

PREFACE

The following text is a set of reflections upon the philosophy of Martin Heidegger in the context of several thinkers and themes, in particular, Nietzsche and modern science and technology. My primary aim is to address the question of “truth” and thus of “being” in the context of Heidegger’s assessment that Nietzsche’s metaphysics is an expression of the underlying metaphysics of modern science and modern technology. But this inquiry is not an end in itself; that is, I do not intend this book to be a mere descriptive analysis of Heidegger’s thinking, but rather I wish to assess not only whether Heidegger’s thinking accomplishes what he intended, but also whether this thinking answers the most important question concerning being and truth, namely their ontological status vis-à-vis modern scientific (Nietzschean) reductionism. It seems to me, for reasons I will later outline, the only way to properly pose and answer this question in a modern context is through Heidegger’s engagement with Nietzsche, since this engagement, in particular, seeks to think through and combat the metaphysics of modernity by using Nietzsche as its representative. Heidegger’s insights concerning Nietzsche are not merely about Nietzsche, but also address science, technology, and the metaphysics that unifies them all, namely will to power.

The basic task of my project is to use Heidegger’s critique of Nietzsche as a way into a deeper critique of modern scientific reductionism. I frame this argument in terms of the “ontological status” of intelligibility (being, truth, etc.) and argue that if any metaphysics (scientific or otherwise) fails to account for such intelligibility, then it fails necessarily,

as it cannot explain or account for its purported ability *to explain* or *account*. My conclusions have direct implications for the viability of a Platonic and theistic account of reality over and against a Nietzschean and atheistic one.

My conclusion, with Heidegger, is that Nietzsche's project, along with the atheist and reductionist accounts of being proposed (axiomatically) by modern science and technology, fails to account for precisely *why* the world is intelligible rather than unintelligible, and thus fails to adequately *explain* not only particular *intelligibles* such as numbers, logical rules, causes, etc., but more importantly, intelligible grounds such as being and truth. I also conclude that Heidegger's proposed solution to the failure of Nietzsche and modern science, namely the posing of the *Seinsfrage*, merely begs the question as to the ontological status of being, truth, and intelligibility. Therefore, I propose a radical conclusion that, because Nietzscheanism collapses into absurdity in its inability to account and explain the intelligibility of reality itself, only a Platonism and Cartesianism of sorts can adequately account for reality in a consistent and intelligible manner. Moreover, and perhaps even more radical than a conclusion that lauds the merits of Descartes, something most unusual for this current period in Continental Philosophy, I argue that there are, in the end, only two possible positions one could take in the history of philosophy—Platonism or Nietzscheanism—and thus the decision as to the viability and truth of one over the other perhaps proves to be *the* most important philosophical question to be asked. It is precisely this question that Plato posed initially in his *Sophist* concerning the *Gigantomachy*, or the battle between “gods” and “giants” concerning the nature of being itself.

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Between Plato and Nietzsche

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