

Monarchy at Sea: The Maritime Dimension of Nationalization

In 1902, the Danish journalist Alexander Svedstrup published a lavishly illustrated travel account which opened with the following lines: “Denmark is small, but the sea is vast, and the sea has been Denmark’s friend from earliest ages”. The book was entitled *Path of the Dane* (*De Danskes Vej*) and its main subject was the cruise of the cruiser corvette *Valkyrie* to East Asia, famously undertaken by Prince Valdemar of Denmark in 1899/1900 to support Danish business interests abroad. By referring to the country’s second national anthem in the title¹ and by summarizing its seafaring past in his introduction, Svedstrup attempted a particular feat: he aimed to convince his readers that the cruise of the *Valkyrie* represented a revival of the kingdom’s naval glory and a “good omen for the future”. As he argued, the “sea race” (*Havracen*) had almost forgotten the naval successes of their forefathers extolled in their anthem, resigning themselves instead to a status as a minor power. Yet, the sight of the *Valkyrie* “under the old split flag with the King’s son on-board” was to remind them that Denmark could be a great nation again, out on the “rediscovered sea” (*genfundne Hav*).²

What Svedstrup formulated here was a programme of national mission derived from a perceived national heritage which was common to many seafaring nations in the long nineteenth century. As they transformed from pre-modern political units to national communities bound together by common pasts, landscapes and mythscapes, Europe’s seafaring countries attached an increasing symbolic importance to their seas and naval traditions as ‘emotional foundations’ of the nation.³ Seen as

a source of livelihood, a gateway to the world or a natural defence, the sea was believed to have shaped their coastlines, histories and culture and, therefore, formed an integral part of their national identities.⁴ This was the gist of Svedstrup's invocation of the "sea race". At the same time, nineteenth-century nations also defined themselves by the goals that they derived from their heritage. Long before Alfred Thayer Mahan's *Influence of Sea Power upon History* (1890) turned naval might into an irrational ideology, nationalist thinkers, political economists and military strategists across Europe were already inferring from the naval histories of their own countries—or from the history of other thalassocracies—that the progress of a nation somehow depended on global or regional naval might.⁵ Svedstrup therefore wanted to encourage his countrymen to build on their naval heritage and become a great maritime nation again.

What is most intriguing about Svedstrup's account, though, is the way in which he put Prince Valdemar, the "King's son", at the centre of his programme. It suggests an intimate involvement of the Danish royal family in the discourse on national identity and national mission, which could only be beneficial to the monarchy. The emergence of nationalism as the predominant state ideology of the nineteenth century meant that Europe's royal houses had to reconfigure themselves: formerly a-national networks of monarchs that used to rule over more or less disconnected territories by divine right had to transform into nationalized first families closely identified with their countries, loved by their people and perceived as relevant to their national goals. By educating their younger sons in their respective navies and thus forging a close personal alliance with some of the most culturally pervasive institutions of the century, dynasties such as the Danish and Greek Glücksborgs, the British Saxe-Coburgs and the German Hohenzollerns were able to build and sustain images of themselves as deep-rooted, popular and relevant national institutions. Through the public persona of the 'King's son on-board', that is the 'Sailor Prince', they appropriated a series of distinct national myths to create a new, composite myth.⁶

This chapter details how the emotive brand of the 'Sailor Prince' helped four distinct monarchies to connect with the nation as an entity increasingly understood to be a community of both common origin and common future.⁷ On a first level, it analyses the role of the ocean and the navy in the nation-building processes of Britain, Denmark, Germany and Greece. By tracing the important part that these institutions played

within national historiographies, literatures and mythscapes, within debates on national defence, national identity and future projects, the study already breaks new ground. For especially where countries other than Britain are concerned, Duncan Redford recently observed, the role of “the maritime dimension” in shaping national identity has hardly “been given the prominence it deserves”.⁸

On a second level, the chapter examines how four dynasties—intuitively or consciously—learned to utilize the national importance of the sea and their own personal connection with the navy to stabilize their position as national institutions within various contexts of institutional contestation and national conflict. As is shown, dynasties which were traditionally a-national or had been transplanted to foreign countries because of power-political considerations, could, on the one hand, dock onto the notion of the ancientness of the sea and thus align themselves with their nations’ sense of identity and national feeling. On the other hand, the association with the navy as an agent of modernity and projection space for future visions could also contribute to the revitalization of the institution of monarchy, linking *ancien régimes* with a range of future projects of nation- and empire building.

To arrive at a comprehensive assessment of these interconnected processes, each section of this chapter is dedicated to one case study, highlighting the national peculiarities of the myths, dreams and hopes projected onto each prince. The individual sea views nevertheless add up to suggest a pan-European maritime culture. And as we investigate the royal reasoning behind the formation of the brand, the ‘Sailor Prince’ also emerges as a product of many transnational transfer processes. Travelling along the channels of dynastic relations from one corner of Europe to the other, it adapted to different water levels like in a system of locks. Ultimately, though, it retained its core quality: the combination of ancient and modern, humble and noble, sailor and prince.

PRINCE ALFRED AND THE ‘ISLAND NATION’

When Prince Alfred, one of the first fully fledged ‘Sailor Princes’ of the nineteenth century, opted for the naval service in 1858, Britain had been the world’s leading power for half a century. As most Britons were well aware, the country’s economic and world-political success had been facilitated by its unrivalled mastery of the sea.⁹ The maritime sphere,

therefore, occupied a central place in British national history and identity. In the mid-Victorian era, memories of a glorious naval past, sentimental feelings about life on-board and a self-righteous belief in the morality of British sea power merged into a national mythology that pervaded popular culture. It provided a unique canvas on which the monarchy could project some vital messages about its national identity and commitment.

These agendas were hardly ever explicitly put down in writing. Surviving records ascribe the motivation behind Prince Alfred's naval career almost entirely to the boy's own wishes. In 1855, Queen Victoria recorded in her journal that she and Prince Albert had decided to educate their second son in the Royal Navy "contrary to our original intention".¹⁰ They were giving into "the spontaneous wish of a young spirit", as Albert assured his brother Duke Ernst of Saxe-Coburg and Gotha in 1857.¹¹ But although these assertions should be regarded as more than a pretext or common trope, there are also serious reasons to believe that Alfred's step was not just a whim. Rather, it fitted neatly into a wider programme of re-invention that his parents were implementing; and it was approved of because the prince had been raised in a royal household which was just as steeped in the maritime culture of the age as the audience that it was addressing. Intuitive attraction, calculating strategy and the interpreting gaze of the public worked together to create, within a few short years, the curious phenomenon 'Sailor Prince'.

To date there have only been a few examinations of the 'cultural presence' of the maritime sphere in the public realm of mid-nineteenth-century Britain. Available studies mainly treat the period as the appendix, pre-history or contrasting foil of the era of the Napoleonic Wars or of New Imperialism, when public enthusiasm ran particularly high.¹² But even though its subdued coverage between 1820 and 1880 seems to signal a loss of importance or standing of the Royal Navy, quite the opposite was the case. Scholars agree that, throughout the century, it was an established, if taken for granted, national institution; and they argue that, while the enthusiasm of the French Wars or of the fin-de-siècle was a response to (perceived) crises, the public neglect of the mid-Victorian era was really a sign of a self-satisfied, sentimental complacency about Britain's uncontested naval supremacy.¹³ Prince Alfred linked the monarchy to some of the most reassuringly British and romantically valued institutions of his time. As the *Dublin University Magazine* elaborated in 1869, he tapped into "the instinctive enthusiasm which all Englishmen

feel for sailors. ... we love the sea, and cherish, above all things, the remembrance of our naval heroes.”¹⁴

The sea, the navy and the sailors were arguably at the core of British national identity. For one, the sea shaped the country’s geography and culture and, therefore, was one of the defining features of nineteenth-century concepts of Britishness.¹⁵ Located off the north-western coast of mainland Europe and surrounded by the rough waters of the Atlantic Ocean, the North Sea and the English Channel, Britain—a conglomerate of two large and many small islands—was commonly conceptualized as an ‘island nation’ inhabited by an ‘island race’.¹⁶ This notion united the competing identities of the ‘four nations’ (the Anglo-Saxon English and the Celtic Irish, Scots and Welsh) into one communal, maritime identity. The sea contributed to a sense of isolation, liberty and uniqueness. Simultaneously, it fostered fears of enemy invasion and served as a high road to the wider world of commercial and colonial enterprise, creating common challenges and common projects.¹⁷ In Victorian poetry and prose, the British and their various ancestors were perceived as ‘natural-born sailors’ whose innate nautical skills made the sea their ‘second home’ and naval supremacy their natural birth-right.¹⁸

The Royal Navy, actually founded in the sixteenth century but often thought to be as old as the country itself, was the central facilitator and symbol of this dominant position.¹⁹ Its ‘wooden walls’ represented the protection of Britain’s constitutional liberty, maritime trade and financial prosperity; and they played a pivotal role in the establishment, defence and integration of Britain’s vast and steadily expanding empire, itself a conglomerate of ‘islands’ connected by a network of sea routes.²⁰ From the early eighteenth century onward, therefore, the navy became the centre of an emerging British nationalism, an “emblem of national identity”.²¹ From 1815, moreover, it was believed to be a ‘moral force’ deployed to establish and protect British liberal values across Europe and the world. The ‘Pax Britannica’ involved the idea that Britain, a naval hegemon in possession of a dense network of naval stations, was using her dominant position like an impartial arbiter, to secure the freedom of the seas, international political stability and what one might call ‘human rights’.²² While standing armies were distrusted as instruments of absolutist power, the navy was regarded as a benign authority: it helped the self-declared policeman of the world to fight piracy and the slave trade in international waters; and its ‘cruiser diplomacy’ protected liberal-national

movements across Europe just as much as it furthered the country's own commercial and colonial interests.²³

The men who had mastered the sea, built the navy, defended the nation and established the empire formed the principal themes of a national historiography which the Victorians were busily recycling and expanding. King Alfred the Great, who had built a couple of ships to fight the Vikings in 897, was re-invented as a prophet of naval might.²⁴ The defeat of the Spanish Armada by the numerically inferior English fleet in 1588 was commemorated as the starting point of God-sent British greatness. Elizabethan privateers such as Francis Drake or Walter Raleigh were romanticized as reckless patriots and pioneers of British maritime expansion.²⁵ The victorious commanders and intrepid explorers of the eighteenth century, men such as Edward Vernon, George Anson or James Cook, who had established and defended Britain's leading position against French and Spanish ambitions, were celebrated as true representatives of national character and superiority. The 'shared culture' of maritime (consumer) patriotism created around these new-style naval heroes peaked during the Napoleonic Wars.²⁶ Through the multiplying, unifying power of cheap prints, popular ballads and commemorative pottery, admirals such as Edward Pellew, Cuthbert Collingwood and the iconic Horatio Nelson achieved a mythical status which informed maritime imageries for years to come.²⁷ In the Victorian period, their pantheon was joined by the explorers of the Northwest Passage, John Ross, William Edward Parry and the tragic John Franklin, who were all celebrated as examples of moral strength enduring the hardships of loneliness and the cold to advance human knowledge.²⁸

The individual bravery of these commanders was complemented by the collective heroism of the naval officer and 'Jack Tar', the common sailor, who were both increasingly thought to embody the best qualities of the nation at large. Especially in the post-Napoleonic period, when Britain's aristocratic military elites were embroiled in a series of scandals and the middle classes worried that the immorality and incompetence of their ruling classes might be the country's downfall, these two groups of professionals were re-evaluated. While the army was seen as a stronghold of the aristocracy where officers' commissions had to be purchased, the navy was conceptualized as a profession for the bourgeoisie governed by ideas of meritocracy. The young genre of naval romance, pioneered by authors such as Robert Southey, Jane Austen and, most of all, Captain Frederick Marryat, shone a new halo of heroism around

the senior service by relocating chivalric ideals from the degenerate aristocracy to the navy's middle-class officers. Tapping into the cult of Nelson's navy, it celebrated the comradeship, resourcefulness and bravery of the gentleman hero at sea.²⁹ The adventure novels that took their rise from this shift also contributed to the slow rehabilitation and reintegration of the common sailor into mainstream culture. Up until the 1800s, 'Jack Tar' had been notorious for being a drunk, dumb or vicious outsider and trouble-maker. The war effort, however, transformed his image into that of a simple but brave fellow. Any remaining negative connotations vanished during Victoria's reign, when children's books, comic operas and advertisements all interlinked to idealize the 'British blue-jacket' as a model of domesticated manliness.³⁰

Prince Alfred's decision to enter the senior service enabled the Victorian monarchy to partake in these myths. Haunted by an un-English ancestry that was increasingly problematic in the age of nationalism, Queen Victoria and Prince Albert were determined to distance themselves from the German heritage of their dynasty. Since their accession in 1714, the kings of the House of Hanover had repeatedly failed to ingratiate themselves with their British subjects by retaining their foreign mores, international lifestyles and unclear loyalties.³¹ In particular, King George IV and his brothers had been castigated for their licentious, corrupt lifestyles. In the first two years of her reign, young Victoria had herself managed to squander much of her initial popularity by becoming involved in the so-called 'Lady Flora Hastings affair' and 'bedchamber crisis'. When, in 1839, she had decided to marry her cousin, Prince Albert of Saxe-Coburg and Gotha, to improve her spoiled image, suspicions about his religious-political inclinations and clan-thinking were rife. Following the advice of their confidant Baron Stockmar and paying heed to critical media voices, the royal couple therefore set to work on the re-invention of their public image according to the new, Europe-wide trend of the nationalized and bourgeois monarchy. Prince Alfred's career plans tied in with their intention of providing their offspring with a "truly moral and truly English education" to avoid "national prejudice".³²

Dynastic law would have it that Alfred was destined to succeed his childless German uncle, Prince Albert's elder brother Ernst, as Duke of Saxe-Coburg and Gotha. By giving in to his "spontaneous wish", his parents were killing two birds with one stone. On the one hand, this provided a convenient excuse not to send their son abroad for his education, a step which, as Prince Albert knew from his own experience,

would “have had the worst construction put upon it in the public mind”.³³ On the other hand, they were actively aligning themselves with a national institution par excellence which also enjoyed a decidedly middle-class reputation.

The national-identity politics that they pursued had a precursor in the cultural engagement of Frederick, Prince of Wales, the ill-fated eldest son of King George II. In August 1740, this visionary prince had staged a shadow play featuring the heroic exploits of the Anglo-Saxon King Alfred the Great against the Vikings, which, by establishing a connection with the Anglo-Spanish War of 1739–1748, was meant to display the patriotic spirit of the Hanoverian monarchy. It would best be remembered by its closing hymn, ‘Rule Britannia’, soon to become Britain’s second national anthem celebrating her navy and all that it stood for.³⁴ When they sent a son named Alfred to sea, Victoria and Albert were following in the footsteps of Frederick and his son, George III, who had been educated to become a ‘patriot king’.

Both the English-born queen and the foreign prince knew about and shared the feelings of pride and enthusiasm that would overcome their subjects when they heard the line ‘Rule, Britannia! / Britannia rule the waves! / Britons never will be slaves.’ Victoria had first soaked up the sea air and the romantic emotions that her contemporaries attached to the ‘lure of the sea’ during the few and carefree seaside holidays of her otherwise unhappy childhood.³⁵ Driven by nostalgia and by Prince Albert’s desire for a family retreat, the royal couple built Osborne House on the idyllic Isle of Wight as their seaside paradise, thereby popularizing the island and the yachting grounds of Cowes among the wider public, as royal holiday makers often did.³⁶ Their sea cruises aboard the royal yacht *Victoria and Albert* fostered a special fondness for “handy”, “well-conducted” and “quite sober” sailors in the queen.³⁷ She shared the sentimental hero-worship of her time, greatly enjoying Southey’s book *Life of Nelson*, visiting the museum ship *HMS Victory* and collecting Nelson souvenirs³⁸; and she participated in the romantic fascination with the pleasant horrors of the trivialized sublime, taking both a humanitarian interest and a voyeuristic pleasure in the increasingly sensationalized news stories about tragic shipwrecks, noble rescues and the triumphs and disasters of Arctic exploration.³⁹ Prince Albert’s curiosity, meanwhile, was directed towards developments in naval technology.

Together, the royal couple would reinvigorate the tradition of the naval review at Spithead near Portsmouth, turning the events into

regular, increasingly public and publicized spectacles.⁴⁰ This was the result of both an instinctive and a conscious patriotism. Especially Prince Albert, the foreigner, who had been carefully briefed about his adopted home by the spin doctors of his clan, King Leopold of the Belgians and Baron Stockmar, was aware of the central position that the navy occupied in British national identity. While the country's elites, complacent about their maritime supremacy, increased their efforts at naval commemoration only in response to the Anglo-French rivalry of the 1840s–1850s, the Prince Consort, anxious to identify with the national past, marched ahead of his time. In addition to insisting on attending naval events, in 1845 he purchased the coat that Nelson had worn at the battle of Trafalgar as a present for the Greenwich Hospital—a publicly acclaimed gesture. As Chair of the Fine Arts Commission for the interior decorations of the new Houses of Parliament, he ordered two large paintings of the battles of Trafalgar and Waterloo.⁴¹

If we trust Prince Alfred's biographers, his parents passed on their naval enthusiasm—and programme—to their second son by encouraging his predilection for practical handicrafts, geography lessons and books about maritime history. They gave him travel books, ship's clocks and barometers as presents, and on his parting in 1858 handed him Southey's *Life of Nelson*, a clear statement of the national role they had in mind for him.⁴² At Osborne House, Prince Albert taught his sons how to swim. And if any more was needed in the way of a role model for a 'Sailor Prince', there was always the queen's favourite cousin, Victor, Count Gleichen, who had run away from home as a child to enlist, with Victoria's moral and financial support, for a career in the Royal Navy.⁴³

In 1846, the couple's famous idea of dressing the little Prince of Wales—and subsequently also Prince Alfred—in a sailor suit met with wide applause, the sartorial innovation becoming an iconic trend in children's fashion.⁴⁴ Success was therefore guaranteed for the uniform the prince donned in 1858 (Fig. 2.1). As *The Times* assessed, "The strong heart of England warms to the seaman's blue jacket."⁴⁵ Just like the Spithead reviews, Alfred's naval rites of passage enabled his parents to stage a 'naval monarchy'. Their observers, perceiving this to be a natural response to Britain's reliance on her seaborne forces, willingly inserted the prince into their line of naval heroes. 'Of Nelson, Hood, and Collingwood / our grandsires used to sing', went one song in 1869, 'Our fathers had a toast as good, / they gave "The Sailor King!" / Now



Fig. 2.1 A royal bluejacket. Prince Alfred in midshipman's uniform. *Carte-de-visite*, Southwell, 1861. Author's collection

royal Alfred treads the deck / his courage to evince; / he braves the storm, nor fears the wreck. / God bless our Sailor Prince!⁴⁶

While the Nelson connection was vital for the national image of the monarchy, the royal tradition referred to in this popular ditty was more problematic. The queen's uncle, 'Sailor King' William IV, and other royals who had held military posts before, were essentially subject to the national discourse on the debauchery of the Hanoverian monarchy and the reviled system of 'old corruption' from which Albert and Victoria wanted to distance themselves. Castigated for their aristocratic amateurism and alleged inability, they did not fit into the image of a modern, future-oriented bourgeois monarchy that the royal couple crafted in response to the emergence of the middle classes as a new socio-cultural and political force.⁴⁷

Prince Alfred's naval career, on the other hand, did. For the prince entered an institution which, especially following the modernization of naval education in the years 1837–1857, was regarded as a thoroughly meritocratic profession, where intellectual and physical abilities rather than purely financial criteria governed admission and advancement, and where all cadets, be they sons of aristocrats or tradesmen, received the same treatment. By subjecting their son to such a democratic training, Victoria and Albert demonstrated their determination to break with the *ancien régime* past and embrace middle-class ideals such as thrift, charity, self-improvement and merit-based assessment. Throughout their married life, they consciously surrounded themselves with middle-class professionals and their children received a remarkably practical education, focusing on modern languages as well as the natural and social sciences.⁴⁸ In line with these ideals, Prince Alfred had originally been intended for a career with the Royal Engineers, a prestigious taskforce consisting of scientifically trained professionals which literally constituted one of the architectural offices of the British Empire.⁴⁹ Although "contrary to [their] original intention", Alfred's wish to join the navy fitted equally well with Victoria and Albert's projected (self-)image.

More than a simple sign of royal embourgeoisement, though, Victoria's and Albert's approval of their son's career also highlighted their—and their nation's—fascination with the armed forces and their determination to influence current debates about national defence and imperial expansion.⁵⁰ Walter Arnstein has convincingly argued that Victoria, despite her civilian appearance, conceived of herself as a "Warrior Queen". She proudly displayed her position as a female Commander-in-Chief, taking a keen interest in her soldiers. And she pursued an active political agenda of strengthening the (military) authority

of the crown as well as Britain's (military) prestige in the world by regularly attending reviews and advocating national-defence issues.⁵¹ Her military patriotism also extended to the navy. During her frequent visits to Spithead, Victoria would be thrilled with naval manoeuvres. "I think it is in these immense wooden walls that our real greatness exists", she confided to her uncle, King Leopold of the Belgians, in 1842. And in 1856, having seen the fleet off to the Crimea, she raved "I may claim to be Queen of the Seas".⁵²

The maintenance of the command of the ocean was by no means self-running, though. Throughout the 1840s–1850s, France was challenging British naval supremacy by rebuilding its fleet to the latest technological standards. The Crimean War would soon reveal the technological backwardness, manning problems and incompetent high command of a Royal Navy still stuck in the past.⁵³ Victoria and Albert were therefore also taking active part in the ensuing debate about national-defence policy. They urged action to prevent Britain from "laps[ing] into a 2nd rate power" and advocated a larger, more independent naval budget.⁵⁴

Prince Alfred's entry into the navy, occurring exactly at this moment, had to be understood as a declaration of faith supporting the royal couple's policy. Their relationship with the navy was one of give and take. On the one hand, they gained the opportunity to extend their influence on the military apparatus and to display their military commitment. On the other hand, they lent their prestige to the Admiralty in a time of transition, helping budget claims, recruitment efforts and reform measures. A *Punch* cartoon from 1859, depicting Prince Alfred in sailor's uniform and bearing the caption "Men for the Fleet! There, boys! There's an example for you" summed up the hoped-for effect that a royal sailor might have on recruitment numbers.⁵⁵ For the next two decades, the prince would be his mother's deputy for maritime patronage activities and a popular president of reform commissions. In an era when Europe's publicans and dynasties became increasingly 'militarized' both in their mentalities and outward trappings, he thus provided his mother with a navy-blue billboard which it was impossible for herself to wear.

The prince's naval cruises, most importantly the cruise aboard HMS *Galatea*, would equally help the monarchy to take an active stance in another debate about Britain's future. As is detailed in Chap. 4, many liberals, following the Indian Mutiny of 1857, regarded the empire as a costly and dangerous enterprise. Albert and Victoria, however, according to Miles Taylor, were eager to give it a new constitution and thereby to

‘imperialize’ the monarchy. By sending their son to visit Britain’s disparate colonies, they united them behind the crown.⁵⁶

Other studies examining the role of the royal family as a ‘catalyst’ and beneficiary of popular navalism or imperialism have largely neglected the period before 1870.⁵⁷ One could argue, however, that in the creation of the public persona ‘Sailor Prince’, the monarchy was cultivating a proto-navalist and proto-imperialist programme as early as 1858. In their quest for re-invention, Queen Victoria and Prince Albert showed a remarkable knack for selecting symbols of national identity and strength to align with. They picked institutions which were widely present in British culture but also could do with some media-effective royal promotion. In a self-reinforcing process, these institutions would then become vital stabilizers of monarchy.

PRINCE VALDEMAR AND THE ‘SEA FOLK’

Nineteenth-century Britons were convinced that their relationship with the sea was unique. There was probably only one other state which, in the public imagination, was readily conceded a comparable status as a maritime nation: Denmark (and with it Iceland and Norway). Inspired by Romantic medievalism, Victorian scholars, poets and novelists such as George Dasent, William Morris, Walter Scott or Henry Rider-Haggard dug up their national past and discovered a racial heritage which they shared with their neighbours across the North Sea. Enthusiasm for everything Viking and the idea that Britain might owe her naval supremacy “to the seafaring instincts” of her Norse rather than Saxon forbears led to a new appreciation of the alleged closeness between Britons and Danes as “children of the sea”.⁵⁸

This perceived bond was cemented by a royal union in 1863, when Prince Alfred’s elder brother, Albert Edward, Prince of Wales, married Princess Alexandra, the daughter of Denmark’s future King Christian IX. An ode penned by the poet laureate Alfred Tennyson was symptomatic: referring to the old Viking chieftains, he welcomed Alexandra as a “Sea-king’s daughter from over the sea”. The ocean was represented as a bridge between the two countries; and the British were proclaimed to be ‘each all Dane’ for the day, happily acknowledging the Norse part of their racial identity. This was easily done since Denmark no longer posed a threat to British naval interests. In fact, the implicit idea of the poem was that the country’s glorious naval tradition had been passed on to a

younger branch of the racial family tree, as Alexandra became the “Bride of the heir of the kings of the sea”.⁵⁹

While Britain’s naval dominance had grown during the Napoleonic Wars, 1860s Denmark had to grapple with having been reduced to a second-rate power. A series of major military and diplomatic defeats between 1801 and 1864 had left the once-famed Oldenburg monarchy a truncated state robbed of considerable parts of its naval force, manpower and financial resources. In the ensuing debates about Danish defence policy, the navy, an institution that used to be taken for granted, was no longer as unchallenged as its British counterpart. As the national identity of the Danish core state was renegotiated, however, Denmark’s closeness to the sea, her ‘golden periods’ of naval warfare and maritime trade and her aspirations to continued regional influence and global commerce emerged as increasingly central points of reference. As late as 1956, King Frederik IX coined the famous term ‘sea folk’ (*‘søens folk’*) to address the nation.⁶⁰ The belief that the Danes had been shaped by their special relationship with the salty water was just as old as the British conviction. It also informed the representation and perception of Denmark’s first ‘Sailor Princes’, Alexandra’s younger brothers Vilhelm and Valdemar, who joined the navy in 1860 and 1875, respectively.

Just as in the British case, the evidence suggests that these princes freely chose the naval profession. As Vilhelm confided in his journal in 1859, his “[l]ove of the fatherland and passion for the sea” had “awakened within [him] the desire to enlist with the navy”.⁶¹ In 1873, when Valdemar embarked on his first preparatory cruise aboard the cadet ship *Sjælland*, his father Christian wrote of his hope that “the path you have chosen for yourself will make you happy”.⁶² We do not have reason to doubt the sincerity of these avowals. It would be naïve to believe, though, that there was only one set of motives behind such a significant step. For the myths surrounding the sea and the navy in the Danish popular imagination provided an important repository for the Glücksborg dynasty in its task of representing a nation which had yet to be redefined.

Surprisingly, the sea is largely absent from the rich scholarship on the formation of Danish national identity and the nineteenth-century re-invention of the Danish nation. Historians have been ‘landlocked’, focusing on the “peasant-farmer roots of Danish national identity” and on the exchanges of political ideas and cultural trends which took—or did not take—place between Denmark and central Europe via the country’s narrow land-border with Germany.⁶³ Assertions of the importance of the

maritime sphere have been left to scholars of naval or economic history.⁶⁴ Yet, Denmark's geography, history and culture were obviously shaped by the ocean. Located at the northernmost end of mainland Europe and surrounded by the diverse waters of the North Sea, the Skagerrak, the Kattegat and the Baltic, the kingdom formed an archipelago consisting of one peninsula (Jutland) and countless islands (among them Zealand, Funen, Lolland and Falster as well as Iceland, Greenland and the Faroese Islands in the North Atlantic). The sea served as a waterway connecting these different provinces. The kingdom's position at the juncture of the Danish Straits, moreover, gave it control of the gateway between the North and the Baltic Seas, a geostrategic advantage which it jealously guarded against its contestants throughout the centuries. The element that united the country, provided a livelihood for its large fishing communities and lent it "importance far in excess of its size" was naturally cherished.⁶⁵

The Danes' self-conception as a seafaring nation and their increasingly romantically charged identification with a landscape characterized by long stretches of coast was echoed in the distinctive national folk lore, literature and song culture.⁶⁶ In the civil national anthem, written by Adam Oehlenschläger (1818), Denmark was represented as "a lovely land / with spreading, shady beeches / near Baltic's salty strand".⁶⁷ In Hans Christian Andersen's landmark fairy-tale *The Little Mermaid* (1837), an entire parallel kingdom was dipped into the sea. And in 1877, Holger Drachmann, the country's marine poet, in a collection of *Songs by the Sea* professed his profound love for "that land / that island encircled by the ocean / where every working man / constantly has a view of the sea."⁶⁸ He was one of several artists who, from the 1870s, became attracted to the seaside and settled in such archetypical fishing villages as Skagen or Sæby at the northern tip of Jutland. Following the Europe-wide trend of spa tourism, they popularized images of beach strolls, realistic fishermen scenes and paintings of heroic rescues among the general Danish public.⁶⁹

For a country so intimately connected to the ocean, both the merchant marine and the navy enjoyed a high symbolic importance. In the nineteenth century, the Danes could look back on a long and glorious seafaring history which had started in the eighth century when the Vikings conquered and colonized large territories in northern Europe. Almost simultaneously with the British, Danish Romantics rediscovered these seaborne warriors in a cultural movement called the 'Norse revival'. In

order to recover and renew a purer Danish cultural identity, the representatives of this movement—Adam Oehlenschläger, N.F.S. Grundtvig or B.S. Ingemann—turned to Norse mythology as well as to Nordic pre-history and medieval history as their main sources of inspiration. Their works were thus particularly concerned with a period of coastal and seaborne warfare in the Baltic region, the Age of the Valdemars, which was explored most prominently in B.S. Ingemann's popular epic poems and historical novels. Ingemann's eponymous heroes, King Valdemar the Great and Valdemar the Victorious, had defended thirteenth-century-Denmark against Wendic invasions, conquered parts of northern Germany and Estonia and achieved the kingdom's first golden age of Baltic dominance.⁷⁰

Throughout the following centuries, it had been the task of Denmark's Royal Navy, first founded by King Hans in the early 1400s, to defend, regain and expand this regional hegemony ('*dominium maris Baltici*') against the Hanseatic League, Sweden or the Netherlands. The naval force therefore became an important symbol of the country's aspirations to power and of the emerging nation-state.⁷¹ This crucial status is reflected in Denmark's second national (or royal) anthem—'King Christian stood by the lofty mast' ('*Kong Christian stod ved højen mast*')—which was first performed in an operetta in 1780 and which celebrated the naval heroes who ushered in the kingdom's naval heyday in the seventeenth to eighteenth centuries: the legendary King Christian IV, Denmark's most popular and myth-invested monarch, who had turned the country into a major sea power, as well as Niels Juel and Peder Tordenskjold, two naval reformers and legendary admirals of the Second Northern (1655–1660), Scanian (1674–1679) and Great Northern (1700–1721) Wars, respectively.⁷²

When the hymn invited theatre audiences to follow the example of this triumvirate of heroes on the 'Path of the Dane to fame and might' ('*Du danskes vej til ros og magt*'), Denmark's naval power had long faded. Her merchant marine, however, was just experiencing a golden age that would be nostalgically remembered for a long time to come. During the 'period of flourishing trade' ('*florissante periode*', c. 1770–1800), Danish shipping and trade boomed and national prosperity grew as the country exploited its position as a neutral power amidst the French Wars. Only once Britain ordered a pre-emptive strike against the Danish fleet in 1801 did this glory fade. Together with the bombardment of Copenhagen (1807) and the loss of Norway in the Treaty

of Kiel (1814), the catastrophe marked the end of the impressive seaborne colonial empire that had been the Oldenburg monarchy.⁷³ It ushered in a period of international decline that thoroughly transformed Denmark's political culture and popular mentality. The country would gradually be degraded from a powerful composite monarchy to a humiliated, small and de-imperialized nation-state. When attempts to integrate the North-German duchies Schleswig, Holstein and Lauenburg into the core state were thwarted by Austria and Prussia in 1864, this process was complete. In the following decades, public discourse revolved around the re-definition of a more introspective Danish national identity. It was centred on a veritable 'cult of defeat' which celebrated the resistance of the small nation against its German neighbour, on the concept of the cultural nation united by language, custom and common symbols, and on the kingdom's archipelagian character.⁷⁴

Reflecting, as it did, the competing strands of Danish nationalism, the navy played a double-edged role in this scenario. On the one hand, it stood at the centre of decade-long debates about a national-defence policy designed to keep Germany at bay. As the country recovered from defeat and felt the shadow of the Wilhelmine Empire grow at its southern border, the question arose whether the reduced military budget should primarily be spent on the upkeep of a strong land force or a modernized navy. Debates became increasingly politicized in the 1880s–1890s, as the governing conservative (*Højre*) party favoured an aggressively nationalist, army-strategic solution focused on the costly fortification of Copenhagen, while the liberal opposition (*Venstre*) advocated a naval-strategic approach centred on a strong fleet able to bolster the nation's preferred policy of neutrality. Since the *Højre* government was backed by the king and the *Venstre* opposition were using their power to block legal initiatives as a form of protest against this unconstitutional practice, a stalemate ensued.⁷⁵

More than a contested instrument of military strategy, though, the navy also emerged as a symbol of peaceful prosperity and prestige as Denmark began to re-define herself as a proudly neutral country. While the 'Norse revival' was linking back to Denmark's periods of Baltic supremacy, a complex of liberal entrepreneurs and opinion-makers towards the fin-de-siècle (among them Alexander Svedstrup) took another route: they tapped into the merchant tradition of the '*floris-sante periode*'. Since it asserted Denmark's authority in her home waters, connected the archipelago with its remaining colonial possessions and

safeguarded innovative commercial enterprises, the navy was hailed by them as a modern promise of future success.⁷⁶

By aligning themselves with this ideologically and emotionally charged institution, Princes Vilhelm and Valdemar helped the young Glücksborg dynasty to become rooted in the maimed nation into which dynastic politics had transplanted it. Their parents, Christian of Schleswig-Holstein-Sonderborg-Glücksborg and Louise of Hesse-Kassel had been selected as heirs to the childless King Frederik VII in 1853 because they combined the claims of two distant branches of the Danish royal house and thus appeared best equipped to secure the territorial integrity of the composite Oldenburg monarchy (a conglomerate of territories with varying succession rights). From the moment they succeeded to the throne, however, the couple, in the eyes of their fervently nationalist subjects, had been tainted by a 'lack of Danishness' manifest in their German accents and cosmopolitan habits. When, only weeks after his accession in 1863, Christian IX was forced to sign a new, nationalist constitution aiming to integrate the duchy of Schleswig into the Danish state, he sparked a nationalist counter-reaction in the North German provinces. The war that ensued was devastating, robbed the Danish kingdom of the very parts that had been Christian's special responsibility and created a poisonous atmosphere in which he was reviled as a 'German traitor'. Inexperienced and reticent, he was initially unable to garner the kind of popularity that had bolstered the reign of his proto-Danish predecessor, Frederik VII. Moreover, by stubbornly supporting a succession of *Højre* governments which only enjoyed the backing of the upper chamber of parliament he incurred the animosity of the growing liberal majority of the elected lower chamber in a constitutional crisis lasting until 1901.⁷⁷

The explanations for why the Glücksborg monarchy nevertheless eventually achieved a position of surprisingly unequivocal national esteem point to embourgeoisement and dynastic expansion. In Jes-Fabricsius Møller's view, the a-political representation of the Glücksborgs as a closely knit family gradually ingratiated them with their bourgeois subjects. Meanwhile, Sebastian Olden-Jørgensen has argued that the Danes, after a chain of misfortunes, were happy to identify with the old-fashioned dynastic successes of their royal family whose offspring came to occupy the thrones of many European countries. Princess Alexandra's marriage to the Prince of Wales in 1863 started this policy; during the festivities, Prince Vilhelm's selection as King of the Hellenes was negotiated, and in 1866, Queen Louise's matchmaking skills culminated

in Princess Dagmar's betrothal to the Russian Tsarevich and later Tsar Alexander III.⁷⁸

The seafaring career of Prince Valdemar was part of the bourgeois and dynastic strategies adopted by the Glücksborgs. It projected yet another powerful middle-class image onto the monarchy—that of the naval officer. Besides, it equipped Danish citizens with one of the most straightforward means of accessing the world of international high politics that had been re-opened to them through their royal great-power connections—overseas naval activities. Most importantly, however, the concept of the 'Sailor Prince' was closely linked with a third royal strategy whose seeming absence inspired scholars such as Møller and Olden-Jørgensen to develop their intricate explanations in the first place: the nationalization of dynasty. So far, no one has taken a closer look at how the Glücksborgs adapted to Danish nationalism and to contemporary ideas of what it meant to be Danish. Yet, one could argue that it was Prince Valdemar, who, by training for the navy, provided his father, the German successor to the 'sea-king's' throne, with a national anchorage.

In September 1885, an article in the family magazine *Illustreret Tidende* declared that this prince had "joined a union with the people which the Danish navy has a lot to tell about".⁷⁹ Even before his momentous decision, Valdemar had already been a truly national prince. In 1858, he had been the first baby in half a century to be born a Prince of Denmark.⁸⁰ Elected heir presumptive in 1853, his father, moreover, had conferred an auspicious name upon his son. While Christian's first three children bore common German dynastic names (Frederik, Alexandra, Vilhelm), his three younger ones were christened according to the nationalist fashion of the Norse revival: the daughters' names, Dagmar and Thyra, linked back to two of the most popular medieval Danish queens, Queen Dagmar and Thyra Dannebod, the wife of Gorm the Old who built the famous rampart Danevirke; the youngest son was named Valdemar after the great thirteenth-century kings who meant so much to the Danish romantics.⁸¹

The national promise encapsulated in this unusual choice came true when the prince joined the naval forces. Both the navy and the naval academy were revered national institutions whose physical presence in the centre of Copenhagen made them an integral part of everyday life.⁸² The gist of *Illustreret Tidende's* eulogy in 1885 was that by entering this service and going through his training together with all the other cadets recruited from the middle-class heart of Danish society,

Prince Valdemar had connected with the Danish people. From the 1860s, continuous political efforts had been made to democratize the naval officer corps by making it accessible to talented boys from wider parts of society through reduced training periods and free boarding for first-years.⁸³ Consequently, the navy acquired the image of an institution not only rooted in national tradition, but in the nation as such. As early as 1871, a portrait of the young Prince Valdemar by the painter Elisabeth Jerichau Baumann made use of this imagery of national belonging: clad in a sailor's suit and standing before a maritime background, Valdemar held a giant Danish flag (the Dannebrog) in his arm which almost wrapped him up.⁸⁴ Even though he would travel the world as a naval officer, by doing so under the Dannebrog Valdemar conveyed a message about his dynasty which was unavailable to most of his siblings: an unqualified loyalty to Denmark. While the Danes could take pride in their family of kings spreading all over Europe, they soon developed a special fondness for their 'stay-at-home' prince. As one anonymous author remarked when Valdemar rejected the Bulgarian crown in 1886, he "preferred a good Danish pancake to the tastiest delicacies" and "his own ship's deck to the most gorgeous halls".⁸⁵

Valdemar's love of the seafaring life had developed quite early and independently, if we are to trust his correspondence with his father: "And even though I miss you and maybe often yearn for home, I never repent what I have done and can only thank you for having given me permission to go to sea", the 17-year-old prince wrote in June 1877.⁸⁶ Life in Copenhagen with its many harbours and canals leading out to the Sound seemed almost designed to give the boy the travel bug. Amalienborg Palace, the royal family's main residence, was practically facing the water and only a few minutes away from *Langelinie*, the famous pier walk where throughout the nineteenth century, Denmark's kings would mingle with their promenading subjects. Royal guests usually arrived in the well-known white barques (*chalupper*) and Valdemar's family frequently travelled in the royal yachts *Slesvig* (1865–1879) or *Dannebrog* (1879–1931) to reach the ends of their archipelagian kingdom. In 1874, for example, they visited Skagen, where King Christian bought one of Michael Ancher's paintings of fishermen gazing out to the sea and thus popularized the artist's works.⁸⁷ As a young prince, Christian had himself felt the 'lure of the sea' and wished to become a naval officer, but his guardian Frederik VII had made him take the more traditional path of an army education.⁸⁸ When his sons, first Vilhelm and

then Valdemar, also displayed a naval predilection, Christian did not dissuade them, although it meant that the doting father would often be worried about his travelling sons.

After the loss of the German duchies and in the context of the national-defence debate, this parental decision amounted to a clear manifesto of identification with Denmark's maritime self-conception. It also showed that the monarchy had clear visions for the future. On the one hand, King Christian, in keeping with his original mission and compensating for early failures, was dedicated to holding together the remaining parts of the commonwealth. As is detailed in Chap. 4, he acquired a charismatic imperial envoy in his sailor son. On the other hand, Valdemar's choice of profession could be read as an active participation in the defence debate which highlighted the continued relevance of the navy and shed a new, more favourable light on the king's controversial role in the constitutional conflict.

Throughout the 1850s–1890s, Christian backed the conservative government of *Konseilspräsident* J.B.S. Estrup, which was generally associated with the army camp and favoured the reduction of the naval budget. The navy and its personnel, meanwhile, were counted as belonging to the liberal camp, which linked its fight for constitutional reform and the principle of majority government with a naval-strategic defence policy. In this situation, Valdemar, by associating with the democratic institution of the navy and the liberal force of the sea, built a bridge which eased his father's commitment to an entrenched position. Particularly once he had married the mesmerizing Princess Marie of Orléans in 1885, he would become the centre of a more liberal court faction surrounded by a network of entrepreneurs, journalists and politicians with close *Venstre* ties. This 'Yellow Mansion' clique (named after the couple's Copenhagen residence) formed a think tank and joint venture which envisioned a new role for the Danish navy, the merchant marine and Denmark as a small power taking advantage of friendly niches in a globalizing world of trade. The establishment of the Freeport of Copenhagen, the foundation of the East Asiatic Company (EAC) in 1897 and Prince Valdemar's famous *Valkyrie* cruise in 1898–1901 formed the culmination of their endeavours (Fig. 2.2).⁸⁹

The initiative was interpreted by contemporaries such as Alexander Svedstrup as a modern take on the seaborne 'Path of the Dane' famously extolled in the last stanza of Denmark's royal anthem. Christian IX, the defeated king of 1864, participated in this counter-narrative of economic modernization and internationalization which predicted the



Fig. 2.2 The King's son on-board. Prince Valdemar of Denmark. Painting by Otto Bache, 1900. © The Danish Royal Household. Photograph: Elisabeth von Buchwald

twentieth-century idea of a “modernity of welfare and wealth”.⁹⁰ On the occasion of his son's successful return from Siam, the usually taciturn

king even gave one of his longest and most momentous speeches which pointed to a significant change in his policy. He spoke of his conviction that the cruise had demonstrated that “the navy, under peaceful conditions, can carry out tasks from which the entire Fatherland will benefit.” Therefore, he hoped that “Parliament will grant the necessary funding for this development.”⁹¹ The very year in which this speech was given also witnessed the famous ‘system shift’, when the king entrusted J.H. Deuntzer, a professor connected to both the EAC and the *Venstre* party, with the formation of government and thus ushered in a new phase in the political modernization of the country. Within the next six years, a defence policy was negotiated which strengthened the Royal Navy.⁹² As their adopted country rose from the humiliation of defeat to a new self-awareness, the Danish Glücksborgs had also left the stigma of being an un-Danish dynasty. One of the reasons for their success was that they had kept a close eye on the process by which national identity was redefined, taken an active part in it and focused on a somewhat contested, though ultimately redeemed, national symbol: the navy.

PRINCE HEINRICH AND THE ‘WINDOW OUT TO THE SEA’

Both Britain and Denmark were essentially surrounded by water. Early nineteenth-century Britons or Danes who travelled to Germany were therefore often surprised by the landlocked character of the country. When Adam Oehlenschläger, the author of the Danish national anthem, toured Germany’s south in 1805, he professed nostalgia for his archipelagian “homeland” where “no streams smother in a grave, wide, wet with clay”⁹³ In 1863, the British journalist Harriet Martineau bemoaned Prince Alfred’s fate, destined to become the “sovereign of a country [Coburg] which has never smelt the sea”.⁹⁴ Yet, although Germany was a land power rooted in central Europe, growing sections of German society would, literally and figuratively speaking, look out to sea in the course of the nineteenth century. By the 1890s, the unified German Empire would be perceived as a growing threat by its Danish neighbours and British competitors since it had spread to the coast and developed a naval presence of its own.

Denmark’s loss in this was Germany’s gain, for the German Empire reached the seaside via the stepping stones of Schleswig, Holstein and Lauenburg. The idea that the annexation of Jutland might remedy the Holy Roman Empire’s geostrategic weakness by providing a

strong naval base in the Baltic dated back to the Thirty Years' War. In the 1830s–1840s, it became an additional driving force for Germany's liberal-national movement. German nationalists in the southern parts of the Jutland Peninsula, fighting for their freedom from Danish centralism and for the continued unity of their duchies, increasingly advocated their full integration into the German Confederation. In this they were supported by their southern compatriots, who regarded the region as Germany's northernmost outpost and a possible 'window out to the sea'. While the first Schleswig War (1848) resulted in a return to the status quo ante, the second Schleswig War (1864) eventually extracted Schleswig-Holstein from Denmark and made it a Prussian province.⁹⁵ The creation of the Imperial German Navy, the establishment of the North Sea port of Wilhelmshaven and the Baltic port of Kiel, and the construction of the Emperor-William-Canal (now known as Kiel Canal) connecting both finally laid the foundations for a powerful naval presence.

As a result, the Imperial House of Hohenzollern was naturally disliked by the Danish Glücksborgs. Its ties with the British royal family, however, were strong despite nascent rivalries. The love-match and "dynastic project"⁹⁶ between Crown Prince Frederick William of Prussia, only son of Emperor William I, and Victoria, Princess Royal, eldest daughter of Queen Victoria, has even been characterized as a 'franchise' of the British monarchy. In Karina Urbach's view, the princely couple, in their quest to fashion a pan-German, bourgeois, popular image for their dynasty, adopted many of the innovative strategies applied by the princess's inventive parents.⁹⁷ The naval career of their second son Heinrich could be regarded as an example of this franchising strategy. The evidence, again, suggests that the boy followed his own "passion for the seaman's profession".⁹⁸ There was also a distinct hope perceivable, though, that the brand import from Britain, if cleverly localized in the German political market, might provide the Prussian Hohenzollerns with a myth transcending the cultural-political divides of a young empire that was by then only incompletely integrated.

That a nation-state where most people lived far away from the sea and had little material benefit from the navy should be united by a maritime project was by no means a matter of course. The question of how naval enthusiasm nevertheless became a major force in Wilhelmine Germany has occupied many researchers. The German Empire was essentially a continental power. Its federal states, first among them the Kingdom of Prussia, looked back on an impressive military history, but not a naval

tradition worth mentioning. Prussia covered a considerable stretch of coastal territory, but it remained bottled into the Baltic until the acquisition of Schleswig-Holstein and Hanover between 1864 and 1866. The coastal regions of North and East Frisia and the Hanseatic ports of Bremen, Hamburg and Lübeck were undoubtedly steeped in an old seafaring culture of fishermen and merchants. For more than two-thirds of the German population, however, the only purpose of a ship they could witness in person prior to 1871 was inland navigation. Some members of the Frankfurt Parliament had suggested the creation of a pan-German fleet in 1848 to counter Danish assaults against the German coast. The plans were soon abandoned, though, and in the wars of unification not even the Prussian navy as the last remnant of the idea played a significant role. The Imperial German Navy practically had to be built from scratch.⁹⁹

In the interpretation of Eckart Kehr and Volker Berghahn, the spread of navalist feeling across the entire empire, particularly under Emperor William II, was therefore the fabricated result of a massive propaganda initiative. Within a few short years, an autocratic regime rallied the Germans behind a fleet-building programme designed to distract them from a delayed political modernization process.¹⁰⁰ Recent research suggests a more complex picture, though. It relocates the growing fascination with the maritime sphere and with related colonial projects to the *Vormärz* (1815–1848) and *Gründerzeit* (1871–1890) periods and, far from being engineered from above, sees it as the result of the activity of various agents, among them both the crown and the national-liberal middle classes.¹⁰¹

As a cultural and political force, the ‘lure of the sea’ needed little factual basis to unfold its full effect on nineteenth-century imaginations. The further people’s everyday lives were removed from it, and the later they became acquainted with it, the stronger their fascination and belief in the prestige and power that a navy could buy.¹⁰² Thus, the poetry and prose of 1820s–1860s Germany was already filled with maritime imageries and expressions of seaborne wanderlust. The regional dialect and mystic sea stories of authors such as Klaus Groth from Schleswig-Holstein or the North Sea poet Theodor Storm were popular across the entire country. Romantic and *Vormärz* writers from across Germany discovered the ocean as a metaphor for their inner feelings and political dreams. In 1826/27, Heinrich Heine penned a cycle of poems about the North Sea in which visions of the sublime vastness of the ocean merged with memories of ancient Greek and Norse myth. In the 1840s,

liberal-national bards such as Ferdinand Freiligrath or Georg Herwegh celebrated the ‘sea of liberty’. Many contemporaries were enthusiastic about the idea of creating a German navy as the foundation on which a powerful united nation could be built and as a power-political tool in global politics.¹⁰³ The popular renderings of the works of Daniel Defoe, James Fenimore Cooper or Jules Verne and the adventure fiction of their German imitators Friedrich Gerstäcker and Charles Sealsfield acquainted wide sections of society with naval and colonial fantasies long before these became viable options. It was within this imaginative landscape that the Imperial Navy was created, and only then that it received the full attention of the country’s governing elites.

As an idea which had fired imaginations before, but was ‘pastless’ as an institution, the navy posed an ideal symbol for a young nation and a welcome partner for a dynasty ‘with a past’. In the first few years of its existence, the German Empire lacked unifying institutions that could represent the nation as a whole and which were not compromised by their pre-history. While the army was split into federal contingents representing the independent traditions and particularistic identities of 25 constituent states, the navy, officially founded in 1871, was one such genuinely national institution. It operated under the supreme command of the Emperor; the Imperial Admiralty and its successor institutions were all *Reich*-ministries; and, unlike the army, which was identified with Prussian *Junkertum* (*squirearchy*), it was meant to draw men from every part of Germany and every stratum of society.¹⁰⁴ As one popular children’s book about Prince Heinrich described it, sailors on home leave would stream out “one to Prussia, the other to Bavaria, one to the East, the other to the West. For the entire German Fatherland provides homes for the German bluejackets at sea.”¹⁰⁵ This image of the navy as a “floating symbol of unity and national identification”¹⁰⁶ was consciously used by the monarchy, another would-be national institution.

Following the foundation of the German Empire in 1871, the newly created Emperor William I and his dynasty, the Prussian Hohenzollerns, needed to develop a new profile for themselves as a national-minded imperial family appealing to the entire nation. This was a balancing act. On the one hand, they had to create integrative myths which could foster a sense of loyalty and love for dynasty and fatherland in their subjects without infringing on their regional identities. On the other hand, the Hohenzollern legacy was problematic as it was one-sidedly Prussian, Protestant and associated with both ruthless power politics and

authoritarianism. Studies examining the integrative effect of the myths employed by William I and William II (the Queen Louise and William-the-Great myths, the official cult of the nation propagated through monuments, public holidays and memorabilia) have attested that the Hohenzollerns were neither particularly inventive nor successful at winning support outside core Prussia.¹⁰⁷

What has often been overlooked was the role of Crown Prince Frederick William as a dynastic myth-maker—and the naval dimension. As Frank Lorenz Müller has demonstrated, the later Emperor Frederick III, by fashioning the public persona ‘Our Fritz’ (a combination of the halo of the military hero of the wars of unification with the ordinary folksiness of a bourgeois family father) became a popular national icon himself in *Gründerzeit*-Germany. Unlike his staunchly Prussian father, he was a strong believer in the imperial idea. His romantically motivated support of a centralized, integrated state overcoming petty particularisms and his conviction of the central authority of the imperial crown even resulted in several dynastic nation-building projects. Museal and architectural schemes such as the Hohenzollern crypt were meant to inform the broader public and inspire love for a dynasty represented as inextricably intertwined with the history and future of the *Reich*.¹⁰⁸ By educating his second son in the navy instead of the army, Frederick William took another important step, stressing the national outlook of the Hohenzollerns and their integrative potential.

A product of unification and a projection space for national dreams ever since 1848, the Imperial Navy was “a central site for the display of German unity”. As Jan Rüger has outlined in his examination of William II’s politics of maritime symbols, turn-of-the-century ship launches and fleet reviews would be used to evoke a sense of national belonging in fascinated audiences. Cruisers named after national or regional royalties, federal states and cities would embody the “imperial mosaic” in steel.¹⁰⁹ Long before William II and his navalist advisors sought to popularize a grandiose fleet-building project, his father had already prepared the way. Media-savvy and obsessive about ceremonial details, he staged Prince Heinrich’s embarkations as popular giving-away ceremonies where the imperial boat would sail close to promenades lined with spectators and the imperial ensign would be meaningfully hoisted aboard his son’s ships. The imagery would then be replicated in official paintings and semi-official newspaper articles (Fig. 2.3).

While the Hohenzollern monarchy profited from the ‘pastlessness’ of the navy, it also contributed to the invention of a Prussian-German naval tradition, which could legitimize both the young navy and the young dynasty. From 1871 onwards, the German Admiralty and its staff of naval writers compiled a continuous narrative going back as far as the Germanic tribes and the Hanseatic League. Unencumbered as they were by the existence of real naval heroes, the myth-makers fell back on a succession of Hohenzollern visionaries, happily weaving together dynastic, Prussian and national history. The ‘Great Elector’ Frederick William of Brandenburg-Prussia was celebrated as the father of all fleet dreams, as he had built a short-lived fleet to assist him in his conflicts with Sweden and to secure his colonies in West Africa. Prince Adalbert of Prussia was styled as the “founding father of the German naval tradition”, since he had been put in charge of the commission for building a German navy in 1848 and had subsequently become chief of the Prussian Admiralty. The dynasty’s motto ‘From rock to sea’, finally, originally coined in reference to their journey from southern-German nobility to Prussian kings, was reinterpreted as a prophecy of the nation’s naval destiny.¹¹⁰

Prince Heinrich’s career choice was generally represented as the culminating point of this tradition and as the starting point of something new. Books about German naval history would usually conclude with a reference to “the Hohenzollern prince at sea”.¹¹¹ Popular songs depicted him as a “scion of the Zollerns” who “ventured to sea” under his “forefathers’ blessing gaze from heaven”.¹¹² And when he went on a two-year world cruise in 1878, the frigate *Sedan* was tellingly rechristened *Prinz Adalbert*.¹¹³ In official speeches given by his father and the chief of the Admiralty, the conspicuous fact that Heinrich was actually the first Prussian prince to be trained in the navy was brushed over with a continuity of a different kind: by proving true to the Zollern virtue of doing one’s duty, he would contribute to the glory of his fatherland, strengthening the young navy just as other princes before him had served the army.¹¹⁴

The alliance between the dynasty and the Imperial German Navy was thus a mutually supportive relationship. While the monarchy profited from the link with an unsullied national symbol which strengthened the imperial idea, the young navy benefited from dynastic promotion. In the first few years of its existence, it lacked social status and prestige. Without a glorious history to look back to and without established educational courses, it was unable to attract the sons of Germany’s elites. Its



Fig. 2.3 Putting the Hohenzollerns to sea. Prince Heinrich of Prussia's embarkation on-board HMS *Prinz Adalbert*. Sketch by Max Schäfer printed in *Über Land und Meer*, Nr. 6, 1878. Author's collection. In the foreground from *left to right*: Albrecht von Stosch, Crown Prince Frederick William, Prince Waldemar, Crown Princess Victoria, Prince Heinrich

personnel was mainly recruited from merchant families and its command positions were held by army officers. Frederick William's decision to educate his son in the navy instead of choosing the traditional path of the Prussian aristocracy had to be understood as an act of support.¹¹⁵ It was meant to inspire the "most adventurous of Germany's vigorous and well-educated youth" to follow his example and form a new naval elite.¹¹⁶ Moreover, it amounted to a vote of confidence for the controversial chief of the Admiralty, Albrecht von Stosch.

When, in 1872, the ten-year-old Prince Heinrich was appointed premier lieutenant, his father wrote to Stosch: "The Navy rightfully sees in [this] a proof of my active devotion to our naval service; it is ... but a new proof, though, for I do not doubt that my sentiments have

long been known.”¹¹⁷ The two men shared a political friendship and Heinrich’s naval career was their common project. Both were Prussian army officers to the core and veterans of the wars of unification. What they also had in common, though, was that some of the most decisive features of their political creeds and hopes for Germany’s future pointed towards the sea. For both Frederick William and Stosch were considered liberals by their contemporaries. Stosch, intimately acquainted with a range of important figures from the national-liberal and progress party, was even whispered about as a possible successor to Chancellor Otto von Bismarck for a while. Frederick William and his left-liberal English wife were also associated with this opposition camp. A single act of open rebellion against Bismarck’s reactionary politics in 1863 had condemned the crown-princely couple to a life on the political sidelines. Thereafter, Stosch, whose nomination as the first chief of the Admiralty had been supported by the crown prince, was one of the few men in power who continued to update Frederick William on current affairs and tried to arouse him from his lethargy. Prince Heinrich’s entry into the navy represented a rare political statement against Bismarck’s attempts to oust Stosch from power.¹¹⁸ And it subtly promoted the liberal programme.

Ever since 1848, the navy had been associated with the liberal-national movement and its twin aims of liberal reform and national unity. This image remained even when German unification was achieved by means of ‘blood and iron’ instead of political fusion. In the eyes of many liberals, the army—though narrated as the ‘nation in arms’ after the successes of 1864–1871—was also indelibly linked with the bloody suppression of political protest in 1848/49. The naval forces, on the other hand, though they had hardly featured in the unification process, would forever hark back to the vigorous national spirit of the Frankfurt Parliament and its forward-thinking dreams: maritime commerce, overseas colonies and naval armament as vital sources of prosperity and power.¹¹⁹

This image was reinforced by recruitment patterns. While the army-officer corps, after 1871, returned to becoming an exclusive stronghold of the aristocracy steeped in conservative traditions, the navy drew its men from the middle classes and thus became a reservoir of liberal ideologies. Bourgeois families chose the naval profession for their sons because it promised equal career opportunities and required, above all, a high standard of formal education, the mainstay of bourgeois upward mobility.¹²⁰ Right until the early twentieth century, German naval officers would thus be disassociated from the negative image of their army

colleagues, embodying military expertise, social skills and cosmopolitanism instead of the narrow-minded *Pickelhauben* militarism so often featured in political satire.¹²¹ By educating their son in the navy, Prince Heinrich's parents provided a proof of their bourgeois, liberal attitude in a manner nicely aligned with their general representation as an approachable 'middle-class' family.

As several scholars have recently stressed, though, the middle classes of nineteenth-century Germany, the navy and Frederick William were not just liberal in that they advocated liberty, equality, democracy and the free market. They were also liberal in the aggressively nationalistic, chauvinistic sense encapsulated in the term 'liberal imperialism'. While the Frankfurt Parliament campaigned for domestic reform, its foreign policy and fleet-building project were guided by 'national hubris' and an aggressive imperial expansionism.¹²² This imperialist spirit was still alive in the 1870s–1890s, when, as Jonathan Steinberg argued, it was the "expansive ideology of the *Bürgertum*" rather than "Prussian militarism" which turned the Imperial German Navy into a symbol of meritocratic advancement opportunities as well as Social Darwinist power struggles.¹²³

In this scenario, Prince Heinrich's naval education, more than shining a liberal ray of hope on German political culture, was also an expression of his father's wish for a strong monarchical executive controlling all military branches.¹²⁴ And it reflected Frederick William's role as one of the most prominent adherents of *Gründerzeit* colonial fantasies. As Hermann Hiery noted, the crown prince's romantic nostalgia for the Old Empire and his belief in the new imperial idea went hand in hand with a commitment to furthering the nation's international prestige and a yearning for colonial expansion.¹²⁵ As Queen Victoria's son-in-law, he always had before his eyes the glorious example of the British Empire. A further revelatory moment might have been when, in 1869, Frederick William, accompanied by Stosch, had attended the festive opening of the Suez Canal, probably the most spectacular maritime construction project of the century. Thrilled by the exoticism of the Middle East and the grandeur of the scene, he exclaimed in his diary: "If only Germany would soon be able to pride itself on similar splendid achievements in the field of traffic-route construction".¹²⁶ His son's naval education and world tours enabled the "landlubber of a father"¹²⁷—and with him many other German landlubbers with a penchant for the sea—to participate vicariously in the adventure of maritime travel and to project their visions

of future imperial greatness onto a suitable canvas. In 1884, the retired Stosch told Prince Heinrich that his journeys allowed him, the armchair sailor, to “construct ever-increasing achievements [for the navy] in [his] mind, to build castles in the air which adorn Germany’s possessions in faraway seas”.¹²⁸ As is addressed in Chap. 4, Heinrich’s publicized service cruises would indeed help to visualize and expand a competitive virtual empire called the ‘wider Fatherland’.

Heinrich and his elder brother William were products and heirs of all their parents’ interest in naval matters, just as their generation inherited the fleet dreams and colonial fantasies of the *Vormärz* and *Gründerzeit*. During their holidays in England, particularly on the Isle of Wight, the princes frequently visited sea ports. In their early youth, a boatswain was engaged to instruct them in practical seamanship in Potsdam. Later, they would enjoy rowing on the *Jungferensee* close to their family farm Bornstedt or sailing on the frigate *Royal Louise*. This early acquaintance with the ‘lure of the sea’ laid the foundations of a life-long passion in both boys.¹²⁹ While the younger was destined for the navy, though, and every part of his training directed towards the requirements of his future profession, the older had to undergo the exacting education of a Prussian heir to the throne and eventually could act out his maritime passion only as an increasingly politicized hobby. His yachting sprees to Norway, his ambition to win the sailing regattas of Cowes and Kiel, and his predilection for naval uniforms were infamous.

Once Emperor, William would use his brother as his “operating hand at sea” and as the public face of his naval policy.¹³⁰ Conveniently stationed at the sea port Kiel in Schleswig-Holstein, Heinrich became the dynastic embodiment of Imperial Germany’s firm position at the once contested ‘window out to the sea’. His public marketing as ‘the Kaiser’s Admiral’ and the diplomatic missions he carried out around 1900 (for example to East Asia or the United States) demonstrate how William, who is generally regarded as the complete opposite of his father, actually took up Frederick William’s dynastic nation-building project.¹³¹ The late Wilhelmine obsession with sea power as a prerequisite of world power, though more extreme and irrational in the assumptions it made about the survival of states, was not far removed from the liberal-national logics of commercial and territorial expansion.¹³² The grandiose fleet-building project undertaken by William II and his secretary of state Admiral Alfred von Tirpitz, though on an unfortunate collision course with Britain, can also be understood as the continuation of Frederick

William's and Stosch's concerted efforts to create a strong navy. Just as Stosch anticipated Tirpitz's propaganda techniques for the promotion of the naval service, so did both Frederick William and his son employ their own aura and dynasty to enhance the image and social status of the naval officer corps. While the father had had only limited means to express his ideas about Germany's imperial and colonial future, though, William would become the voice of the bourgeois power fantasies of late Wilhelmine Germany, infamously evoking "futures lying on the water". It was arguably this alignment with the dreams, fantasies and possible futures of their time, all encapsulated in the navy, that accounts for the astonishing approval that the Hohenzollerns achieved with at least their middle-class subjects in the years preceding 1914.

PRINCE GEORGIOS AND THE 'GREEKS OF THE SEA'

Britons, Danes and Germans were all united in their fascination for the sublime seascapes of the Atlantic Ocean characterized by heavy swells and the mystical aura of the North.¹³³ However, throughout the nineteenth century, the ancient lore surrounding the calm blue Mediterranean and the Black Sea, and the maritime imagery, marine Olympus and Odyssean plots of Greek and Roman literature provided an equally potent imaginative prism through which oceans were perceived. 'Thalatta! Thalatta! Hail to thee, thou eternal sea!' was how the German bard Heinrich Heine, referring to Xenophon's ancient Greek report *Anabasis*, addressed the North Sea in 1826/27.¹³⁴ In an act of both physical invasion (through cultural tourism) and mental appropriation (through classical education), the educated elites of Western Europe took possession of the classical heritage, the landscapes and mythscapes of Italy and Greece, which they regarded as the cradles of European civilization.¹³⁵ Poseidon's realm, in this scenario, was turned into a common good. All across Europe, ships bore the names of ancient mythical figures such as *Niobe* or *Galatea*. Liberals reaching out for the 'sea of liberty' ultimately referred to the Gulf of Aegina famously described by Thucydides as the marine gateway that had turned the Athenian city-state into an open, democratic society. States aspiring to naval dominance, meanwhile, claimed the legitimizing heritage of the famed thalassocracy of the Athenian Empire.¹³⁶

As a young and aspiring nation-state amidst the political turmoil of the Balkans, modern Greece profited from this popularity. It was

the attractive idea that the nineteenth-century Greeks struggling to throw off the yoke of Ottoman rule were the direct descendants of the forefathers of European civilization which inspired first individual Philhellenes and then the great powers to intervene in the Greek War of Independence (1821–1832). For decades, the country’s epic past, its picturesque ruins and landscapes would be its best assets in the fight for international recognition.¹³⁷ As they built their nation, though, the Hellenes were also eager to emancipate themselves from the political-cultural tutelage of the West, to reclaim their past and pursue their own agendas. While ruins had to be excavated, traditions re-invented and histories re-written, one source of national pride which could also be traced back to the ancients, but had remained central to the Greeks’ self-conception throughout the ages, was their belief in their special relationship with the ocean. As late as 2014, a panoramic documentary entitled ‘Greeks of the Sea’ celebrated “the world’s most acclaimed mariners”.¹³⁸ In the nineteenth century, this proud maritime identity and the wish to re-establish the seaborne empires of Athens/Byzantium served as main-springs of the ‘Great Idea’ (Μεγάλη Ιδέα). The nation’s great goal was to incorporate all Greek-inhabited areas of the Ottoman Empire and the Balkans peninsula into their state. Disappointed by the lack of support from the European concert, the Hellenes would come to rely on military expansion. The assertion of naval dominance in their home waters, either in defiance or in alliance with the Mediterranean powers Britain and France, was one of the central strategies through which they meant to achieve their goal.

Elected to succeed Greece’s first king, Otto I, in 1863, King George I of the Hellenes had no choice but to align himself with his adopted country’s national identity and future project. A harmless prince-ling from Denmark, he followed a Bavarian would-be autocrat on the throne who had come to Greece full of Philhellenic passion. Having failed to ingratiate himself with his subjects, though, Otto was eventually ousted.¹³⁹ Eager to anchor his dynasty more securely in Greek national waters, George, himself a ‘Sailor Prince’, resorted to a strategic tool of the Danish Glücksborgs and sent his second son Georgios to Denmark to be trained in the navy.

As in all of the case studies discussed here, this decision was retrospectively interpreted as a natural choice. According to one biographer, Georgios was not yet 15 when in April 1884, his father asked him: “Would you like to become a seaman?” “Indeed, I would”, the prince

replied, thrilled by the thought. “Well then”, George said, “you will have to get ready within the week to go to Denmark for your education.”¹⁴⁰ More than in any other case, though, we can assume, that, far from being a childhood dream, Georgios’s career was part of a carefully devised agenda. As George wrote to his father, King Christian IX, in April 1889, when the boy was due to return from the Danish naval academy: “Here, the whole navy waits for him with indescribable impatience.”¹⁴¹ Georgios had a mission: it was to help create a powerful naval force which would bolster the Greek claim to regional power and thus save the Glücksborgs from the fate of Otto I.

Studies examining Greek maritime history rightly note that the country has always been inseparably associated with the ocean. Located at the southernmost end of the Balkans and nestled between the Aegean and the Ionian Seas, the Greek state, even at its smallest extent in 1832, encompassed two peninsulas (the Peloponnese and the Chalcidice) and countless small islands (among them the Cyclades, the Dodecanese and the North Aegean Isles). In pursuit of the ‘Great Idea’, it would expand further along the Aegean coast as well as acquire the Ionian Islands and Crete. The long stretches of coast and the scattered nature of these realms meant that from earliest times the Greeks had been forced to travel by boat. They made a living from fishing, deep-sea diving and maritime trade.¹⁴² Their relationship with the sea was therefore perceived as so intimate and pervasive that according to myth they were “born with salty blood”.¹⁴³ They were “*marins*” by nature, as the French journalist Amédée Britsch noted in 1910.¹⁴⁴

The long seafaring tradition that the modern Hellenes could look back to or re-invented started in antiquity. The ancient Greek city-states had essentially been maritime societies averse to settling far from the coast. Their mythology was pervaded by marine deities and sea creatures. Their literature was steeped in maritime imageries such as those of Homer’s seminal epic *Odyssey*, Europe’s first sea adventure. Their histories, most of all the works of Herodotus and Thucydides, were fundamentally concerned with themes such as the build-up of the Athenian navy under Themistocles, the land and sea encounters of the Persian Wars, the zenith of the seaborne Athenian Empire under Pericles or its subsequent demise in the Peloponnesian War.¹⁴⁵ This was the legitimizing heritage on which the independence fighters and later the political leaders of the independent Greek state could capitalize. Eager to build a modern, secular nation distinct from the Ottoman system of religious

millets and keen to win the support of the great powers for their national aspirations, they projected a cultural link with classical antiquity. Parallels were drawn between, on the one hand, the Greek fight against the Ottoman Empire and, on the other, the Persian Wars—when the Greek city-states, embodying Western liberty, had warded off the Persian forces, representing oriental despotism. Taking the analogy further, the intellectual elites and the independence fighters would adopt ancient names for themselves and their war ships as well as use the countenances of great warriors such as Themistocles or Leonidas as their figureheads.¹⁴⁶

While the naval hegemony of the Athenians was fleeting and impossible to resurrect for most of the nineteenth century, the success of their merchant marine emerged as a second source of national identity and pride for the modern Hellenes. In a pamphlet published in 1905, Admiral Periklis Argyropoulos, an important reformer and builder of the Greek navy, remarked that it was not only the memory of the heroic exploits of the ancients which inspired the “justified love of the Greeks for their valued element, the sea”, but the fact that their ancestors had become rich in shipping and trade. The “enriching ocean”¹⁴⁷ had produced a prosperous class of merchants, ship owners and captains operating within the Ottoman Empire and particularly the Mediterranean. Wealthy, confident and often settled in the important commercial and intellectual centres of the West, this mercantile diaspora served as the financial and ideological backbone of the Neo-Hellenic Enlightenment, the revolution of 1821 and the nascent Greek state.¹⁴⁸

The proudest moment of the merchant marine came when, in the absence of anything resembling a regular navy, it engaged in naval warfare during the independence fight. In the earliest stages of the revolt, the ‘Nautical Islands’ of the Aegean, most notably Hydra, Psara and Spetsai, built up an impressive fleet to support the insurrections on the mainland. Commanded and equipped by wealthy ship owners and manned by former mercenaries and pirates, this first modern Greek navy, as it was later called, proved a major challenge for the Ottoman forces. By blockading their sea routes, diverting their attention and breaking their sieges, it made a decisive contribution to the war effort. When the Ottomans finally sent the Egyptian fleet under Muhammed Ali, the cornered Greeks resorted to the infamous use of fire ships, earning them lasting acclaim.¹⁴⁹

Although it was the combined intervention of the great powers in the Battle of Navarino (1827) which saved their revolt in the end,

the Hellenes celebrated their navy as the main source of their independence. In Dimitrios Vikelas' first modern Greek (children's) novel *Loukis Laras* (1879), "the ships of the Greek fleet" are thus almost apotheosized: "They swept over the Greek seas, manned by dauntless mariners, showing their flag from coast to coast, bidding the Christians take heart, and hurling defiance at the Turk."¹⁵⁰ A vigorous mythscape emerged around the heroes of 1821–1832, which greatly contributed to the nation-building process. While the illiterate mass of Greek people had little connection with the classical heritage embraced by the Western-oriented intelligentsia, they were receptive to the 'folk spirit' and emotional appeal of the revolution. Romantic Greek poetry and art, folklore and popular literature were therefore filled with heroic war scenes.¹⁵¹ Though ambivalent in their treatment of the veteran warlords, the political elites also utilized these soldiers' larger-than-life myths to create a sense of nationhood among the people. In history lessons, children's books and magazines—media which count amongst the most important tools for generating a literate people 'aware of their fatherland'—Greek children read detailed portraits of the revolutionary 'fathers' and 'mothers' of the nation.¹⁵²

Three naval commanders were particularly adored and officially commemorated: Admiral Constantine Kanaris, a seaman from Psara who devised the fire ship tactic and famously destroyed Ali Pasha's flagship at Chios; Admiral Andreas Miaoulis, a merchant from Hydra who was chief of the Greek naval forces and managed to break the siege of Missolonghi several times; and Laskarina Bouboulina, a wealthy widow from Spetsai who used her fortune to build a large vessel named *Agamemnon*.¹⁵³ Just as the freedom fighters had given their ships ancient Greek names, so the modern Hellenic Navy would also pay tribute to them: one sail cruiser was named *Navarchos* (*Admiral*) *Miaoulis* in 1879, a torpedo boat *Kanaris* in 1889 and a steamer *Bouboulina* in 1879. In accordance with the Greek trend of interpreting independence as a common achievement of the wider community, moreover, three prestigious ironclads built between 1889 and 1890 would bear the proud names of *Hydra*, *Psara* and *Spetsai*.

The commission of all these vessels fell into a period when Greek politicians began to resort to naval power as a possible means to achieve the 'Great Idea'. Dissatisfied with the extent of their independent kingdom, the Greeks increasingly pursued an irredentist-imperialist foreign policy aimed at reclaiming 'Greater Greece' from the Ottomans and other

emerging Balkans nations. As the hope for the support of Europe's great powers faded, war became a more likely option. Just as in Denmark, the role of the Royal Hellenic Navy within this was contested. Periods when the build-up of a land army operating in the North against the Ottomans and the Bulgarians stood in the foreground alternated with periods when most hope was placed on the water. Following the Russo-Turkish War (1876–1878), the moderate Prime Minister Charilaos Trikoupis ushered in a programme of naval build-up and reform aimed at the command of the Aegean Sea against the declining Ottoman fleet. In response to opposition calls for a stronger naval presence, he invited a French mission, which resulted in the reorganization of officer education, the development and technological modernization of the country's naval bases and the procurement of new warships.¹⁵⁴ The same period also witnessed the construction of the Corinth Canal connecting the Ionian with the Aegean Sea, a major national prestige project comparable to the Emperor-William-Canal.

The high expectations that “ever-excitable Greek public opinion”,¹⁵⁵ fuelled by the nationalist rhetoric of Trikoupis' opponent Theodoros Deligiannis, set on the promises of naval power, were soon thwarted. In 1886, the Hellenes, planning on war with Turkey, had to endure the humiliation of a naval blockade by the great powers. The Greco-Turkish War of 1897 ended in disaster, despite the achievement of naval dominance in the Aegean Sea. After a period of debate about their role in Greek defence policy, however, the naval forces resumed their central place in the public's imagination and national consciousness.¹⁵⁶ From 1904, the building of the fleet would even be financed by the national lottery, which so far had solely benefitted the Archaeological Society—a sign of how the naval future of the country was increasingly considered as central to Greek national consciousness as the ancient past.¹⁵⁷ The partial withdrawal of Britain's Royal Navy from the Mediterranean finally meant that Greece, suddenly the valued and supported partner of the allied forces in the region, would indeed become an Aegean naval power of consequence in the 1910s.¹⁵⁸

King George's decision to educate his son Georgios in the navy was a direct response to the discourse on national identity and the ‘Great idea’. Transplanted to the radically democratic ‘crowned democracy’ (‘βασιλευομένη δημοκρατία’) of Greece at the tender age of 17, his fate and that of his dynasty rested to a large extent on their ability openly to identify with the Greeks' self-image and national cause. While George

proved a shrewd advocate of Greek interests on the international stage and thereby earned the respect of his notoriously critical people, he was not particularly adept at winning their affection. Embroiled in a constitutional conflict early in his reign—due to his support of often corrupt minority governments—he would later be criticized for his prolonged absences from Athens, his cosmopolitan lifestyle and his passivity in domestic politics.¹⁵⁹ What the father lacked in charisma, ‘Greekness’ and national fervour, though, was compensated for by the second generation of his dynasty: a phalanx of five athletic sons and three beautiful daughters who were reared in the Orthodox faith and Greek language. They formed exactly the naturalized dynasty that the childless Otto I would have needed to stay in power.¹⁶⁰ ‘Sailor Prince’ Georgios contributed to their success by connecting the monarchy to a strong emblem of national identity intimately involved in the future project of the ‘Great idea’ (Fig. 2.4).

In May 1891, the newspaper *Asty* wrote that the tall and brave Prince Georgios spoke “directly to the imagination and to the hearts of the people”.¹⁶¹ By choosing to embody the Greek sailor type, Georgios had become a popular figure. That the concept of the ‘Sailor Prince’ had a special appeal for the ‘Greeks of the sea’ had already been demonstrated before. Following King Otto’s departure, Prince Alfred had been the first choice for the Hellenic throne.¹⁶² As one Athenian pamphleteer remarked in 1863, this “English prince, who has styled himself the Mariner of England” would have made a perfect ‘Sailor King’ for the merchant nation Greece.¹⁶³ Obviously, nothing came of the idea. When the lot finally fell to Prince Vilhelm of Denmark, though, the Greeks, in the words of a British diplomat, had again picked a man who “is like Prince Alfred a Sailor”.¹⁶⁴ Only months after his accession, the “crowned midddy” proved how his sailor’s identity matched the maritime nature of this archipelagian kingdom by undertaking a tour of his realm. It culminated in a sea journey aboard the corvette *Hellas* during which he commemorated the great sea battle of Navarino as well as formally taking possession of the Ionian Islands (Corfu, Paxos, Ithaca and others)—a dowry conceded to him from Britain.¹⁶⁵

Unfortunately, George would only once and rather late in his life repeat the success of this initial royal progress. He continued to visit Corfu each year during Eastertide, though.¹⁶⁶ Enamoured with the beauty of the Ionian Sea, which also fascinated other European royals such as Empress Elizabeth of Austria or Emperor William II, he chose



Fig. 2.4 A mariner with salty blood. Prince Georgios of Greece. Postcard, c. 1900. Author's collection

the palace of *Mon Repos* as his holiday residence. It was here, close by the waters which one American novelist described as of “the bluest blue you know” that Prince Georgios was born in June 1869.¹⁶⁷ This young boy took up where his father had left off and became a ‘Sailor Prince’ close to

the Greek heart. According to his biographer, he “felt drawn to the sea rather than the mainland” from the earliest age, enjoying playing with his boat in the palace garden lakes or at the beach of Phaleron Bay. As Athens grew in size, this bathing resort outside the city attracted increasing parts of fashionable society. Of an ordinary summer afternoon, the royal couple would be seen driving along their favourite carriage promenade, while most Athenians arrived by tram or later by steam railway. All would then mingle at the beach, with King George frequently walking his dogs among his subjects.¹⁶⁸ From the bustling, steadily growing port of Piraeus nearby, the royal yacht *Amphitrite* would leave for summer cruises. On-board, little ‘Georgy’, ‘electrified’ by the lure of the sea, would soak up the stories of the naval officers or pester the helmsman with nautical questions.¹⁶⁹

Once the boy had completed his training in Denmark and subsequently joined the Hellenic Navy, he was adopted by the Greeks as one of their own, a mariner with ‘salty blood’. The 1891 article from *Asty* celebrated him as an “ephebe” (ἑφηβον) toughened up by the “looming dangers of the ocean”. Tall as a tower, “with the arm of Heracles ... and a body evoking a race of Giants” he allegedly took his descent directly from the “tree of the people”.¹⁷⁰ Throughout his life, a myth would surround the ‘Sailor Prince’ that by his acquaintance with Greek seamen he had learned to love the ordinary life of the Greeks from which his cosmopolitan dynasty was rather removed. He was said to frequent the taverns of Plaka and Psyri in Athens, drinking retsina and eating sardines.¹⁷¹ As a result, the prince, for much of his tumultuous life, was far more popular than the other members of his family. In August 1890, the newspaper *Ephimeris*, contrasting him with his elder brother, remarked how he had won “the general admiration and love of the nation” by his diligent work. Shortly after, he was made honorary citizen of the islands of Hydra and Spetsai because he was a sailor like the islanders.¹⁷² In 1897, days before the outbreak of the Greco-Turkish War, rumours were circulating that he had even quarrelled with his father because of his more decidedly ‘Panhellenic’ feelings and war spirit.¹⁷³ And as late as 1910, the French journalist Amédée Britsch noted that the Greeks might prefer him over his brother as their future king.¹⁷⁴

One reason why Georgios enjoyed such popularity was because high hopes were set on him as a future leader of the Hellenic Navy in the struggle for expansion. In response to the news of his naval training in Denmark, *Asty* predicted as early as 1885 that, on his return, the ‘Sailor

Prince' would "raise the morale of our brave seamen".¹⁷⁵ King George was aware of these hopes and had even reckoned with them. A momentous speech that he gave at the old harbour of Ermoupolis on the island of Syros on 24 April 1888 can be read in direct relation to the national mission he envisioned for his son. Unveiling a statue of Admiral Andreas Miaoulis in the city square, the king invoked the memory of Greece's "heroic naval warriors" to inspire his compatriots with similar feelings of "love for the fatherland" and with the readiness to repeat their "deeds". Addressing his sailors, he exclaimed: "Strive, toil, do your duty at every moment; everything is easy if the goal is the wellbeing of the fatherland and the progress of our Hellenic Navy, the guardian and glory of the fatherland."¹⁷⁶

These words were enthusiastically received. Although they "electrified every heart", *Asty* ironically remarked a few days later that a mild reprimand could be made: "The impression made by the speech and the enthusiasm that it engendered would have been infinitely greater, if [the king] had used the first instead of the second person plural."¹⁷⁷ This rebuke referred to a frequent reproach flung at George: that he did not care enough about his royal duties, spent half the year abroad and only rarely inspected the navy. Once the constitutional conflict that had characterized his early reign had been resolved in favour of the government-by-majority principle in 1875, George became too much of a model constitutional monarch for Greek tastes. There were frequent calls for a more involved and expansion-minded king who would fight corruption within and the enemy without.¹⁷⁸

Prince Georgios's re-appearance as a Danish-trained naval officer less than one year after the king's speech thus filled a void: it represented the first-person-plural devotion of the Glücksborg dynasty to the naval build-up. King George used all of his sons as his deputies in the armed forces to strengthen his remaining prerogatives and create a strong support base in Greece. Although often criticized as a form of clientelism, their employment in a force whose ultimate goal was the establishment of Greater Greece also frequently caused upsurges in the dynasty's popularity. As the newspaper *Ephimeris* remarked in 1890, the nation, "monarchically minded" and "feeling as one with the dynasty" demanded "that the royal family live amongst the people, serve their interests, keep up their traditions and take part in their aspirations and struggles". Georgios, in the opinion of the author, fulfilled this ideal.¹⁷⁹

From the moment he returned to Greece as a lieutenant in December 1889, the prince was directly involved in the naval build-up. Trained in the cutting-edge science of torpedo ballistics, he was almost immediately charged with the command of the mobile defence and thus with the establishment of a torpedo school for officers.¹⁸⁰ His contribution to the irredentist-imperialist cause was even more striking. At the beginning of the Greco-Turkish War of 1897 he was dispatched to the conflict-stricken island of Crete as the commander of an entire torpedo-boat flotilla to support or rather protect an insurrection against the Ottoman Sultan. Following the humiliating defeat by the Ottoman forces and the semi-autonomy of Crete in 1898, the prince was elected High Commissioner of the Cretan state, hailed as the “Messianic angel of God’s great will” by the Cretans.¹⁸¹ The mission would fail in 1906. Georgios, however, though temporarily seeking exile in Denmark and France, would continue to play a role in the defence debate and remained a comparative darling of the Greeks.¹⁸² In the concept of the ‘Sailor Prince’, appealing to the ‘salty blood’ and great dreams of the Hellenes, the Glücksborgs had probably found the most stable and popular token of their devotion to Greek national identity and the Greater Greek cause.

CONCLUSION

This chapter has explored how, between 1850 and 1914, several major dynasties entered the maritime sphere to close ranks with the “imagined community”¹⁸³ of the nation. The sea and all the institutions attached to it exerted a strong fascination on European societies in the Age of Empire. Through the public persona of the ‘Sailor Prince’, monarchies could profit from this ‘lure of the sea’ in both its general and nation-specific forms.

So how exactly did this lure spell out? Considered alongside each other, the four case studies reveal that what has been said about national myths in general also applies to the role of the maritime dimension in national identity: claims of exceptionality and peculiarity were accompanied by striking structural similarities.¹⁸⁴ Thus, nations as diverse as Britain, Denmark or Greece all defined themselves by their geographical position (the ‘island race’), special relationship with the sea (their ‘salty blood’) and long seafaring traditions (‘Path of the Dane’). Deriving their national missions and future projects from their ‘heroic ages’ of naval dominance (the Athenian Empire, the Age of the Valdemars, the

Napoleonic Wars and so on), these countries also placed great importance on the navy and the command of the sea in debates about national defence or foreign policy.

Moreover, the all-pervasive nature of nineteenth-century maritime culture, its assumptions about geostrategy, political economy and the evolving ideology of sea power meant that even traditional land powers such as Germany could join the ranks of the sea-loving nations. In various contexts of international decline (Denmark), power preservation (Britain) or aspiration (Germany, Greece), the future was seen 'lying on the water'. On closer inspection, the invention of tradition that followed from this in post-1871 Germany (applying the regional history of the north to the entire nation) was only gradually, but not fundamentally, different from the re-invention of tradition discernible in Denmark and Britain (where the Vikings were rediscovered) or Greece (where a link with antiquity was projected). The idea of the chronological succession of thalassocracies virulent in the period even meant that any nation with sea access could potentially tap into the mythologies of naval might.

A myth as powerful as this was a vital tool for Europe's monarchies in their quest to nationalize their public image and thus gain new legitimacy. By aligning themselves with their countries' maritime identities and sending their sons to join the prestigious naval forces, dynasties originating from outside the nation or criticized for their unclear loyalties (the German Saxe-Coburgs and Glücksborgs in Britain and Denmark, the Danish Glücksborgs in Greece, the Prussian Hohenzollerns in the German Empire) inserted themselves into a timeline of national descent and destiny. They showed their commitment to the nation's perceived traditions, tapped into a pool of national myths or became themselves symbols of national unity. Simultaneously, they presented themselves as integrally connected to the nation's future by accessing the sea as a 'frontier of modernity' and the navy as an instrument of future (imperial) greatness.

In doing so, the dynasties not only gained symbolic relevance and influence, they also managed to take an active stance in a variety of public debates.¹⁸⁵ Public gestures, naval rituals, speeches, et cetera combined to create a platform for monarchical involvement in current affairs in countries as radically 'democratic' as Greece or Britain or as ambivalently 'autocratic' or 'pre-parliamentary' as Germany or Denmark. Naval build-ups, budget claims and imperial expansion programmes were supported in all four countries; naval recruitment was enhanced in Britain, Germany

and Greece; the liberal chief of the Admiralty was defended in Germany; and in Denmark, a semi-private business corporation (the EAC) was successfully launched.

Given the lack of explicit ego-documents, it would be presumptuous to project too much intentionality onto these developments. The functions performed by ‘Sailor Princes’, and the success they met with, could hardly have been anticipated or planned. What has been demonstrated, though, is that their naval careers were more than the result of youthful whims. All royal parents, in varying degrees, shared in the rich maritime cultures of their age. They had at least an intuitive grasp of what might be popular among their countrymen. Being initially foreigners to their nations, dynasts such as Prince Albert, King Christian or King George even had a heightened sense of awareness concerning the defining characteristics and self-images of their compatriots. Combining their insights with the models they knew from the transnational network of kings, they devised a remarkably adaptive approach. As the phenomenon spread via dynastic channels and across generations, moreover, the motivations increasingly shifted from intuition to strategy. Whether precursors such as King Christian IV or King William IV were decisive role models for Prince Alfred and Prince Valdemar, can only be a matter of speculation. Both princes’ parents were initially not even pleased with their sons’ career choices or even tried to ‘suppress’ their inclinations.¹⁸⁶ Only gradually did they realize the full potential of the ‘Sailor Prince’ brand. Prince Heinrich’s and Prince Georgios’s careers, however, were without doubt moulded upon those of their British and Danish uncles and aimed to imitate their success.

As the princes were trained in the navy and enhanced the nationalized image of the monarchy, however, they increasingly left the very context of dynastic internationalism from which their brand originated.¹⁸⁷ Their popular attraction, to a large extent, rested on the assumption that they became national (rather than international) princes in their own self-understanding as well as that of others. The ‘Sailor Prince’ brand connected the monarchy with the nation by symbolically locating it on a horizontal timeline between naval past and naval future, tradition and modernity. But it also repositioned it on a vertical, social scale: instead of being above the nation, the monarchy had to become of the nation, transcending social barriers and becoming one with the people. How this was achieved—if at all—is the subject of the next chapter.

NOTES

1. Denmark's second national—or royal—anthem '*Kong Christian stod ved højen mast*' culminates in an emotive invocation of the sea: '*Du danskes vej til ros og magt, sortladne hav!*': 'Path of the Dane to fame and might, dark-rolling wave!' (transl. by Henry Wadsworth Longfellow).
2. '*Danmark er lille, men Havet er stort, og Havet er Danmarks Ven fra gamle Dage*', Svedstrup (1902, pp. 1–7).
3. For other examples of 'emotional foundations', see Francois and Schulze (1998), Germer (1998).
4. Cf. Kirby and Hinkkanen-Lievonon (2000, p. 1), Quilley (2011, p. 7).
5. Cf. e.g. Semmel (1986, pp. 2–4).
6. For a discussion of political myths, their origins and utilization, see Becker (2005).
7. For the idea of the nation as a community of common origin and future, see Nipperdey (1983).
8. Redford (2014, pp. 3f.).
9. The standard work on the genesis and heyday of British naval supremacy is Rodger (2004).
10. Queen Victoria's Journals (<http://www.queenvictoriasjournals.org>), 27 March 1855.
11. Letter from Prince Albert to Duke Ernst, early 1857, cited in Bolitho (1933, pp. 169f.).
12. For the Napoleonic Wars, see Land (2009); for the fin-de-siècle, see Rodger (1975–1976).
13. This point was made by Lincoln (2002, pp. 189–202), Redford (2014, pp. 63–64).
14. 'The cruise of the Galatea', *Dublin University Magazine* (1869).
15. Cf. Rüger (2004, pp. 183–86).
16. For an invaluable study of the role of the sea in British consciousness, see Behrman (1977, pp. 11–31, 38–45).
17. See Behrman (1977, pp. 38–45), Rüger (2004, pp. 159–72, 183–86), Quilley (2011, pp. 7–8).
18. All quotes are taken from: Behrman (1977, pp. 25–31).
19. Cf. Behrman (1977, p. 31).
20. See Lincoln (2002, p. 2), Rüger (2007, p. 3). Cf. more generally Colley (1992), Taylor (2013).
21. Lincoln (2002, p. 18).
22. See, for example, for the suppression of the slave trade, Kielstra (2000).
23. See Behrman (1977, p. 33), Hamilton (1986, p. 355), Semmel (1986), Angster (2012).
24. The revival of King Alfred was explored by Parker (2011, pp. 198–200).

25. See Behrman (1977, pp. 77–87).
26. See Davey (2014, pp. 21–32).
27. The myths of ‘Nelson’s Navy’ were explored, among others, by Lincoln (2002, pp. 19f., 44, 101–3), Philip (2006, pp. 93–120), Lambert (2006).
28. Cf. Lincoln (2002, p. 195), Land (2009, pp. 149ff.), McGoogan (2002, pp. 220–33).
29. Fulford (1999). For a corresponding development in the army, see Dawson (1994, pp. 107–09).
30. The transformation and appeal of the sailor image was explored by: Conley (2009, pp. 123–30), Land (2009, pp. 9, 80), Marcombe (1985, pp. 5–7).
31. Cf. e.g. Harris (2007).
32. The key document for this educational intention is a memorandum by Baron Stockmar (1872, pp. 390ff.) in response to the pamphlet ‘Who should educate the Prince of Wales?’ (1843).
33. Prince Albert quoted by Bennett (1977, p. 331).
34. Cf. Keynes (1999, pp. 277–80), Cox (2013), Parker (2011, 198ff.).
35. Cf. Southall-Tooley (1897, pp. 25, 49f.).
36. For royal seaside holidays, see Corbin (1995, pp. 174, 269–76), Knox-Johnston (1990, pp. 44f.).
37. See e.g. Queen Victoria’s Journals, 31 August 1842, 7 July 1844, 21 and 22 August 1846.
38. See e.g. Queen Victoria’s Journals, 18 July and 25 December 1833, 16 June and 21 October 1844, 14 October 1853.
39. For shipwrecks, see Queen Victoria’s Journals, 24 February 1841, 10 January and 7 April 1852; letter from Prince Alfred to Queen Victoria, 28 March 1858, RA VIC/ADDA20/1203. For arctic exploration, see Potter (2007, pp. 113–15, 146); Queen Victoria’s Journals, 9 November 1853, 16 December 1856, 4 July 1857 and 16 February 1864.
40. See Wade (1987, pp. 4–7, 10f., 18–20).
41. See Lambert (2006, pp. 162–63).
42. Alfred’s youth is best described by Kiste and Jordaan (1984, pp. 17–25); cf. Queen Victoria’s Journals, 26 October 1858. Among Alfred’s collection of books held at the *Landesbibliothek Coburg* are several travel and adventure books inscribed with dedications by his parents and grandmother, e.g. William Anderson’s *Treasury of discovery, enterprise and adventure for the young* (Edinburgh 1853).
43. See Gleichen (1892).
44. See Queen Victoria’s Journals, 2 September 1846 and 6 August 1847. Cf. Rose (2010), *passim*.

45. “An existence compounded of the two ideas”, *The Times* (30 December 1858).
46. Glover, Stephen, ‘God bless our sailor prince’ (1868).
47. For the discourse on ‘old corruption’, see Rubinstein (1983).
48. The middle-class elements in royal education were analysed by Schneider (2009), Hobhouse (1989).
49. For the Royal Engineers, see Weiler (1987).
50. For the role of the military in Victorian society, see Scott Myerly (1992), Paris (2000).
51. See Arnstein (1998).
52. First quote cited by Wade (1987), p. 6. Second quote: Queen Victoria’s Journals, 23 April 1856.
53. The Anglo-French naval rivalry was explored by Hamilton (1993), Fuller (2014).
54. Queen Victoria’s Journals, 2 May and 31 July 1858, 2 September 1858.
55. ‘Men for the Fleet!’, *Punch or the London Charivari* (14 May 1859).
56. The argument about the early imperialization of the monarchy is expanded in more detail by Taylor (2004), cf. Aronson (1995, p. 103).
57. See e.g. Hamilton (1986, pp. 81–113).
58. For the Victorian re-invention of the Vikings, see Wawn (2000, pp. 3–8, 117, 130), Parker (2011, pp. 203f.), Behrman (1977, p. 28).
59. Tennyson (1863); cf. Beckwith.
60. A discussion of the speech from which the term originated can be found in the most recent and most academic study of the Glücksborg Monarchy: Møller (2013, p. 222).
61. “*Kjærlighed til mit Fædreland og Lyst til Søen, have bibragt mig Ønsket om at komme i Marinen*”, Prince Vilhelm, 6 July 1859, King George of Greece’s Archives (KGA), Kongehusarkivet, pk. 1.
62. “... *om at den Vej Du nu selv har valgt gjør Dig lykkelig.*” Letter from King Christian to Prince Valdemar, 17 October 1873, Prince Valdemar’s Archives (PVA), Kongehusarkivet, pk. 9.1.
63. This omission was observed by Kirby and Hinkkanen (2000, p. 21). Neither the quintessential volume on Danish national identity (Feldbæk 1991–92) nor a recent study on national symbols (Adriansen 2003) cover the sea/the navy. For the peasant dimension, see Østergaard (2006, pp. 71ff.). The omission was also recently addressed by the lovely DR TV documentary ‘*Sømand af verden*’ (‘Sailor of the world’), <http://historieselskabet.dk/presse/pressemeddelelse-soemand-af-verden/> (May 2017).
64. E.g. Bjerg (2010).
65. Jones (1986, pp. 1–5); cf. ‘Navy’, in: Thomas (1998, p. 301).

66. An invaluable overview of Danish literature and the sea was provided by: Sørensen (2002); cf. Conrad (1992, pp. 150–252). For the early modern period cf. Grage (2000).
67. ‘*Der er et yndigt land, / det står med brede bøge / nær salten østerstrand*’, transl. by S.D. Rodholm in *Songs from Denmark*, ed. Peter Balslev-Clausen. Copenhagen (1988, p. 102).
68. ‘*Fugleperspektiv: O ja, jeg elsker dette Land, / Hvor Havet slaar Ring om Øen, / Hvor hver en Dont, hver virkende Mand / Bestandig har Udsigt til Søen*’. Cf. Sørensen (2002), Gregersen (2013).
69. For the Skagen movement, see Svanholm (2003), Holm (1991, pp. 275–94), Oelsner (2014).
70. For the rediscovery of the Vikings and Valdemars, see e.g. Sørensen (2002), Kent (2001, pp. 12, 57–62), Petersen (2011), Díaz-Andreu (2007, pp. 324–25).
71. A comprehensive history of Danish naval history was provided by Bjerg (2010, pp. 9–22, 187–90).
72. Regarding Denmark’s naval heroes cf. Bjerg (2010, pp. 41–72), Lockhart (1996), Bregnsbo (2015).
73. Cf. Hørnø (2015), Heinzelmann (2006).
74. Denmark’s troubled commemorative culture is discussed in Jahnke and Møller (2011).
75. Cf. Bagge (2005, pp. 444ff.), Lisberg Jensen (2005, pp. 155–60, 189–92), Galster (2007).
76. Cf. Bjerg (2010, pp. 187ff.), Nørby and Seerup (2007, pp. 9f., 218ff.), Lisberg Jensen (2005, pp. 125–30).
77. Christian’s troubled succession and early reign were poignantly described by Møller (2013, pp. 42–61 and 106–21), Møller (2015), Olden-Jørgensen (2003, pp. 50–70), Madol (1998, pp. 95–98).
78. Møller (2013, pp. 88–96), Olden-Jørgensen (2003, pp. 52–55, 71–75, 102–08).
79. “... sluttede Prins Valdemar det Forbund med Folket, hvorom den danske Marine har et og andet at fortælle”, ‘Prins Valdemar og Prinsesse Marie’, *Illustreret Tidende* (6 September 1885).
80. Madol (1998, p. 69).
81. See Sørensen (2002), Wawn (2000, pp. 218ff.).
82. See Seerup (2007).
83. See Steensen (1951, pp. 276–79), Seerup (2007, p. 329), Lisberg Jensen (2005, p. 234).
84. Cf. <http://elisabeth.jerichau.org/blog/test5/> (May 2017).
85. “... Prinsen en Gang foretrak en god Dansk pandekage for de laekkreste Delikatesser ... han fremfor de pragtfuldeste Sale foretrækker at træde paa sit eget Skibsdæk”, Fredensborg (1896, p. 32).

86. "... om jeg ogsaa længe efter Eder og maaske ofte ønsker mig hjem saa fortryder jeg dog aldrig, hvad jeg har gjort og takker Eder kun for at have faaet Lov til at gaae tilsoes." Prince Valdemar to King Christian, 17 June 1877, PVA, Kongehusarkivet, pk. 8.2.
87. See Nørby and Seerup (2007, p. 146), Svanholm (2003, pp. 45f.).
88. See Steensen (1951, p. 246).
89. See Olden-Jørgensen (2003, pp. 79–84), Klausen and Rosvall (2012, p. 107), Larsen (1992, pp. 494f.).
90. Henningsen (2011, p. 137).
91. King Christian cited by Muusmann (1939, p. 37f.), cf. Olden-Jørgensen (2003, p. 103).
92. Cf. Lisberg Jensen (2005, p. 189), Madol (1998, p. 154). Mørch (2004, pp. 31–41), argued that Deuntzer's connection with the EAC was the main reason for his selection as *Konseilspresident*. The true force behind the new naval defence plan was J.C. Christensen, though, who was also strongly supported by the Crown Prince and later King Frederik VIII.
93. "*Hjemme rinder ingen floder i en sid og leret grav*", transl. by Sørensen (2002).
94. Harriet Martineau, 'Prince Alfred's romance', *Once a Week* (24 January 1863).
95. See Bjerg (2010, pp. 45–50, 127–35), Geisthövel (2003, pp. 159–80).
96. Müller (2011, p. 139).
97. Urbach (2015, p. 23).
98. '*Heinrich bewahrt Lust zum Seemann*', letter from Crown Prince Frederick William to Charles of Romania, 22 November 1877, cited in Poschinger (1900, p. 226).
99. A crucial essay on the early history of the Imperial Navy is Sondhaus (1995, pp. 461–71).
100. Kehr (1930), Berghahn (1971).
101. Pre-1871 German colonial ambitions were explored by e.g. Fenske (1978), Müller (1996), Zantop (1997), Fitzpatrick (2008).
102. Cf. e.g. Elvert (1992, pp. 26f.).
103. See Müller (1996, pp. 129–32).
104. For the nation-building potential of the navy, see Steinberg (1964, pp. 103–05), Eberspächer (2003, pp. 42f.), Rüger (2007, pp. 3f., 93f., 144–46), Clark (2007, p. 602).
105. "*Zur Heimat eilte ein jeder, der nach Preußen, der andere nach Baiern, der eine nach Ost, der andere nach West. Denn das ganze deutsche Vaterland ist ja die Heimat der deutschen blauen Jungen zur See!*", Elster (1890, p. 177).
106. Rüger (2007, p. 3).

107. See e.g. Giloi (2011, pp. 13–16, 294, 314f.), Green (2001, pp. 315, 355).
108. Müller (2011, pp. 105–48).
109. Rüger (2007, pp. 144–46).
110. The re-invention of naval tradition was poignantly described by Eberspächer (2003, pp. 27–30), Herwig (1973, pp. 1–3). For the naval propaganda of the Stosch and Tirpitz eras, see Deist (1976), Sieg (2005).
111. E.g. Müller-Angelo (1894, p. 51), Wislicenus (1896, pp. 75f.), Langguth (1892, pp. 429–33).
112. Pothenberg, F., *Zum Meere zog der Zollernsproß* (c. 1900).
113. Langguth (1892, pp. 29ff., 43).
114. See speeches cited by Langguth (1892, pp. 26f.), *Provinzial Correspondenz* (13 October 1880).
115. This argument was first made by: Eberspächer (2003, p. 31). Cf. Steinberg (1964, pp. 104–06), Sondhaus (1995, pp. 461–71), Sieg (2005, p. 54).
116. “... der wägelustigste Teil der kräftigen und gebildeten deutschen Jugend”, Wislicenus (1896, p. 75).
117. “Die Marine sieht aber mit Recht in seiner Ernennung ... einen Beweis meiner theilnehmenden Hingebung für unseren Seedienst; doch ist dies – wie ich annehmen darf – nur ein neuer Beweis, denn ich zweifle nicht daß meine alten Gesinnungen in unserer Marine bereits wohl bekannt sind.” Crown Prince Frederick William to Stosch, 17 September 1872, cited in Baumgart (2014, p. 82).
118. For the relationship between Frederick William and Stosch, see Hollyday (1960, pp. 283f.), Baumgart (2014, pp. 23–31), Sieg (2005, pp. 14, 22–25), Müller (2011, pp. 149–90).
119. For the navy as a symbol of liberal nationalism, see Müller (1996, pp. 129–32), Steinberg (1964, pp. 103f.), Sieg (2005, p. 47).
120. For the navy as a predominantly bourgeois profession, see Herwig (1973, pp. 39–44), Steinberg (1964, pp. 105ff.), Sondhaus (1995, pp. 472–84).
121. Christadler (1978, pp. 149f.).
122. The chauvinist aspects of ‘liberal imperialism’ were discussed by Müller (1996, pp. 99–133), Hiery (1999, pp. 157–59), Geisthövel (2003, 159–80), Fitzpatrick (2008).
123. See Steinberg (1964, pp. 102–10).
124. Cf. Müller (2011, pp. 72, 81–87).
125. Hiery (1999, pp. 162–65).

126. “*Möchte doch Deutschland sich bald ähnlich großer Leistungen auf dem Gebiet der Verkehrswege rühmen können*”, Frederick William cited by Füger (2007). Cf. Huber (2013, pp. 39–41), Sieg (2005, p. 22).
127. “... *Landratte von Vater*”, Frederick William to Stosch, 10 November 1879, in: Baumgart (2014, pp. 236–40).
128. “... *da kann ich aus kleiner Thätigkeit mir immer größere Leistungen in Gedanken konstruieren, mir Luftschlösser aufbauen, welche Deutschlands Besitzungen in fernen Meeren schmücken*”. Stosch to Prince Heinrich, 24 March 1884, LASH (Landesarchiv Schleswig-Holstein) Abt. 395 Nr. 4.
129. The most empathic and insightful account of William’s and Heinrich’s common childhood and of their general relationship can be found in Eschenburg (1989, pp. 19–23) and *passim*.
130. Eschenburg (1989, e.g. p. 192), cf. Mirbach (2013, pp. 176, 183, 291–300).
131. For a more detailed argument, see Eberspächer (2003, p. 32), Müller (2011, pp. 271–74).
132. Cf. Bönker (2012, pp. 23–30).
133. See Corbin (1995, pp. 129–31).
134. “*Meergruß: Thalatta! Thalatta! Sei mir gegrüßt, du ewiges Meer!*”, transl. in: *German classics of the nineteenth-twentieth centuries*, vol. 6. New York, 1913. For a reception history of Xenophon’s famous exclamation, see Rood (2004).
135. For the tourism and cultural imperialism of the West, see Macgregor Morris (2007, pp. 231f., 253–63), Mack (2011, pp. 28f., 95f.), Díaz-Andreu (2007, pp. 99–128).
136. Cf. Hall (2014, p. 128), Semmel (1986, p. 2), Behrman (1977, p. 33), Winkler (2012), Stuchtley (2012).
137. For Greek politics of memory, see Hamilakis (2007, pp. 77–82), Díaz-Andreu (2007, pp. 129f.), Etienne (1992, pp. 108f.).
138. Cf. the documentary’s website available at <http://www.greeksofthesea.com/#!the-series/c2141> (May 2017).
139. For the destiny of King Otto and the Philhellenic movement, see e.g. Seidl (1981).
140. Skandamis (1954, p. 24).
141. “*Her venter hele Marinen paa ham med ubeskrivelig Utaalmodighed*”, King George to King Christian, 2 April 1889, KGA, Kongehusarkivet, pk. 20.
142. Cf. Chrysos (1999, p. 11), Lemos (1970, p. ix), Vryonis (1993, pp. 1–15).
143. Cf. <http://www.greeksofthesea.com/#!the-series/c2141>.
144. Britsch (1910, p. 234).

145. Cf. Vryonis (1993, pp. 3–15), Hall (2014, pp. 1–4), Ceccarelli (2012, pp. 26–28).
146. See Clogg (1979, pp. 36–38), Hamilakis (2007, pp. 77f.), Zervas (2012), Hadzijiosif (1993, p. 138).
147. “... τὴν πλουτοφόρον θάλασσαν ... τὴν δεδικοιολογημένην ἀγάπην τῶν Ἑλλήνων πρὸς τὸ προσφιλές αὐτοῖς στοιχεῖον, τὴν θάλασσαν”. Argyropoulos (1905, p. 2).
148. See Clogg (1979, pp. 33–37), Yapp (1991, p. 59), Fotakis (2005, p. 1).
149. See Koliopoulos and Veremis (2009, pp. 4f.).
150. Vikelas (1972, p. 24). Cf. Koulouriotes (1863, p. 36).
151. See Delivoria (2009, p. 114), Clogg (1979, p. 37), Koliopoulos and Veremis (2009, p. 6), Beaton (1994, pp. 30–45).
152. An intriguing source on Greek popular reading is Zervas (2012, pp. 88f., 97f., 111f.), Zervas (2013).
153. Cf. Varfis (1997), Angelomatis-Tsougarakis (2008).
154. The most important recent study of Greek naval policy is Fotakis (2005, pp. 1–11). Cf. Argyropoulos (1905, pp. 1–5), Skandamis (1954, pp. 30f.).
155. Fotakis (2005, p. 13).
156. See Fotakis (2005, pp. 14f.). For the involvement of Prince Georgios in this process, see Oikonomou (1952). For the role of Admiral Argyropoulos, see Argyropoulos (1905), Furakis (2009).
157. See García (2007, p. 106), Etienne (1992, pp. 108f.).
158. See Fotakis (2005, pp. 25ff.), Holland and Markides (2008, p. 8).
159. An invaluable source on Greek politics is Hering (1992, pp. 381, 434–78). For an English overview, see Gallant (2015, Chap. 5). Cf. Markopoulos (1968). For a contemporary view of George’s reign, see Vikelas (1889). Countless reports which compensate for the lack of Greek archival sources are also found in PA AA (Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amtes), RZ 201, R7472–84.
160. An insightful study of monarchical stabilization in the Balkans was provided by Binder-Iijima and Kraft (2010). For contemporary views of the Greek Glücksborgs, see Miller (1898, pp. 279f.), Britsch (1910, p. 201).
161. “... λαλεῖ εἰς τὴν φαντασίαν καὶ τὴν καρδίαν τοῦ λαοῦ”, “Ὁ Βασιλόπαις Γεώργιος”, *Asty* (6 May 1891).
162. See Holland and Markides (2008, pp. 55–60); TNA (The National Archives) PRO 30/22/64.
163. Koulouriotes (1863, p. 40).
164. Lord Cowley to Lord Russel, 21 March 1863, TNA PRO 30/22/105.
165. Cf. Rumbold (1902, pp. 126, 136–42), Holland and Markides (2008, pp. 71–80).
166. See Rumbold (1905, p. 13).

167. Woolson (1896), cf. Dierichs (2004).
168. Skandamis (1954, pp. 23f.), Llewellyn-Smith (2004, p. 142).
169. Skandamis (1954, p. 24).
170. "... αἱ κινδυνώδεις ... τύχαι ... μὲ βραχίονας Ἡρακλέους, κορμὸν οἰοῦναι λαξευμένον εἰς μονοκόμματον γρανίτην... εἴλκε τὴν καταγωγὴν τοῦ ἀπ' εὐθείας ἐκ τοῦ λαικοῦ δένδρου", 'Ὁ Βασιλόπαις Γεώργιος' *Asty* (6 May 1891).
171. See Skandamis (1954, pp. 29, 33); 'Ἀπο τὴν ζωὴ τοῦ κηδευθέντος σήμερα Πρίγκιπος', *Athenaiki* 4 (December 1957), Greek National Archives, Palace Records, f.259, 16–16a.
172. *Ephimeris* (10/22 August 1890), cited and translated in a report from 24 August 1890, PA AA RZ 201 R7475; Prince George to Queen Louise, 7/25 November 1890, King Christian/Queen Louise's Archives (KCQLA), Kongehusarkivet, pk. 12/59.
173. 'Αἱ πανελληνίστικαι τάξεις τοῦ Πριγκ. Γεωργίου', *Empros* (5 February 1897).
174. Britsch (1910, p. 209).
175. "... θὰ συντελέσῃ τὰ μέγιστα εἰς τὴν ἀνύψωσιν τοῦ φρονήματος τῶν ἡμετέρων γενναίων ναυτικῶν". 'Ὁ Βασιλόπαις Γεώργιος', *Asty* (8 December 1885).
176. "Σπουδάσετε, ἐργάσθε, ἐκτελεῖτε τὸ καθήκον ὑμῶν ἐν παντί καιρῷ. Εὐχερῇ τὰ πάντα, ὅταν σκοπὸς εἶνε ἡ εὐημερία τῆς πατρίδος καὶ ἡ πρόοδος τοῦ ἑλληνικοῦ ἡμῶν ναυτικοῦ, φρουροῦ καὶ κλέους τῆς Πατρίδος". 'Ἀποκαλυπτήρια ἀνδριάντος Μιασούλη', *Palingenesia* (24 April 1888); Argyropoulos (1905, p. 1).
177. "... ὅτι θὰ ἐνεποιοῦν ἀσυγκρίτως μεγαλειτέραν ἐντύπωσιν καὶ ἐνθουσιασμόν, ἐὰν ἀντὶ εἰς δεύτερον πληθυντικὸν πρόσωπον ἐξεφέροντο εἰς πρῶτον πρόσωπον". 'Ἡχὼ τῶν ἐν Σύρῳ ἐορτῶν', *Asty* (30 April 1888).
178. E.g. a report from 8 March 1896, PA AA, RZ 201, R7478; Gounaris (2008, p. 142).
179. *Ephimeris* (10/22 August 1890).
180. See Oikonomou (1952, p. 103), Skandamis (1954, pp. 31–33).
181. Nikos Kazantzakis cited by Bien (2012, p. 27), cf. Markopoulos (1969, pp. 335f.); report from 9 February 1897, PA AA, RZ 201, R7479.
182. See e.g. Oikonomou (1952, pp. 104–06).
183. For the seminal book about this now well-established concept, see Anderson (2006).
184. Cf. Germer (1998, p. 32).
185. Cf. Thomas Nicklas' concept of the "talking monarchy" ("*redende Monarchie*") as outlined in his talk about '*Fürstliche Rituale in drei europäischen Monarchien. Sachsen-Coburg, Belgien und Großbritannien*'

- im Vergleich*’, given at the conference ‘*Inszenierung als Legitimation? Die Monarchie im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert*’, Coburg, 8–9 September 2011.
186. On 18 February 1864, Queen Victoria even wrote to Duke Ernst—albeit in defence against his more conservative views—“... daß Albert ebensosehr wie ich selbst, die Neigung Alfreds für den Seedienst zu unterdrücken suchten, daß aber diese Neigung zu entschieden ausgewachsen war, um ihr auf die Länge entgentreten zu können”. StACo LAA 7001.
187. For the concept of royal internationalism, see Paulmann (2001).

REFERENCES

- Adriansen, Inge. 2003. *Nationale symboler i det Danske Rige, 1830–2000*. Copenhagen.
- Anderson, Benedict. 2006. *Imagined communities. Reflections on the origin and spread of nationalism*. London.
- Angelomatis-Tsougarakis, Helen. 2008. Women in the Greek War of independence. In *Networks of power in modern Greece*, ed. Mark Mazower, 45–68. New York.
- Angster, Julia. 2012. *Erdbeeren und Piraten. Die Royal Navy und die Ordnung der Welt, 1770–1880*. Göttingen.
- Anon. 1896. *Fredensborg. Det danske Kongehus og dets slægt*. Copenhagen.
- Argyropoulos, Periklis. 1905. *To Ναυτικόν της Ελλάδος πρόγραμμα* [The naval programme of Greece]. Athens.
- Arnstein, Walter. 1998. The Warrior Queen. Reflections on Victoria and her world. *Albion* 30 (1): 1–28.
- Aronson, Theo. 1995. *Royal ambassadors. British royalties in Southern Africa, 1860–1947*. Cape Town.
- Bagge, Poul. 2005. Nationalisme, antinationalisme og nationalfølelse i Danmark omkring 1900. In *Dansk Identitetshistorie 3. Folkets Danmark, 1848–1940*, ed. Ole Feldbæk, 443–467. Copenhagen.
- Baumgart, Winfried (ed.). 2014. *General Albrecht von Stosch. Politische Korrespondenz, 1871–1896*. Munich.
- Beaton, Roderick. 1994. *An introduction to modern Greek literature*. Oxford.
- Becker, Frank. 2005. Begriff und Bedeutung des politischen Mythos. In *Was heißt Kulturgeschichte des Politischen?* ed. Barbara Stollberg-Rilinger, 129–148. Berlin.
- Beckwith, Alice. *Sea King’s daughter from over the sea*. Website. Available at: <http://www.victorianweb.org/art/design/jones/48.html> (May 10, 2017).
- Behrman, Cynthia. 1977. *Victorian myths of the sea*. Athens, OH.
- Bennett, Daphne. 1977. *King without a crown. Albert, Prince Consort of England*. London.

- Berghahn, Volker. 1971. *Der Tirpitz-Plan. Genesis und Verfall einer innenpolitischen Krisenstrategie*. Düsseldorf.
- Bien, Peter (ed.). 2012. *The selected letters of Nikos Kazantzakis*. Princeton.
- Binder-Iijima, Edda and Ekkehard Kraft. 2010. Making of states. Constitutional monarchies in the Balkans. In *Ottomans into Europeans. State and institution-building in South Eastern Europe*, ed. Alina Mungiu-Pippidi, et al., 1–29. London.
- Bjerg, Hands. 2010. *A history of the Royal Danish Navy, 1510–2010*. Copenhagen.
- Bolitho, Hector (ed.). 1933. *The Prince Consort and his brother. Two hundred new letters*. London.
- Bönker, Dirk. 2012. *Militarism in a global age. Naval ambitions in Germany and the United States before World War I*. Ithaca, NY.
- Bregnsbo, Michael. 2015. Two naval heroes with admirable qualities. The Great Northern War in memorial culture in Denmark. In *Princess Hedvig Sofia and the Great Northern War*, ed. Ralf Bleile and Joachim Krüger, 339–349. Dresden.
- Britsch, Amédée. 1910. *La jeune Athènes*. Paris: Une démocratie en Orient.
- Ceccarelli, Paola. 2012. Naming the Aegean Sea. *Mediterranean Historical Review* 27 (128): 25–49.
- Christadler, Marieluise. 1978. *Kriegserziehung im Jugendbuch. Literarische Mobilmachung in Deutschland und Frankreich vor 1914*. Frankfurt.
- Chrysos, Evangelos. 1999. *Griechenland und das Meer*. Mannheim.
- Clark, Christopher. 2007. *Iron kingdom. The rise and downfall of Prussia, 1600–1947*. London.
- Clogg, Richard. 1979. *A short history of Modern Greece*. Cambridge.
- Colley, Linda. 1992. *Britons. Forging the nation, 1707–1837*. New Haven.
- Conley, Mary. 2009. *From Jack Tar to Union Jack. Representing naval manhood in the British Empire, 1870–1918*. Manchester.
- Conrad, Flemming. 1992. Konkurrencen 1818 om en Dansk nationalsang. In *Dansk Identitetshistorie 2. Et yndigt land, 1789–1848*, ed. Ole Feldbæk, 150–252. Copenhagen.
- Corbin, Alain. 1995. *The lure of the sea. The discovery of the seaside in the western world*. London.
- Cox, Oliver. 2013. Frederick, Prince of Wales and the first performance of “Rule Britannia”. *Historical Journal* 56: 93–154.
- Davey, James. 2014. The naval hero and British national identity. In *Maritime history and identity. The sea and culture in the modern world*, ed. Duncan Redford, 13–37. London.
- Dawson, Graham. 1994. *Soldier heroes. British adventure, empire and the imagining of masculinities*. London.

- Deist, Wilhelm. 1976. *Flottenpolitik und Flottenpropaganda. Das Nachrichtenbureau des Reichsmarineamtes, 1897–1914*. Stuttgart.
- Delivoria, Yanna. 2009. The notion of nation. The emergence of a national ideal in the narratives of ‘inside’ and ‘outside’ Greeks in the nineteenth century. In *The making of Modern Greece*, ed. Roderick Beaton and David Ricks, 109–121. Ashgate.
- Díaz-Andreu García, Margartia. 2007. *A world history of nineteenth-century archaeology. Nationalism, colonialism and the past*. Oxford.
- Dierichs, Angelika. 2004. *Korfu–Kerkyra. Grüne Insel im Ionischen Meer*. Mainz.
- Eberspächer, Cord, et al. (eds.). 2003. *Wilhelm II. und Wilhelmshaven. Zur Topographie einer wilhelminischen Stadt*. Wilhelmshaven.
- Elster, Otto. 1890. *Klaus Erichsen. Prinz Heinrichs Schiffsjunge*. Berlin.
- Elvert, Jürgen (ed.). 1992. *Kiel, die Deutschen und die See*. Stuttgart.
- Eschenburg, Harald. 1989. *Prinz Heinrich. Der Großadmiral im Schatten des Kaisers*. Heide.
- Etienne, Roland, and Francois. 1992. *The search for ancient Greece*. New York.
- Feldbæk, Ole (ed.). 1991–1992. *Dansk Identitetshistorie*, 4 vols. Copenhagen.
- Fenske, Hans. 1978. Imperialistische Tendenzen in Deutschland vor 1866. Auswanderung, überseeische Bestrebungen, Weltmachtträume. *Historisches Jahrbuch* 97 (98): 363–383.
- Fitzpatrick, Matthew. 2008. *Liberal Imperialism in Germany. Expansionism and nationalism, 1848–1884*. New York.
- Fotakis, Zisis. 2005. *Greek naval strategy and policy, 1910–1919*. London.
- Francois, Etienne and Hagen Schulze. 1998. Das emotionale Fundament der Nationen. In *Mythen der Nationen. Ein europäisches Panorama*, ed. Monika Flacke, 17–32. Munich.
- Füger, Hans. Der Suezkanal. Ein Jahrhundertwerk der Schifffahrt. *Siebenbürgische Zeitung* (Sept 1, 2007).
- Fulford, Tim. 1999. Romanticizing the empire. The naval heroes of Southey, Coleridge, Austen and Marryat. *Modern Language Quarterly* 60: 161–196.
- Fuller, Howard. 2014. *Empire, Technology and Seapower. Royal Navy crisis in the Age of Palmerston*. London.
- Furakis, Panagiotis. 2009. *Περικλής Αργυρόπουλος. Ο θεμελιωτής της ελληνικής ναυτικής ισχύος* [Periklis Argyropoulos. The founder of Greek naval might]. Athens.
- Gallant, Thomas. 2015. *The Edinburgh History of the Greeks, 1768 to 1913: The Long Nineteenth Century*. Edinburgh.
- Galster, Kjeld. 2007. *Protecting democracy. Danish defence debate in times of change*. Copenhagen.
- Geisthövel, Alexa. 2003. *Eigentümlichkeit und Macht. Deutscher Nationalismus, 1830–1851. Der Fall Schleswig-Holstein*. Stuttgart.

- Germer, Stefan. 1998. Retrovision. Die rückblickende Erfindung der Nationen durch die Kunst. In *Mythen der Nationen. Ein europäisches Panorama*, ed. Monika Flacke, 33–52. Munich.
- Giloi, Eva. 2011. *Monarchy, myth and material culture in Germany, 1750–1950*. Cambridge.
- Gleichen, Albert Edward Count. 1892. *The late Prince Victor of Hohenlohe-Langenburg*. n.p.
- Gounaris, Basil. 2008. Model nation and caricature state. Competing Greek perspectives on the Balkans and Hellas, 1797–1896. In *The making of Modern Greece. Nationalism, Romanticism and the uses of the past, 1797–1896*, ed. Roderick Beaton and David Ricks, 137–150. Ashgate.
- Grage, Joachim. 2000. *Chaotischer Abgrund und erhabene Weite. Das Meer in der skandinavischen Dichtung des 17. und 18. Jahrhunderts*. Göttingen.
- Green, Abigail. 2001. *Fatherlands. State-building and nationhood in nineteenth-century Germany*. Cambridge.
- Gregersen, Hans. 2013. *Her går solen aldrig ned. Drachmann og Skagen*. Aalborg.
- Hadzijiosif, Christos. 1993. Social values and business strategies in the naming of ships in Greece. In *The Greeks and the sea*, ed. Speros Vryonis, 135–151. New Rochelle.
- Hall, Edith. 2014. *Introducing the ancient Greeks. From Bronze Age seafarers to navigators of the Western mind*. New York.
- Hamilakis, Yannis. 2007. *The nation and its ruins. Antiquity, archaeology and national imagination in Greece*. Oxford.
- Hamilton, Mark. 1986. *The nation and the navy. Methods and organization of British navalist propaganda, 1889–1914*. London.
- Hamilton, Charles. 1993. *Anglo-French Naval Rivalry, 1840–1870*. Oxford.
- Harris, Bob. 2007. Hanover and the public sphere. In *The Hanoverian Dimension in British History, 1714–1837*, ed. Brendan Simms and Torsten Rott, 183–212. Cambridge.
- Heinzelmann, Eva, et al. (eds.). 2006. *Der dänische Gesamtstaat. Ein unterschätztes Weltreich*. Kiel.
- Henningsen, Bernd. 2011. 1864. Der lange dänische Weg der Niederlagen. In *1864 og historiens lange skygger*, ed. Carsten Jahnke and Jes Fabricius Møller, 121–142, Husum.
- Hering, Gunnar. 1992. *Die Politischen Parteien in Griechenland, 1821–1936*, vol. 1. Munich.
- Herwig, Holger. 1973. *The German naval officer corps. A social and political history, 1890–1918*. Oxford.
- Hiery, Hermann. 1999. Der Kaiser, das Reich und der Kolonialismus. Anmerkungen zur Entstehung des deutschen Imperialismus im 19. Jahrhundert. In *Imperium – Empire – Reich. Ein Konzept politischer*

- Herrschaft im deutsch-britischen Vergleich*, ed. Franz Bosbach and Hermann Hiery, 155–166. Munich.
- Hobhouse, Hermione. 1989. The monarchy and the middle classes. The role of Prince Albert. In *Bürgertum, Adel und Monarchie. Wandel der Lebensformen im Zeitalter des bürgerlichen Nationalismus*, ed. Adolf M. Birke, et al. 53–69. Munich.
- Holland, Robert and Diana Markides. 2008. *The British and the Hellenes. Struggles for mastery in the Eastern Mediterranean, 1850–1960*. Oxford.
- Hollyday, Frederick. 1960. *Bismarck's rival. A political biography of General and Admiral Albrecht von Stosch*. Durrham, NC.
- Holm, Poul. 1991. *Kystfolk. Kontakter og sammenhænge over Kattegat og Skagerrak, 1550–1914*. Esbjerg.
- Hørnø, Flemming. 2015. *Den florissante periode. Danmark i slutningen af 1700-tallet*. Ådalén.
- Huber, Valeska. 2013. *Channelling mobilities. Migration and globalisation in the Suez Canal region and beyond, 1869–1914*. Cambridge.
- Jahnke, Carsten and Jes Fabricius Møller (eds.). 2011. *1864 og historiens lange skygger*. Husum.
- Jones, Glyn. 1986. *Denmark. A modern history*. London.
- Kehr, Eckart. 1930. *Schlachtflottenbau und Parteipolitik, 1894–1901*. Berlin.
- Kent, Neill. 2001. *The soul of the north. A social, architectural and cultural history of the Nordic countries, 1700–1940*. London.
- Keynes, Simon. 1999. The cult of King Alfred the Great. *Anglo-Saxon England* 28: 225–356.
- Kielstra, Paul. 2000. *The politics of slave trade suppression in Britain and France, 1814–48. Diplomacy, Morality and Economics*. London.
- Kirby, David G., and Merja L. Hinkkanen-Lievonen. 2000. *The Baltic and the North Seas*. London.
- Kiste, John van der, and Bee Jordaan. 1984. *Dearest Affie. Alfred, Duke of Edinburgh*. London.
- Klausen, Inger-Lise, and Ted Rosvall. 2012. *Marie. A French princess in Denmark*. Falkoping.
- Knox-Johnston, Robin. 1990. *History of yachting*. Oxford.
- Koliopoulos, John, and Thanos Veremis. 2009. *Modern Greece. A history since 1821*. Malden.
- Koulouriotis, A.J. 1863. *Greece. Her past condition under King Otho, her present requirements and tendencies, and her future prospects*. London.
- Lambert, Andrew. 2006. The magic of Trafalgar. The nineteenth-century legacy. In *Trafalgar in history. A battle and its afterlife*, ed. David Cannadine, 155–174. Basingstoke.
- Land, Isaac. 2009. *War, nationalism and the British sailor, 1750–1850*. Basingstoke.

- Langguth, Adolf. 1892. *Prinz Heinrich von Preußen*. Halle: Ein seemännisches Lebensbild.
- Larsen, Hans. 1992. *Det nationale synspunkt på den økonomiske udvikling, 1888–1914*. In *Dansk Identitetshistorie 3. Folkets Danmark, 1848–1940*, ed. Ole Feldbæk. Copenhagen.
- Lemos, Andreas. 1970. *The Greeks and the sea*. London.
- Lincoln, Margarette. 2002. *Representing the Royal Navy. British sea power, 1750–1815*. Aldershot.
- Lisberg Jensen, Ole. 2005. *I skyggen af Tyskland*. Copenhagen.
- Llewellyn-Smith, Michael. 2004. *Olympics in Athens 1896. The invention of the Modern Olympic Games*. London.
- Lockhart, Paul. 1996. *Denmark in the Thirty Years' War, 1618–1648. King Christian IV and the decline of the Oldenburg state*. Selingsgrove.
- Macgregor Morris, Ian. 2007. "Shrines of the mighty". Rediscovering the battle-fields of the Persian Wars. In *Cultural responses to the Persian wars*, ed. Emma Bridges, et al., 231–264. Oxford.
- Mack, John. 2011. *The Sea. A cultural history*. London.
- Madol, Hans Roger. 1998. *Christian IX*. Copenhagen.
- Marcombe, David. 1985. *The Victorian sailor*. Shire.
- Markopoulos, George. 1968. King George I and the expansion of Greece. *Balkan Studies* 9: 21–40.
- Markopoulos, George. 1969. The selection of Prince George of Greece as High Commissioner in Crete. *Balkan Studies* 10: 335–350.
- McGoogan, Ken. 2002. *Fatal passage*. London.
- Miller, William. 1898. *Travels and politics in the East*. New York.
- Mirbach, Ernst. 2013. *Prinz Heinrich von Preußen*. Köln: Eine Biographie des Kaiserbruders.
- Møller, Jes Fabricius. 2013. *Dynastiet Glücksborg. En Danmarkshistorie*. Copenhagen.
- Møller, Jes Fabricius. 2015. Domesticating a German heir to the Danish throne. In *Sons and Heirs. Succession and political culture in nineteenth-century Europe*, ed. Frank Lorenz Müller and Heidi Mehrkens, 129–146. Basingstoke.
- Mørch, Søren. 2004. *25 statsministre. 25 fortællinger om magten i Danmark i det tyvende århundrede*. Copenhagen.
- Müller, Frank Lorenz. 1996. Der Traum von der Weltmacht. Imperialistische Ziele in der deutschen Nationalbewegung. *Jahrbuch der Hambach-Gesellschaft* 6: 99–183.
- Müller, Frank Lorenz. 2011. *Our Fritz. Emperor Frederick III and the political culture of Imperial Germany*. Cambridge, MA.
- Müller-Angelo, Adolf. 1894. *Deutschland zur See*. Dresden.
- Muusmann, Carl. 1939. *Da København blev voksen. Levende billeder fra aarhundredets start*. Copenhagen.

- Myerly, Scott. 1992. "The eye must entrap the mind". Army spectacle and paradigm in nineteenth-century Britain. *Journal of Social History* 26 (1): 105–131.
- Nipperdey, Thomas. 1983. In search of identity. Romantic nationalism, its intellectual, political and social background. In *Romantic Nationalism in Europe*, ed. J.C. Eade, 1–15. Canberra.
- Nørby, Søren and Jakob Seerup. 2007. *Den danske flåde, 1850–1943. Som foto-graferne så den*. Copenhagen.
- Oelsner, Gertrud. 2014. Tuxen reborn? Skagen becomes a modern seaside resort. In *Tuxen. Color, countryside and crown*, ed. Mette Bøgh Jensen, et al., 120–137. Skagen.
- Oikonomou, Dimitrios. 1952. Η Α.Β.Υ. ο Πρίγκιψ Γεώργιος και το ναυτικόν πρόγραμμα της χώρας [HRH Prince Georgios and the country's naval programme] *Ναυτική Επιθεώρησης* 231: 100–138.
- Olden-Jørgensen, Sebastian. 2003. *Prinsessen og det hele kongerige. Christian IX og det Glücksborgske Kongehus*. Copenhagen.
- Østergaard, Uffe. 2006. Denmark: A big small state. The peasant roots of Danish modernity. In *National identity and the varieties of capitalism. The Danish experience*, ed. John Campbell, et al., 53–98. Montreal.
- Paris, Michael. 2000. *Warrior nation. Images of war in British popular culture, 1850–2000*. London.
- Parker, Joanne, 2011, Ruling the waves. Saxons, Vikings and the sea in the formation of an Anglo-British identity in the nineteenth century. In *The sea and Englishness in the Middle Ages*, ed. Sebastian Sobceki, 195–206. Woodbridge.
- Paulmann, Johannes. 2001. Searching for a Royal International. In *The mechanics of internationalism*, ed. Martin Geyer and Johannes Paulmann, 145–176. Oxford.
- Petersen, N.H. 2011. B.S. Ingemann. Danish medievalism in the nineteenth century. In *Makers of the Middle Ages. Essays in honor of William Calin*, ed. R.J. Utz and E. Emery, 33–35. Kalamazoo, MI.
- Philip, Mark. 2006. Politics and memory. Nelson and Trafalgar in popular song. In *Trafalgar in history. A battle and its afterlife*, ed. David Cannadine, 93–120. Basingstoke.
- Poschinger, Margaretha von. 1900. *Kaiser Friedrich in neuer quellenmäßiger Darstellung*, vol.3. Berlin.
- Potter, Russel. 2007. *Arctic spectacles. The frozen North in visual culture, 1818–1875*. Seattle.
- Quilley, Geoff. 2011. *Empire to nation. Art, history and the visualization of maritime Britain, 1768–1829*. New Haven.
- Redford, Duncan (ed.). 2014. *Maritime history and identity. The sea and culture in the modern world*. London.

- Rodger, Nicholas A.M. 1975–1976. The dark ages of the Admiralty, 1869–1885. *Mariner's Mirror* 61–62.
- Rodger, Nicholas A.M. 2004. *The command of the ocean. A naval history of Britain, 1649–1815*. London.
- Rood, Tim. 2004. *The Sea! The Sea! The shout of the Ten Thousand in the modern imagination*. London.
- Rose, Clare. 2010. *Making, selling and wearing boys' clothes in late-Victorian England*. Aldershot.
- Rubinstein, William. 1983. The end of “Old Corruption” in Britain, 1780–1860. *Past and Present* 101: 55–86.
- Rüger, Jan. 2004. Nation, empire and navy. Identity politics in the United Kingdom, 1887–1914. *Past and Present* 185: 159–187.
- Rüger, Jan. 2007. *The great naval game. Britain and Germany in the Age of Empire*. Cambridge.
- Rumbold, Horace. 1902. *Recollections of a diplomatist*, vol.2. London.
- Rumbold, Horace. 1905. *Final recollections of a diplomatist*. London.
- Schneider, Miriam. 2009. ‘Who should educate the Prince of Wales?’ *Eine viktorianische Debatte*. Unpublished BA thesis, University of Bayreuth.
- Seerup, Jakob. 2007. The Royal Danish Naval Academy in the Age of Enlightenment. *Mariner's Mirror* 93 (3): 327–334.
- Seidl, Wolf. 1981. *Bayern in Griechenland. Die Geburt des griechischen Nationalstaats und die Regierung König Ottos*.
- Semmel, Bernard. 1986. *Liberalism and naval strategy. Ideology, interest and sea power during the ‘Pax Britannica’*. Boston.
- Sieg, Dirk. 2005. *Die Ära Stosch. Die Marine im Spannungsfeld der deutschen Politik, 1872–1883*. Bochum.
- Skandamis, Andrea S. 1954. *Πριγκιψ Γεωργιος*. Athens.
- Sondhaus, Laurence. 1995. “The spirit of the army” at sea. The Prussian-German naval officer corps, 1847–1897”. *International. History Review* 17 (3): 459–484.
- Sørensen, Søren. 2002. *Danish literature and the Baltic*. Website. Available at: <http://www.balticsealibrary.info/> (10 May 2017).
- Southall-Tooley, Sarah. 1897. *The personal life of Queen Victoria*. London.
- Steensen, Steen. 1951. *Søofficersskolen gennem 250 år, 1701–1951*. Copenhagen.
- Steinberg, Jonathan. 1964. The Kaiser’s navy and German society. *Past and Present* 28: 102–110.
- Stockmar, Ernst von (ed.). 1872. *Denkwürdigkeiten aus den Papieren des Freiherrn von Stockmar*. Braunschweig.
- Stuchtey, Benedikt. 2012. Ein liberales Weltreich? Westeuropäische Diskurse im 19. Jahrhundert. In *Die Legitimation von Imperien: Strategien und Motive im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert*, ed. Herfried Münkler, 94–109. Frankfurt.
- Svanholm, Lise. 2003. *Northern light. The Skagen painters*. Copenhagen.

- Svedstrup, Alexander. 1902. *De Danskes vej. Valkyrien's togt til Østasien*. Copenhagen.
- Taylor, Miles. 2004. Prince Albert and the British Empire. In *Prinz Albert. Ein Wettiner in Großbritannien*, ed. Franz Bosbach and John Davis, 75–82. Munich.
- Taylor, Miles (ed.). 2013. *The Victorian Empire and Britain's maritime world, 1837–1901*. Basingstoke.
- Tennyson, Alfred. 1863. *A welcome to HRH the Princess of Wales*. London.
- Thomas, Alistair (ed.). 1998. *Historical dictionary of Denmark*. Lanham, MD.
- Urbach, Karina. 2015. Die inszenierte Idylle. Legitimationsstrategien Queen Victorias und Prinz Alberts. In *Inszenierung oder Legitimation? / Monarchy and the art of representation*, ed. Frank-Lothar Kroll, et al., 23–33. Berlin.
- Varfis, Konstantinos. 1997. Andreas Miaoulis. From pirate to admiral. In *The great admirals. Command at sea, 1587–1945*, ed. Jack Sweetman, 216–240. Annapolis, MD.
- Vikelas, Dimitrios. 1889. Vingt-cinq années de règne constitutionnel en Grèce. *La Nouvelle Revue*: 492–519.
- Vikelas, Dimitrios. 1972. *Loukis Laras*, Trans. John Gennadius. London.
- Vryonis, Speros (ed.). 1993. *The Greeks and the sea*. New Rochelle.
- Wade, George. 1887. *The wind of change. Naval reviews at Spithead, 1842–1856*. Portsmouth.
- Wawn, Andrew. 2000. *The Vikings and the Victorians. Inventing the old North in nineteenth-century Britain*. Cambridge.
- Weiler, John Michael. 1987. *Army architects. The Royal Engineers and the development of building technology in the nineteenth century*. Unpublished PhD thesis, University of York.
- Winkler, Herfried. 2012. Translation, Filiation und Analogiebildung. Politische Legitimation und strategische Reflexion im Spiegel vergangener Imperien. In *Die Legitimation von Imperien: Strategien und Motive im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert*, ed. Herfried Münkler, 34–69. Frankfurt.
- Wislicenus, Georg. 1896. *Deutschlands Seemacht sonst und jetzt*. Leipzig.
- Woolson, Constance F. 1896. *Mentone, Cairo and Corfu*. New York.
- Yapp, Malcolm. 1991. *The making of the modern Near East, 1792–1923*. London.
- Zantop, Susanne. 1997. *Colonial fantasies. Conquest, family and nation in precolonial Germany, 1770–1870*. Durham.
- Zervas, Ted. 2012. *The making of a modern Greek identity. Education, nationalism, and the teaching of a Greek national past*. New York.
- Zervas, Ted. 2013. Informal learning in late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century Greece. Greek children's literature in historical and political contexts. *American Educational History Journal* 40: 207–219.

The 'Sailor Prince' in the Age of Empire
Creating a Monarchical Brand in Nineteenth-Century
Europe

Schneider, M.M.

2017, XII, 309 p. 13 illus., 7 illus. in color., Hardcover

ISBN: 978-3-319-63599-6