

# Contents

<b>1</b>	<b>Introduction</b>	<b>1</b>
	<i>Stefan Collignon</i>	
	References	8
<b>2</b>	<b>European Public Goods in the Neo-Medieval Model of Governance</b>	<b>9</b>
	<i>Robert Berith</i>	
	Theory of Public Goods	12
	What Are Public Goods?	13
	Externalities and the Role of State	15
	Problems in the Provision of Public Goods	17
	European Public Goods	20
	Neo-Medieval Paradigm	22
	What Is the Neo-Medievalism?	23
	Main Features of Neo-Medieval Paradigm	25
	Problems of Neo-Medievalism	28
	Neo-Medieval Provision of European Public Goods?	30
	Conclusion	34
	References	36

<b>3</b>	<b>The European Union as a Republic</b>	<b>39</b>
	<i>Stefan Collignon</i>	
	Public Goods in the European Context	40
	Governing Externalities	41
	The Concept of the Republic	47
	Historic Roots	47
	The Republic and the State	49
	The Logic of Public Goods	52
	Public Goods, Republics and Citizenship	52
	Incentive Structures for the Provision of Public Goods	54
	The Euro and the European Republic	57
	Democracy and the Principal-Agent Relationship	60
	State and Republic	60
	The Sovereignty of the Citizens Against the Power of the State?	63
	The Federal Order of the Republic	67
	Conclusion	72
	References	73
<b>4</b>	<b>On Paradigms and Public Goods: Has the Eurozone Crisis Changed the Economic Paradigm of EMU?</b>	<b>79</b>
	<i>Sebastian Diessner</i>	
	The Crisis and the Euro Area's Dominant Paradigm	80
	Studying Policy Paradigms	83
	Ideas and Paradigms in the Study of Policy-making	83
	The Three Orders of Policy Change	85
	The Policy Paradigm of 'Stable Money and Sound Finances'	89
	Stable Money	90
	Sound Finances	92
	The Separation of Monetary and Fiscal Policy	94
	Major Responses to the Euro Area Crisis: Within or Beyond EMU's Paradigm?	95
	The Case of EMU Fiscal Surveillance Reform	95
	The Case of the ECB's Non-Standard Monetary Policy Measures	99
	Conclusion	104
	References	108

<b>5</b>	<b>Principals and Agents in European Democracy</b>	<b>117</b>
	<i>Benjamin Spörer</i>	
	The Pre-crisis Discussion About the Democratic	
	Deficit of the European Union	119
	Discussing Europe—The Standard Version of the	
	Democratic Deficit	119
	Examining the Deadlock Between Majone,	
	Moravcsik and Hix	120
	<i>Policymaking</i> in the EU—Regulatory or Redistributive?	120
	Policy Outcomes or Process?	121
	Electoral Salience	122
	Discussion of the Deadlock	123
	Applying the Principal-Agent Model to the Debate	
	on Democratic Deficit	124
	Explaining the Principle-Agent Model	124
	Benefits and Costs Associated with Member States	
	Delegation to Supranational Agents	125
	What Does Principal-Agent Theory Tell Us	
	About the EU's Democratic Deficit?	126
	Reforms in the Lisbon Treaty	129
	What Does Pollack Say About the European	
	Parliament?	130
	Citizens as Ultimate Principals	131
	Citizens as Owners of Public Goods	131
	Delegation and Legitimacy—The Principals' Perception	
	and the Centrality of the Public Discourse	134
	Institutional Discourses in the European Union	135
	The Discussion About the Democratic Deficit	
	After the Lisbon Treaty	137
	'The Euro Crisis' or 'How Member States Took the Power	
	Away from the People'	140
	The European Union and the Erosion of the Permissive	
	Consensus	142
	Europe and Its Political Response to the Euro Crisis	143
	The Crisis Management—What Has Been Done Exactly?	145
	What Are the Implications?—A Discussion	147

Conclusion: Outlining the Agency Slack	151
Conclusion	154
Appendix	157
References	160
<b>6 Why Does EU Governance Change?</b>	<b>167</b>
<i>Sebastian Salch</i>	
The Frame of Integration	169
Economic Causes for Governance Problems	169
Governing Public Goods	169
<i>Economically Adequate Governance</i>	171
Game Theory: Prisoners' Dilemma	172
Game Theory: Common Aversion	174
Explaining Integration	175
Exogenous Shocks	176
Endogenous Efforts	178
Change Caused by Endogenous Efforts: Motivation	178
Change Caused by Endogenous Efforts: Learning	179
The Public Goods Approach in a Nutshell	182
Two Crises that Shook the EU	183
Testing the Theory	183
Hypotheses for the Exogenous Shock Model	183
Hypotheses for the Endogenous Efforts Model	183
Make the Approach Visible & Selecting Cases	184
Dimensions and Variables	184
The Choice of Cases	187
Case Studies	187
The Empty Chair Crisis	187
Case Analysis: CAP as a Public Good	188
Case Analysis: The Strategic Preference Situation	189
Case Analysis: Hypothesis Test	194
The Euro Crisis	198
Case Analysis: The Euro as a Public Good	201
Case Analysis: The Strategic Preference Situation	202
Case Analysis: Hypothesis Test	209
Synthesis	211

Conclusion	212
References	213
<b>7 The ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) as a Public Good</b>	219
<i>A. Han</i>	
Background of ASEAN Integration	221
From Political to Economic Cooperation	221
The ASEAN Economic Community	223
ASEAN Way	226
ASEAN's Potential	229
The AEC as a Public Good	230
Obstacles to ASEAN Economic Integration	233
Increasing Externalities	233
Information Asymmetries	237
Different Marginal Benefits and Costs	239
Different Individual Marginal Benefits from the AEC	240
Not Only Different Benefits, but Different Costs	242
Developmental Gaps and the Lack of Leadership or a Redistributive Mechanism	243
No Mechanism for Preference Revelation	246
Strengthening ASEAN Institutions for the Better	
Governance of ASEAN Public Goods	248
Central Level or Voluntary Cooperation?	248
The Case for Increased Institutionalisation	250
New Procedural Rules for ASEAN?	253
References	256
<b>Index</b>	261

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