian statement may seem somewhat confusing, the philosopher is simply saying that in the state of being-there a person is existentially invested in its being-affected by what unfolds in the clearing (*Lichtung*).

This investment in the there is, in part, made clearer by recognizing the distinctions that the term the there carries. For instance, let us for a moment return to wayfaring. As we proceed along a path of involvement, we are never simply engulfed in the present, the here and now, but also the yonder. Heidegger writes:

The “here” of an “I-here” is always understood in relation to a “yonder” ready-to-hand, in the sense of Being towards this “yonder” – a Being which is de-severant, directional, and concernful. Dasein’s existential spatiality, which thus determines its “location”, is itself grounded in Being-in-the-world. The “yonder” belongs definitely to something encountered within-the-world. “Here” and “yonder” are possibly only in a “there” – that is to say, only if there is an entity which has made disclosure a spatiality as the Being of the “there.” This entity carries in its ownmost Being the character of not being closed off. In the expression “there” we have in view this essential disclosedness. By reason of this disclosedness, this entity, together with the Being-there of the world, is “there” for itself. (ibid.)

Because we are not closed off in the sense that the world is open and made available to us via its forest-clearing like disclosure, we are here for ourselves both spatially (in the sense of what is available for inhabitation) and intentionally. Remember, for Heidegger intentionality does not mean a cognitive act of intention, but rather a way with which a person is always absorbed in being towards a purposive act, hence the use of the term “yonder” and its relation to “here.”

In having such foresight, in being receptive to it with a specific mood, Wrathall writes that Dasein, in the there, is always prepared with “a background readiness to act in ways that make sense ... which give unity and coherency to our activities in the world” (Wrathall 2011, p. 106). A principal point worth stating, specifically at this junction, concerns that such background readiness is exactly that, in the background. When the world manifests, we neither challenge it nor confront it, but rather with our moods submit to it in an effort to continue the solidification of our homeworld (see Heidegger 1962 [1927], p. 177). Our submission to the unfolding world leads me to the next component: moods can change.

Changing moods reveal both that we are *always* in a mood and that moods are temporal; “the fact that moods can deteriorate [*verdorben werden*] and change over means simply that in every case Dasein always has some mood [*gestimmt ist*]” (ibid., p. 173). While moods change,



one merely shifts from one to another and, consequently, how the world shows up alters, in addition to our background readiness. For example, in a chapter on correlations between the public and language, Wrathall explains that someone fluent in both German and English may be in the United States and, therefore, will not expect to hear German. When unexpectedly exposed to the language, it may take a moment for the person to realize exactly what is being said. Additionally, Dreyfus uses an example of a good weather day, he suggests that:

On a sunny day not only are all present objects bright, but it is difficult to imagine a drab world, and, conversely on dull days everything that can show up is dull, and so is everything one can envisage. Indeed far from being fleeting as the tradition has supposed, moods settle in like the weather and tend to perpetuate themselves. (Dreyfus 1991, p. 174)

These examples are intended to show that “Heidegger’s concept of disclosure is meant to demonstrate how our active response to things and people in the world around us is made possible by a readiness for the things that ordinarily show up in the world” (Wrathall 2011, p. 106). For Heidegger, our most common mood is that of the everyday. He notes that “the pallid, evenly balanced lack of mood (*Ungestimmtheit*), which is often persistent and which is not to be mistake for a bad mood, is far from nothing at all. Rather, it is in this that Dasein becomes satiated with itself” (Heidegger 1962 [1927], p. 173). In the everyday mood, people simply go about their business; the world is seen as both neutral and ready-to-hand. We find ourselves engulfed in the familiar. According to Moran, the everydayness “is a fundamental mood and has a fundamental way of relating to the world. In our ordinary everydayness we simply pass information along, not getting wrapped up in it” (2000, p. 242).

Throughout this section I have described dwelling through the lens of practice rather than ontology. Dwelling, as the amalgamation of way-faring, bodily hybridizing, and being-affected, is the fundamental way we poetically nourish the disclosure of our world. However, ontologically dwelling belongs to what Heidegger refers to as care (*Sorge*). This distinction is crucial because it demonstrates that *dwelling* is inherently motivated. Human beings dwell because they are united in care. For us, our being is an issue; we inherently care about what unfolds and wish to nurture its smooth progression. It is important to recognize that care, as

Heidegger states, “has nothing to do with ‘tribulation’, ‘melancholy’, or the ‘cares of life’, though ontically one can come across these in everyday Dasein. These—like their opposites, ‘gaiety’ and ‘freedom from care’—are ontically possible only because Dasein, when understood *ontologically*, is care” (Heidegger (1962 [1927], p. 84). For Heidegger care is a primordial structure that lies “before every factual ‘attitude’ and ‘situation’ of Dasein, and it does so existentially a priori; this means that is always lies *in* them” (ibid., p. 238). Dreyfus notes that care is also crucial to consider because “this is Heidegger’s answer to cultural relativism. There is a common structure to all ways of being human. Every culture is a different self-interpretation, but *any* self-interpreting way of being has the disclosedness structure called care” (Dreyfus 1991, p. 239).

To conclude, dwelling, grounded in care, is how we foster absorption and inhabitation; “dwelling is Dasein’s basic way of being-in-the-world” (Dreyfus 1991, p. 45). In more recent work, Dreyfus often uses the term *skillful coping* rather than dwelling (see Dreyfus 2015). For me the two essentially reveal the same fundamental aspects of human existence, that we are not in the world spatially, in that we are “in” vacuous space, but rather as motivated dwellers eager to nurture at-homeness. For me, our motivated involvement with the world is made evident through the dwelling triad of wayfaring, hybridity, and being-affected (or mood/state-of-mind). This triad is intended to bring awareness to the practical, cultivating side of our-being-in-the-world. With these three components, emphasis is explicitly placed on the *there*; as Heidegger states, “the entity which is essentially constituted by Being-in-the-world is itself in every case its *there* ... this entity carries in its ownmost Being the character of not being closed off. In the expression ‘*there*’ we have in view this essential disclosedness” (Heidegger 1962 [1927], p. 171). Careful attention to this triad is intended to show that as we make our way through the world, we inhabit the world, align with it, and become invested in both its maintenance and progression. The practices we perform are, simultaneously, connected with the event of appropriation and *poiēsis*. The arena that I have chosen to display all this in is, of course, the mobile media use of students experiencing the life transition from secondary school to university education.

## IN SUMMATION

Why Heidegger? To explore how dwelling associates with our everyday use of mobile media technologies, why choose Heidegger over theorists who possess clear weightiness within critical/cultural studies, an

academic field that regularly engages with media and media technologies? Surely employing work inspired by Berger and Luckmann (1966), Anthony Giddens (1984), or even Raymond Williams and his concept of cultural ordinariness would provide a better alternative (see Williams 1989 [1958]). My response to this query is, frankly, no, they will not. Taking the reigns from Marx, Durkheim, and Weber, these theorists and those influenced by them often begin with a similar premise: because society exists as subjective reality, we must make sense of the seemingly endless number of encounters that contribute to the formation of subjective stances across cultures. The adoption of these specific theorists directs the research to study the intricate contributions that form a society's collective consciousness, its relationships, and system of exchanges. For example, Berger and Luckmann use the concept of freedom and proclaim: "what we can and must do ... is to ask how it is that the notion of freedom has come to be taken for granted in one society and not in another, how its reality is maintained in one society and how, even more interestingly, this reality may once again be lost to an individual or an entire collectivity" (1966, p. 15). For me, society being socially shaped and comprehended is not in question. The existence of objective structures and the crucial role they play is also not in doubt.

My interest is not centered on exploring the intertwined entities that encourage subjectivity and how it is forged through socialization, particularly if viewed with what some refer to as a detached lens (Taylor 1995). If this were the case, I would happily draw on structuration theory (see Giddens 1984). Pierre Bourdieu and his groundbreaking work on the habitus could also provide a fruitful path, but even with Bourdieu, the work is often driven by the desire to understand the processes that bring about social stratification (see Bourdieu 1984). Deleuze and fractal theory could provide another path, particularly as it concerns new narratives of the self, but in this work embodied investment is absent (see Duarte 2014). Jürgen Habermas provides a path of investigation attentive to investment. However, despite being significantly influenced by Heidegger, Habermas is more interested in communicative rationality and its place in the lifeworld to understand how systems disrupt a shared sense of the significance (see Habermas 1984, 1987).

By this point in the book it should be quite clear that Heidegger is being utilized because no other theorist, in my view, provides the necessary means to make sense of the manifestation of phenomena as it happens, as it unfolds in an event like clearing, an opening up to one's phenomenological horizon. Object-oriented ontology, a somewhat in

vogue branch of new materialist philosophy that argues for the existence of objects (and their agency) outside the realm of human sensory perception, offers an insightful and intriguing path to understand the things of the world (see Bryant 2011; Harman 2002). According to this viewpoint, everything within the world is an object, including the motivated and involved Dasein. Objects should neither be warranted more value over another, nor should they be defined by their relations, or the sum of such relations. This book is, in part, informed by and adheres to such a stance; objects in themselves possess no inherent value. Reducing them to their relationship(s) with other entities shows very little about the object under investigation and, perhaps worse, glosses over the role *poiēsis* and dwelling practices play in cultivating that manifestation. As stated in the introduction, this book does not seek to examine mobile media technologies as objects humans share a relationship with, nor does it examine human beings as the sole providers of meaning. Instead, this book draws from Heidegger to position each of these things, both human beings and mobile technologies, as taking part, but not precedence, in the creative cultivation of worldhood. They are material instruments that we, as Dasein, approach with a specific state of mind depending on a number of factors: personal motivations, upbringing, geographic positioning, and so on. Whenever we take them and put them to use, we do so because we are entities capable of being caught up in an inhabitable world, one where we care about its progression and solidification.

Prioritizing dwelling and *poiēsis* has been done, additionally, because they deserve a place in the media studies/cultural studies lexicon, as they provide an astute avenue for the discipline to rediscover the power that accompanies them as disclosing practices. Moreover, if rigorously explored and understood, dwelling and *poiēsis* offer the possibility of renewed confidence in that we, as Daseins, are situated as a force of cultivation, as a principal driver in the gathering of worlds. Kompridis writes:

Now more than ever, we require cultural practices that can reopen the future and unclothe the past, cultural practices that can regenerate hope and confidence in the face of conditions that threaten to make even their regeneration meaningless. Philosophy, critical theory, critique, whatever name one wants to use, have been and can still be possibility-disclosing practices. To the extent that it can contribute to the “disclosure of possibilities that contrast with actual conditions”, critical theory can be a cultural practice that facilitates the renewal of utopian energies, the regeneration of

confidence and hope. And it can be so only to the extent that it is responsive to (and responsible for) what calls it from the future and the past. (2005, p. 348)

It is my feeling that mobile media technology research, and the cultural studies discipline in general, can learn much by being open to Heidegger, particularly his investigations of the pre-Socratics. By providing us with a path to experience how strands of involvement weave together via the temporal disclosure of phenomena, his work has proven to be invaluable.

## NOTES

1. Cartesian ontology, as explained by Tim Ingold, “takes as its starting point the self-contained subject confronting a domain of isolable objects ... [and] ... assumes that things are initially encountered in their pure occurrentness, or brute facticity. The perceiver has first to make sense of these occurrent entities—to render them intelligible—by categorizing them, and assigning to them meanings or functions, before they can be made available for use” (Ingold 2000, pp. 168–169).
2. Ingold initially begins with the term wayfinding, only to switch to wayfaring in later texts. I’ve chosen to employ the term wayfaring unless directly quoting Ingold’s earlier writings.
3. For the nuances of their similarities, see (Ingold 2000, pp. 219–242).

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