

2 Three approaches to the political involvement of migrants – a short overview over the state of research and some theoretical considerations

Political participation, of course, is essential to democracy - without at least some participation of the *demos*, the concept appears devoid of meaning. Indeed, in their nowadays classic “Civic culture” study, Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba concluded that a democratic political system needed a “political culture consistent with it” (Almond/Verba 1963: 3) in order to be stable. Observing the political developments in post-World War II Europe and in the newly independent states of the formerly colonised world, they furthermore noted that a new “world political culture” was in the making with all countries striving for modern industrial technology and bureaucracy (Almond/Verba 1963: 2). Whereas the political content of this world culture was not yet foreseeable at the time, so the authors of the study, it was already possible to make out one important political aspect of it:

“But one aspect of this new world political culture is discernible: it will be a political culture of participation. If there is a political revolution going on throughout the world, it is what might be called the participation explosion. In all the new nations of the world the belief that the ordinary man is politically relevant -- that he ought to be an involved participant in the political system -- is widespread” (Almond/Verba 1963: 2).

Nowadays, political theory of democracy still stresses the great importance of political participation for democracy (Barnes 2006: 76), and there are still many studies on political culture.⁶ In addition, however, students of political participation today concentrate on explaining variations in concrete acts of participation, rather than on attitudes alone.

According to their respective (normative) views on political participation and democracy, authors define political participation differently. Many either conceptualise it as all actions which citizens undertake voluntarily in order to influence political decisions (Schultze 2010: 723). Or they prefer a definition which stresses the deliberative character of participation. For instance, Manfred G. Schmidt suggests defining political participation as participation in the process of deliberation

⁶ There is a comprehensive literature concerned with political attitudes and political culture. Among many others, see e.g. Westle/Gabriel (2009) for the German context; for France, e.g. Mayer et al. (2010).

and decision-making on political and/or public affairs (cf. Schmidt 2004: 546). A very comprehensive and widely accepted definition has been put forward by Max Kaase, who explains that political participation is a form of social behaviour oriented towards collective goals, which materialises in a complex interplay of institutional structures, concrete political events, group ties and individual characteristics (Kaase 1996: 525).⁷ Schultze's, Schmidt's, Kaase's and many other definitions today have in common that they include both conventional elements of participation such as voting, party membership or holding office, and unconventional elements such as working for a solidarity group, writing a pamphlet or participating in a road block. Political violence is not excluded by these definitions, either.

The inclusion of "unconventional" forms of participation into the definition is essential, especially if the focus is on the participation of migrants. Indeed, while the participatory revolution foreseen by Almond and Verba in the 1960s has since then certainly reached many societies and many different sectors within societies that before were characterised by logics of hierarchy, obedience or exclusion, the participation of migrants still hardly ever is a matter of course. As migrants often are citizens of a country other than the one they live in, they commonly do not have the same political rights as the majority in their country of residence. And even if they are naturalised citizens of their country of residence, they frequently are not perceived as a legitimate part of the *demos*. Social movements and other forms of political participation that are considered "unconventional" thus may be more easily available forms of political involvement for migrants. For the present research, it is therefore advisable to take into account both conventional and unconventional forms of political involvement and to draw on theories of participation and of social movements more specifically - although, of course, the participation of migrants in social movements and other forms of collective mobilisation does not go without saying, either.

As has been sketched briefly above it is the aim of this research to find out whether *religion* can contribute to overcoming the barriers that keep migrants from getting involved politically, to facilitating migrant politicisation, participation and collective mobilisation, and thus to surmounting (at least partly) a situation where migrants are politically marginalised. The focus is on migrants from sub-Saharan Africa in Berlin and Paris who constitute a particularly vulnerable and marginalised population. As will be shown in later chapters, their situation in both cities gives many reasons for protest and collective mobilisation and, at the same time, renders both conventional and unconventional political participation rather difficult.

⁷ Translation by the author (political participation is "auf kollektive Ziele hin orientiertes soziales Verhalten, das in einem komplexen Zusammenspiel zwischen institutionellen Strukturen, konkreten politischen Ereignissen, Gruppenbindungen und individuellen Merkmalen zustande kommt" (Kaase 1996: 525)).

Yet, while Black migrants are particularly often the victims of discrimination and racist violence and their position on the labour market in both cities is especially weak, their political marginalisation is something they share with many migrants. It is therefore useful to take a closer look at what we know about the political involvement of migrants in general, before outlining a few theoretical elements guiding this research. This chapter therefore first gives a short and non-exhaustive overview over the literature on the political participation and mobilisation of migrants generally. Against this background, in a second step, it outlines the theoretical considerations that frame and support this research.

2.1 Three major perspectives on (migrant) political participation and collective mobilisation: A very short overview

Three major elements characterise approaches to the study of both individual participation and collective mobilisation: (1) material and immaterial resources as a requirement for political involvement, (2) cultural factors contributing to or shaping political preferences and actions and (3) context factors. The literature covering these three factors will be reviewed very briefly as the background the theoretical framework guiding the empirical research.

2.1.1 Resources as a necessary requirement for political involvement

One of the most influential explanatory models of political participation still is the socioeconomic status (SES) model proposed by Sidney Verba and his colleagues in the 1970s (Verba/Nie 1972; Verba et al. 1978), and the decisive influence of social stratification has been confirmed empirically both for conventional and unconventional political participation in Western democracies (cf. Schultze 2010: 723-725; Schmidt 1995: 740). Fundamental findings include the fact that generally a higher SES, i.e. a higher income, level of education, and status of occupation, correlates positively with a higher level of political participation (cf. Schultze 2010: 723-725; Schmidt 1995: 740; Kaase 2002: 353-354).

In order to elucidate why the socio-economic status explains much of the variation in political participation, Henry E. Brady, Sidney Verba and Kay Lehman Schlozman (Verba et al. 1995) developed an extended resource model of political participation according to which resources closely related to socioeconomic status - time, money and civic skills - are essential for political involvement. Brady et al. argue that their new focus on resources allows them a) to “move beyond the ‘SES model,’ that is, beyond explanations of political activity based on one or more of the components of socioeconomic status” and b) to “probe the way resources link backward to SES and other social characteristics and forward to political activity”

(Brady et al. 1995: 271). Thereby they demonstrate that the three resources they identified as essential for political participation “vary in their association with SES and other social characteristics” (Brady et al. 1995: 271). Obviously, money and some civic skills which are acquired at the workplace correlate highly with SES, whereas time as well as those kinds of civic skills that are learnt in clubs, associations or congregational churches are less strongly linked to SES (Brady et al. 1995: 271).⁸

Focussing on collective rather than individual action, an important branch of social movement theory also stresses the relevance of resources as well as of the inclusion of organisations and actors into social networks. While the earlier approaches of collective behaviour and rational action explain the surge of social movements by collective grievances and frustration (e.g. Smelser 1962; Gurr 1970) or by individual interest and rational calculation (e.g. Olson 1965) respectively, the resource mobilisation theory stresses that resources and the strategic actions of movement leaders are necessary for collective action.

To be sure, resource mobilisation theory is less a coherent paradigm than a broader theoretical category which assembles different approaches (cf. Neveu 2005: 49; Della Porta/Diani 1999: 3; 7-8). Whereas some of these approaches concentrate on so-called Social Movement Organisations and rational Social Movement Entrepreneurs within a supply-side model of mobilisation (cf. McCarthy/Zald 1977: 1213), others go further and also take into account institutional and historical factors (Tilly 1978; cf. Neveu 2005: 49). All approaches, however, have in common that they stress the rational character of social movements: whereas theories of collective behaviour conceptualise social movements as inherently irrational, resource mobilisation theory characterises social movements as “rational, purposeful and organized action” (Tilly 1978; quoted in Della Porta/Diani 1999: 8).

In contrast to the resource model explaining political participation proposed by Verba and his colleagues, resource mobilisation theory does not focus on the individual socio-economic status, on individual skills and resources, but on the resources which Social Movement Organisations (SMO) may mobilise in order to achieve their goals (McCarthy/Zald 1977). As Donatella della Porta and Mario Diano highlight, resource mobilisation theory thus stresses the significance of material resources, but also of immaterial resources such as solidarity networks (della Porta/Diani 1999: 8). Also, this approach considers a limited number of Social Movement Entrepreneurs as decisive for the success of a movement (McCarthy/Zald 1977; Neveu 2005). These entrepreneurs draw on the different resources available to them and mobilise and lead others.

⁸ Michael A. Jones-Correa and David L. Leal argue that it is mainly the associational character of churches that increases political participation (Jones-Correa/Leal 2001).

In short, when analysing individual political participation or collective mobilisation, relevant theories stress the significance of access to and strategic mobilisation of material and immaterial resources. Migrants, of course, often have a comparatively low socio-economic status in their country of residence and limited access to resources. As newcomers, they occupy the jobs that the autochthonous population rejects; their formal qualifications are often devalued on their country of residence's labour market; their civic skills, networks and integration in relevant organisations frequently differ from those of the majority. Nevertheless, when it comes to analysing the political participation and mobilisation of migrants and post-migration minorities more specifically, the SES and resource models as well as theories of resource mobilisation are very influential. Just as in research on political participation in general, many explanations of migrant and minority political participation focus on resources as a *sine qua non* for political action. For example, for minorities in the United States, Verba, Schlozman, Brady, and Nie (Verba et al. 1993) show that race and ethnicity do not matter once researchers in their analyses control for the resources that are explicated in the resource model.

At the same time, authors often make certain qualifications to the SES or the resource models when they explain migrant political participation. One example for this is the study of the case of Australia by McAllister and Makkai, who come to the conclusion that differences in political trust and political participation between different migrant groups are due to different socioeconomic resources, but also to the political socialisation in the country of origin (McAllister/Makkai 1992). Similarly, Cho, Gimpel and Wu (2006) show that for Arab Americans political socialisation as well as a context perceived as threatening and/or discriminating mediate the impact of socioeconomic status differences: "Threat and SES work in tandem and viewing either in isolation paints an incomplete picture" (Cho et al. 2006: 989).

Scrutinising the political attitudes and behavioural intentions (i.e. not the actual behaviour) of migrants in Germany, Diehl and Blohm find a certain alienation from the German political system and its main parties which cannot be explained by their lower socioeconomic status alone and which is not compensated for by participation in ethnic associations (Diehl/Blohm 2001: 417). Instead, according to the authors, the low levels of interest for and identification with the German political system reflect the political marginalisation of migrants (Diehl/Blohm 2001: 417) in a country whose official rhetoric has for a long time denied the fact that Germany had become an immigration country.⁹

Meanwhile, critics of the resource mobilisation theory point to the fact that this kind of explanations of social movements tends to underestimate the cru-

⁹ Diehl and Blohm, however, do not systematically control for all resources relevant for political participation in Verba, Schlozman and Brady's model.

cial role context factors play in mobilisation processes and also overlook the capacity of the most marginalised groups to get organised. This, of course, is particularly relevant if the focus is on migrant mobilisation, because migrants are more likely to find themselves in a marginalised social position than members of the non-migrant population. Generally, there are not as many studies which explain the collective mobilisation of migrants by resource mobilisation theories than there is research on individual migrant political participation based on Brady, Verba and Schlozman's resource model. Among other things, this is certainly due to the fact that migrants' movements are less frequent and often less prominent than other social movements.

One important exception in the European context is, of course, the *sans-papiers* movement, i.e. the mobilisation of undocumented migrants, especially in France, which has received much scholarly attention in recent years. Thierry Blin's study of the *sans-papiers*' occupation of the Parisian church of Saint-Ambroise, for instance, draws on the resource mobilisation approach (Blin 2005). The author argues, however, that the resource mobilisation approach is too narrow for the analysis and should be reformulated (Blin 2005: 172-174; 189).

What is more, the resource mobilisation approach emerged as an answer to social movement theories that stressed collective frustration and grievances and thus is a rather "old" approach. Yet, while many authors and important studies nowadays rely on other theories such as the political opportunity structure approach, there are also interesting attempts to further develop the resource mobilisation theory or to combine it with other approaches. Manlio Cinalli (2007), for instance, introduces social network theory into the analysis of social movements in order to combine theories of resource mobilisation and other approaches. His network approach, he argues, thus "encompasses RMT [resource mobilisation theory; MS]" (Cinalli 2007: 5). In an empirical study based on this approach, Cinalli focuses on two socially marginalised and politically rather quiescent groups, but with pro-beneficiary activists campaigning for them: the unemployed and asylum seekers in the UK. He finds that mobilisation in the issue-field of asylum is more effective than in the issue-field of unemployment and concludes that this is due to different relational structures between pro-beneficiary organisations (Cinalli 2007: 18).

In addition to this structural perspective on political involvement, it is necessary, however, to turn to the other two theoretical elements which form the basis of the approach that guides this study. What is more, in addition to social movement theories, theories of individual participation must not be forgotten. The following section therefore briefly summarises what might be called cultural approaches to both individual and collective political involvement. It first turns to identity as an important factor influencing migrant political participation and mobilisation before discussing what may be summarised under the heading "cultural approaches" more broadly. The section after the next will then cover theories that stress the

significance of context factors for collective mobilisation, of which the Political Opportunity Structure approach (POS) is one of the most important.

2.1.2 *Identity, frames and migrant political involvement:*

Resources and socio-economic status explain a great amount of the variation in individual political participation. Also, access to and strategic mobilisation of resources by SMOs and individual social movement entrepreneurs are important factors that must not be neglected when analysing collective action. However, the individual level of education and income, skills and other personal resources as well as the collective availability and strategic usage of resources alone cannot be the reasons why people participate in politics. As Almond and Verba have already pointed out in “Civic culture”, individual participation is not independent of cultural elements, and, especially when it comes to analysing collective forms of political involvement, “culture” must not be ignored. And while the resource mobilisation theory goes beyond approaches that explain social movements solely by the existence of grievances and frustrations, it does not pay enough attention to the social construction of meaning: the significance of group belonging as well as the relevance of particular issues are not primordial, but have to be constructed and reconstructed continuously.

To be sure, the terms “culture” and “cultural approaches” respectively are used here as conglomerated categories referring to a number of very different approaches which cannot all be discussed here in detail. In the following section, the literature focusing on ethnic identity will be reviewed. As one of the major lenses through which researchers look at migrants and their (political) participation is that of ethnicity, this concept will be at the core of this section. In addition, framing approaches of mobilisation will be discussed more briefly.

Ethnic identities as one particular form of collective identity, of course, have been of particular interest to students of political participation in the US, and especially of the political participation of migrants and post-migration minorities. From the US American literature, “ethnicity” found its way into European research, too. The term “ethnicity” was “rediscovered” by American social scientists only in the mid-1970s and from there came into the analysis of political participation and movements on both sides of the Atlantic.

When they first published their now classic book on ethnicity in 1975, Nathan Glazer and Daniel Moynihan explained that “[e]thnicity seems to be a new

term” (Glazer/Moynihan 1975: 1)¹⁰ and further noted that not only the term, but also the social phenomenon itself was of a new quality: “[s]omething new has appeared” and

[...] to see only what is familiar in the ethnicity of our time is to miss the emergence of a new social category as significant for the understanding of the present-day world as that of social class itself” (Glazer/Moynihan 1975: 2-3).¹¹

In their view, ethnicity is an important “organizing principle” of great “strategic efficacy” (Glazer/Moynihan 1975: 15) when trying to get organised and mobilise in the name of a particular group’s interests. This new category according to Glazer and Moynihan, is not the same as “interest”, but a “means of advancing interests” (Glazer/Moynihan 1975: 19): it is a “political idea” and a “mobilizing principle” (Glazer/Moynihan 1975: 20) that can be interpreted as an umbrella social category which has the potential to shape decisively the political behaviour of social groups. It helps to rally and unite individuals by combining interest with affection (Glazer/Moynihan 1975: 19-20).

While Glazer and Moynihan stress the use of ethnicity as a rallying resource and thus are rather close in their argumentation to the resource mobilisation approach, the attention they draw to identities and especially ethnic identities opens up new paths in research on (migrant) political participation and movements. With regard to political participation as well as the social mobilisation of migrants, the main empirical question is whether and how ethnic identity and a sense of ethnic group belonging shape the political behaviour of individuals and groups. This has been asked and explored empirically many times for different ethnic groups in the United States, especially for African and Latino Americans, as well as for ethnic groups and “races” in the UK more recently the concept of ethnicity has also found its way into research on political participation in other European countries. Ethnicity is scrutinised in this area of research from two different perspectives. In both cases, authors either focus on the way (ethnic) identity and group belonging are constructed and may or may not change or they analyse how identity serves as a basis for solidarity and thus as an (indirect) resource.

One sub-strand of research focuses on migrant political allegiances, attitudes and values, which stems from the in-group and out-group logic that is at the base of the modern nation-state. In the eyes of many scholars, both state and nation

¹⁰ Of course, it was not a new discovery - the term having been used and defined already by Max Weber in *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft*. Rather, the authors stress the new significance ethnicity as a social category seemed to have acquired.

¹¹ Glazer and Moynihan compare the emergence of ethnicity as a social category in the 20th century to that of social classes shaped by industrialisation in the 19th century (Glazer/Moynihan 1975: 2).

are founded on an in-group/out-group logic, the one politically, the other culturally, which in the concept of the modern nation-state have become inextricably tied together. As Stephen Castles highlights, a member of the political community is conceptualised as a member of the nation (Castles 2005: 303; see also Brubaker 1997: 90; Colas 2004).¹² International migrants - by definition usually of different national origin than the majority¹³ - then are recurrently feared to weaken the cohesion of both the society and state where they are residing despite their lack of traditional power resources. What Alejandro Portes and Ruben Rumbaut note for the U.S. is true for most Western countries, too: "Throughout the history of American immigration, a consistent thread has been the fear that the 'alien element' would somehow undermine the institutions of the country and lead it down the path of disintegration and decay" (Portes/Rumbaut 1996: 94). Research inspired by these concerns generally focuses on the political allegiance and loyalty of immigrants and their children - can a non-national or someone of a different national "origin" be a "good citizen"? Concerned mainly with the preservation of the social and political cohesion of the "host" society, many of these approaches to immigrant political participation are marked by a rather normative stance.¹⁴

More importantly for the present research, another sub-thread of this field of study concentrates on ethnicity as the basis for migrant and minority political empowerment. Results are inconclusive: Some authors like Eric M. Uslaner and Richard S. Conley claim that, in the U.S., strong community ties lead migrants and ethnic minorities to refrain from engagement in the wider society (Uslaner/Conley 2003), whereas others demonstrate that the opposite may also be the case. For instance, in their comparative study on the political participation of Latinos, Blacks, and Whites in the United States, Hritzuk and Park find that Latino political participation is not only determined by socioeconomic status, but that the embeddedness into an ethnic milieu increases the likelihood that Latino Americans will get involved politically: "integration into politically active social networks, exposure to mobilization efforts, and affiliation with at least one organization significantly increase the likelihood Latinos will participate at higher levels" (Hritzuk/Park 2000: 164). In contrast, studying three kinds of group-based resources - group consciousness, group identity, and ethnic organisations - as predictors of political participation among Asian Americans, Wong, Lien and Conway come to the conclusion that

¹² For a critique of the influence of this conceptualisation in the social sciences, see also Wimmer/Glick Schiller (2003).

¹³ Except for cases of re-migration or the migration of persons who are considered as ethnically part of the nation-state they are migrating to, e.g. the so-called *Aussiedler* and *Russlanddeutsche* who move to Germany from Russia or other succession states of the former USSR generations after their ancestors moved from Germany to the East.

¹⁴ For an elaborate criticism of some of these positions, see for example Takaki (1999).

different ethnic group-based resources are of different importance for political involvement. Whereas a strong ethnic identity does not lead to higher levels of political participation, affiliation with an Asian American organisation and “feelings of linked fate with others of the same ethnic background” correlate positively with political participation (except voting). In contrast, group-based resources do lead to a higher propensity to vote, which makes Wong et al. claim that “[i]t may be that group-based resources are only used when they have some connection to community-level politics” (Wong et al. 2005: 568).

Affiliation with ethnic associations has also been a recurrent concern in European research on migrant participation, and both in Europe and the U.S. commentators have drawn attention to the role these organisations may play for the political participation of migrants. Here again, the literature is quite inconclusive. As pointed out above, Wong et al. (2005) find that membership in ethnic associations facilitates participation in American politics. Similarly, Gökçe Yurdakul’s case study of two Turkish migrant associations in Berlin shows that these organisations constitute an important resource for Turkish migrant elites to become relevant political actors in Germany (Yurdakul 2006). At the same time, Strömblad and Adman (2010) come to the conclusion that ethnic associations in Sweden contribute to civic skill acquisition, but do not offer sufficient opportunities for mobilisation and, consequently, “[o]rganizational membership based on ethnic origin does not seem to clear any roads to democratic influence in the wider society” (Strömblad/Adman 2010: 727).

Other studies also show that “ethnic social capital”, which could be seen as a form of the resources “solidarity network” and “trust” specific for migrants and ethnic minorities, influences their political involvement. Most notably, members of the research network “Multicultural democracy in European Cities” developed a concept of ethnic social capital, which they applied to the political participation of immigrants in different European countries (Berger et al. 2004; Jacobs et al. 2004; Tillie 2004; see also Jacobs/Tillie 2004).¹⁵ Starting from Jean Tillie and Meindert Fennema’s finding that migrant and minority political participation correlates positively with the density of networks of ethnic associations, they discuss the hypothesis that

differences in political participation of ethnic minorities are linked to differences in ‘civic community’, primarily seen as the amount of ‘ethnic’ social capital (participation in ethnic associational life) of the relevant group (Jacobs/Tillie 2004: 419; see also Jacobs/Tillie 2004: 420; Jacobs et al. 2004: 544).

¹⁵ Their combined efforts have resulted in a special issue of the *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* (2004), Vol. 30, Issue 3.

Yet, again, results are not entirely clear: While most of the research teams do not reject this claim entirely on the grounds of the empirical cases in question, the Belgian group's findings do not confirm the hypothesis at all (Jacobs et al. 2004). All authors argue for a refinement of the concept and the inclusion of more explanatory factors.

In social movement theory, critics of the resource mobilisation theory as well as authors who are in favour of a renewal and enlargement of this theory (re)introduce the basic ideas of the Chicago School and symbolic interactionism as well as Goffman's framing approach to social movement theories. Adepts of the framing approach argue that mobilisation depends to a great extent on the framing of issues and actions, i.e. by the way their meaning is constructed. The focus then is less on (material) resources, but on these meanings which individuals and groups accord to objects, and to issues of discontent as well as to their group-belonging (Benford 1997). Like the adepts of the resource mobilisation theory, proponents of this approach adopt a micro-perspective. Yet, theirs is not an organisational or supply-side model of social mobilisation, but much more a social-psychological perspective (cf. Noakes/Johnston 2005). Nevertheless, as Noakes and Johnston point out, framing approaches, too, pay attention to the strategies of social movement entrepreneurs as their role "in the construction of collective action frames is crucial" (cf. Noakes/Johnston 2005: 7).

Yet again, as most new social movements (NSM) in Europe were not led by migrants, research on their mobilisation is not as extensive as on their individual political participation. While there are several more or less recent studies on migrant activism in European contexts (e.g. Pojman 2008), they do not necessarily focus on cultural bases of the movements but rather on context factors that render action possible or, especially in the case of anti-racist or anti-deportation movements, even necessary. There are, however, a number of well-informed case studies on framing processes in social movements of (ethnic) minorities in different parts of the world (e.g. Baud 2004). Furthermore, one important exception to the rule is again the mobilisation of undocumented migrants in different European countries, which is quite present in the (European) research literature. Several studies focus on the construction of the *sans-papiers* as a group and the framing of their actions. Thierry Blin, for instance, speaks of the "invention" of the *sans-papiers* and compares this process of invention to a dramaturgical process (Blin 2008). While Insa Breyer focuses in her thesis on the (legal) context factors of the life situation and mobilisation of undocumented migrants in France and Germany, she also argues that their mobilisation is not independent of how undocumented or "irregular migration" and "sans-papiers" are constructed and perceived by the autochthonous population and the migrants themselves (Breyer 2011: 57-63). Catherine Raissiguier most explicitly adopts a framing approach in her 2010 book with the telling title "Reinventing the Republic", when she studies the situation of undocumented migrant women in

France and the possibilities of coalitions and solidarity between them and other precarious or discriminated against groups (Raissiguier 2010). As will be discussed in chapter 2.2., both theories that relate identity to political participation and framing theories appear particularly relevant when it comes to analysing the role religion may play for the *collective* mobilisation of migrants, because religion is likely to be an important source of both group identities and of (theological) frames for the mobilisation around a particular issue.

2.1.3 *Political context and migrant transnationalism shaping individual and collective political involvement*

Obviously, political participation and collective action never take place in a vacuum, but in a structured political and social space which renders some actions possible or even likely, whereas it leaves little room for others. Of course, the political culture as analysed already by Almond and Verba in the 1960s - i.e. generalised attitudes towards politics and participation as well as the feeling that ordinary people should and can (or should not and cannot) have a say in the political decision-making process - is important here. Also, ideas about who is a legitimate part of the demos influence the scope within which migrants can easily get active. Even more so, legislation, the social structure and political events shape the way migrants and non-migrants can get involved politically - as suggests already Max Kaase's definition of political participation quoted above.

In social movement research, one of the most important approach that focuses explicitly on structures facilitating or constraining mobilisation of particular groups or on particular issues is the so-called Political Opportunity Structure (POS) approach. While the POS approach belongs to the field of research on social movements, which is why its adepts often prefer the term "political mobilisation" to "political participation", many definitions of political mobilisation are broad enough to include all forms of political involvement. In their introduction to the *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*' issue on "Ethnic Mobilisation and Political Participation in Europe", Martiniello and Statham (1999), for example, use the expression "political mobilisation" in such a way that it corresponds more or less to the above definitions of "political participation", with the exception, however, of its focus on minority groups and its stronger emphasis on extra-parliamentary mobilisation:

By 'political mobilisation', we refer broadly to both extra-parliamentary mobilisation by social movements (e.g., protest actions) and also to conventional types of political participation (e.g., voting for political parties) made by minority groups [...] (Martiniello/Statham 1999: 568).

Many proponents of POS claim that the political involvement of migrants is shaped essentially by citizenship and integration regimes (Koopmans 2004):

Differences in types of incorporation regime linked to different conceptions of citizenship go a long way in explaining both national and local differences in the central characteristics of migrant mobilisation and claims-making. In more inclusive political contexts, migrants play a more important role in the public debate on issues concerning them, they are much less oriented toward the politics of their homelands, and focus more strongly on issues pertaining to their integration and rights in the receiving society (Koopmans 2004: 467).

Indeed, the most eminent studies in this field of research with regard to migrant mobilisation are certainly those focusing on citizenship, immigration and integration laws and policies. Yet, different empirical studies of migrant mobilisation also show that context factors other than citizenship legislation and integration policies shape the participation and mobilisation opportunities of migrants. What is more, adepts of migrant transnationalism argue that the political participation and collective mobilisation of migrants is not only shaped by national structures but by political issues, networks and opportunity structures that transgress national boundaries.

Sohler et al. for instance show that the presence of many refugee-supporting NGOs facilitates political action of refugees at the local level but that participation at the national level very much depends on national and European legislation and structures for refugee representation (Sohler et al. 2009). Also, as Østergaard-Nielsen (2001) shows, the context in the country of residence does not only influence the political participation of migrants in this country, but also migrant political transnationalism. The author chooses an approach which may be interpreted as an intermediate position between theories of POS and transnationalism and demonstrates how context factors in the country of residence shape the transnational political practices of Kurdish migrants in Germany.

In contrast, Bauböck argues from a political theory perspective that the distinctive characteristic of political transnationalism is precisely the challenge of national boundaries and the creation of “overlapping memberships between territorially separated and independent polities” (Bauböck 2003: 720; cf. also Pries/Sezgin 2012). Thus, the theory of migrant political transnationalism taken seriously necessarily takes the analysis of migrant political behaviour beyond the (from this perspective: narrow) framework of actions with reference either to the country of residence or the country of origin, because migrant political transnationalism then “also affects collective identities and conceptions of citizenship among the native populations in both receiving and sending societies” (Bauböck 2003: 720). The political practices of migrants from this point of view are thus likely also to transform the

political opportunity structure in their country of residence and cannot be seen as solely determined by the latter.

Critics of the POS approach furthermore often highlight its over-emphasis of structural factors over cultural factors (e.g. Goodwin/Jasper 1999). However, as Koopmans and Statham point out, it is a widely shared opinion among students of social movements that it is necessary “to combine political opportunities (contextual factors), mobilizing structures (organizational resources), and framing processes (discursive resources)” (Koopmans/Statham 1999: 1).

While Koopmans and Statham formulate this idea very precisely, it is also found in other approaches. As already mentioned above, Manlio Cinalli, for instance, proposes an interesting way of integrating different theoretical elements into one approach. He introduces network theories in order to bridge the gap between theories of resource mobilisation, the POS approach and cultural approaches to the study of social movements. Cinalli argues that his network approach shows how resources, opportunity structure and cultural elements become most relevant for collective action through relational structures (Cinalli 2007).

It is this idea of combining contextual, resource-related and framing elements which seems the most useful for the purposes of the present research.

The focus of this study is mainly on mobilisation in favour of a particular migrant group itself - i.e. of migrants from sub-Saharan Africa for their own interests - and on their (religious) leaders and organisations. It aims at contributing both to our knowledge about a particularly visible, yet also particularly marginalised migrant group, and to our understanding of religion and migrant activism.

It is sensible to assume that, both for the collective and individual political activities of migrants - just as for the political involvement of everybody else -, resources, symbolic elements as well as context factors matter. This is the case because it is not conceivable that any participation or mobilisation can take place without any resources at all, be they as limited as they may. Even in order to vote individuals need not only have the right to do so, but they need the capacity to understand the basics of the electoral process. This means that they need to know at least that it is asked from them to go to the correct place on the correct day and check the correct number of boxes on their ballot paper. While many autochthonous citizens of a given country will consider this often implicit knowledge negligible, this is not necessarily the case for someone who has moved to the country recently and who first needs to be able to find out how things are done there. Social

networks as well as linguistic and reading capacities, then, are essential resources for participation. It is also implausible to presume that context factors may be irrelevant for the individual participation and collective mobilisation of migrants, whose political rights are determined in the first place by citizenship and immigration policies. The construction of a collective identity, but also the framing and legitimisation of their participation and protest are also particularly relevant for migrants, who are often not perceived as legitimate political actors.

Against this background, the main argument of this study is that the migrants' religion may play a role in the process of getting involved politically. This, of course, leads to a number of further questions. The first question of course is whether the religious participation of migrants can contribute to their political participation in a European context in a similar way as in the US. Can migrants acquire different kinds of resources through their involvement in churches and other religious organisations? Also, it is interesting to ask whether migrants can draw on religious organisations and inter-organisational networks in order to mobilise collectively in the name of their migrant group or for other purposes and whether there are differences observable between different religions. In terms of the symbolic content of religion, one question is whether religion can contribute to the framing of migrant collective and individual political involvement as legitimate or even necessary. Another question is whether religion can serve as a means to create unity among migrants in order for them to act in public space more effectively. Finally yet significantly, it is important to ask whether and how particular religious and political contexts shape the way religion can be a support for the political actions of migrants. How do opportunities differ for adepts of different religions?

2.2 Some theoretical considerations on religion and the political involvement of migrants

As Nina Eggert and Marco Giugni note, in terms of conventional political involvement, religion, just like social class, has long been one of the "usual suspects" among variables predicting voting behaviour in Europe (Eggert/Giugni 2011: 219). This observation ties in with Rokkan and Lipset's seminal work on the most important cleavages dividing West European societies and the genesis of stable party systems. And although value change and the general trend towards individualisation within West European societies have made both class and religion less powerful

predictors of voting behaviour than they used to be, they are still far from being obsolete (cf. e.g. Elff/Roßteuscher 2009).¹⁶

As discussed above, the proponents of the resource model of political participation also stress the significance of participation in clubs as well as in churches and religious associations not only for party preferences and voting behaviour, but also for individual political participation.¹⁷

¹⁶ For a recent analysis of the German case demonstrating the attenuation, but by no means irrelevance of social structural characteristics such as religion, class, union membership and occupational status for party preference and voting, see e.g. Pappi/Brandenburg (2010).

¹⁷ Furthermore, although the literature is inconclusive with respect to the influence of social capital on political participation, it is important to note that just like the literature on social capital and political participation discussed above, the literature on social capital and religion is growing rapidly. And although they focus on different dimensions of religion - church-membership (e.g. Alexander 2007; Wuthnow 2002), religious participation (e.g. Putnam 2000; Channell 2000; Byfield 2008, Glanville et al. 2008), or the cultural-religious background of social groups (Fukuyama 2001) - most authors agree that there is an association between social capital and religion. Robert D. Putnam even goes as far as to call "faith communities in which people worship together [...] the single most important repository of social capital" (Putnam 2000: 66).

At the same time, the notion of social capital is a difficult one, especially social capital as a prerogative or a booster for political participation. If it was Pierre Bourdieu who (re-)introduced the concept of social capital into the social scientific debate, it was Robert D. Putnam (1993; 2000) who most prominently linked it to liberal democracy. Since his 1993 book *Making Democracy Work*, literature on social capital and political participation has grown immensely, under very different academic, political, and normative auspices, and is now as inconclusive as it is vast. While some authors ascertain that there is a clear association between social capital and political participation (e.g. Klesner, 2007; Hansen, 2005), others claim that social capital plays a minor role, if at all (e.g. McVey, 2005; Rie, 2007). Some argue that there may be a causal link between the two, but in particular circumstances only (e.g. Berger, 2004).

In spite of these differences, most recent research scrutinizing the putative association of social capital and political participation is based on Putnam's concept of social capital (cf. Fennema/Tillie, 1999; Jacobs/Tillie, 2004; Tillie, 2004; van Londen, 2007). Although it is probably the most influential theory of social capital today, this approach may still not be the most useful for analysing immigrant and minority political participation. To begin with, there are several problems with what Putnam calls a "lean and mean' definition" of social capital (Putnam, 2007, 137). According to Putnam, social capital consists of "social networks and the associated norms of reciprocity and trustworthiness" (Putnam, 2007, 137). Thus, his definition includes the *assumption* that social networks and norms of reciprocity and trustworthiness are associated. It is, however, unhelpful for empirical as well as for theoretical purposes to include hypotheses into a definition. (cf. Putnam, 1995; 2000, Newton, 1997, 577). Second, although very influential, Putnam's approach may be particularly unhelpful for the analysis of social capital as a resource for political participation, because it tends to blur the difference between the explanatory variable and the outcome. One of Putnam's major points is that social capital leads to increased political participation. At the same time, he describes political participation as one dimension of social capital (Putnam, 2000, 35-40). His argument thus risks becoming tautological: political participation is part of social capital, which leads to political participation, which is one of the dimensions of social capital, and so on. Finally, but significantly, the way in which Putnam and many others operationalise social capital does not tell us much about the underlying mechanisms of how social capital is generated and how it works. With participation in voluntary associations as the main instrument for measuring social capital, the actual social relations remain a kind of black box. This may lead in fact to unwarranted assumptions, as empiri-

What is more, there are several historical examples in which religion provided a base for the more general politicisation and mobilisation of minorities. Most prominently, the US civil rights movement drew on the Black church in order to mobilise African Americans. What is more, as Aldon D. Morris noted already in the 1980s, the important role of the Black Church in the processes of politicisation and mobilisation of the African American minority goes back even to the times of slavery, when slave revolts often took their beginning in the churches:

A number of writers have noted the central role that black religious institutions played in slave revolts. John Hope Franklin, in *From Slavery to Freedom*, wrote, 'In most states Negro preachers were outlawed between 1830 and 1835. It was believed that too many of the conspiracies had been planned in religious gatherings' (Morris 1984: 291).

Dr. DuBois, that most sensitive analyst of the black experience, wrote in *The Philadelphia Negro*, first published in 1899, that 'all movements for social betterment are apt to centre in the churches... the race problem in all its phases is continually being discussed, and, indeed, from this forum many a youth goes forth inspired to work' (Morris 1984: 293).

Following the events of 9/11, for a decade, religion, and especially Islam, has been at the core of the debate of migrant "integration" in Western Europe and there is an ever-growing literature on political Islam as well as on the compatibility of Islam and Western democracy and the integration of Muslim migrants and post-migration minorities into European political systems. Also, much research has focused on state policies concerning the governance of increasing religious pluralism.¹⁸ Yet, as Steven Pfaff and Anthony Gill highlight, "[i]n the wake of recent terrorist attacks, scholars and the media have focused attention on Islamic extremism as a threat to pluralist democracies [...]. [...] but little work has been done to understand the conventional political engagement among the vast majority of Muslims" (Pfaff/Gill 2006: 803-4). What is more, migrant and minority religions other than Islam have received far less scholarly attention, especially when it comes to analysing the relationship between the religious and the political.

cal research has shown repeatedly. For example, several studies found one of Putnam's core assumptions about the functioning of social capital – namely that the association between civic and political participation is mediated by social trust – to be misleading (van Londen et al., 2007, 1220, Boulianne, 2006).

In the following, there will be only few references be made to social capital, and although this study scrutinises the relation between organisations, networks and participation, it is not based on the social capital approach as such.

¹⁸ See, among many others, Minkenberg (2007), Soper/Fetzer (2007), Koenig (2005), Kastoryano (2003; 2004), Zolberg/Woon (1999); for prominent work on political Islam in Germany, see, also among many others, Schiffauer (2000), Heitmeyer et al. (1997).

One of the few exceptions to this is the study presented by Nina Eggert and Marco Giugni (2011) which focuses on the impact religion has on the political participation and protest activities of Christian and Muslim migrants in European urban contexts. Drawing on data on Christian and Muslim migrants in Barcelona, London, Milan, and Zurich, the authors find that religion may influence the political participation of migrants, but under certain circumstances only. Eggert and Giugni come to the conclusion that religion matters for migrant political participation and protest only in the case of Muslim migrants: “Specifically, they [the results of their binomial logistic regressions; MS] suggest, first, that religion plays a role for Muslim migrants but not for Christian migrants [...]” (Eggert/Giugni 2011: 231). In addition, according to the authors, the impact of religion on migrant political participation is mediated by the citizenship model of the respective country and by participation in religious associations (Eggert/Giugni 2011: 231-232). In a nutshell, their results suggest that “religion does play a role in explaining the political participation of migrants but only in culturally pluralist contexts and only through religious associations” (Eggert/Giugni 2011: 232). The authors of this study also note that “the observed impact of membership in religious organizations both on general political participation and on protest activities by Muslim migrants in London and Barcelona remains, even when we control for the effect of overall organizational membership” (Eggert/Giugni 2011: 233). It is thus the membership and participation in explicitly *religious* associations which matters for the political engagement of Muslim migrants in these cities rather than their being members of any kind of civic association as such, as theories of social capital or approaches which stress the importance of associations for developing civic skills might suggest.

In contrast, in their study on Muslim interest organisation in Berlin, Pfaff and Gill (2006) conclude that it is particularly difficult for Muslims to get organised and mobilise collectively. Focussing on collective action rather than on individual political participation, they highlight the obstacles Muslim migrants face in Germany when trying to mobilise as Muslims: firstly, the institutional and political setting is unfavourable, and secondly, European Islam as a decentralised religion “provides opportunities for factions (‘spoilers’) to undermine broad-based collective action” (Pfaff/Gill 2006: 822). Despite their different approach, Pfaff and Gill, just like Eggert and Giugni, thus also partly attribute the lack of mobilisation of Muslim migrants to the unfavourable context in the *Land* of Berlin. At the same time, they see the many different Muslim associations as a barrier to effective mobilisation because they render it easy for leaders of small sections of the Muslim community to subvert collective action if they feel threatened in their authority by overarching or centralising religious structures or if they perceive differences in religious interpretations or political goals. In Pfaff and Gill’s view, “[a]t present, Islam in Germany has a weak and divided voice” (Pfaff/Gill 2006: 822).

Although the two studies do not contradict, but rather complement, each other, they show quite eloquently that “researchers are only beginning to analyze how religion may influence political behavior and integration” (Pfaff/Gill 2006: 804). Or, in the words of Eggert and Giugni: “[...] the question still remains as to how religious organizations favour political participation and what type of resources religious associations provide for political participation” (Eggert/Giugni 2011: 237).

Against this background, in what follows, the theoretical framework of this book will be outlined further. Naturally, the questions raised by Pfaff and Gill’s and Eggert and Giugni’s studies are manifold and cannot all be answered by this study. The major question guiding this work is whether religion can contribute to the political participation and mobilisation of migrants. The focus is thus on just one particular aspect that has long been ignored in European research on both migrant religion and migrant political involvement.

In the following sections, the three elements sketched in the previous subchapter will be discussed with respect to religion. The focus first will be on religion as an organisational resource, then on religion as a source of frames for political action. Thirdly, the role context factors play for religion as a support for the political involvement of migrants will be sketched briefly.

2.2.1 *Religion as an organisational resource*

As pointed out above, resources are essential for political involvement. Yet, as Blin rightly notes, it is important to further specify which resources are particularly significant for collective mobilisation (Blin 2005: 173-174) and for individual political involvement. What is necessary for the present research is to sketch in what ways religion may provide resources for the politicisation, individual participation or collective mobilisation of a highly vulnerable, under-privileged population.

In the first place, politically relevant resources are, of course, material resources as well as formal education and occupational status and the skills that go along with a higher level of education and white-collar jobs. Yet, less tangible resources such as time, more informally acquired skills, friendship and solidarity influence the motivation and capacity to mobilise collectively or to get involved individually, too. These less tangible factors are likely to be especially important if individuals or groups have few material resources at their disposal, as is often the case with first generation migrants. Furthermore, migrants often do not have access to a great amount of these material and immaterial resources easily, and thus may have to rely on sources that others may not need. In the following it will be argued that religion can be such a source of resources. The main reasons for this supposition will be sketched briefly here.

One important factor is that many religions induce the creation of local, and often also national or transnational, organisations of some kind or other and that many migrants tend to participate in religious organisations more readily than in explicitly political organisations in their new country of residence. These religious organisations then can be an important base for participation and activism. To put it differently, the argument is that religion may be an *organisational resource* for the politicisation and political involvement of migrants.

Yet, what characterises religious organisations so that they may be considered a basis for political involvement? Religious organisations often differ from other organisations in several ways which may in some cases be helpful for political mobilisation and involvement. First of all, religious communities differ from ethnic and other civic communities in that they usually imply specific religious practices that can reinforce their organisational structures. Many religious communities congregate regularly in religious services and ceremonies, which facilitate face-to-face encounters and may thus contribute to fostering social networks. In many cases, members may even be morally obliged to come together and worship in public or to participate in the affairs of their religious community or society. In line with Émile Durkheim's sociology of religion, we can furthermore assume that religious rites and rituals foster social integration and thus the ties that make up social networks. If religion, according to Durkheim, may be defined as

[...] un système solidaire de croyances et de pratiques relatives à des choses sacrées, c'est-à-dire séparées, interdites, croyances et pratiques qui unissent en une même communauté morale, appelée Église, tous ceux qui y adhèrent (Durkheim 1960: 65),¹⁹

religious practices help create a unified moral community. Even if one does not follow Durkheim's definition entirely²⁰, it would be unwise to neglect or deny the collective character of many religions. It is through shared beliefs, and through collective practices deduced from as well as made necessary and legitimised by shared beliefs that individuals become part of a community and that this community is sustained. More precisely, shared beliefs, regular face-to-face contacts, and collective rites and rituals foster social integration within a community.

¹⁹ "A religion is a unified system of beliefs and practices relative to sacred things, that is to say, things set apart and forbidden—beliefs and practices which unite into one single community called a Church, all those who adhere to them" (Durkheim 1957 [1915]: 47; translation by Joseph Ward Swain).

²⁰ Later in this chapter, reference will be made to the definition of religion put forward by Clifford Geertz, who conceptualises religion as a symbolic system. While Geertz in contrast to Durkheim highlights the conflict potential that rites and rituals may have, he also recognises their integrative function and thus does not contradict, but rather complement, Durkheim's propositions on religion as a source of integration and solidarity.

The organisational structures that these communities create and sustain, can, of course, become an immensely important resource for political action. Furthermore, in the case of migrants, some forms of collective organisation can be seen as political in themselves as they increase the migrants' public visibility and their opportunities to voice their claims and concerns.

In more concrete terms, the resources local religious organisations can provide include communication networks as well as interpersonal trust which may facilitate collective action and also increase individual political participation. As discussed in the previous sub-chapter, Jacobs and Tillie show for ethnic associational networks that participation in ethnic associations may increase the individual political participation of migrants (Jacobs/Tillie 2004) and it is likely that religious associations may have a similar structural effect. What is more, individuals and groups may access information through communication networks that they otherwise would not have or only receive much later. Also, religious congregations can offer space for the exchange and development of ideas and, in more material terms, local church communities and other local religious congregations usually have premises and some infrastructure at their disposal: a room for regular meetings as well as office space, a telephone, and other office equipment obviously make it easier to get involved politically. Finally yet significantly, as especially Verba and his colleagues as well as Robert Putnam stress, religious congregations may help individuals acquire skills that are relevant for individual as well as collective political involvement.

Secondly, and in an important difference from ethnicity, religion often distinguishes between religious specialists and lay people, as already Max Weber pointed out and as Pierre Bourdieu elaborated in his interpretation of Weber's work and his concept of the religious field.

According to Bourdieu's theory, fields are characterised by several features. These include their boundaries, i.e. the distinction between who is a member of the field and who is not (cf. Bourdieu 2001: 50), the underlying *nomos* as well as what is at stake in the respective field. Actors exist in a particular field only if their presence (or absence) in it transforms the field (Bourdieu 2001: 50). Their positions in the field depend on the amount of capital at their disposal and their behaviour is shaped by their position in the field's structure of power relations (cf. Bourdieu 2001: 49). Accordingly, the religious field is characterised by the distinction between religious experts and the laity. Religious specialists - i.e. in the terminology Bourdieu borrows from Max Weber: priests, prophets and magicians - are players in the religious field, who compete for the monopoly over the legitimate exercise of religious power,

whereas members of the laity do not belong to the field and have been expropriated of their religious capital (Bourdieu 2000: 56-57).²¹

In the context of the present work, it seems reasonable to expect that especially religious experts are well placed to draw on their position for support for political activities. While Bourdieu claims that the social function of religion is to justify human existence in general, and the individual's existence in a certain position in the social structure of society in particular (Bourdieu 2000: 20; 70); and hence has the "external function" of legitimising the political order (Bourdieu 2000: 97), it may be argued that this is not necessarily the case. In Bourdieu's view, the Catholic Church specifically, and religion in general, contribute to maintaining the established political and social order by "naturalising" them through mental frameworks which shape people's perceptions, thoughts and actions and are inculcated in the laity (Bourdieu 2000: 97). In other words, they legitimise a given order by "implanting" a religious habitus in the laity which makes this order seem "natural".

Yet, religion may also have a more subversive function if religious leaders - and in their wake also the laity - can draw on it as a resource for political action which questions the status quo. For instance, on the one hand, their religious capital may increase the legitimacy of religious experts as players within the religious field and thus give them access to information they would otherwise be incapable of receiving and which may help them get involved not only in religious but also in political terms. Also, they may use their religious networks, their position within the religious field as well as their legitimacy as religious experts in order to influence other leaders. On the other hand, as religious experts they may just as well try and shape their followers' perception of the status quo in a way which makes them want to change it. Again, as the seminal work of Aldon D. Morris shows, the role of Black Church leaders within the civil rights movement may serve as an illustrative example (Morris 1985; see also Wood 1994).

Third, for the politicisation and the mobilisation of a group, the actions of individual leaders usually are not enough. As Cinalli shows, coalitions within an issue field are essential for sustained collective action (Cinalli 2007). Religion may therefore contribute to the collective mobilisation of migrants if it supports the creation of overarching organisational structures that permit the co-operation of a larger number of both religious experts and lay-persons.

For instance, if migrants are able to form local umbrella organisations that overarch their individual congregations, these structures increase the probability that resources will be pooled and thus can be accessed more easily for collective

²¹ Analogously, the political field is marked by the boundaries between political specialists and non-specialists, and the competition of specialists for power over the "laity", i.e. those who are not members of the political field.

action. Most importantly, religious organisations that are able to create umbrella organisations with other religious organisations are able to draw on these networks for coalitions in their political involvement. These render it possible to act as a united group and thus give leaders a greater “capacity to act” (Hardin) and increase the public visibility of the group. Also, their legitimacy is increased if they speak for the entire Turkish Muslim population in Berlin or for all Black Christians in Paris instead of speaking for a single mosque association or church. As it is likely that many religious organisations set up by migrants usually are rather small, badly equipped in terms of material resources and also have few immaterial resources such as prestige and legitimacy, their co-operation and the formation of overarching structures is particularly relevant in their case. This co-operation may counter-balance the deficits individual migrant religious organisations may otherwise have.

Fourth, beyond the local level, religious communities very often refer to a transnational imagined community, such as global Catholicism or the *umma*. Thus, not only do they permit migrants to perpetuate their membership in their country of origin through transnational religious networks (Levitt 2001: 20), but they may open up new transnational social fields which are not necessarily limited to migrants and post-immigration minorities, nor to specific countries of residence and origin. These may then serve as support for political action in different ways and at different levels: Like in the case of local religious organisations, this may facilitate umbrella organisations and/or coalitions of politically active groups based on their shared religion. This institutionalised unity can then increase the visibility and the legitimacy of their leaders and of the entire group. Obviously, transnational ties built on religion can also be a source of very tangible, material resources, i.e. in the first place money. For instance, more established religious communities elsewhere may contribute financially to the mobilisation of their brothers and sisters in faith in the diaspora. At the same time, the diaspora may also be involved in political struggles elsewhere. Thus, transnational religious ties and representations may also lead to the politicisation of migrants. The most prominent example for this certainly is the support of Muslim migrants in Europe or elsewhere to the struggle of the Palestinians for an independent state, for better living conditions in Gaza etc.

Fifth, religious communities may also bridge the gap between migrants and the majority in the country of residence (e.g. Wuthnow 2002; 2003). This can be assumed to be a particularly important factor for migrant and minority political involvement, since members of the majority tend to have access to more resources that are relevant in the political process - for instance, they generally have more money and higher occupational status and are more likely to be fluent in the respective language, know the basic functioning of their country's political system as well as the media, and so on. In some cases, religious communities may also bridge barriers of class and education more easily than other organisations, which, again, would have similar effects as bridges between minority and majority. Finally, as

Evangelos Karagiannis and Nina Glick Schiller (2008) show, migrant religious communities can also open up “pathways to incorporation” other than those foreseen by the dominant structures in the “host” country (Karagiannis/Glick Schiller 2008: 275).

To be sure, religions in general as well as individual religious communities differ greatly in their form and degree of organisation as well as in their social and ethnic composition. It is therefore only sensible to suspect that their followers and members can draw on their religion as an organisational resource to a varying degree. For instance, the degree of organisation of the Christian religion generally is higher than that of Islam. And while both are part of the wide spectrum of Christianity, Pentecostal congregations are organised differently than Catholic parishes.

Generally, the most relevant features which shape the network structures of religious communities may be derived from what was outlined above. Figure 1 summarises these characteristics, which can be organised along three lines: the organisational form of the religion and the particular community, the ethics of the respective religion, and the community’s composition. All of these features may be conceptualised as a continuum ranging from a very low degree of organisation to a very dense organisational form, from religious ethics favouring withdrawal from public life to religious ethics stimulating participation, and so on, with most communities probably located somewhere in the middle.

The religious field itself can be considered as (partly) structuring the creation of networks and the access to resources through the three dimensions just stated.

It is furthermore interesting to know how individuals invest in (faith-based) social relations, and how they access and use the embedded resources in those relations (cf. Lin, 1999). Again, there are different features which can be assumed to be most relevant for an individual’s position in a religious network. Some of them are the same as in any social relation, some are specific to migrants and minorities, and some characterise social relations in a religious context. The most important ones are listed in Figure 2.

Organisation	Regular conventions [religious services, ceremonies etc.]
	Shared rites and rituals
	Institutionalisation of the transmission of religious knowledge/values etc. [Sunday school...]
	Special interest groups, social services
	Transnational networks
Religious ethics	Shared set of values and norms
	Obligation to practice religion publicly
	Obligation to participate actively in community matters (of the congregation or wider religious community)
	Obligation/prohibition to participate actively in the wider community
Composition/social structure	Immigrant church/congregation
	Ethnic homogeneity
	Class homogeneity
	Gender

Figure 1. Determinants of network structures and embedded resources.

General	Time commitment
	Money
	Demographic characteristics
Migrant / minority specific	Ethnicity / immigrant origin (Immigrant / member of a post-immigration minority vs. member of majority)
	Language skills (minority / majority language)
	Familiarity with customs, ways of communication etc. of minority / majority
	Orientation towards country of origin / country of residence (transnational ties)
Specific to religious networks	Religious commitment
	Religious knowledge
	Compliance with religious obligations (religious practices, lifestyle, etc.)

Figure 2. Determinants of individual network locations.

Time and money are the two most obvious resources a person can invest in their social relations (cf. Bourdieu, 1992). As Gerhards points out, individual demographic and socio-economic characteristics have been identified as being crucial for network relations, too (Gerhards, 1987). When it comes to immigrant-specific characteristics, being a member of a minority group is likely to lead to overlapping and thus strong ties within the religious community (cf. Jansen, 2004). At the same time, language skills as well as familiarity with ways of communication and of doing things can be considered as essential for establishing ties as fluency in more than one language may facilitate links from minority to majority members. As scholars of transnational religion have shown, it is also significant, whether a person is more interested in establishing ties into the majority society, or whether most of their ties are transnational, i.e. with members of their religious community in their home country or of an imagined transnational religious community (cf. Ebaugh/Chafetz, 2002; Levitt, 2001). Locally or transnationally, in the context of a religious community, religious knowledge, commitment, and compliance with religious obligations must be considered as fundamental determinants of an individual's network position as they are most likely to influence their opportunities to meet with co-practitioners as well as their prestige in the community.²²

2.2.2 *Religious identities and religion as a symbolic resource for political involvement*

Religion, however, may not only constitute an organisational resource for the political participation and collective mobilisation of migrants. Religion as a *symbolic system* (cf. Geertz 1983) may also be the source of identities and frames which can contribute to their political involvement. In other words, the second argument made here is that religion may not only be an organisational resource, but also a cultural or *symbolic resource* for the politicisation and the political involvement of migrants.

The relevance of ethnic identities and of the participation in organisations based on ethnic identities for political participation and political attitudes and preferences has been outlined in the previous sub-chapter. Religion, just like ethnicity, can be the source of interpretations and identifications which may be the source of feelings of belonging and inclusion or exclusion, in short: of both personal and social identities. Religion as a comprehensive symbolic system is likely to offer even more elements to draw on for individual and collective identities and to play a role for the political participation and collective mobilisation of migrants.

To be sure, this is not to say that everyone identifies with a particular religion or that, to most people, their faith is relevant on an everyday basis. Yet, at least

²² See also Finke and Dougherty's concept of religious capital (Finke/Dougherty, 2002).

for active practitioners of a religion - religious leaders and active participants of a religious congregation for instance - it is sensible to assume that their religious identity is of importance for their everyday lives, for their understanding of the world and of their place in the world. Religion may reinforce their national or ethnic identity or their identity as migrants, if they share the same faith with most of their co-nationals or co-ethnics or if theirs is a religion made up predominantly of migrants. Their religious identity may also be even more important to them than their ethnic or national belonging or their identification with the migrant situation or population. At the same time, religious identities may, of course, be in conflict with other potential elements of personal and social identities and migrants may have to decide whether their being a religious person is more important than their nationality, language, gender etc.

In any case, it is likely that the effects religious identity has on the political involvement of migrants are similar to those ethnic identity may have. It may be the foundation or a reinforcement of solidarities, and it may lead to the participation in particular organisations. Also, religious identities may be a reason to get involved politically, for example because a person deems certain policies as incompatible with their faith, or because theirs is a minority religion in their country of residence and they mobilise for equal rights.

Solidarity based on a "minority identity" - be it chosen or ascribed -, of course, is of the utmost importance especially for the political participation of migrants and minorities. As Dawson shows, it is still more rational for African Americans to vote according to what he calls a "Black utility heuristic" than based on a class-based utility heuristic (Dawson 1994). It is even more important for the collective mobilisation of migrants and minorities because it can at least partly counter-balance the structural disadvantages that these groups face.

At the same time, political mobilisation in the name of a particular religious identity as well as the politicisation of religion are more likely to occur in the case of migrant religion because migrants are more likely to have to get involved politically in order to reach the recognition of their religion by the state or similar religious political goals because they are more likely than the majority to belong to a minority religion. At least in most European contexts, especially Muslims are often in the position that they need to campaign for the adaptation of more or less established models of state-church relations so as to include Islam as a religion with equal status.

Since the relevance of religious organisations, i.e. of organisations that are based on the identification with a particular faith, has already been sketched above, it is useful to turn directly to another reason as to why religion as a symbolic system may be relevant for the political involvement of migrants. Religion, or to put it more precisely, entire theologies as well as individual religious texts, stories, and metaphors and other symbolic elements offer a wealth of possibilities to frame

political actions, and goals, but, of course, also political quiescence. These may be mobilised strategically just as other resources, too. Religion then can be described as a symbolic resource which can be mobilised strategically by social movement entrepreneurs, for example, in order to legitimise their actions or to motivate others to get involved.

As Noakes and Johnston note, “all social movements must ‘break the frames’ of quiescence and acceptance of the status quo that characterizes everyday life” (Noakes/Johnston 2005: 7). Religion may offer the cultural fabric needed for the construction of interpretations of events and issues which leaders can use to overcome the voicelessness of migrants by “breaking” overcome frames. For instance, it can offer legitimacy as well as examples for collective struggle or justifications for calls for solidarity.

Furthermore, as Wood (1994; 1999) demonstrates, religion as a symbolic system can contribute to the continuity, persistence and success of political activism. For instance, in a comparison of three congregations in the U.S., he finds that “liturgical experience” and “religious symbolism” decisively shape the success or failure of the political mobilisation of these congregations (Wood 1994: 397). Referring back to Swidler, Wood argues that religion may provide the members of a congregation with a “tool kit” of cultural resources for political action” which will shape their political involvement (Wood 1994: 398). The author goes as far as to argue that this has direct consequences for their political success:

I investigate how mobilization of these cultural resources influences the character of the resulting politics, and argue that certain kinds of religious practice structure participants’ political engagement in ways more likely to lead to long-term political success (Wood 1994: 398).

While Wood seems to overestimate the influence of internal cultural factors shaping the success or failure of political activities of a religious congregation and to underestimate the importance of material resources and especially of external factors, he certainly makes a relevant point. Not only may activists draw on religious organisations for more or less material resources or on religious symbols for legitimacy, but sets of beliefs, liturgy and other elements of religious practice can shape the way individuals approach politics and their collective actions.

2.2.3 Taking religious and political context factors into account

This said it is important to bear in mind that no religious organisation exists completely independent from a religious context, just as every kind of political involvement has to be thought of as being shaped by and referring to a particular political context. Two theoretical concepts are particularly helpful for the analysis of context

factors influencing whether and how, religion can contribute to the political involvement of migrants. These are the concept of political opportunity structures (POS) discussed above and Bourdieu's field concept. The following section will shortly discuss how these two concepts can contribute to the present research.

While the POS approach, as outlined in the previous sub-chapter, is one of the most important strands of research on social movements and has informed essential contributions to the analysis of the claims-making and mobilisation of migrants and of Muslim minorities in Europe, Bourdieu's field concept may serve as a helpful tool better to understand the opportunities and constraints that structure migrant political involvement. To be sure, since it focuses on institutional and discursive opportunity structures shaping the emergence, strategies and actions of social movements (cf. Koopmans 2004: 451), the POS approach obviously differs from Bourdieu's field approach. Nonetheless, if interpreted as conceptual tool boxes, the two theories are compatible and complementary insofar as they both conceptualise the (political) actions and strategies of individuals and movements as being constrained, and therefore shaped, by structures which precede and transcend them.

This idea of a field with boundaries separating (legitimate) players within a social field from those who are not part of the game is important for the research question treated here for several reasons. First of all, drawing attention to the boundaries between members and non-members of social fields is especially relevant in the case of migrants and post-migration minorities because entering or being part of the religious or the political field is likely to be more difficult for them than for "autochthonous" actors. Just like the majority in their country of residence, migrants face the boundaries between those who are part of the field - religious specialists, professional politicians - and those who are not. Usually many migrants, however, find themselves in the lowest positions of the receiving society's social structure so they have to overcome the particular difficulties members of the lowest classes face if they want to enter the political field or make the specialists take into account their interests. Furthermore, migrants are excluded by a second boundary which is drawn between those who are perceived as "consumers" with legitimate interests and those whose interests are often considered illegitimate. Their religious habitus, for instance, does not necessarily correspond to the religious habitus of members of the same social strata but who did not migrate.

Yet, if established players in the religious field perceive migrants as an important part of the laity and change their religious "products" in such a way as to cater also for this new group of potential consumers this may be interpreted by other players in the field as well as by the non-migrant "political laity", i.e. the voters, as a transformation not only of the religious but also of the political field. Migrant religion may thus become a political issue in itself. The same is true, and probably even more acutely so, if migrants as "newcomers" enter the religious field

themselves or try to do so. As the presence of new actors is a more visible transformation of the religious field, the changes it induces to the symbolic order are more obvious, too. If the religious order helps explaining and legitimising the political order, however, the presence of migrants as independent actors in the religious field - for instance, in West European societies as Muslim leaders or as pastors of non-established Christian churches - is likely to be interpreted by the majority not only as a transformation of the symbolic, but also of the political order. It is reasonable to assume that these perceptions then influence the chances of migrants to enter the religious field and the way religion may become a resource for political participation. At the same time, even if migrants themselves initially did not perceive their religious activities as political, these may become so in their point of view as well, if they encounter strong obstacles when attempting to be part of the game.

In this light, the POS approach is especially helpful for the analysis of the political involvement of migrants because it draws attention to the fact that the political field is confined by a very particular boundary which, as a legal boundary, is an important structural and structuring element of this field: this boundary is, of course, created by the citizenship regime of the respective country. Whereas proponents of the theory of post-national citizenship claim that membership rights have been decoupled from nationality and national territory to the extent that the concept of citizenship in the traditional sense of national citizenship has become less important (e.g. Soysal 1997), adepts of the political opportunity structure (POS) approach have shown several times that national citizenship regimes still shape the political behaviour of migrants (e.g. Koopmans/Statham 1999, Koopmans 2004, Eggert/Giugni 2011).²³ In their studies, citizenship models are seen as (part of the) opportunity structures “that may stimulate, constrain, or channel the degrees and types of migrants' political involvement” (Koopmans 2004: 449).

If what has been found by the empirical studies informed by the POS approach is combined with Bourdieu's idea of a field's boundaries being crucial, it is reasonable to assume that national citizenship models still shape the access of migrants to the political field in their country of residence in important ways. This is most apparent in voting legislation, of course, but it is also true for other aspects of political participation where the exclusion through citizenship legislation is not so obvious: Not only do citizenship rules legally exclude non-citizens from certain political actions such as voting in general elections, but they also contribute to stabilising boundaries by marking insiders and outsiders, “legitimate” and “illegitimate” activists, the claims of groups who have the “right” to make demands and those who do not. These rules, while not prohibiting the political involvement of non-citizens, make it easy for members of the field to keep out newcomers on the

²³ For criticism of the POS approach, see e.g. Goodwin/Jaspers (1999).

grounds of their origin and their legal status. The symbolic boundary between autochthonous and allochthonous residents of a country thus is reinforced by a legal barrier.

If states attribute a privileged status to certain religious communities or organisations but not to others, a similar boundary may surround the religious field: If, as is the case in Germany for instance, some religious communities hold a status which permits them to have the government collect taxes for them and to teach religious education in state schools while others do not have the same rights, members of the religious field can build their strategies on the distinction between legally recognized religions and religions that do not have the same status attributing them legitimacy to act in the public sphere. Although it is not as clear-cut a boundary as the one between migrants (and their descendants) and non-migrants imposed by citizenship, the distinction between religions that are publicly recognised and those that are not is particularly relevant for migrants since they are more likely than non-migrant residents to belong to a “new” religion which is not part of an institutional arrangement that has evolved over centuries and which thus does not have the same privileges.

As citizenship regimes and legislation governing the relation between religious communities and the state are shaped by laws crafted and passed by the most powerful actors in the political field - politicians in parliament, important lobbyists etc. - the key players in the political field control both the legal barriers confining their field and the religious field.

To sum up, the first part of this chapter has focused on three general perspectives which guide the research on the political participation and the collective mobilisation of migrants: a resource perspective, a cultural perspective, and a perspective focusing on context factors. Against this background, the second part of this chapter has then outlined how religion might be integrated into these three perspectives. It has shown that religion may be an organisational resource which may provide material resources such as money or office space as well as immaterial resources, reaching from ties to individuals with particular skills to legitimacy for leaders. Religion may also be what might be called a “symbolic” resource, because it can offer the “cultural fabric” for individual and collective political activities and for greater solidarity.

Accordingly, these three theoretical elements will guide the analysis of the empirical data: the idea that religion can be an organisational resource for the political involvement of migrants; the idea that it can be a symbolic resource, and the idea that whether religion may be such a resource and whether migrants do draw on their religion for their political participation and collective mobilisation is also influenced by the religious and political context.

More aspects could, of course, be taken into account and would have to be considered if the present book sought to find all possible ways by which religion

could contribute to (or be an obstacle for) the politicisation and the political involvement of migrants. This, however, would be a rather imprecise and possibly never-ending scheme. Obviously, this cannot be the goal of this work. Rather, this research aims at contributing to our knowledge about how religion may support the political involvement by drawing on the most important theories of political participation and integrating religion into these three broad perspectives. All three perspectives, of course, appear relevant and fruitful enough to deserve to be at the centre of attention of this study. Yet, since it would still be beyond the scope of this book to cover all three perspectives to the same extent, it is essential to prioritise. Therefore, the main focus of this study is on religious organisations and on religion as an organisational resource, but the other two elements, i.e. the cultural dimension and context factors, will be taken into account, too.

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