

Religion in the Black Notebooks: Overview and Analysis

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INTRODUCTION¹

I have argued at length elsewhere that Heidegger's early philosophical path was guided, among other things, by a strong though idiosyncratic interest in eschatology. In the years 1909–1915, Heidegger—who was born into a devout Roman Catholic family in 1889 and espoused the anti-Modernist cause in his youth—gradually dissociated himself from post-Vatican I Catholicism against the background of his growing sense of the importance of philosophical questions '*as questions*'. By this he primarily meant two things: one, the epistemological questions about metaphysics posed first by Kant and now by Husserlian phenomenology; and two, the problem of 'historicity' for our understanding both of individual human existence (as inherently temporal) and of Christianity (as a historically situated and developing religion). Searching for a theological method capable of doing justice to lived experience rather than assuming the spurious god's-eye view of the Neo-Scholastic *philosophia perennis*, Heidegger, after 1915, began to synthesize Schleiermacher's

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and the medieval mystics' 'proto-phenomenology' with the emphasis on suffering and mortality he found in the early Luther, Friedrich Hölderlin, Fyodor Dostoevsky, Søren Kierkegaard and Franz Overbeck. The result was a phenomenology of religious life that took affliction—suffering our own finitude—as the basic religious experience.²

These concerns converged on a re-appropriation of early Christian eschatology in Heidegger's thought of the early 1920s, within the context of similar but competing appropriations by other theological thinkers of the time, especially Karl Barth and Eduard Thurneysen. Following a dominant interpretation in early twentieth century Protestant scholarship, Heidegger posited, in the early 1920s, a profound irreconcilability of earliest ('authentic') Christian experience—centrally characterized by eschatological expectation—on the one hand, and the subsequent development—when this expectation failed to materialize—of a Christian philosophy and culture on the other. Building on his phenomenological analysis of affliction with our own finitude as the basic religious experience, Heidegger now found in early Christian eschatological expectation an instantiation *par excellence* of authentic religious existence. His description of this expectant restlessness, however, turned out to be fundamentally at odds with its original Christian context, for Heidegger's commitment to a phenomenological description of the human situation—that is, a description of that situation solely from within—led him to divorce the 'existential' experience of expectation from its (from this perspective merely 'existentiell' or derivatively postulated) object, the 'blessed hope' of the coming Kingdom of God. As a consequence, that hope no longer appeared as constitutive of, but rather as fundamentally inimical to 'eschatological' unrest as Heidegger understood it, because it projects an end to that unrest, and so a cancellation of the nexus of authentic existence.

Against the Christian vision, Heidegger thus developed, in the mid-1920s, an eschatology without eschaton that culminated in his account of being-unto-death in *Being and Time*. On this account, its own being is, at the deepest level, a *question* for each person. This question cannot be answered or resolved in any traditional sense, because as soon as a person's existence is complete and therefore in theory intelligible, that person is no longer there to be capable of understanding it. The consummation of one's existence—death—is at the same time its negation. To live authentically within these conditions can only mean to live in

resolute anticipation of this perpetual, inavertible, and inescapably personal possibility: to ‘be unto death’.

The main two shifts in Heidegger’s eschatological thought in the 1930s are from the individual (*Dasein*) to the people (*Volk*), and from radical negativity (an eschatology without possible object) to apophatic positivity (an eschatology with an unknown but anticipated object). In *Being and Time* and related texts, the main focus of his eschatological perspective is the individual in his or her mortality. Towards the end of *Being and Time*, however, Heidegger moves his attention away from individual existence towards collective or national life, aiming to repeat on that level the question what a radically temporal existence can mean.³ Within the incomplete framework of *Being and Time*, this corporate perspective is never fully worked out, but a vague appeal to ‘destiny’ begins to be formulated which Heidegger works out further, in proximity to the Nazi party, in the early 1930s.⁴ In the years 1933–1934, the categorical impossibility of *fulfilment* that has been such a central characteristic of Heidegger’s eschatology is briefly submerged by a (short-lived) hope for the fulfilment of a national destiny in the National Socialist state. But already in 1934, Heidegger becomes disillusioned with the regime, and begins, primarily via his readings of Hölderlin, to re-assert the uncertainty and (perhaps perpetual) *futurity* of his vision of individual and corporate existence. Still, unlike in Heidegger’s early work, eschatology as configured in the 1930s no longer ‘teaches us exactly what death teaches us’, as Franz Overbeck had put it.⁵ On the contrary, the anticipation of a god whom we can neither summon nor dispense with is now to be the heart of the human vocation. This attitude, though submerged in his writings outside the Black Notebooks, shapes Heidegger’s thought from that time to the end of his career in the late 1960s, when he mysteriously remarks to *Spiegel* magazine that ‘only a god can now save us’.

CONTESTING CHRISTIANITY

By contrast to Judaism, which is mentioned only a handful of times, Christianity is a constant theme of the Black Notebooks, and Heidegger’s anti-Christian polemics are incomparably more pronounced and developed than his (condemnable but largely conventional) Antisemitism.⁶ The primary target of his critique is the Roman Catholic Church as the dominant form of cultural and academic Christianity in his

state Baden. To fight against the church (*Kirche*) as a whole, Heidegger concedes, is useless—‘but we must fight against Catholicism’.⁷

This animus against Christianity in general and Catholicism in particular is motivated both biographically and philosophically, and must be understood against the background of Heidegger’s abiding concern about the inadequacy of modern universities (which were, he thought, steadily degenerating into mere polytechnics⁸), and the squeezing of philosophy departments by efficiency reviews on the one hand and church control on the other.

In a letter to his friend Elisabeth Blochmann shortly after his return from Protestant Marburg to Catholic Freiburg in 1928, Heidegger expressed his ‘abhorrence’ with ‘present-day Catholicism’ (as well as institutionalized Protestantism).⁹ Much of his dismay resulted from the control that the church still exercised on the Philosophy Faculty and the university as a whole—something that had troubled Heidegger since his student days, when the Anti-Modernist Oath had been one of the catalysts of his departure from Roman Catholic scholarship.¹⁰ This tension escalated when the Concordat of 1932 between Baden and the Holy See cemented Roman Catholic authority over the Philosophy Faculty’s chairs in Christian philosophy and medieval history, stipulating that they be held by ‘personages suitable for the impeccable education of students of theology’.¹¹ The Faculty Board, on which Heidegger served, strongly protested the consolidation of these ‘Concordat Chairs’, but was ignored by the Senate.¹² Years of friction followed. In 1941, after the death of its incumbent, the Faculty (no doubt aided by an anti-Christian regime) temporarily abolished the Concordat Chair in Christian Philosophy, re-dedicating it to psychology; to what extent Heidegger was involved in this effort is unclear.¹³ The chair reverted to its confessional status in 1946, with Max Müller as its first post-war incumbent.¹⁴

Heidegger, who had devoted much of his intellectual energy since the early 1920s both to university reform in general and to a rigorous defence of the essential separation of theology and philosophy as disciplines, did not suffer these impositions lightly. His double failure—to bring academic reform to the university and to assert his vision of philosophy even in his own faculty—made him particularly hostile to all perceived encroachments of ‘Christian philosophers’ on his academic field.¹⁵

Heidegger’s growing commitment, in the late 1920s, to philosophy over and against theology was reinforced by, and in turn encouraged, an increasingly exclusive focus on the ‘degenerate’ form of Christianity

which he had criticized from the beginning. While in the early 1920s, Heidegger was still confident that Christianity had the resources to set against the spurious, damaging god's-eye-perspective of Scholasticism an authentic, aboriginal Christian experience of eschatological anxiety, he now began to share Overbeck's conviction that Christianity's earliest experience no longer remained a live option for it, and was consequently no viable model for the present.¹⁶ All theology was now the 'mortal enemy' of philosophy,¹⁷ precisely because the task of philosophy was to open and sustain the unanswerable *question* of existence, while the basis of faith and theology was to hold fast to (in his view premature or simplistic) *answers*. 'In the *philosophical* problem of existence', Heidegger wrote in 1928, 'there is necessarily ... an absolute opposition to all Christianity'.¹⁸ This 'systemic' focus, as already noted, went hand in hand with a renewed focus on Catholicism rather than Protestantism as most genuinely representative of Christianity—'The Catholic Church', as he wrote in 1932, 'alone "is" Christendom'.¹⁹ Heidegger retained this re-orientation towards Roman Catholicism, both positive and negative, for the rest of his life.²⁰

Throughout the 1930s, Heidegger was vociferous in his antagonism in lectures and student assessments. In 1935, he opened his lecture series *Introduction to Metaphysics* with the taunt that to believe in the Bible as divine revelation was to bar oneself from asking the basic philosophical question, 'Why are there beings rather than nothing?', since one's very starting point was a particular (assumed) answer to that question, made with reference to a creator god.²¹ As second examiner of doctoral and post-doctoral work written under the supervision of Martin Honecker, the Chair in Christian Philosophy, Heidegger was equally critical. Of Max Müller's qualifying thesis on Thomas Aquinas, he noted that 'though the author talks a lot about "problems", these remain confined to a dogmatic domain which is itself not at all problematized, and within which the decisive questions of philosophy are not raised because they cannot be raised'.²² 'Christian philosophy', Heidegger concluded in his *Introduction to Metaphysics*, is nothing but 'a square circle and a misunderstanding'.²³

In the Notebook entries of the same period, Christianity's 'essential referral to a creator god is the fulcrum of Heidegger's critique of the modern Western worldview'.²⁴ The entire 'history of beyng'—'beyng' (*Seyn*) now spelled in Hölderlin's archaizing form—is here cast as a story of

how it [beyng] loses its only-just-dawning truth, which belongs to itself (*aletheia* in *phusis*), and thus has to displace its 'essence' to the façade of *being* [*Seiendheit*]; how the latter makes beings into originated creatures; how these creations of a creator-god become things present-at-hand to humans now arranging themselves as subjects; how presence-at-hand as the essence of beings (objects) raises to supremacy the ever-more self-concealing, artifying haunting [*machenschaftliches Unwesen*] of Beyng (*phusis—techné*).²⁵

Modernity, in Heidegger's analysis, has reduced the world to mere resources that can be calculated and used to satisfy men's needs. The Christian God is both the archetype and the supposed justification of this misapprehension, satisfying the human need for mock-absolute power, and reducing the world to a 'creation' to be measured and handled at will. 'The average in all beings is the most acute enemy of the gods. But the Christian God is perhaps himself the absolute average and therefore the most persistent in the West. He is, moreover, as if made for modernity, since one can count and bargain with him'.²⁶

The Christian legacy, in other words—and this was Heidegger's real concern—was not confined to confessional Christianity and the power of the state church to impose it on individual university posts or curricula. Rather, this legacy had defined an entire era in the history of being, infecting all modern philosophy with the basic supposition of a creator god who defined natures that were stable and intelligible, and could therefore be measured and utilized.

In this dominance, the Christian church seemed to Heidegger to swallow all opposition. It irked him greatly that modern Catholicism appropriated thinkers such as Kierkegaard and Nietzsche,²⁷ distorting them in its own image.²⁸ But even secular modern philosophy, in its explicit opposition to Christianity, was to Heidegger merely an unwitting replication and therefore reinforcement of Christianity's basic principles.

Those who now pervert the last remnant of philosophy into worldview-Scholasticism in order to be 'contemporary' should at least have the insight and rectitude of thought to make St Thomas Aquinas their (only appropriate) patron saint, so that they may learn from him how to be uncreative on a grand scale and yet astutely put essential ideas at the service of faith and give it a decisive framework. Why is this not happening? Because they lack the power and, above all, the technical assurance even for such generous derivativeness of thought. The confusion is so great that

they do not even recognize that their ‘political’ and ‘nationally relevant’ philosophies are nothing but meagre shadows of *Scholasticism*.²⁹

Christianity, he concludes, ‘triumphs *again* through the production of subservient opponents, whose sphere is limited to the *inversion* of the Christian doctrine of man. ... Inversion is collapse and relapse—but never emancipation as liberation’.³⁰

Although Heidegger focused his criticisms on the Roman Catholic Church as the dominant institution of Christendom, he also nursed a specific grudge against the Confessing Church, to which he denied any genuine power or even sincerity. The ‘*Confessing Church*’, he wrote in 1938, was merely ‘Roman Papalism in the form of German Protestantism: the latest form of cultural Christendom: Christianness masking the claim to a crumbling worldly rule’.³¹

His acrid dismissal of the Confessing Church shows, perhaps more starkly than any of his other comments, the fixity of Heidegger’s conviction of Christianity’s absorption in the intellectual and social power structures he criticized, and of its lack of resources to overcome them. His contempt for the Confessing Church seems to stem from, or at least correlate with, his long-standing animus against dialectical theology and Karl Barth. Already in 1927, Heidegger had dismissed Barth to his colleague Rudolf Bultmann, who was then also part of Barth’s circle, as a ‘lightweight’ without enough sense to grasp the philosophical issues at stake,³² and urged Bultmann to ‘make clear that something like “dialectical theology” is a mere spectre’.³³ In 1931, he remarked in his Notebooks: ‘the vacuity and fraudulence of so-called “dialectical theology” doesn’t even deserve notice; it is Protestant Jesuitism of the worst kind’.³⁴ The later Notebooks attest the extent to which Heidegger regarded the Confessing Church as near-synonymous with Barth and his circle, and accused both of concealing ulterior motives under ultimately implausible theological talk:

Then there are also ‘Christians’ who, because they cannot fathom what is really going on, think they are living in the ‘catacombs’ when just recently, when there were opportunities everywhere for political power sharing, they knew themselves in ‘heaven’. The Pharisaism of Karl Barth and his comrades outstrips that of ancient Judaism by the dimensions staked necessarily by the modern history of being. This appendage seems to think that shouting as loudly as possible about the long-dead God will somehow

lead to a realm of decision about the divinity of the gods. They think that by taking refuge in the past through ‘dialectic’ talk, they are raised out of time into eternity, while they, as the real destroyers, merely undermine ‘the future’ (not the progress) of humanity. In reality, they are nevertheless the completely peripheral and unwitting promoters of *brutalitas* – they belong, in their own way, among the indispensable, insofar as *they too forestall* essential knowledge and keep clear the way of the *brutalitas* of Being.³⁵

Heidegger’s dismissal of the Confessing Church deserves more research. What is clear is that he thought a more thorough-going alternative to prevailing worldviews was necessary than a Christian rhetoric that he regarded (however perversely) as superficial. His own estimation of what was needed, however, underwent considerable change over the course of the 1930s. This development also serves as a strong focal lens on his changing relationship to Nazism. That complex interaction is the burden of the remainder of this essay.

CONTESTING THE NATION

The Notebooks’ strong anti-Christian strain is noteworthy but not necessarily surprising: its substance (if not its acidity) is consonant with Heidegger’s later writings as a whole, though his relationship to theology and theologians mellowed considerably in the 1940s and 50s.³⁶ More remarkable is the arch of his attempted alternatives to the Christian predicament. The anti-political as much as anti-clerical pessimism of 1931, the sudden surge of optimism that the Nazi movement might catalyse a renewal of his generation’s metaphysical standing, the bitter dismissal of that hope after the failed rectorship, and the gradual formation of an apophatic eschatology inspired by Hölderlin are the real sites of the Notebooks’ theological interest.

In 1931, Heidegger opened his intellectual diary with the repeated complaint that *Being and Time* was not being received as intended: rather than bringing genuine change, it was unthinkingly assimilated into the production line of ‘polytechnic’ university culture.³⁷ How, Heidegger asked again and again in these early notebooks, could his project—which should elicit a consciously lived life, not more idle talk—be actualized? In those early days, Heidegger dismissed both politics and faith as possible sources of renewal, mocking the ‘cheap superiority of faith’ in the same breath as the ‘fake vivacity of politics, whose

intellectual-spiritual paralysis cries to heaven'.³⁸ The National Socialist movement, like Christianity, seemed to him merely opium for the masses: 'Let the many be awakened, yea saved, to peoplehood, or left to the theologians and scribblers of theology outscreeching each other today'.³⁹ His own project needed the leadership of the noble few.⁴⁰

Nevertheless, Heidegger's ambition was now (whether or not it had been in 1927) for a corporate rather than a merely individual renewal. To understand his book aright, he maintained, it was sufficient neither to take it as personal spiritual direction, nor as academic philosophical commentary, but as a redirection of the German orientation to being as a whole. What was at stake was nothing less than the 'distant calling' of the German people to an unprecedented 'depth of existence and breadth of horizon',⁴¹ spearheaded by a 'spiritual-intellectual nobility ... strong enough to shape the tradition of the Germans anew from out of a great future'.⁴²

This rhetoric situates Heidegger's project, or the way he now conceived it, within the larger self-understanding of Weimar philosophy and theology as tasked with the reformulation of an ideal and practical vision of Germany after the trauma of the First World War and the Treaty of Versailles—a vision that the political system of the Weimar Republic was not seen as fit to furnish or sustain. More specifically, his rhetoric situates Heidegger, however uneasily, within the contemporaneous re-appropriation of nineteenth-century idealist and Romantic nationalism, as fostered for example by the German Philosophical Society under neo-Fichtean Bruno Bauch. Heidegger's own remarkable 1929 turn to Fichte, Hegel and Schelling is attested in his lecture courses of 1929 and 1930 on German Idealism (Fichte, Hegel, Schelling) and the Philosophical Situation of Today and on Hegel's *Phenomenology of Spirit*. In June 1929, he wrote to his colleague Karl Jaspers about his ongoing lectures: 'I'm currently lecturing on Fichte, Hegel, and Schelling for the first time—and am discovering a whole new world'.⁴³

Before specifying what was distinctive about Heidegger's rediscovery of Fichte and Hegel, it is instructive to sketch the trend in which it, though idiosyncratically, participated. Many intellectuals at the time, including those of the German Philosophical Society, looked back to Fichte and nineteenth-century Romantic nationalism as a framework for the reconstruction of a Germany in crisis. That nationalism, carried by the educated middle classes, had centred on the hypostatization of the German national 'spirit' (*Geist*) as unadulterated expression of the divine

‘world spirit’ that would, in its self-realization, perfect the world. That realization was seen as, at heart, a matter of education more than political or military action, and played a major part in the rise of the German research universities. In his 1808 *Addresses to the German Nation* (which became a model not only for the rhetoric of the German Philosophical Society but also for Heidegger’s 1933 Rectoral Address⁴⁴), Fichte declared that it was in the Germans that ‘the seed of human perfection [was] most decisively planted, and to whom progress in this development [was] entrusted’. ‘If you perish in this your essence’, he exhorted his countrymen, ‘then all hope of the entire human race for salvation from the depths of its evils perishes with you’.⁴⁵ In 1821, Hegel similarly argued that Germany’s ascendancy would mark the ‘absolute rule’ of Spirit, in which ‘all peoples would find their salvation’.⁴⁶

When the German Philosophical Society pledged its allegiance to Hitler in 1933, it was with this vision in mind.⁴⁷ At its October meeting, to which Hitler sent greetings, Bauch spoke of National Socialism as the beginning of a ‘wonderful national revival’ of the Fichtean dream, destined to ‘radically overcome the malign spirit of pragmatism and materialism’—a vision, he added, which German philosophy would support as a ‘sacred duty and task’.⁴⁸ Bauch went on to deliver guest lectures on ‘the people as a structure of nature and meaning’ (*Das Volk als Natur- und Sinngebilde*) and ‘Fichte and the political task of reconstruction of our time’ across Germany.⁴⁹

The extent to which the National Socialist vision remained underdefined and so invited philosophical and religious projection at the beginning of the 1930s is demonstrated by the 1932 correspondence of Heidegger and his theological colleague Rudolf Bultmann. In autumn 1932, after a volume filled with dejected grumbling, Heidegger opened a new volume of his intellectual diary with the exuberant observation of ‘a people’s gloriously awakening will in the midst of a great world-darkness’.⁵⁰ In November, he wrote with excitement to his friend Bultmann that National Socialism might be a movement with enough driving force to instil in Germany as a whole the kind of conscious life he envisioned. Bultmann, who was never a Nazi, and later joined the regime-resisting Confessing Church, agreed that although he regretted National Socialism’s consolidation into a political party, the ‘actual movement was, and perhaps still is, something great, with its instinct for the ultimate, its feeling of solidarity, and its discipline’.⁵¹

Although Heidegger's version of National Socialism differed in important respects (to be specified in the next section) from that of the neo-Fichtean and neo-Hegelian, it shared with them the projection of a spiritual vision of Germany onto an essentially pragmatic regime. Though he did not invest his vision of spiritual renewal directly in a political programme, Heidegger now saw 'metaphysics as meta-politics',⁵² earnestly hoping that the ongoing political revolution would act as a catalyst for a second, spiritual-intellectual one. It was this second revolution that Heidegger regarded as the yet-to-be-realized essence of Nazism.

The relation of this 'spiritual-intellectual Nazism'⁵³ to the political regime was always volatile. Shortly after assuming the rectorship of Freiburg University in 1932, Heidegger wrote to his friend Elisabeth Blochmann that the political upheavals of the moment were ever at risk of 'getting stuck in the superficial', but had the potential to become the 'way of a first awakening'—provided that 'we are preparing ourselves for a second and deeper one'. In the surge of that second awakening, Nazism as a political party, he thought, would be overcome. The movement, he wrote in 1932, had a responsibility to 'become nascent' or 'begin to begin' (*werdend werden*), shaping the future by 'stepping aside as a mere construct in the face of it'.⁵⁴ He warned that if the party did not 'sacrifice itself as a transitional phenomenon',⁵⁵ but was itself absolutized and treated as 'complete, eternal truth dropped from heaven', then it was merely 'aberration and folly'.⁵⁶ Rather, the present, he emphasized to Blochmann, would only be comprehensible from out of the future.⁵⁷ And if Germany did not continually 'fight for an existential breadth and depth drawn from the silent essence of being', it would have 'squandered its end—a small and laughable end'.⁵⁸

But like the neo-Fichtean, Heidegger was 'caught in the trap of his own ideas'.⁵⁹ Hitler and his chief ideologue Alfred Rosenberg, increasingly contemptuous of the old, 'spiritual' understandings of the German nation as bourgeois obfuscations, defined *Volk* instead as 'a substance of flesh and blood' requiring racial purification and *Lebensraum*.⁶⁰ In his programmatic *Myth of the Twentieth Century* (1930), Rosenberg defined for this ancestral people a 'religion of blood' commensurate with its nature. The fatal flaw of Christianity, in Rosenberg's view, was precisely its disregard for the 'law of blood': 'the stream of blood-red, real life, which rushes through the veins of all true peoples and every culture' and

‘alone enables the creation and maintenance of values’.⁶¹ Heidegger, too, at that time dismissed Christianity as an ossified system that evaded rather than encouraged spiritual effort; but his hope was for a people trained in radical questioning and intellectual striving, not steeped in blood-and-soil nationalism.

Heidegger’s opposition to the Nazi leadership’s definition of the *Volk*, and his growing disappointment with their stubborn commitment to that definition, became a constant refrain of his Notebooks from 1933/34 onwards. National Socialism, he warned, was in danger of cutting itself off from ‘the great tradition’.⁶² ‘Is all this just domineering mindlessness running riot?’⁶³ ‘Primary school teachers gone wild, technicians without jobs, and displaced bourgeois as the guardians of the “people”—as those who are supposed to set the standards’.⁶⁴ ‘And the much-discussed *people* [*Volk*]? I.e. its innermost spiritual destiny? Is being plunged into desolation and lethargy such as the Germans have never yet experienced’.⁶⁵

Heidegger associated this failure particularly with Hitler’s shift of emphasis from the people as a spiritual entity to the people as defined by blood: ‘The subject character [of the people] is rigidified by the prioritization of the biological (i.e. in reality unbiological) interpretation of peoplehood, which particularly sticks in the minds of the masses...’⁶⁶ To define ‘the people’ biologically and ‘biological’ in terms of blood (*blutmäÙig*), he thought, was simply to absolutize presence-at-hand, a misrepresentation he had attacked since at least *Being and Time*.⁶⁷ Instead of representing the essence of the people as fixed by its ancestry or territory, Heidegger argued, that essence should be apprehended as a *task* requiring a consistent and effortful orientation towards Being itself. ‘Blood and soil’ nationalism, to him, constituted a failure in this fundamental task, and so a betrayal of Germanness itself. ‘When a people posits itself as autotelic, egotism grows to enormous dimensions, but no true realm or truth is gained—the blindness of Beyng ensconces itself in an arid and rough ‘biologism’ that promotes strong-arming in words. All this is fundamentally un-German’.⁶⁸

In its reduction of the people to a thing present-at-hand, Nazism for Heidegger became merely another transposition of Christianity that replicated its structure and perpetuated rather than helped overcome the desperate condition of the West. Indeed, it is one of the constant refrains of his later Notebook entries that aspects of Nazism, like other ‘totalizing’ systems, were merely ‘inversions’ of Christianity: ‘These “worldview

wars” [are] so entangled’ in the modified metaphysics of Western thought that they ‘don’t fathom how deeply they share the same crumbling ground’ – ‘unquestioning assumption of Being, groundlessness of truth, determination of humanity by its essence’—as their ‘opponent’.⁶⁹

Neither, for Heidegger, had anything to do with genuine philosophy anymore. In 1935, he suggested that he preferred the honesty of those who dismissed philosophy as ‘useless’ or ‘impossible’ to those peddling a ‘National Socialist philosophy’, which ‘is even more impossible and vastly more superfluous than a “Catholic philosophy”’.⁷⁰ Within this intellectual wasteland, his own philosophy remained, for Heidegger, a lone first overcoming of the totalizing frameworks represented by both Nazism and Christianity.⁷¹

CONTESTING THE APOCALYPSE

But what was the substance of Heidegger’s vision of Germany and ‘intellectual-spiritual Nazism’, developed amid but also against neo-Fichteanism and -Hegelianism?⁷² The answer can be framed by an aspect of nineteenth-century Romantic nationalism and its appropriation by Nazi rhetoricians that is often remarked upon in histories of political ideas, but seldom in philosophical treatments, namely the eschatological thrust of the German *Reich* envisioned by both. Fichte and Hegel had consciously appropriated the Christian apocalyptic tradition especially of Joachim of Fiore, whose apocalyptic periodization of history into the empires of God the Father (Old Testament), the Son (New Testament and Church), and the Holy Spirit (the age to come) served as the model for Hegel’s own periodization in the *Philosophy of Religion*, and for his eschatological Germanic Realm in the *Philosophy of Right*.⁷³ The identification of the World Spirit harnessed by Germany with the Holy Spirit of Scripture made this appropriation of the biblical foretelling of an eschatological outpouring of the Spirit on all flesh (e.g. Joel 2:28–9; Acts 2:17) a natural one.

The nationalist revival of the 1920s and 30s brought with it a projection onto Hitler’s promised *Reich* of the quasi-messianic kingdom envisioned by Fichte and Hegel, now with a redoubled emphasis on the suffering and struggle that had been part of biblical as well as Hegelian eschatology. In biblical prophecy, the coming of the eschatological age was preceded by its ‘birth pangs’ (Matthew 24:8; Romans 8:22)—by war, persecution, and natural disaster. In Hegel’s rational eschatology,

this suffering was folded into the dialectical self-realization of Spirit. The final phase of that self-realization, the ‘Germanic empire’, could only arise out of ‘infinite pain’ and the confrontation of ‘absolute negativity’.

This is the absolute *turning point*; spirit rises out of this situation and grasps the *infinite positivity* of this its inward character, i.e. it grasps the principle of the unity of the divine nature and the human, the reconciliation of objective truth and freedom as the truth and freedom appearing within self-consciousness and subjectivity, a reconciliation with the fulfilment of which the Nordic principle ... of the Germanic peoples, has been entrusted.⁷⁴

The early myth of the Nazi *Reich* participated fully in this imagery. Arthur Moeller van den Bruck, author of the programmatic *Germany's Third Empire* (1924), chose ‘the Third Reich’ as an epithet for the Germany of the future not just by reference to the two preceding ‘German’ empires, but above all to Joachim of Fiore’s apocalyptic ‘third empire’ of the Holy Spirit.⁷⁵ The condition from which this *Reich* would be born was as one of pain and mourning, symbolized by the ‘sable flag of need, humiliation and utter bitterness’ which he saw flying over Germany, and which Hitler and Goebbels concretized in the ‘blood flag’ of the failed beer hall putsch liturgically paraded as a symbol of the sacrifice necessary for the coming of the kingdom.⁷⁶ Hitler encouraged the apocalyptic terminology of a ‘Third Reich’ until 1938, when he discarded it for more pragmatic language.⁷⁷

Heidegger’s embrace of the Nazi promise was premised precisely on a ‘grotesquely sophisticated receptiveness to [these] initially rhetorical calls for self-sacrifice’,⁷⁸ inflected by a critique of Hegel’s insufficiently radical valorization of negativity or death. In 1929, Heidegger concluded his lectures on idealism with a discussion of Hegel’s definition of eternity as absolute presence. He shared Hegel’s focus on ‘absolute negativity’ (or ‘death’, as Hegel famously glossed the term in the preface to his *Phenomenology of Spirit*) as the crucible of peoplehood. However, he strongly rejected Hegel’s conception of death as *preliminary* or sublatable. Where for Hegel, death was a necessary turning point ultimately sublated in the self-realization of Spirit, for Heidegger, it remained (as it had been in *Being and Time*) the ultimate, impossible possibility of human existence which could only be anticipated, yet never grasped or overcome. Heidegger’s critique of a Hegelian understanding of the

state, in fact, repeated his earlier critique of Augustine's eschatology on the level of corporate rather than individual existence. Just as he felt that Augustine had betrayed his aboriginal insight into the radically temporal character of human existence by his neo-Platonic vision of eschatological stasis,⁷⁹ so he criticized Hegel for his sublation of negativity into absolute presence.

In the National Socialist rhetoric of sacrifice, Heidegger (absurdly) saw the possibility of a more radical national dedication to being-unto-death than that made possible by Hegel. His 1934/5 lectures on Hölderlin paint a concrete image of a people formed by this dedication. The close fellowship of soldiers at the front, Heidegger maintains there, has nothing to do with shared enthusiasms or distance from other friends.

On the contrary, it finds its source solely and most deeply in the fact that the closeness of death as sacrifice had first set each in the same nullity, which then became the source of unconditional co-belonging. Precisely that death, which each human being has to die on his or her own, and which isolates each individual to the utmost, precisely that death and the readiness for its sacrifice are what first creates the space of community from which fellowship springs. Does fellowship therefore arise from fear? No and yes. No, if like the philistine one means by fear only the helpless trembling of panic-stricken cowardice. Yes, if one understands fear as the metaphysical proximity to the unconditioned which is granted only to the highest independence and readiness. Unless we force powers into our existence [*Dasein*] which bind and isolate through free sacrifice as unconditionally as death – i.e. which grasp at the roots of each individual's existence – and are rooted as deeply and fully in genuine knowledge, there can be no 'fellowship', but at best a modified societal form.⁸⁰

The urgency of this national re-orientation towards being-unto-death was the primary motor of Heidegger's public speeches as Rector. Throughout 1933, he called students to 'grow unceasingly in [their] courage to sacrifice [themselves] for the salvation of our people's essence',⁸¹ 'led by the relentlessness of that spiritual mission that forces the destiny of the German people into the shape of its history'.⁸² What is significant here is not so much the rhetoric of sacrifice, but the fact that in Heidegger's vision, the people's 'essence' was not something pre-existing the willing anticipation of death, but arising from that sacrifice itself. The people's 'spiritual mission' was not substantive but

performative, driven, like the sacrifice that realized it, by the essential questionableness of existence. '[I]n our present time', Heidegger had told his students in 1930, 'we have no footing in any objective, universally binding knowledge or power; the only foothold [*Halt*] that remains to us is our bearing [*Haltung*]'.⁸³ And his Rectoral Address in 1933 concluded: 'This people works at its fate by ... continually fighting for [*erkämpfen*] its spiritual world anew. Thus exposed to the most extreme questionableness of its own existence, this people wills to be a spiritual people'.⁸⁴ As James Phillips put it so well, 'Heidegger's nationalism in 1933 was not ... the "psychological solution" to the anxiety of 1927, but, on the contrary, its formulation as a philosophical-political program'.⁸⁵

RECONFIGURING ESCHATOLOGY

And yet the redirection of the call to being-unto-death from the individual to the *Volk* does not leave intact the radical commitment to mortality which fuels that call in *Being and Time*. In that earlier work, as we recall, Heidegger derives moral responsibility from the nature of the human person, which has no fixed essence, but consists precisely in *possibility*—that is, in the human orientation towards a future self which is shaped (but not predetermined) by both internal and external forces. This basic potentiality of the human person seems ordered towards the achievement of a whole and therefore true self. But this orderedness towards fulfilment, on Heidegger's account, is ultimately illusory, for the paradigmatic possibility of human life turns out to be the final and unavoidable possibility of death, which is at the same time the *impossibility* of any longer being a self. The nature of each human person thus presents itself as a question to that person which cannot ultimately be answered, but only sustained *as* question. Being-unto-death is the resolute living-out of that sustainment.⁸⁶

On the national level, Heidegger repeats the structure of an undetermined essence yet to be realized in active choice and struggle, whose active moment of self-realization, however, is structured not linearly towards fulfilment, but peripeteically towards an eschatological end that is both *telos* and catastrophe.

The first aspect of this structure—German 'nature' as task rather than given—is a frequent theme of the Black Notebooks. 'The true essence of the Germans', Heidegger writes in 1938, for example, 'demands of

them the fight [*Kampf*] for their essence; this fight must itself be fought for [*er kämpft*].⁸⁷ ‘Culture’, on this understanding, is nothing other than ‘the warlike fabric of the existence and destiny of a people exposed to god and history (war in the sense of *polemos*)’.⁸⁸ Both the National Socialist programme and the Christian Church demonstrate their weakness precisely by foreclosing this calling by a premature definition of humanity and Germanness. ‘But who would presume’, Heidegger protests at the restriction of the school curriculum to poets ‘promoting ... German folkdom [*Volkstum*]’, ‘especially in such confused “times”, to fix for “eternity” what it is to be German and a people—at a time which perhaps is itself nothing but the result of a misidentification of Germanness on the basis of nationalism’.⁸⁹

It is the second aspect—the peripeteic horizon of this task of self-realization—that is more puzzling. This horizon is announced in unambiguously eschatological terms throughout the Black Notebooks as the awaited advent of a ‘last god’.⁹⁰ But while this advent demands a national enterprise oriented towards its own limit, that limit is not merely an end but also a second beginning.⁹¹ The people, Heidegger is clear, cannot give itself its own essence: it is, after all, precisely the forceful ‘enframing’ of the world (which he now identifies with both Christianity and Nazism) which has caused the present god-forsakenness.⁹² It can only empty itself through ‘complete conversion’ and ‘silent waiting’⁹³ to prepare a space into which the radically other ‘god’ can descend. Unlike death, this god determines the people’s essence not by negation but by donation: The god ‘must already have arrived if a people is to find its essence’.⁹⁴

Where *Being and Time* insisted on the unflinching acceptance that no *parousia* would wrest existence from the radical negativity of death, therefore, the Black Notebooks arrive at a contrary insistence precisely on the need for openness to a god who must come from without, or doom humankind by remaining absent.⁹⁵ This remains central to Heidegger’s thought to the last, when he tells an incredulous *Spiegel* reporter in a final interview:

Philosophy will not be able to bring about an immediate change in the current state of the world. This is true not only of philosophy, but of all merely human thought and desire. Only a god can now save us. I see the only possibility of rescue in preparing, through thought and poetry, a readiness for the appearance of this god or for the absence of this god in our

downfall; so that we will not, to put it crudely, ‘croak’, but, if we go down, go down in the face of the absent god.

[Philosophy and the individual can do nothing more than] prepare this readiness to hold themselves open for the arrival or non-appearance of the god. Even the experience of non-appearance is not nothing, but a liberation of man from what I have called, in *Being and Time*, his addiction to that-which-is.⁹⁶

It is important to stress that this posture of openness cannot be interpreted as a return to Christianity. Even on an understanding of Christianity as vitiated rather than essentially constituted by an onto-theological understanding of God and the world, Heidegger’s radical apophaticism regarding the nature of the god to come is at basic odds with the Christian orientation by and towards a revelation of God that has already occurred. Nevertheless, Heidegger’s last god represents a significant revision of his thought whose provenance and significance is, I submit, the central puzzle of the Black Notebooks in their relevance for theology. It will take sustained work to delineate the contribution of these difficult texts to what we already know of Heidegger’s ‘last god’ from his volumes on Hölderlin and *Contributions to Philosophy*. Some of that work is the burden of the following chapters of this book. What should be stressed at the outset is the integral importance, in Heidegger’s own mind, of his world-historical drama of being to the philosophical counsel of mindful receptivity for which his late work is generally praised. Any reception of that later work will have to come to terms with the idiosyncratic eschatological vision within which it arose in the 1930s, and which has too often been dismissed as a marginal poetic flourish. It will be a large task to assess the full scope or significance of this eschatological narrative, but the Black Notebooks both demand and enable that task.

NOTES

1. The Black Notebooks written during the Nazi period span fifteen manuscript volumes bound as three published volumes: Martin Heidegger, *Überlegungen II–VI (Schwarze Hefte 1931–1938)*, GA 94 (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 2014); *Überlegungen VII–XI (Schwarze Hefte 1938/39)*, GA 95 (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 2014); and *Überlegungen XII–XV (Schwarze Hefte 1939–1941)*, GA 96 (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 2014).

References to Heidegger's works will be given as GA (*Gesamtausgabe*) followed by the volume number. Translations are by the author unless otherwise stated. My thanks to Luisa Melloh for her research assistance and to the School of Divinity at the University of St. Andrews for enabling it.

2. Judith Wolfe, *Heidegger's Eschatology: Theological Horizons in Martin Heidegger's Early Work* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), ch. 1–3.
3. See Martin Heidegger, *Sein und Zeit* (1927), GA 2 (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1977), §§72–77.
4. Much stronger readings than my own of the continuity between §§72–77 of *Being and Time* and Heidegger's Nazi involvement can be found, e.g., in Johannes Fritsche, *Historical Destiny and National Socialism in Heidegger's 'Being and Time'* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999); Tom Rockmore, *On Heidegger's Nazism and Philosophy* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991).
5. From the unpublished 'Kirchenlexikon' (a collection of several thousand index cards), on a series of cards entitled 'Christentum Eschatologie Allg.', 2–3; quoted in Rudolf Wehrli, *Alter und Tod des Christentums bei Franz Overbeck* (Zurich: Theologischer Verlag, 1977), 229; Franz Overbeck, *Christentum und Kultur*, ed. by C.A. Bernoulli (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1963), 297–298.
6. I have offered an interpretation of these statements in Judith Wolfe, 'Caught in the Trap of His Own Metaphysics', *Standpoint*, June 2014, accessed 5 June 2017: <http://standpointmag.co.uk/node/5583/full>.
7. Heidegger, GA 94, 186.
8. See e.g. *ibid.*, 193.
9. Heidegger to Blochmann, 8 August 1928, in Joachim Storck (ed.), *Martin Heidegger / Elisabeth Blochmann: Briefwechsel 1918–1969* (Marbach: Deutsches Literaturarchiv, 1990), 32.
10. See Wolfe, *Heidegger's Eschatology*, Chap. 2.
11. 'Concordat between the Holy See and the Free State of Baden', Addendum to Article IX, in *Badisches Gesetz- und Verordnungsblatt* 1933, 19.
12. See Sylvia Paetschek, 'Entwicklungslinien aus der Perspektive der Fakultätssitzungen', in *Die Freiburger Philosophische Fakultät 1920–1960: Mitglieder, Strukturen, Vernetzungen*, ed. Eckhart Wirbelauer (Freiburg: Karl Alber, 2006), 58–107, here 70, documenting the minutes of the Philosophy Faculty Board meeting of 20 December 1932 (UAF B3/798, 32).
13. For a full account of philosophical appointments in Weimar and Nazi Germany, including the Concordat Chairs, see Christian Tilitzki, *Die deutsche Universitätsphilosophie in der Weimarer Republik und im Dritten Reich* (Berlin: de Gruyter, 2002).

14. A detailed account of Heidegger's institutional conflicts with the Concordat Chair and its students, and especially of his relationship with Max Müller, can be found in Judith Wolfe, *Heidegger and Theology* (London: T&T Clark, 2014), Chap. 7.
15. See Heidegger's letter to Karl Jaspers of 1 July 1935, in which he speaks of the 'faith of his youth' and the 'failure of the rectorship' as two thorns in his flesh; in Walter Biemel and Hans Saner (eds), *Martin Heidegger / Karl Jaspers: Briefwechsel 1920–1963* (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1990), 157.
16. Franz Overbeck, *Über die Christlichkeit unserer heutigen Theologie* (Leipzig: C.G. Naumann, 1873); Overbeck, *Christentum und Kultur*, 7; see esp. Heidegger to Blochmann, 8 August 1928, in Storck, *Martin Heidegger / Elisabeth Blochmann: Briefwechsel 1918–1969*, 32.
17. Martin Heidegger, *Wegmarken (1919–1961)*, GA 9 (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 2004), 66.
18. Heidegger to Julius Stenzel, 14 April 1928, quoted in Hugo Ott, *Martin Heidegger: Unterwegs zu seiner Biographie* (Frankfurt: Campus, 1988), 158.
19. Heidegger, GA 94, 182.
20. This is corroborated in 1947 by Heidegger's erstwhile student and life-long friend Max Müller; see Max Müller to Alois Naber SJ, 2 February 1947, in Holger Zaborowski and Anton Bösl (eds), *Martin Heidegger / Max Müller: Briefe und andere Dokumente* (Freiburg: Karl Alber, 2004), 71–81; quote from 74.
21. Martin Heidegger, *Einführung in die Metaphysik* (1935), GA 40 (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1983), 9.
22. 'Martin Heideggers Gutachten zur Habilitation Max Müllers' (1937), published in Zaborowski and Bösl, *Martin Heidegger / Max Müller: Briefe und andere Dokumente*, 68–70; quote from 70.
23. Heidegger, *Einführung in die Metaphysik*, 9.
24. Heidegger, GA 95, 320.
25. *Ibid.*, 66.
26. Heidegger, GA 94, 51.
27. *Ibid.*, 182.
28. *Ibid.*, 186. See also George Pattison's chapter in the present volume.
29. Heidegger, GA 94, 401.
30. *Ibid.*, 463; see also 401.
31. *Ibid.*, 522.
32. Heidegger to Bultmann, 29 March 1927, in Andreas Großmann and Christof Landmesser (eds), *Rudolf Bultmann / Martin Heidegger: Briefwechsel 1925–1975* (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 2009), 24–26; quote from 25.
33. Heidegger to Bultmann, 14 March 1927, in *ibid.*, 19–22; quote from 22. For a fuller treatment of Heidegger's relationship to Barth and dialectical theology in the 1920s, see Wolfe, *Heidegger's Eschatology*, Chap. 5.

34. Heidegger, GA 94, 49.
35. Heidegger, GA 95, 395.
36. See Wolfe, *Heidegger and Theology*, 135–137, 158–164.
37. See e.g. Heidegger, GA 94, 193.
38. Ibid., 94.
39. Ibid.
40. See e.g. ibid., 121.
41. Ibid., 125.
42. Ibid., 121.
43. Heidegger to Jaspers, 25 June 1929, in Biemel and Saner, *Martin Heidegger / Karl Jaspers: Briefwechsel 1920–1963*, 123.
44. See Hans D. Sluga, *Heidegger's Crisis: Philosophy and Politics in Nazi Germany* (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1993), 31.
45. J.G. Fichte, 'Reden an die deutsche Nation', in *Werke: Auswahl in sechs Bänden*, vol. 5 (Leipzig: Felix Meiner, 1920), 609.
46. G.W.F. Hegel, *Philosophy of Right*, trans. T.M. Knox (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1942), §352, 218–219.
47. See *Mitteilungen der Deutschen Philosophischen Gesellschaft* 10 (April 1933), 1. See also George Leaman, 'Reflections on German Philosophy and National Socialism: What Happened and Why It Matters to Philosophy', in Marion Heinz and Goran Gretic (eds), *Philosophie und Zeitgeist im Nationalsozialismus* (Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann, 2006), 233–250.
48. Published as Bruno Bauch, 'Wert und Zweck', *Blätter für deutsche Philosophie* 8 (1934), 39–59.
49. See Sven Slotter, 'Die Tyrannei der Werte: Philosophie und Politik bei Bruno Bauch', in Klaus-M. Kodalle (ed.), *Angst vor der Moderne: Philosophische Antworten auf Krisenerfahrungen* (Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann, 2000), 89–103; quote from 98.
50. Heidegger, GA 94, 109.
51. Bultmann to Heidegger, 14 December 1932, in Großmann and Landmesser, *Rudolf Bultmann / Martin Heidegger: Briefwechsel 1925–1975*, 187–188.
52. Heidegger, GA 94, 116.
53. Ibid., 135.
54. Ibid., 114–115.
55. Ibid., 125.
56. Ibid., 59.
57. Heidegger to Blochmann, 30 March 1933, in Storck, *Martin Heidegger / Elisabeth Blochmann: Briefwechsel 1918–1969*, 60. See also GA 94, 243 and 244.
58. Heidegger, GA 94, 92.

59. Hannah Arendt to Günther Gaus, in an interview given on 28 October 1964 on his television show *Zur Person* (ZDF).
60. Adolf Hitler, 'Das dichterische Wort im Werk Adolf Hitlers', *Wille und Macht: Führerorgan der nationalsozialistischen Jugend* 8 (15 April 1938); quoted in Klaus Vondung, *Die Apokalypse in Deutschland* (Munich: Deutscher Taschenbuch Verlag, 1988), 208.
61. Alfred Rosenberg, *Der Mythos des 20. Jahrhunderts: Eine Wertung der seelisch-geistigen Gestaltenkämpfe unserer Zeit* (Munich: Hoheneichen-Verlag, 1930), 23.
62. Heidegger, GA 94.
63. *Ibid.*, 174.
64. *Ibid.*, 187.
65. *Ibid.*, 173.
66. *Ibid.*, 521–522.
67. Heidegger, GA 95, 22; see also 117.
68. Heidegger, GA 94, 233.
69. *Ibid.*, 401; see also Heidegger, GA 95, 161.
70. Heidegger, GA 94, 509.
71. See e.g. *ibid.*, 475–476.
72. See e.g. *ibid.*, 101.
73. Hegel, *Philosophy of Right*, §352 and §358; G.W.F. Hegel, *Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion*, trans. Peter Hodgson (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990), vol. 3. See also e.g. Cyril O'Regan, *The Heterodox Hegel* (Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 1994); Jayne Svenungsson, *Divining History: Prophetism, Messianism and the Development of the Spirit*, trans. Stephen Donovan (New York: Berghahn Books, 2016); Judith Wolfe, 'Eschatology', in Joel Rasmussen, Judith Wolfe, and Johannes Zachhuber (eds), *The Oxford Handbook of Nineteenth-Century Christian Thought* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017), Chap. 40.
74. Hegel, *Philosophy of Right*, sec. 358, translation emended.
75. Arthur Moeller van den Bruck, *Germany's Third Empire*, trans. E.O. Lorimer (London: Allen & Unwin, 1934), 12–13. On Nazism's appropriation of apocalyptic language, see e.g. Ekkehard Bärsch, *Die politische Religion des Nationalsozialismus*, 2nd ed. (Munich: Fink, 2002), B.I.1–3; Klaus Vondung, 'National Socialism as a Political Religion: Potentials and Limits of an Analytical Concept', *Totalitarian Movements and Political Religions* 6, no. 1 (2005), 87–95; Judith Wolfe, 'Messianism', in Nicholas Adams, George Pattison, and Graham Ward (eds), *The Oxford Handbook of Theology and Modern European Thought* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 301–324; esp. 310–315.
76. See Vondung, 'National Socialism as a Political Religion: Potentials and Limits of an Analytical Concept'.

77. For a fuller account, see Wolfe, 'Messianism'.
78. James Phillips, *Heidegger's Volk: Between National Socialism and Poetry* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2005), 55.
79. See Wolfe, *Heidegger's Eschatology*, Chap. 3.
80. Martin Heidegger, *Hölderlins Hymnen 'Germanien' und 'Der Rhein'* (1934/35), 3rd ed., GA 39 (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1999), 73.
81. Martin Heidegger, 'Aufruf an die deutschen Studenten', *Freiburger Studentenzeitung* 8, no. 1 (3 November 1933); rpt. in Bernhard Martin, *Martin Heidegger und das 'Dritte Reich': Ein Kompendium* (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1989), 177.
82. Heidegger, 'Die Selbstbehauptung der deutschen Universität' (Rectoral Address, 27 May 1933), in Martin Heidegger, *Reden und andere Zeugnisse eines Lebensweges* (1910–1976), GA 16 (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 2000), 70–117; quote from 70.
83. Heidegger, '[Studenten ehren Professor Heidegger]' (1930), in *ibid.*, 755–758; quote from 758.
84. Heidegger, 'Selbstbehauptung', in *ibid.*, 114.
85. Phillips, *Heidegger's Volk*, 76.
86. For a fuller version of this account, see Wolfe, *Heidegger's Eschatology*, Chap. 6.
87. Heidegger, GA 95, 31.
88. Heidegger, GA 94, 172.
89. Heidegger, GA 95, 31.
90. See e.g. IV.179, IV.288, IV.292, V.1, V.4, V.15, etc. See also Martin Heidegger, *Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis)* (1936–1938), 3rd ed., GA 65 (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 2003), esp. 405–419.
91. See e.g. Heidegger, GA 94, 243, 244.
92. E.g. *ibid.*, 167, 210.
93. *Ibid.*, 170.
94. Heidegger, GA 95, 25.
95. E.g. Heidegger, GA 94, 262.
96. *Ibid.*, 114, 125, 174.

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