

Cold War Anxieties

The analysis of literary responses to the Cold War has made rapid progress in recent years. Emerging in the 1980s and 1990s, the field of study has its roots in US research into the multiple ways in which domestic authors responded to such events as McCarthyism, Soviet containment, arms escalation and military intervention in Korea and Vietnam. In the twenty-first century, a clearer sense of Cold War literature as a global phenomenon has emerged. Studies by David Caute, Jean Franco, Ann Sherif, Derek Maus, and M. Keith Booker, amongst others, have addressed writings from the Soviet Union to Latin America and from western Europe to Africa, China and Japan.¹ Although the focus is often on national and regional literatures, the studies view the Cold War as a shared experience that transcended geopolitical borders and produced a literature marked by converging styles and themes. A full examination of the field, however, has barely begun. With regard to British literary studies, little has been said about authors' coverage of the conflict or about their sustained participation in the journals, congresses, literary exchanges and speaking tours that typified literary culture of the period. Paradoxically, the authors themselves were in no doubt about the geopolitical context in which their writing took place. Doris Lessing, one of the period's most prolific dystopian novelists, was adamant that by the 1950s 'politics permeated everything': 'the Cold War was a poisonous miasma', she wrote, 'as if an air that had once been the climate of a distant and cataclysmic star had chosen to engulf our poor planet'.² Nevertheless, the critical oversight has remained.

Adam Piette's lament that scholarship is 'sometimes baffling indifferent to the importance of the Cold War in shaping cultures' is vindicated by one recent study that claims British literature showed 'relatively little direct engagement with the events and issues that arose over the time'.³

The oversight is all the more remarkable in the light of Britain's involvement in international affairs. In mainstream historiography, there is a tendency to view the Cold War as a bipolar contest between the United States and the Soviet Union, denying or overlooking the contribution made by China, the EEC member states and the non-aligned nations. This is especially true of US historians who, working mainly from American archives, have often treated the study of the Cold War as 'an outgrowth of the history of American foreign relations'.⁴ Yet a more internationalist understanding of the conflict gradually emerged. In the 1970s and 1980s, British Cold War studies acknowledged the importance of US-Soviet rivalry but also unearthed evidence of Britain's role in the propaganda, diplomacy, intelligence, counter-insurgencies and arms negotiations that defined the era. Evidence was most commonly found in the 'first Cold War'. Worried about Stalin's intentions after World War Two, British statesmen were determined to mobilise their allies into the defence of the 'free world', particularly the United States, which looked set on a return to isolationism. An early instance was Winston Churchill's 'Iron Curtain' speech of March 1946, which not only denounced Soviet communism but also railed against the 'Communist fifth columns' which Churchill saw as 'a growing challenge and peril to Christian civilisation'.⁵ A few years later, Whitehall set up a covert propaganda bureau, the IRD, to classify and publicise the Soviet threat to a global audience. The warnings issued by the Foreign Office helped to secure US assistance for regimes threatened by left-wing subversion, as formalised by the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan in 1947, and to encourage US engagement in West Germany, Turkey, Greece and Iran. Britain's successes in the realm of propaganda were repeated in other areas of activity. Alongside defending its empire against Soviet encroachment, the government participated in rollback operations in eastern Europe, armed interventions in the Middle East and Asia and intelligence networks that straddled the globe. There were even hopes that Britain could refashion western Europe as a global third force. The Labour Foreign Secretary, Ernest Bevin, was convinced that greater unity between 'the countries of Western Europe but also their Colonial possessions in Africa and the East [...] would form a *bloc* which, both in population and productive

capacity, could stand on an equality with the western hemisphere and the Soviet blocs'.⁶ It was with this in mind that Bevin played a major part in the allied occupation of Germany, in the negotiation of the Brussels Pact (1948) and in the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty (1949).⁷ With British participation continuing in the summitry of Churchill, Anthony Eden and Harold Macmillan in the 1950s, there is a strong sense of a nation operating at the heart of international events. As Sean Greenwood argues, 'Britain helped shape the contours of the Cold War not just in terms of strategic geography, but also in its language and concepts; containment, globalism, deterrence and *détente* were already part of the thinking of British planners and politicians before being appropriated by the Americans'.⁸

There is no doubt that British influence lessened during the drift to *détente* in the 1960s. The institutionalisation of US-Soviet hostility, which worked to stabilise the conflict into distinct spheres of influence, downgraded the diplomatic efforts of western European nations. Although military flashpoints remained, the emphasis was on what Nikita Khrushchev termed 'peaceful co-existence', particularly after the Cuban Crisis of 1962, when the Soviets placed missile bases on Cuba, only ninety miles off the US coast, and brought the world to the brink of nuclear confrontation.⁹ The new climate of caution and accommodation was assisted by the rise of communist China as a third superpower. Finding a rival on its eastern border, Moscow was obliged to scale down hostilities with the West and to enter a new era of tripartite negotiation, one that offered few openings for Britain's Cold War planners. Henry Kissinger, who had engineered Richard Nixon's historic visit to Peking in 1972, was convinced of their irrelevance from the mid-1960s: 'British statesmen were content to act as honoured consultants in our deliberations', he remarked: 'with every passing year they acted less as if their decisions mattered'.¹⁰ The decline in British involvement was hastened by economic downturn in the late 1960s. Once the prosperity of the post-war decades passed to recession, the nation's attempts to maintain the costs of a nuclear defence, an essential factor in securing a seat at the 'top table', had a damaging effect on its balance of payments, reducing its ability to take part in the conflict. In the realms of intelligence and propaganda, Britain certainly continued to outperform other second-tier countries, and in terms of military engagement its armed forces operated in the Middle East and Asia, even offering assistance to the US military in Vietnam and to the *mujahidin* in Afghanistan. It can also claim

diplomatic successes in Macmillan's work on the Partial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty of 1963 and Harold Wilson's promotion of the Non-Proliferation Treaty of 1968, even if the outcome was the increased irrelevance during *détente*. In the 1980s, when relations between Washington and Moscow deteriorated, the intermediary role that British politicians played in superpower diplomacy was a significant achievement but pales in comparison to the momentous events of the 'second Cold War' and had little influence on the historic collapse of the eastern bloc. By this late stage of the conflict, Brian White observes, Britain was no longer 'an initiator, still less an architect, of Western policy in the way that the Attlee government had been [...] in the late 1940s'.¹¹

The activities of political elites, however, are not the only gauge of a nation's involvement in geopolitical events. Britain may have steadily lost ground in global decision-making, but the population still lived with the direct and often damaging consequences of that decision-making. This was clearly the case for British service personnel fighting in counter-insurgencies, for civil defence volunteers preparing for the aftermath of a nuclear strike and for the legion of imperial administrators, government officials, technicians and engineers implementing political policy at home and abroad. More extensively, there were the miseries of a general populace who, in Mary Kaldor's words, 'lived with the permanent anxiety of war, and with many of the forms of organization and control that are characteristic of war'.¹² The kind of anxieties that Kaldor has in mind—surveillance, military threat, political oppression—had a profound impact on social and cultural practice and created what Hugh Wilford terms a 'Cold War consciousness', a harmful mixture of paranoia and vulnerability common in quasi-militarised societies.¹³ It is this area of history as a lived experience that literature has been particularly adept at exploring. Although plenty of writers engaged with the events occurring at national and international level, plenty more used their writing to explore the impact of these events on the individual and community. As the following chapter will examine, the overlap was particularly powerful in late twentieth-century dystopianism, which, as an intrinsically political genre, was ideally suited for analysing the interrelations between the public realms of domestic and foreign policy and the supposedly private realms of emotion, outlook and behaviour. More specifically, it dramatized the complex effects of the political centralism, militarism, nuclearism, espionage and propaganda used in the ideological contest between socialism and capitalism, a set of features which, taken together, can be considered

the thematics of Cold War writing. When speculating on possible futures, it was this set of features that dystopian authors typically chose to intensify in order to capture the lived experiences of the period.

The themes of British Cold War dystopianism emerged fully formed in George Orwell's *Nineteen Eighty-Four*. In the famous tale, an atomic war has led to the emergence of three international power blocs—centred on the Soviet Union, the United States and China—which have attained the nuclear capability necessary for national defence but which still wage, via conventional weaponry, an ongoing war over peripheral territories in the Third World. In this global impasse, Britain has been reduced to a lowly satellite of Oceania, the US-led bloc, and is beset by power cuts and shortages. More urgently, it is governed by an oligarchy that, despite professing a form of socialism, evolves a cult of leadership around its symbolic patriarch, Big Brother, and achieves complete control of the population. For the protagonist, Winston Smith, a party functionary engaged in propaganda work at the 'Ministry of Truth', the outcome is a nightmarish cycle of perpetual defeat. Despite having the same dreams of working-class revolution as the author ('*If there is hope*', Winston believes, '*it lies in the proles*'), there is no means of toppling a regime that has elevated absolute power into a creed.¹⁴ "One does not establish a dictatorship in order to safeguard a revolution", an inner party member tells him: "one makes the revolution in order to establish the dictatorship. The object of persecution is persecution. The object of torture is torture. The object of power is power" (227). The epigrammatic confidence of the speech conceals the fact that global conflict is not strictly necessary. As Winston discovers, the struggle between the superpowers is not a genuine attempt to secure global dominance, nor a method of supplying material needs, but a means of pacifying the domestic population, turning the average citizen into 'credulous and ignorant fanatic whose prevailing moods are fear, hatred, adulation, and orgiastic triumph' (168). At the same time, continuous warfare is necessary for destroying the products of industrial labour and keeping society in a condition of want ('if leisure and security were enjoyed by all alike', we are told, 'the great mass of human beings who are normally stupefied by poverty would become literate and would learn to think for themselves; and once they had done this, they would sooner or later realize that the privileged minority had no function') (167). With the three blocs pursuing the same goal, the Cold War is conceived by Orwell as a symbiotic relationship designed to maintain the power of its participants. In this sense, the

classic summary of the novel's prophesy ("If you want a picture of the future, imagine a boot stamping on a human face—for ever") is less a warning against a totalitarian nation than a counsel against a militarised world (230). As this chapter aims to show, the force of Orwell's vision had a profound influence on speculative fiction for the next forty years, with few dystopian novels departing from its fundamentally Cold War matrix of ideological conflict, nuclear anxiety, propaganda, espionage and tyranny.

The only major departure from *Nineteen Eighty-Four* was a rejection of Orwell's stand against the right-wing propaganda of the age. Ironically, the official campaign against the left began during Clement Attlee's Labour government of 1945–1951. On the surface of things, this was committed to an amelioration of the worst excesses of capitalism, nationalising coal, iron and steel, legislating for full employment and establishing the 'cradle to grave' security of the Welfare State, which increased social spending on health, welfare, education and pensions.¹⁵ The euphoria felt by many in the Labour Party, who believed they had found a 'third way' between US capitalism and Soviet communism, was captured by the Chancellor of the Exchequer: 'That first sensation, tingling and triumphant, was of a new society to be built', Hugh Dalton later wrote: 'We felt exalted, dedicated, walking on air, walking with destiny'.¹⁶ Yet the creation of a 'new society' was not the Party's major aim. Mindful of the radicalism of the 1930s, when economic recession had provoked public demonstrations and a rise of Communist Party and International Labour Party membership, Attlee's intention was to use social welfare to ward off political unrest. With eighty per cent of the economy remaining in private hands, there was no significant alteration in the relations between labour and capital and no redistribution of wealth or power, despite the trickledown effect of the economic boom in the 1950s. As John Hill points out, the utopian declarations of front-benchers like Dalton took no account of the persistence of economic hardship and social division, and as such the 'boom' was partly a political myth, one that aimed to 'cover over the gaps between real inequalities and the promised utopia of equality-for-all'.¹⁷ The conservatism of the period was also manifest in other areas of policy. It was the Labour government, deeply suspicious of Soviet intentions, that established the IRD in 1948 and mounted a propaganda campaign against both foreign and domestic communists, with Attlee himself using radio broadcasts to urge the nation to 'guard against the enemy within'.¹⁸ Although the

paranoia of the period did not lead to a British version of McCarthyism, the Labour Party still ejected members with communist links, advocated a purge of communists from branches of the civil service and tasked MI5 with vetting employees of the BBC.¹⁹ The 'red scare' years set the tone for the decades to come. Despite the victory of the Conservative Party in 1951, the tenets of Keynesian social democracy were retained as a way of weakening the socialist cause, a policy continued by successive governments in the 1960s and 1970s, many of which were deeply opposed to progressive politics. The scale of the opposition fully emerged in the 1980s with Thatcher's sustained attacks on social justice and economic equality and her blunt rejection of communism as 'a modern version of the early tyrannies of history'.²⁰

An early indication of how dystopian fiction would align itself to dominant political narratives came in Evelyn Waugh's *Love among the Ruins* (1953). A committed member of the literary right, Waugh felt such disgust at the apparent socialism of the late 1940s that he viewed Attlee's government as an 'enemy occupation'.²¹ In *Love among the Ruins*, his political views emerge in a caustic satire on the Welfare State, overlooking both its origins in the 1942 Beveridge Report, written by the liberal William Beveridge, and its muted support from sections of the Conservative Party.²² Miles Plastic, the novella's protagonist, is a former trainee serviceman who burns down an Air Force base in a moment of madness and is interned in a prison populated by murderers and sex offenders. Set in a former country house, the prison's grand interiors, landscaped gardens and lavish entertainments work as an obvious symbol of the pampering and overspending that Waugh attributed to social welfare. Added to this is the state's preference for the lower classes. In his infancy, Miles's parents had enjoyed a measure of material comfort but were bankrupted by socialist economic policy and obliged to leave Miles at an orphanage; the state then lavished upon him 'sums which, fifty years earlier, would have sent whole quiversful of boys to Winchester and New College and established them in the learned professions'.²³ The overturning of the social order, which has left university graduates trying to enter 'the ranks of the workers' in order to advance themselves, is also seen when Miles is rehabilitated and gains automatic employment in the Ministry of Welfare's most active sector, the Department of Euthanasia (196). A workplace of choice for ambitious civil servants, the department processes a steady stream of 'welfare-weary citizens' from the new 'Population Centres', described as standardised, shoddily built

conurbations plagued by strikes and power cuts and deadened by an official culture of 'People's Choirs' and 'community-songs' (196, 189, 191, 186). Waugh's heavy-handed satire on the socialist utopia extends to those who sought that utopia. For example, the ideologically disillusioned Dr. Beamish, the head of Miles's Euthanasia Centre, is a man

whose character had been formed in the nervous thirties, now much embittered, like many of his contemporaries, by the fulfilment of his early hopes. He had signed manifestoes in his hot youth, had raised his fist in Barcelona, and had painted abstractedly for *Horizon*; he had stood beside Spender at great concourses of Youth, and written 'publicity' for the Last Viceroy. Now his reward had come to him.²⁴

Importantly, Waugh's resentment is directed not only at socialists but also at those members of the political right who compromised with left-wing centralism for the sake of social stability. Under the governments of Churchill, Macmillan and Eden, centralised planning had extended from social reform to industrial expansion and urban regeneration and had soon helped to create the economic growth of the 1950s, when wages doubled, unemployment fell to a historical low and consumer goods became widely available for the first time.²⁵ In the latter half of the decade, Macmillan was claiming that 'most of our people have never had it so good' and even sections of the Labour Party were admitting that '[w]e stand on the threshold of mass abundance'.²⁶ For Waugh, such utopian assertions masked a multitude of social sins. In the novella, there is significance in the fact that euthanasia was not part of the original legislation on welfare in the 1940s but a product of the later 'Bevan-Eden Coalition', a cross-party alliance of Labour and the Conservatives that had its historical equivalent in 'Butskellism' (a term coined by *The Economist* to describe the consensual economics of the Tory Chancellor, R.A. Butler, and his opposite number, Hugh Gaitskell) (194). The result may have been a lessening of radical dissent, even a reduction of ideological infiltration from "our neighbour in the East", but left much to be desired for political idealists (188).

As with British literature in general, dystopian fiction was dominated by the battle against left-wing ideologies waged by the literary right. Waugh's disgruntled Toryism recurred in L.P. Hartley's *Facial Justice* (1960), James Barlow's *The Hour of Maximum Danger* (1962), Emma Tennant's *The Last of the Country House Murders* (1974) and Anthony

Burgess's *1985* (1978), each denouncing the 'secrecy, silent power [and] senseless destruction' pursued by socialist governments and communist fifth columns.²⁷ In *1985*, Burgess accepts the differences between socialism and Stalinism but still insists on the dangers of left-wing administrations: 'a bigger bureaucracy, [...] a social security apparatus that costs too much, a mass of "equalizing" laws not easily enforceable, and a necessary thwarting of individual, as opposed to collective, endeavour'.²⁸ This is not to say that conservative authors went unchallenged. Although rarely studied in scholarship, left-wing dystopianism existed in the period, with Raymond Williams, Naomi Mitchison, Adrian Mitchell and John Brunner railing against the iniquities of state capitalism.²⁹ During Thatcher's term in office, Zoe Fairbairn's *Benefits* (1979), Caroline Forbes's *The Needle on Full* (1985), Gwyneth Jones's *Kairos* (1988), Fay Weldon's *The Cloning of Joanna May* (1989) and Storm Constantine's *The Monstrous Regiment* (1990) developed a specifically feminist critique of the depredations of neo-liberal economics. Even authors who showed no overt commitment to socialism occasionally considered its benefits, dreaming of a time when 'mutual competition should cease' (Rex Gordon), when 'a new ethos will bind men [*sic*] of all races and nations in harmony' (Richard Pape) and when 'all subdivisions within our society and within our world [are] treated as being of equal importance' (Sheila MacLeod).³⁰ There were also texts in which the focus was less on left- or right-wing authoritarianism than on any manifestation of political tyranny. The nihilistic credo of Orwell's Ingsoc—'The object of power is power'—is found in a number of fictional despotisms, where "power-mad paranoics" cause "a fantastic maelstrom of intelligently organised thuggery" or where political managerialism ensures that 'all important decisions affecting the structure of human society [are] taken in committee', reducing citizens to "ciphers in some enormous statistical scheme".³¹ Nevertheless, the criticism of the labour movement always predominated. When placed alongside dystopian portraits of the eastern bloc, examined in the next chapter, the phenomenon appears so extensive that dystopianism can be linked to the wider genre of containment fiction, that form of Cold War writing that condemned the left with the same propagandistic fervour as the IRD.

The links between literary culture and state propaganda was not without its ironies. Although dystopian fiction largely endorsed the anti-communist crusade, it also functioned as a medium for questioning the ways the crusade was waged. The point can be clarified through an

extended definition of the Cold War. If there is a distinction to be made between ‘cold war’ and ‘hot war’ then the former must entail the pursuit of victory through political strategies that, while allowing military preparedness, seek to avoid military engagement. Accordingly, the actual Cold War of 1945–1990 has been described as ‘a state of extreme tension between the superpowers, stopping short of all-out war but characterised by mutual hostility and involvement [...] by indirect means’.³² While interventionism was not ruled out by the superpowers, military combat with the enemy bloc was exchanged for the more indirect processes of propaganda, espionage and nuclear deterrence. Of these, the technique of public persuasion, or the battle for the hearts and minds of domestic and foreign populations, was particularly central to Cold War governance.³³ This took an extreme form in US rhetoric which, as Anders Stephanson argues, constructed the opposition between communism and capitalism via an aggravated ‘language of evil plots, sins and sinners, demons and saviors, corruption and redemption, dramatic choices in the name of humanity by anointed leaders on the edge of the abyss’, all of which was rooted in the ‘radical Protestantism’ of the seventeenth century.³⁴ Yet Britain had equal claim to the creation and practice of psychological warfare. For John Lewis Gaddis, the message emerging from the IRD ‘revealed an assessment of the Soviet threat more sweeping in character and apocalyptic in tone than anything in the record of private or public statements by major American officials’.³⁵ The coming decades saw the IRD achieve global influence through the hundreds of staff it stationed across the Third World, where the organisation’s briefing papers were circulated via MI6-funded radio stations, news agencies and newspapers, as well as by the BBC’s Overseas Service, whose worldwide reputation for impartiality made it a far more effective medium for propaganda than Voice of America.

The propagandistic strategies of distortion, disinformation, concealment and censorship were viewed with suspicion, if not outright hostility, in dystopian literature. Despite voicing their own ideological preferences, left- and right-wing authors were critical of “‘non-stop propaganda’”, ‘childish propaganda’, ‘clap-trap propaganda’ and “‘phoney propaganda’”, targeting both Soviet declarations about ‘the spiritual superiority of the Communist way of life’ and the ‘overkill-escalation-death-to-the-Reds mentality’ that guided western rhetoric.³⁶ The most detailed criticism came in two texts from the liberal-left: Doris Lessing’s *Documents Relating to the Sentimental Agents in the Volyen*

Empire (1983) and Angela Carter's *The Infernal Desire Machines of Doctor Hoffman* (1972).³⁷ The first of these, an instalment of the novel series 'Canopus in Argos' (1979–1983), deals with the attempts by an agent of the Canopean Empire to keep watch on two rival empires as they compete over a string of small planets in a distant part of the galaxy. In the reports that Klorathy sends back to Canopus, the Volyen and Sirian Empires are equally tyrannical in their treatment of colonised populations, which in turn have become riddled with violent anti-imperial groups. With all sides pursuing their goals through propaganda, the enslaved citizens are torn between the claims of imperial rulers, who are 'prisoners of their own Rhetoric and can no longer distinguish between fact and their own fictions', and the claims of resistance movements 'whose only aim is to become, in their turn, rulers who will govern through Rhetoric'.³⁸ Inevitably, the aim of such rhetoric is to conceal rather than to reveal truth. As in Orwell's *Nineteen Eighty-Four*, where the regime disguises the barbarism of its rule with the euphemisms 'War is Peace', 'Freedom is Slavery' and 'Ignorance is Strength', each governing elite uses language to evoke its dominion as 'some sort of Utopia', recasting 'tyrants [...] as benefactors, butchers as social surgeons, sadists as saints [and] war as peace'.³⁹ Klorathy is soon faced with the human consequences. One of his duties in the Volyen Empire is to look after a fellow agent, Incent, who has fallen under the sway of anti-Volyen propaganda and is recuperating in the Hospital for Rhetorical Diseases, a Canopean institution for treating such symptoms as elation, aggression, sentimentality, "self-righteousness" and 'heady partisan enthusiasms' (91, 18). In a clear reference to the Cold War, Klorathy finds patients who are suffering from the delusions that 'capitalism equals injustice, communism equals injustice, a free market equals progress, [...] the dictatorship of the proletariat must be followed by the withering away of the state. And so on' (22). For Incent, a particularly dangerous word is 'history', as Klorathy discovers when conducting a series of tests on the stricken agent:

At this word itself, he was able to maintain composure. The word *historical* caused his pulse to quicken, but then it steadied. At *historical processes*, he remained firm. *Perspective of history*—so far so good. *Winds of history*—he showed signs of agitation. These did not decrease. I then decided, wrongly, to increase the dose, trying *logic of history*. At this point I began to realize the hopelessness of it, for his breathing was rapid, his face pale,

his pupils dilating. [...] But it was not until *dustbin of history* that I gave up. He was on his feet, wildly exultant, both arms held up, preparatory to launching himself into declamation, and I said, 'Incent, *what* are we going to do with you?' (35)

As the passage dramatizes, the process of brainwashing affects the physical self as much as the mind, often causing in Incent 'a permanent high fever of Rhetoric' (65). The various treatments used to combat his condition—Basic Rhetoric, Benign Immersion, Total Immersion—have only limited effect. For example, a course of Basic Rhetoric, which entails watching footage of indoctrinated populations 'fighting each other [...] in the most vile and brutal conditions, for aims that are to be judged as stupid, self-deluding, and greedy by their own immediate descendants', barely rouses Incent from his sickness (19). Nor does the novel offer a clear solution. As imperial competition intensifies, and the weakening Volyen regime is overrun by the Sirian army, a glimmer of hope is produced when the Sirian troops, many of them impoverished subjects of other Sirian colonies, are angered by their deprivation and rebel against their imperial masters. Any optimism caused by the rebellion, however, is offset by the ending of the novel, when Incent suffers a relapse and returns to a state of ideological arousal. Indeed, Klorathy himself is not immune to the 'verbal effluvia' and 'the orgies of words, words, words' which surround him: having heard so much inflated rhetoric, he senses that his reports to Canopus are 'from time to time [...] infected by the style'.⁴⁰

While Lessing's novel draws on the motifs of science fiction, Carter's *The Infernal Desire Machines of Doctor Hoffman* turns to magic realism to capture the impossibility of distinguishing between fact and fiction in times of heightened propaganda.⁴¹ The novel concerns the eruption of civil war in an unnamed South American country that prides itself on the traditions of rationality and materialism. The narrator, a young civil servant called Desiderio, is bored by the country's 'smug, impenetrable, bourgeois affluence', although is no more enthused when an eccentric renegade, the titular Doctor Hoffman, determines to take control of the state and besieges his city.⁴² The siege is not conducted by conventional military means but by a barrage of images ('chanting pillars', 'winged jaguars', 'imaginary massacres'), which occur entirely in the symbolic realm and capture the non-material procedures of psychological warfare (11, 18, 19). Indeed, the immediate target of the

Doctor's magical offensive is not the political framework of the state but the rationalist ideology that buttresses it, assuming that once the ideology is discredited the state will collapse. While Desiderio remains convinced of the unreality of the Doctor's weapons, he is doubtful that the city offers anything more substantial. The local leader, the Minister of Determination, is untroubled by 'the slightest quiver of empirical uncertainty' and turns to scientific methods to defend the population, not only transmitting 'propaganda broadcast[s]' but also declaring absolutist decrees on signification: that is, 'a strict control of [...] actualities by adjusting their names to agree with them perfectly' and by ensuring that 'no shadow would fall between the word and the thing described' (22, 206, 194, 194). Although these 'ideological weapons' have some success, the Minister's manipulation of public opinion foreshadows more authoritarian methods of containment (194). As public order begins to break down, the Minister declares a state of emergency, increases police powers and transforms society into something 'recruited wholesale from a Jewish nightmare' (22). The state that fights against totalitarianism, Carter's allegory informs us, risks totalitarianism itself.⁴³ The emerging parallels between the antagonists become clear when Desiderio is tasked with hunting down and assassinating the Doctor. His liminal role as secret agent brings insight to the strategies of the two warring factions and destabilises their binary positions in the conflict. Aware that murdering the Doctor will only encourage the Minister's dreams of 'megalthic grandeur', Desiderio is faced with two unappealing alternatives, or with what he calls 'the casting vote between a barren and harmonious calm and a fertile yet cacophonous tempest' (29, 207). In short, this is the East–West conflict as 'looking-glass war', as Philip Taylor describes it, one in which two superpowers, 'star[ing] aggressively at each other through the Iron Curtain, [...] were in fact seeing a reflection of themselves'.⁴⁴

Carter was part of a new generation of British novelists who, as the Cold War entered its fourth decade, addressed contemporary history with a distinctly postmodernist sensibility. The demystification of official rhetoric in dystopian novels, which 'set out to destabilize and/or reconstruct the subjectivity of their readers', was part of a wider literary investigation into the fantastical nature of political truth-claims, an investigation also occurring in such New Wave novels as Michael Moorcock's *The Final Programme* (1968), Brian Aldiss's *Barefoot in the Head* (1969) and J.G. Ballard's *The Atrocity Exhibition* (1970).⁴⁵ Alongside writers'

mistrust of totalising systems of belief was their self-reflexive treatment of literature itself, with Julian Barnes, Emma Tennant, Ian McEwan and Salman Rushdie using the constructed world of the text as a metaphor for the constructed nature of the extra-textual world. Indeed, the techniques used to evoke their futures—language games, convoluted plots, paranoid conspiracies, deferrals of closure—mirrored the political and experiential intricacies of Cold War history, achieving narrative form for the ontological notion of superpower conflict as a constructed or staged reality. Mary Kaldor expressed the notion succinctly when she termed the conflict an ‘imaginary war’, one that existed only ‘in the scenarios of military planners, in the games and stories of espionage and counter-espionage [and] in the hostile rhetoric of politicians and newspapers’.⁴⁶ While the argument could be contested by those suffering in military conflict or struggling under repressive police states, it captures the experience of western populations distanced from the most chilling aspects of the Cold War. The suspicion that political discourse was part of a much wider project of indoctrination emerges in authors’ treatment of technology, another area in which the futuristic projections of science fiction overlapped with the anticipatory quality of postmodernism. The ‘reality modifying machines’ of Doctor Hoffman have counterparts in the ‘truth-evacuating drugs’, ‘psychic Y-ray photographs’, ‘soft-termination facilities’ and ‘all the latest gadgets of capital and corporal punishment’ which characterised ‘scientific dictatorship’ in other novels.⁴⁷ The governmental control of the mind was not the only technophobic prophecy that writers made, but it was a particularly common one. As mentioned earlier, Robert Conquest’s *A World of Difference* is not unusual in fearing the restriction of psychological autonomy through ‘psycho-technicians’, ‘psycho-compellers’, “psychosemantic control exercises” and other ‘psycho-techniques capable of altering whole personalities’.⁴⁸ The endless recurrence of such neologisms in dystopian fiction (‘psycho-hospitals’, ‘psycho-surgeons’, ‘medico-psychiatric treatments’) indicates the widespread anxiety about scientific techniques of governance.⁴⁹ This anxiety was acute in writings that addressed the emerging Internet age. Julian Barnes’s *Staring at the Sun* (1986), for example, foresees a computer programme that stores ‘the whole of human knowledge’ and places users under strict surveillance, making knowledge ‘subject to political manipulation’.⁵⁰ If there was a single cause of the ‘paralysis of utopian thought and imagination’, in Northrop Frye’s phrase, then the adaptation of technology to social engineering was it.⁵¹

The fear of covert manipulation was heightened by the expansion of the secret services, a second Cold War process foregrounded in dystopian fiction. Although intelligence activity had developed during the First and Second World Wars, it evolved so rapidly during the Cold War that some 400 semi-secret governmental organisations soon existed amongst the world's 150 nations, indicating the perceived importance of intelligence to national defence. 'Secret service is fundamental to any understanding of the Cold War', Richard Aldrich argues, because '[t]he Cold War was fought, above all, by the intelligence services'.⁵² Again, this may be viewed as a western-centric assumption, hardly believable for those stricken by warfare and oppression, but it is certainly relevant to the 'intelligence/industrial complex' that existed in Britain.⁵³ On the one hand, intelligence in foreign territories was conducted by MI6, or the Secret Intelligence Service, which installed listening posts in the remnants of the empire and participated in military campaigns, covert operations and information gathering around the world. On the other hand, responsibility for counter-subversion at home was shared between MI5, the Special Branch and the Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ), which directed a programme of phone tapping, mail opening and infiltration against unionists and left-wing activists. For members of the public, the shadowy world of intelligence and counter-intelligence hinted at a vast conspiracy taking place beneath the normal order of things; even intelligence operatives started to view their profession as a 'wilderness of mirrors' in which 'lies are truth, truth lies, and the reflections leave you dazzled and confused'.⁵⁴ The combination of unknowability and alienation made the spy novel one of the key Cold War genres, particularly the new realist school of Graham Greene, Eric Ambler, John le Carré and Len Deighton, which exchanged the sensationalism of earlier espionage writers for gritty accounts of subterfuge, betrayal and death. With its focus on the unchecked power of institutions, and particularly on the solitary agent 'out in the cold', spy fiction was not without dystopian qualities, evoking a 'worst of all possible worlds' composed of political violence and existential despair. As a result, criticism was soon arguing that the spy narrative is 'a major expressive phenomenon of modern culture' and that '[t]he soul of the spy is somehow the model of our own'.⁵⁵

The metonymic potential of espionage was understood by novelists working outside the spy genre, who not only condemned secret-service activity but also used that activity to symbolise the institutional and psychological crises of modern society. In dystopian fiction, the technique

was exemplified by the work of Doris Lessing, who often observed that ‘rulers make it their business to know what went on in the lower reaches of their administrations’, ‘[t]hat a great deal of what is going on [...] remains the property of small castes and juntas’ and that the government ‘taps telephones, opens letters and keeps dossiers on its citizens’.⁵⁶ Such criticisms were repeated in Pamela Kettle’s *The Day of the Women* (1969), Raymond Williams’s *The Volunteers* (1978) and Ian McEwan’s *The Child in Time* (1987), in which clandestinity blurs the boundary between public and private by branching into the realms of the media, the workplace and childcare. A fear of the secret services even pervaded less serious texts. Peter Fleming’s *The Sixth Column* (1951), which appears to satirise the Bond series that the author’s brother would create several years later, finds amusement in ‘the *demi-monde* of clandestine intelligence’, the kind of modest bureau tasked with ‘the prevention of sabotage to lighthouses and to piers’, but still raises the serious question of whether “[t]oo much security [...] is far worse than too little”.⁵⁷ The point was echoed in the technophobic fantasies of science fiction, which dwelt on the perils of ‘electronic surveillance’, ‘electronic eavesdroppers’ and ‘electronic eyes’, its targets ranging from the ‘new devices [...] to spot mail bombs and concealed weapons at frontier posts and airports’ to the ‘cunningly concealed microphones [and] tape-recorders’ in civilian homes.⁵⁸ Again, the discussion occasionally drifted into satire. Rex Gordon’s description of an international science conference in *Utopia Minus X* (1966) finds “something ludicrous about the spectacle of the two security forces, of east and west, trying to trap the world’s best technicians with hidden microphones”.⁵⁹ Yet the usual approach was a serious study of the contradiction between clandestinity and democratic governance. As a member of the security services admits in Gordon’s *The Yellow Faction* (1972), ‘[t]here has never been a government yet, whether a dictatorship or a so-called nominal democracy, that, having set up an organization of our kind, has not found its actions guided, ultimately, into the most appalling mistakes, or into paths of action that have nothing to do with its own aims, but everything to do with the interests of the organization which it has itself created’.⁶⁰ Clearly, Fleming was not alone in sensing that the self-serving omnipotence of intelligence agencies was a primary cause of ‘the alarm and despondency with which so many of my fellow-countrymen [*sic*] appear to contemplate the future’.⁶¹

The social impact of clandestinity was most fully examined in Adrian Mitchell’s *The Bodyguard* (1970). Significantly, the novel was published after a decade in which the official secrecy surrounding MI6 and

GCHQ had been threatened by a series of high profile spy scandals. These included the Portland Spy Ring, the Profumo Affair and the official admission of Kim Philby's role in the 'Cambridge Five', all of which began to expose the nature and extent of secret service activity, as did the revelations in the late 1960s of governmental intrusion into the lives of private citizens.⁶² It is this atmosphere of 'spy fever' that Mitchell aims to document. Set in the mid-1980s, *The Bodyguard* depicts a Britain riddled with subversive political groups—collectively known as 'The Rot'—which threaten revolution across western Europe. In response, an authoritarian government, backed by an increasingly intrusive European Community, retains power through rigged elections, a complicit media and a host of security agencies, including the European Riot Police, the Warden Force, the Civil Police, the Media Police and a thuggish outfit known as the 'bodyguards'. The first-person narrative is delivered by a security operative, Len Rossman, who dictates his life story into a tape-recorder as he recovers from injuries sustained after the assassination of a new hard-line Prime Minister, Commander Daniel Gray. As Rossman relates, one function of the security agencies is to advertise the power of the state, aiming to reduce public dissent by intimidation. For example, the European Riot Police carry around 'gas grenades and [...] mini-napalm eggs' and dress imposingly in a garish yellow costume of shoulder pads, groin protectors, studded jackets, helmets and goggles.⁶³ Yet another crucial function of the security agencies is covert work: the Civil Police are 'glorified street- and parish-informers', the bodyguards are 'unknown to the public' and even the flamboyant European Riot Police engage in the under-cover practices of surveillance, infiltration and information-gathering (14, 10). During his time with the 'Yellows', Rossman acts as an *agent provocateur* amongst revolutionary groups at the University of Oxford, provided with a fake scholarship and a collection of 'subvert books' and required to 'establish myself a reputation as a mystery man of action, red as hell and let's stuff all this chat' (22, 23). Mitchell's choice of a university setting is significant. Along with its series of spy scandals, the 1960s saw a growth of semi-covert militant groups—the Vietnam Solidarity Campaign, the Radical Students' Alliance and the Angry Brigade, as well as range of Trotskyist and Maoist groups—who found ready support from an increasingly radicalised student movement.⁶⁴ The emergence of the 'campus war' explains the government's paranoid security policy, which focuses not only on areas of social deprivation, all '[t]hose run-down, broken up cities' where life is 'jagged, unsafe, ugly and violent', but also on universities, each of which has been allocated 'a super-tight

security system of its own' (98, 109, 97). As Rossman ascends to the status of bodyguard, tasked with protecting members of the establishment with his 'booby-traps, electronic spies and bugs', he becomes convinced that the security system needs to expand into every corner of British society. 'Harm is always done by neglect', he intones: 'there can be no no-man's land in the whole universe' (166, 184).

What lifts Mitchell's novel above other portraits of surveillance society is its analysis of the impact of clandestinity on psychological and emotional life. Most obviously, *The Bodyguard* describes the personal self-censorship required to survive under a regime that believes "everything everyone does is political" (99). The comment is made by Finn Murdoch, an apparently faithful bodyguard who inspires Rossman to join the organisation and who admits that paranoia and suspicion have destroyed all possibility of trust between citizens: "everyone goes round afraid of other people", he remarks: "some of them bluster it out [...] but they're all being eaten up, eaten up alive" (45). The trials of isolation are aggravated by the inevitable ignorance that marks a society in which "almost every kind of truth can be twisted right around through one hundred and eighty degrees to serve any cause you care to name" (149). Rossman discovers this for himself when he attends an elite school for bodyguards to study under Commander Gray, the future Prime Minister. The training school, Hollow Hill, functions as a metaphor for the impossibility of truth in a modern security state:

You never know what will happen the next day or which part of the course you will be assigned to [...]. Orders may conflict. One day you may be given a personal order to spend the next twelve hours contemplating in silence and learning by heart the mechanisms of various firearms, but you have to perform this while you're carrying out other orders [...]. Another trainee may have been instructed to attack and disable (without maiming) as many other trainees as possible without being caught. Yet another may be playing the role of a subvert, attempting to spread disaffection, again without being reported. No wonder trainees crack. (53–54)

The unknowingness experienced at Hollow Hill enters the narrative form. Rossman's intention in recording his memoirs is to produce a training manual for young bodyguards that will help to ensure 'an England and a Europe which are both strong and clean' (34). While the aim is clearly stated, the result is complicated by the fact that

Rossman is not alone in the room, but is attended by a figure, hidden from the patient, who draws out the narrative by a mixture of chemical inducement and interrogation. The occasional doubts that Rossman expresses—‘I sometimes feel as if I am dictating this against my will’—create an atmosphere of menace, one not dispelled by the final revelation that the unidentified figure is Finn Murdoch and that Murdoch has been working for ‘The Rot’ all along (34). The short afterword that Murdoch attaches to the text also reveals that the revolution has succeeded, that Commander Grey has been an undercover agent and that they intend to use Rossman’s memoirs to propagandise against ‘the insanity of pre-revolutionary England’ (187). The afterword exposes the unreliability of the preceding narration, which, as Murdoch says, is ‘a tangle of facts and fantasies, distorted sexuality, obscured dates, anti-feminism, glorified brutality and narcissism’ (187). Yet there is no reason to suppose that the frame narrative is any more objective. Admitting that he has edited and excised parts of the memoir, Murdoch comes across as a shadowy manipulator, enjoying absolute power over the text, as well as the body, of the vulnerable Rossman, and pursuing a form of clandestinity that mirrors the practices of the former regime. At the same time, the insistence on Rossman’s unreliability as a servant of tyranny does not negate his criticisms of ‘The Rot’. The movement includes the ‘old-established parties like the New Maoists, the Old Maoists, Cubans, Trots’ and a welter of newly formed ‘sabotage/assassination groups’, all of which are as committed to violence as the government they destroy (34, 29–30). Mitchell’s full-fronted satire on militant groups refuses to believe, simplistically, that a right-right dystopia can be replaced by a left-wing utopia. Indeed, it is significant that Mitchell, a left-wing author, finds no answer to Britain’s future crisis in the Labour Party, which has already renamed itself the ‘New Labour Party’ and become ‘about as threatening to the State as convolvulus’ (34).

This inability of dystopian authors to conceive solutions for the crises they described was nowhere as evident as in the final area of debate, the proliferation of nuclear technologies.⁶⁵ After committing itself to an atomic arsenal in 1947, Britain tested its own bomb and delivery system a few years later, securing the hydrogen bomb in the late 1950s and purchasing the Polaris missile system in the 1960s. From the late 1940s, it also allowed US atomic bombers to be stationed on British soil, a move that helped to secure the Atlantic alliance but that also made Britain ‘the bull’s eye of a Soviet attack’, in Churchill’s words.⁶⁶ By the 1960s, it was

estimated that all British military airfields were targeted by Soviet intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBMs), each with a yield equivalent to some 1,000,000 tons of TNT. With only a small number of these needed to wipe out the entire population, Britain was especially vulnerable to the dangers of the arms race, as dystopian authors pointed out. For example, Storm Jameson describes “an island the size when it comes to atomic war of a beetle under a navy’s foot” and Doreen Wallace imagines “a nation of fifty million [...] blown into fifty million fragments”.⁶⁷ Along with the immediate destruction of nuclear war were the ravages of its aftermath. Martin Amis, critiquing the colossal overproduction of nuclear weapons, emphasises the hazards with which survivors of a nuclear strike would need to contend:

Prompt radiation, superstellar temperatures, electromagnetic pulse, thermal pulse, blast overpressure, fallout, disease, loss of immunity, cold, dark, contamination, inherited deformity, ozone depletion: with what hysterical ferocity, with what farcical disproportion, do nuclear weapons loathe human life [...]. It is possible to imagine nuclear synergisms multiplying into eternity, popping and crackling away, inimical to life even when there is nothing left to be inimical to.⁶⁸

Although Amis chastises the literary mainstream for failing to address the nuclear threat, the topic had long informed British fiction.⁶⁹ Absolute weapons had been forecast in early twentieth-century dystopian writing and became an urgent theme after the US strikes on Japan, when British authors found themselves living and working in the shadow of the bomb. Even before the first Soviet testing of a nuclear device in 1949, George Borodin, Pelham Groom, J. Jefferson Farjeon, Roald Dahl and Aldous Huxley produced disaster novels that prophesied the appalling consequences of a nuclear exchange.⁷⁰ In the late 1950s, the emergence of the British peace movement inspired a new wave of anti-nuclear fiction, much of it written by supporters of the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament. This included Peter George’s *Two Hours to Doom* (1958)—the inspiration for Stanley Kubrick’s *Dr. Strangelove* (1964)—and a wide range of such lesser-known texts as Bertrand Russell’s ‘Dean Acheson’s Nightmare’ (1954), Mervyn Jones’s *On the Last Day* (1958), J.B. Priestley’s *Doomsday for Dyson* (1958), John Brunner’s *The Brink* (1959) and Andrew Sinclair’s *The Project* (1960).⁷¹ Yet literary pacifism was not limited to authors involved in the left-wing peace movement.

John Wyndham's *The Chrysalids* (1955) and *Web* (1979) went some way to dramatizing his idea that nuclear war was 'a kind of chess in which one's pieces were lost, not to the opponent, but to obsolescence', and Bernard Newman's *The Blue Ants* (1962) acknowledged that "[i]n modern war there are no victors and vanquished, but only two degrees of vanquished".⁷²

The genre of nuclear disaster fiction offered the clearest example of the formal and thematic links between literary dystopianism and science fiction. Any text that contemplated the perils of a thermonuclear age inevitably raised the concerns about technological development which had informed science fiction from the early nineteenth century onwards.⁷³ At a time when the genre was still considered a disreputable, sub-literary affair, the crossover caused a dilemma for British publishers, who were uncertain whether to market nuclear disaster fiction to a pulp or a mainstream audience. One course of action was illustrated by the treatment of John Wyndham, whose writings were issued by Penguin Books as middlebrow fiction, following the author's insistence they appear 'without the science fiction label'.⁷⁴ The reverse was the case for Henry Brinton, a novelist as middlebrow as Wyndham but whose *Purple-6* (1962), a sober debate about the pros and cons of nuclearism, was packaged with lurid artwork and sensationalist slogans ('Annihilation—6 Minutes to Go', '1000 Million Lives at Stake!').⁷⁵ Brinton's narrative follows the fortunes of Dr. Will Burley, the deputy-director of an atomic research centre at Barford, whose work is interrupted by the arrival on British soil of a stray Soviet rocket. Suspected to be the first strike in a nuclear war, the rocket triggers the alert code 'purple-7' (indicating the danger level above red and seven minutes to impact) and atomic bombers are released in retaliation (16). Although the rocket turns out to be a harmless space probe, the shock felt by the British characters is never dispelled; Burley, for example, starts to contemplate the prospect of 'impending universal doom', convinced that 'quarter of a million years of human history had commenced their termination' (19, 14). The crisis initiates Brinton's lengthy discussion of deterrence, which for much of the novel appears to endorse the nuclear lobby. Most obviously, the humanist argument that nuclear research is a scientific gift to the world, and should therefore be available to all, is undermined by the fact that Barford is riddled with enemy spies, who have no interest in humanism. Similarly, the concern expressed by left-wing characters that the arms race is drawing Britain closer to America,

and therefore to a way of life marked by consumerism, McCarthyism and institutional racism, is rejected by the head of Barford: “[i]t’s popular to abuse the Americans”, he says, “but the abuse is nothing like it would be if it weren’t for them, and we found ourselves a Communist satellite” (12). There are even attempts to downplay the threat of nuclear annihilation. When Burley hears an air force pilot remark on the absurdity of a nuclear arsenal which, in the final analysis, can only “even [...] the score by killing all the people, instead of only half the people in the world”, the scientist takes the standard line “that, if one has enough power of retaliation, neither side will start anything” (36). Yet Burley is unable to overcome his doubts. The pacifist stance of his left-wing associates begins to have an effect, particularly his wife’s argument that the military defence of western values is pointless if it leads to the termination of those values and the people who hold them. It is with this in mind that Burley finally resigns from his job, unable to believe “that annihilation is better than surrender”.⁷⁶ His moral stance has little impact on events, however. The novel closes with the announcement of ‘purple-6’, an alert code which, being the novel’s title, has been anticipated by readers for the duration of the narrative, rather like the general British population had been anticipating the ‘four-minute warning’ (191).

Despite the arms reduction talks of the 1960s, which appeared to reduce the threat of mutually assured destruction, nuclear disaster fiction continued to chart ‘the collective death-wish’ of a “doomed species”.⁷⁷ Jean Ross’s *A View of the Island* (1965), George Corston’s *Aftermath* (1968), Michael Frayn’s *A Very Private Life* (1968), Anna Kavan’s *Ice* (1967) and Doris Lessing’s *The Memoirs of a Survivor* (1974) depicted ‘the world in a storm of decay’ or the “world in anarchy and ruins”, envisaging ‘huge tract[s] of dead ocean’, “rubble-filled smouldering wildernesses” and ‘piles of smashed concrete and [...] twisted steel girders’, all cloaked in ‘the monstrous odour of burnt flesh’.⁷⁸ The origins and effects of ‘total war’ were often presented symbolically. In science fiction, global calamity may have resulted from natural disasters, galactic cataclysms, viruses and invasions (of black clouds, giants wasps, mutated plants, alien life forms) but the outcome always evoked the carnage of nuclear war, a technique best illustrated by the meteorological and geographical calamities found in Ballard’s *The Drowned World* (1962), *The Drought* (1965) and *The Day of Creation* (1987).⁷⁹ Alongside the continuation of disaster fiction, the 1960s saw the development of a second strand of nuclear writing. This was what Daniel Cordle terms the ‘nuclear

anxiety text', a fictional form that focuses 'less on the physical impact of nuclear war, than on the psychological and cultural consequences of living in anticipation of this event' and that seeks to show how 'personal and domestic relations and spaces become heavily politicised by external forces'.⁸⁰ Typifying the form are characters who worry about their leaders' ability 'to blow up the world fifty times over', who admit to being 'supersaturated with fear' and who have 'dreams of cruise missiles' and 'dreams of nuclear supercatastrophe'.⁸¹ In McEwan's *The Child in Time*, a decline in superpower relations brings a 'sudden threat of global extinction' and forces one character to reflect on how '[t]he world outside the room, outside his clothes even, seemed bitter, harsh beyond reason'.⁸² Although military danger is conceived to reside outside the home, the act of living with that danger exists inside, collapsing the boundary between public and private in the same way as the intrusive activities of the intelligence services. In this way, dystopian fiction documented what Susan Sontag calls 'the trauma suffered by everyone in the middle of the twentieth century when it became clear that, from now on to the end of human history, every person would spend his [*sic*] individual life under the threat [of] collective incineration'.⁸³

Although nuclear anxiety texts usually reduce the futurism of their narratives, choosing to construct the 'worst of all possible worlds' from an intensification of present fears, the genre does not eschew references to nuclear conflict. One of the most powerful examples is Maggie Gee's *The Burning Book* (1983). Reflecting the rise in nuclear tensions during the 'second Cold War', the novel not only appeared amidst a flurry of anti-nuclear writing but also coincided with the development of Nuclear Criticism, a theory focused on the treatment of nuclear technologies in cultural production.⁸⁴ In Gee's novel, this treatment extends from a study of how nuclearism impacts on mental and emotional life to a discussion of the difficulties of representing global obliteration. This is Jacques Derrida's notion of 'total war' as '*fabulously textual*', as an imagined future that 'can only be the signified referent, never the real reference (present or past) of a discourse or text'.⁸⁵ Foregrounding the difficulties of representation, Gee cuts against the ostensible realism of the narrative—a family tale about Lorna and Henry Ship and their children—with a self-reflexive commentary on literary endeavour in an age that is likely to destroy literature. The feature is best illustrated in the eldest child, Angela, an anti-nuclear protester who believes that writing will reduce her 'stockpile of poisonous fears' about the future.⁸⁶

Nevertheless, Angela struggles to find an appropriate form for the nuclear theme, starting with a political treatise, shifting to a doctoral thesis and then attempting fiction, but always finding that, when addressing the imminent apocalypse, '[r]ules of thumb didn't get you anywhere' (250). Experimentalism also appears in the way that Gee combines the family story with aspects of nuclear history. Firstly, what appear to be eyewitness accounts of nuclear conflict are inserted into the narrative without explanation or context, interrupting descriptions of family life with fractured and italicised passages of free verse ('*whiteness burnt to black lace /they were sick all day in the darkness*') (122). With many of these hinting at the experiences of the *hibakusha*, everyday experience in Britain is shown to be haunted by collective memories of Hiroshima and Nakasaki. Secondly, the novel makes multiple references to the official discourse of nuclearism. A largely masculinist endorsement of nuclear technologies, this is 'the giant fiction with the giant bombs' found in 'scripts [...] written by hacks' and in '[e]ndless conversations between grey-faced statesmen' (243, 22, 250). So numerous are these references that when the ending comes—a brief allusion to '[b]lackening paper' followed by three black pages—there is no doubt about the ideologies responsible for bringing the family tale to an end (298). In this way, Gee's critique of nuclearism takes its place in the long line of female-authored texts which, from the 1950s, had been challenging the practices of male scientists, militarists and politicians. Highlighting the threat they posed to the feminist cause, Lessing's *The Memoirs of a Survivor* (1974) is certain that the barbarism of post-nuclear society will be especially damaging for women, erasing the 'gallantry of their fight for equality, the decades-long and very painful questioning of their role'.⁸⁷

In conclusion, the multiple events, processes and ideologies of the Cold War were an enduring presence in British dystopian fiction from the mid-1940s to the late 1980s. While these appeared in speculative fiction in literary cultures worldwide, they were particularly persistent in a country actively involved in global intelligence and propaganda and acutely vulnerable to Soviet attack and American intrusion, two forms of invasion that will be discussed in the next chapter. An indication of the heightened anxieties was the way that writers presented their nightmarish prophecies not as temporary aberrations from the normal course of history but as constant fixtures of national experience. The perceived perpetuity of the Cold War was an obvious feature of science fiction. However far authors of sci-fi novels took their characters away from

the here and now, they were still faced with political and military structures that mirrored those of the superpower stand-off. The sense of the Cold War as a permanent condition is so strong for the space traveller of Rex Gordon's *Utopia Minus X* that when he visits Earth and is told that the superpower conflict is over he refuses to believe it, unable to escape a mindset shaped by 'the age into which he was born [and] the society that had bred him'.⁸⁸ Even outbreaks of nuclear war failed to bring an end to the paralysis.⁸⁹ Collectively, the post-apocalyptic societies of Huxley's *Ape and Essence* (1948), Golding's *Lord of the Flies* (1954), Roberts's *The Chalk Giants* (1974), Hoban's *Riddley Walker* (1980) and Amis's *Einstein's Monsters* (1987) are marked by savagery, superstition, infanticide, tribalism, genetic mutilation and devil worship, yet are still troubled by violent new elites craving a form of absolute power that will likely require a reinvention of nuclear weaponry.⁹⁰ In this sense, British dystopianism was less concerned with highlighting current historical trends in order to forestall them than with decrying an unavoidable future. Storm Jameson's blunt summation of Cold War realities, "[t] here's no end, short of the end of the world", gives some indication of the despair of the age.⁹¹

NOTES

1. See Cauter's *Politics and the Novel during the Cold War* (2010), Franco's *The Decline and Fall of the Lettered City* (2002), Sherif's *Japan's Cold War* (2009), Maus's *Unvarnishing Reality* (2011) and Juraga and Booker's edited *Socialist Cultures East and West* (2002).
2. Lessing, *Walking in the Shade: Volume Two of My Autobiography, 1949–1962*, new edn (1997; London: Flamingo, 1998), pp. 53, 53; Lessing, *The Summer before the Dark*, new edn (1973; Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1975), p. 205.
3. Piette, *The Literary Cold War: 1945 to Vietnam* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2009), p. 5; Steve Padley, *Key Concepts in Contemporary Literature* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), p. 20.
4. Odd Arne Westad, 'Introduction: Reviewing the Cold War', in Westad, ed., *Reviewing the Cold War: Approaches, Interpretations, Theory* (London and Portland: Frank Cass, 2000), p. 5.
5. Churchill, 'Iron Curtain', in Young Hum Kim, ed., *Twenty Years of Crises: The Cold War Era* (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1968), p. 17.
6. Quoted in Anne Deighton, 'Ernest Bevin', in Steven Casey and Jonathan Wright, eds, *Mental Maps in the Early Cold War Era, 1945–68*

- (Basingstoke and New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), pp. 62–63 (Bevin's italics).
7. The supranational ideal was promoted by Labour's President of the Board of Trade, Stafford Cripps, who argued that 'we must all get out of our minds any idea that world organisation and world co-operation are Utopian ideas which are not practical' (quoted in R.M. Douglas, *The Labour Party, Nationalism and Internationalism, 1939–1951* (London and New York: Routledge, 2004), p. 146).
 8. Greenwood, *Britain*, p. 194.
 9. Quoted in Joseph Smith, *The Cold War 1945–1965* (Oxford and New York: Basil Blackwell, 1989), p. 38.
 10. Quoted in Marc Trachtenberg, *The Cold War and After: History, Theory, and the Logic of International Politics* (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2012), p. 184.
 11. White, *Britain, Détente and Changing East-West Relations* (London and New York: Routledge, 1992), p. 143. White may well have in mind F.S. Northedge and Audrey Wells's claim that Britain was the 'architect of the West's Cold War confrontation with Russia' (Northedge and Wells, *Britain and Soviet Communism: The Impact of a Revolution* (London and Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1982), p. 128).
 12. Kaldor, *The Imaginary War: Understanding the East-West Conflict* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1990), p. 4.
 13. Wilford, *The CIA, the British Left and the Cold War: Calling the Tune?* (London and Portland: Frank Cass, 2003), p. 126.
 14. Orwell, *Nineteen Eighty-Four*, p. 64 (Orwell's italics).
 15. Derek Fraser, *The Welfare State* (Stroud: Sutton Publishing, 2000), p. 1.
 16. Quoted in Eric Shaw, *The Labour Party since 1945: Old Labour, New Labour* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1996), p. 19. As one historian describes it, '[t]here was much utopianism in the air' (Kenneth O. Morgan, *Britain since 1945: The People's Peace*, new edn (1990; Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), p. 28).
 17. Hill, *Sex, Class and Realism: British Cinema 1956–1963* (London: BFI Publishing, 1986), p. 10.
 18. Quoted in Tony Shaw, 'British Feature Films and the Early Cold War', in Gary D. Rawnsley, ed., *Cold-War Propaganda in the 1950s* (Basingstoke and London: Macmillan, 1999), p. 128.
 19. For a consideration of whether a British version of McCarthyism existed, see Paul Lashmar and James Oliver, *Britain's Secret Propaganda War* (Stroud: Sutton Publishing, 1998), p. 123.
 20. Quoted in Peter Jenkins, *Mrs. Thatcher's Revolution: The Ending of the Socialist Era* (London: Jonathan Cape, 1987), p. 288.

21. Quoted in Alan Sked and Chris Cook, *Post-War Britain: A Political History*, new edn (1979; Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1984), p. 33.
22. That many others on the right were opposed to welfarism is clear from the *Daily Telegraph's* denunciation of the Beveridge Report as 'half way to Moscow' (quoted in Steven Fielding, 'The Good War: 1939–1945', in Nick Tiratsoo, ed., *From Blitz to Blair: A New History of Britain since 1939*, new edn (1997; London: Phoenix, 1998), p. 45).
23. Waugh, *Love among the Ruins*, in Waugh, *The Ordeal of Gilbert Pinfold; Tactical Exercise; Love among the Ruins*, new edn (1957, 1962, 1953; Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1962), p. 183.
24. *Ibid.*, p. 195. As John Russell Taylor has pointed out, there were many left-wing idealists in the 1950s who, faced with the 'Socialist Utopia', soon discovered that 'realities hardly live up to visions' and who were 'left feeling that there must be something more' (Taylor, 'Introduction' to Taylor, ed., *John Osborne: Look Back in Anger* (London: Macmillan, 1968), p. 12).
25. See Dominic Sandbrook, *Never Had It So Good: A History of Britain from Suez to the Beatles*, new edn (2005; London: Abacus, 2006), p. 109.
26. Quoted in Dilwyn Porter, "'Never-Never Land': Britain under the Conservatives 1951–1964", in Tiratsoo, ed., *From Blitz to Blair*, pp. 118–119; Anthony Crosland quoted in Morgan, *Britain since 1945*, p. 157.
27. Barlow, *The Hour of Maximum Danger*, new edn (1962; Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1963), p. 106.
28. Burgess, '1984: An Old Man Interviewed', in Burgess, *1985*, new edn (1978; London: Arrow Books, 1980), p. 37.
29. See Williams's *The Volunteers* (1978), Mitchison's *Not by Bread Alone* (1983), Mitchell's *The Bodyguard* (1970) and Brunner's *Stand on Zanzibar* (1968). As M. Keith Booker has argued, the critical suppression of British left-wing culture was 'one of the major cultural/political phenomena of the century' (Booker, *The Modern British Novel of the Left: A Research Guide* (Westport and London: Greenwood Press, 1998), p. 3).
30. Gordon, *The Yellow Faction*, new edn (1969; London: Dennis Dobson, 1972), p. 130; Pape, *And So Ends the World*, new edn (1961; London: Panther, 1963), p. 9; MacLeod, *Xanthe and the Robots*, new edn (1977; Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1979), p. 8.
31. Gordon, *Utopia Minus X*, p. 83; Fred Hoyle, *Ossian's Ride*, new edn (1959; London: The New English Library, 1967), p. 12; Hoyle and Hoyle, *Fifth Planet*, pp. 20–21; Peter Edwards, *Terminus* (London and Basingstoke: St. Martin's Press, 1976), p. 21. As Naomi Mitchison summarised the political landscape of the twentieth century, "[i]t's about police states: power and police" (Mitchison, *Solution Three* (London: Dennis Dobson, 1975), p. 32).

32. Michael L. Dockrill and Michael F. Hopkins, *The Cold War, 1945–1991*, new edn (1988; Basingstoke and New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), p. 1.
33. ‘A Cold War is a rhetorical war’, Martin Medhurst argues: ‘a war fought with words, speeches, pamphlets, public information (or disinformation) campaigns, slogans, gestures [and] symbolic actions’ (Medhurst, ‘Introduction’ to Medhurst, Robert L. Ivie, Philip Wander and Robert L. Scott, eds, *Cold War Rhetoric: Strategy, Metaphor, and Ideology* (New York and Westport: Greenwood Press, 1990), p. xiv).
34. Stephanson, ‘Liberty or Death: The Cold War as US Ideology’, in Westad, ed., *Reviewing the Cold War*, p. 84. See also Noam Chomsky’s remarks on the ‘theological overtones’ of US propaganda (Chomsky, *Towards a New Cold War: Essays on the Current Crisis and How We Got There* (London: Sinclair Browne, 1982), p. 74).
35. Gaddis, *The Long Peace: Inquiries into the History of the Cold War* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987), p. 46.
36. Priestley, ‘The Grey Ones’, in Priestley, *The Other Place and Other Stories of the Same Sort* (London: William Heinemann, 1953), p. 50; Mackenzie, *Lunatic Republic*, p. 11; Brinton, *Purple-6*, p. 145; Ted Allbeury, *All Our Tomorrows*, new edn (1982; St. Albans: Granada, 1983), p. 148; Pape, *And So Ends*, p. 105; Greenaway, *Man Who Held the Queen*, p. 173. The ultimate objective of governmental propaganda is indicated by a character in Rex Gordon’s *Utopia 239* who complains that “[a]fter ten years of cold war loyalty means only loyalty to the State” (Gordon, *Utopia 239* (London: William Heinemann, 1955), p. 9).
37. As an example from the literary right, Amis’s ‘Something Strange’ (1960) finds a metaphor for the increasing unreality of Cold War society in a crew of astronauts, isolated in what appears to be a space station, who are bombarded by simulacra as part of an official research programme that has not been explained to them (see Amis, ‘Something Strange’, p. 183).
38. Lessing, *Documents Relating to the Sentimental Agents in the Volyen Empire*, new edn (1983; London: Panther Books, 1985), pp. 99, 102.
39. Orwell, *Nineteen Eighty-Four*, pp. 9, 9, 9; Lessing, *Sentimental Agents*, pp. 104, 158.
40. Lessing, *Sentimental Agents*, pp. 100, 62, 101. As Lessing writes in *Shikasta*, ‘one cannot spend years sunk inside false and lying propaganda without one’s mental faculties becoming impaired’ (Lessing, *Re: Colonised Planet 5 Shikasta*, new edn (1979; London: Panther Books, 1981), p. 111).
41. Nicholas Ruddick describes Lessing’s work of the 1970s and 1980s as ‘the most ambitious attempt [...] to appropriate and exploit the motifs of

- science fiction by a writer whose work had, until then, been regarded as “mainstream” (Ruddick, *British Science Fiction*, p. 145).
42. Carter, *The Infernal Desire Machines of Doctor Hoffman*, new edn (1972; Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1982), p. 16.
 43. As Desiderio comments, “[w]e did our best to keep what was outside, out, and what was inside, in; we built a vast wall of barbed wire round the city, to quarantine the unreality, but soon [...] the enemy was inside the barricades, and lived in the minds of each of us” (ibid., p. 12).
 44. Taylor, ‘Through a Glass Darkly? The Psychological Climate and Psychological Warfare of the Cold War’, in Rawnsley, ed., *Cold-War Propaganda*, p. 226.
 45. George McKay, ‘Metapropaganda: Self-Reading Dystopian Fiction: Burdekin’s *Swastika Night* and Orwell’s *Nineteen Eighty-Four*’, *Science Fiction Studies*, Vol. 21, No. 3 (1994), p. 303.
 46. Kaldor, *Imaginary War*, p. 4. Similarly, Chris Megson argues that the attachment of world leaders to both rhetorical drama and the rhetoric of drama—‘actors’, ‘theatres of operations’, ‘iron curtains’—exposes ‘the performative underpinnings of superpower politics’ (Megson, “Is It Chaos? Or Is It a Building Site?” British Theatrical Responses to the Cold War and Its Aftermath’, in Andrew Hammond, ed., *Cold War Literature: Writing the Global Conflict* (London and New York: Routledge, 2006), p. 46).
 47. Carter, *Infernal Desire Machines*, p. 211; L.P. Hartley, *Facial Justice*, new edn (1960; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987), pp. 29, 48; Julian Barnes, *Staring at the Sun*, new edn (1986; London: Picador, 1987), p. 142; Waugh, *Love among the Ruins*, p. 188; Cooper, *Tenth Planet*, p. 95. As critics have indicated, science fiction also attends to the way ‘in which the human subject is pierced or wounded by invasive technologies that subvert, enslave or ultimately destroy’ and examines ‘what is left of the “human” after technology has changed human life so radically’ (Luckhurst, *Science Fiction*, p. 5; Gloria Pastorino, ‘The Death of the Author and the Power of Addiction in *Naked Lunch* and *Blade Runner*’, in Karen Sayer and John Moore, eds, *Science Fiction, Critical Frontiers* (Basingstoke and London: Macmillan, 2000), p. 102).
 48. Conquest, *World of Difference*, pp. 114–115, 117, 82, 25.
 49. Amis, ‘Something Strange’, p. 184; Cooper, *Tenth Planet*, p. 54; Hoyle and Hoyle, *Fifth Planet*, p. 195. Further examples of these neologisms are ‘psycho-checks’, ‘psycho-profiles’, ‘psycho-sensors’, ‘psycho-stimulatory devices’, ‘psycho-corrective centres’ and departments of ‘Psychoprop’, or psychological propaganda (Edwards, *Terminus*, pp. 121, 142; Pearce, *Worlds for the Grabbing*, p. 190; Michael Moorcock, ‘The Deep Fix’, in Moorcock, *The Time Dweller*, new edn (1969; London:

- Mayflower, 1971), p. 55; Williams, *Call of Utopia*, p. 121; Cooper, *Uncertain Midnight*, p. 59). J.B. Priestley wondered whether modern technology aimed “‘to make mankind go the way the social insects went, to turn us into automatic creatures’”, while Richard Pape went so far as to hypothesise a dehumanised ‘kingdom of technology all on its own, cut off from the real world’ (Priestley, ‘Grey Ones’, p. 47; Pape, *And So Ends*, p. 109).
50. Barnes, *Staring at the Sun*, pp. 144, 146.
 51. Frye, ‘Varieties of Literary Utopias’, in Frank E. Manuel, ed., *Utopias and Utopian Thought* (London: Souvenir, 1973), p. 29.
 52. Aldrich, *The Hidden Hand: Britain, America and Cold War Secret Intelligence* (London: John Murray, 2001), p. 5.
 53. Richard Norton-Taylor, *In Defence of the Realm? The Case for Accountable Security Services* (London: The Civil Liberties Trust, 1990), p. 2.
 54. James Angleton quoted in Nigel West, *Historical Dictionary of International Intelligence*, new edn (2006; Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2015), p. 364; Peter Wright, *Spy Catcher: The Candid Autobiography of a Senior Intelligence Officer* (New York and London: Viking, 1987), p. 305.
 55. John G. Cawelti and Bruce A. Rosenberg, *The Spy Story* (Chicago and London: University of Chicago, 1987), p. 9; Jacques Barzun, ‘Meditations on the Literature of Spying’, *American Scholar*, Vol. 34 (1965), p. 167. Indicating the importance of the British contribution to the genre, Myron J. Smith notes that most of the 1700 spy novels published between 1937 and 1975 were by British authors (see Smith, *Cloak-and-Dagger Bibliography: An Annotated Guide to Spy Fiction, 1937–1975* (Metuchen: The Scarecrow Press, 1976), pp. x, vi).
 56. Lessing, *The Making of the Representative for Planet 8*, new edn (1982; St Albans: Granada, 1983), p. 169; Lessing, ‘Preface’ to Lessing, *The Sirian Experiments*, new edn (1981; St Albans: Granada, 1982), p. 9; Lessing, *The Four-Gated City*, new edn (1969; St Albans: Granada, 1972), p. 192.
 57. Fleming, *The Sixth Column: A Singular Tale of Our Times* (London: Rupert Hart-Davis, 1951), pp. 16, 13, 44.
 58. MacLeod, *Xanthe*, p. 184; Farren, *Feelies*, p. 128; Gordon, *Yellow Faction*, p. 102; John Brunner, *Total Eclipse*, new edn (1975; London: Futura Publications, 1976), p. 47; Chapman Pincher, *Not with a Bang* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1965), p. 83.
 59. Gordon, *Utopia Minus X*, p. 176.
 60. Gordon, *Yellow Faction*, p. 41.
 61. Fleming, *Sixth Column*, p. 11.
 62. Extending the point, Bernard Porter argues that ‘Britons were far more spied upon in the 1970s and 1980s than they had been [...] for the

- whole of their history' (Porter, *Plots and Paranoia: A History of Political Espionage in Britain 1790–1988* (London: Unwin Hyman, 1989), p. 208).
63. Mitchell, *The Bodyguard* (London: Jonathan Cape, 1970), p. 16. The colour yellow is chosen for 'its associations with pus, with vomit, with mustard gas [...] and even with peril' (ibid., p. 18).
 64. See Jeremi Suri, *Power and Protest: Global Revolution and the Rise of Détente* (Cambridge and London: Harvard University Press, 2003), p. 92; and Robert Hewison, *Too Much: Art and Society in the Sixties, 1960–75*, new edn (1986; New York: Oxford University Press, 1987), pp. 157–169.
 65. Krishan Kumar, pondering the aspects of 'contemporary history that have rendered all utopian aspirations illusory', highlights the fact that '[t]o totalitarian tyranny and world domination was now added the spectre of nuclear annihilation' (Kumar, *Utopia and Anti-Utopia*, pp. 380–381).
 66. Quoted in David Reynolds, *Britannia Overruled: British Policy and World Power in the 20th Century* (London and New York: Longman, 1991), p. 181. The narrator of Doreen Wallace's *Forty Years On* (1958) makes the same point: 'why should we be expected to incur the dislike of Russia by having American air bases, armed with these missiles, all over our country [...] It looked like suicide' (Wallace, *Forty Years On* (London: Collins, 1958), p. 13).
 67. Jameson, *Moment of Truth*, p. 92; Wallace, *Forty Years*, p. 250. In a nuclear war described in one of Edmund Cooper's novels, 'Britain, being one of the most densely populated countries, was naturally one of the worst hit' (Cooper, *Uncertain Midnight*, p. 29).
 68. Amis, 'Introduction: Thinkability', in Amis, *Einstein's Monsters*, new edn (1987; London: Penguin, 1988), p. 17. Amis is writing in the 1980s, when the US presence in Britain had risen to some 130 bases and facilities and 22,000 military personnel, turning the country into 'America's unsinkable aircraft carrier' (Peter Byrd, 'The Development of the Peace Movement in Britain', in Werner Kaltefleiter and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, eds, *The Peace Movements in Europe and the United States* (London and Sydney: Croom Helm, 1985), p. 65).
 69. See Amis, 'Introduction', pp. 18–19.
 70. See Borodin's *Spurious Sun* (1948), Groom's *The Purple Twilight* (1948), Farjeon's *Death of a World* (1948), Dahl's *Sometime Never* (1948) and Huxley's *Ape and Essence* (1948). Examples of nuclear forecasts from earlier decades are H.G. Wells's *The World Set Free* (1914), Cicely Hamilton's *Theodore Savage* (1922), Harold Nicolson's *Public Faces* (1932) and J.B. Priestley's *The Doomsday Men* (1938).

71. For other examples of nuclear fiction from the period, see Bryan Berry's *Born in Captivity* (1952), Margot Bennett's *The Long Way Back* (1954), John Bowen's *After the Rain* (1958), Doreen Wallace's *Forty Years On* (1958), H.C. Asterley's *Escape to Berkshire* (1961) and Christine Brooke-Rose's *Out* (1964).
72. Wyndham and Lucas Parkes, *The Outward Urge*, new edn (1959; Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1962), p. 96; Newman, *The Blue Ants: The First Authentic Account of the Russian-Chinese War of 1970*, new edn (1962; London: Brown, Watson Limited, 1963), p. 119. For rare instances of fiction making the case for nuclear defence, see John Wyndham's *The Kraken Wakes* (1953), D.G. Barron's *The Zilov Bombs* (1962) and John Hackett's *The Untold Story* (1982).
73. C.P. Snow's *The New Men* (1954), a broadly realist novel about nuclear science, admits that nuclear war would be a 'futurist war', 'a piece of science fiction' (Snow, *The New Men* (London: Macmillan, 1954), pp. 16, 18).
74. Quoted in Brian Stableford, *Scientific Romance in Britain 1890–1950* (New York: St Martin's Press, 1985), p. 327 (Wyndham's italics).
75. Brinton, *Purple-6*, cover blurb. Brinton's paperback publisher demonstrated what Gary K. Wolfe calls the 'talent for disguising relatively sophisticated work in pulpish packages' (Wolfe, 'Science Fiction and Its Editors', in James and Mendlesohn, eds, *Cambridge Companion to Science Fiction*, p. 106).
76. Brinton, *Purple-6*, p. 188. As other authors argue, nuclear scientists, lobbyists and planners were not only 'guilty of treason against the entire human species', but had also "spoiled soldering—made it a filthy business, no better than butchering" (Fred Hoyle, *The Black Cloud*, new edn (1957; Richmond: Valancourt Books, 2015), p. 205; Jameson, *Moment of Truth*, p. 45).
77. Priestley, 'Grey Ones', p. 67; Anna Kavan, *Ice*, new edn (1967; London and Chester Springs: Peter Owen, 1997), p. 123.
78. Lessing, *The Memoirs of a Survivor*, new edn (1974; London: Picador, 1976), p. 122; Christopher Priest, *Inverted World*, new edn (1974; London: Gollancz, 2010), p. 296; Sheila Sullivan, *Summer Rising*, new edn (1975; London: Futura Publications, 1977), pp. 201–202; John Griffiths, *The Survivors* (London: Collins, 1965), p. 97; Philip McCutchan, *A Time for Survival* (London: George G. Harrap & Co., 1966), p. 29; Egleton, *Judas Mandate*, p. 50. Similarly, Rex Gordon describes 'a civilisation which had [...] doomed itself' and Arthur Sellings describes a 'catastrophe that had shattered the world' (Gordon, *Utopia* 239, p. 172; Sellings, *Junk Day*, new edn (1970; Drifffield: Leonaur, 2007), p. 14).

79. For examples of each type of invasion, see Fred Hoyle's *The Black Cloud* (1957), Keith Roberts's *The Furies* (1966), John Wyndham's *The Day of the Triffids* (1951) and John Brunner's *The Day of the Star Cities* (1965).
80. Cordle, *States of Suspense: The Nuclear Age, Postmodernism and United States Fiction and Prose* (Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press, 2008), p. 25; Cordle, 'Beyond the Apocalypse of Closure: Nuclear Anxiety in Postmodern Literature of the United States', in Hammond, ed., *Cold War Literature*, p. 68.
81. Jeanette Winterson, *Sexing the Cherry*, new edn (1989; London: Vintage, 1990), p. 122; Griffiths, *Survivors*, p. 20; J.G. Ballard, *Hello America*, new edn (1981; London: Vintage, 1994), p. 187; Amis, 'Insight at Flame Lake', in Amis, *Einstein's Monsters*, p. 54.
82. McEwan, *The Child in Time*, new edn (1987; London: Vintage, 1997), pp. 34, 163.
83. Sontag, 'The Imagination of Disaster', in Sontag, *Against Interpretation*, new edn (1966; London: Vintage, 1994), p. 224. Fred and Geoffrey Hoyle express the same sentiments when describing the characters of *Fifth Planet* (1963): 'they'd lived with those thoughts and those visions for a whole lifetime, literally from their first thinking moments. Everybody had done so since the middle of the twentieth century' (Hoyle and Hoyle, *Fifth Planet*, p. 192).
84. Nuclear Criticism has retained its relevance in the post-Cold War era, when such fear derives, not from US-Soviet conflict, but from conflicts in other parts of the world: see Ken Ruthven, *Nuclear Criticism* (Victoria: Melbourne University Press, 1993), p. 10, and Patrick Mannix, *The Rhetoric of Antinuclear Fiction: Persuasive Strategies in Novels and Films* (London: Associated University Presses, 1992), pp. 172–173.
85. Derrida, 'No Apocalypse, Not Now (Full Speed Ahead, Seven Missiles, Seven Missives)', *Diacritics*, Vol. 14, No. 2 (1984), p. 23 (Derrida's italics).
86. Gee, *The Burning Book* (London: Faber and Faber, 1983), p. 226.
87. Lessing, *Memoirs of a Survivor*, p. 122. For further examples of nuclear writing from the 1980s, see Yorick Blumenfeld's *Jenny* (1981), Emma Tennant's *Queen of Stones* (1982), Naomi Mitchison's 'Remember Me' (1982), Ian McEwan's, *Or Shall We Die?* (1983), Fay Weldon's 'Polaris' (1985), Jeanette Winterson's *Boating for Beginners* (1985) and Julian Barnes's 'The Survivor' (1989).
88. Gordon, *Utopia Minus X*, p. 5.
89. The species extinction foreseen in Gee's *The Burning Book* and Nevil Shute's *On the Beach* (1957) is unusual: as critics point out, 'most post-apocalyptic fictions do not think of the apocalypse as the end of time or worldly reality itself, but rather as the end of the era, which is at the

beginning of a new one' (Christian Hoffstadt and Dominik Schrey, 'Aftermaths: Post-Apocalyptic Imagery', in Hochscherf and Leggott, eds, *British Science Fiction*, p. 31).

90. The tendency to foresee primitive power struggles emerging from social or political upheaval is also found in John Wyndham's *The Day of the Triffids* (1951), Anthony Burgess's *The Wanting Seed* (1962), John Brunner's *The Day of the Star Cities* (1965), Kenneth W. Hassler's *The Glass Cage* (1969), Michael Coney's *Winter's Children* (1974) and Emma Tennant's *The Crack* (1973) and *Queen of Stones* (1982). The central concern of such texts was expressed by John Griffiths: "We've survived the holocaust and all the dangers it brought. It remains to be seen if we can survive ourselves" (Griffiths, *Survivors*, p. 159).
91. Jameson, *Moment of Truth*, p. 36.

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