
Poverty and Attachment Regimes in Modern Societies

Serge Paugam

In my book *Les formes élémentaires de la pauvreté* (Paugam 2005) I argued that we cannot study poverty without understanding the relationship between the poor and society. My analysis was based on the sociological definition of poverty given by Simmel in 1908 in his study on 'The Poor' (Simmel 1965). Following this perspective, I have proposed that two dimensions be considered to define elementary forms of poverty. The first dimension is of a macro-sociological type, using a collective and social representation of least partially, in analysis of the institutional forms of social intervention that aim to help the members of these groups. Such forms of social intervention are responsible for shaping the social perception of poverty and exclusion, the importance given to these questions, and the ways in which societies aim to address the problems. The second dimension derives more from micro-sociology and considers the importance of poor people's own experiences, the attitudes they have towards those who give them particular labels and the way they adapt to different situations. 'The poor' and 'the excluded' are not defined and treated in the same way within different European countries, let alone cross-nationally. At similar standards of living, social assistance during a person's active life will not necessarily have the same meaning or evoke the same attitudes in a nation of limited unemployment and heavily anti-marginal attitudes as it does in a society experiencing structural unemployment and widespread economic change. In the former case, the individuals concerned are in a minority and face stigmatization by not conforming with general social norms; in the latter, they are less marginalized and have a greater chance of recovering their previous social status through the material and symbolic resources available to them as members of the economic underclass.

Following this conceptual framework, three elementary forms of poverty have been put forward: *integrated poverty*, *marginal poverty*, and *disqualifying poverty*. These terms link the concept of poverty to its social context. They do not take their point of reference from fixed population groups, but instead from relatively stable

groupings which, whilst having a social basis, evolve as they draw members labelled 'poor' or 'excluded' from different social categories.

Integrated poverty refers more to traditional forms of poverty than to social exclusion. Those labelled 'poor' are, from this perspective, extensive in number and relatively indistinguishable from other social strata. Their situation is of such immediacy that it is more likely to be treated as a regional or local problem rather than one affecting a particular social group. Social debate is organized around issues of socio-economic and cultural development in their broadest sense, and focuses especially on the territorial dimension of social inequality. Poverty in the national population and the entire social system is linked, via collective representation, to that found at the regional level. Because 'the poor' form a broad social class, rather than a strictly defined 'underclass', they are not heavily stigmatized. Their standard of living is low, but they remain part of the social networks which stem from family and the immediate neighbourhood. Moreover, although unemployment may also impinge upon this group, it does not lead to a concomitant loss of status. In fact, its effects are usually compensated by resources available from the underground economy, and furthermore, such activities play an integrating role for those who participate. This type of social orientation towards poverty is more likely to develop in traditional, 'underdeveloped' or 'underindustrialized' societies than in their advanced, modern counterparts. It is often linked to the economic backwardness of pre-industrial societies as against those with more advanced production and social welfare protection.

Marginal poverty also refers more to traditional forms of poverty than to social exclusion as such. As opposed to the victims of integrated poverty, those who are referred to as 'the poor' or 'the excluded' in this case constitute only a minor part of the population. In the collective consciousness, the group is made up of those who cannot adapt to the progress of modern civilization or conform to the norms of economic development. Even though they are only a residual minority, their existence is disruptive because it demonstrates the presence of 'system drop-outs' and may foster 'disillusionment with progress'. It is for this reason that social welfare institutions ensure that they cater for those who, without the influence of outside pressure, are socially and professionally unable to integrate with society. This social orientation towards poverty is based on the idea that this peripheral minority is unlikely to challenge the economic and social functioning of the system in its entirety. Measures should be taken, but they should not monopolize the efforts of economic, political and trade union actors. In any case, the social debate is organized not so much around this residual group, but rather around the sharing of benefits amongst socio-professional groups. The social status of those judged unable to integrate is thus badly compromised. Social intervention reinforces

the feeling that these people are on the margins of society, and once stigmatized, they are unable to escape fully from the protection of the social organizations that look after them. This social orientation towards poverty is more likely to manifest itself in advanced and developing industrial societies, where unemployment can be controlled to a certain degree, and revenues are sufficiently high to guarantee everyone a high level of social protection—often the result of union demands. Without automatically sweeping away the protection afforded by close ties (such as the family, for example), the welfare state, which provides more general security, may in the long term eventually replace them in their role as social stabilizers.

Disqualifying poverty is concerned more with the question of exclusion than with actual poverty, although social actors continue to employ both terms. Those they refer to as ‘the poor’ or ‘the excluded’ are becoming steadily more numerous. They exist outside the productive sphere and become more dependent on social welfare institutions as they encounter greater and greater problems. It is not so much a question of abject destitution, spreading more widely every year, but rather a process that can produce sudden changes in daily life. Although, as noted above, we should not generalize, it is nevertheless true that progressively more and more people are being confronted with precarious situations in employment liable to increase their burdens: low revenue, unsatisfactory housing and health care, weak familial ties and social networks and unstable positions in institutionalized social networks. For those in such a situation, material decline, even if only relative, and dependence upon social benefits—especially financial aid—result in a feeling of going into an inevitable descent into social hopelessness. These people’s self-devaluation is accentuated by the fact that many of them have not experienced any sort of childhood deprivation. In contrast to marginal poverty, this phenomenon affects society as a whole and has been turning into the so-called ‘new social question’, which threatens social order and cohesion. ‘Disqualifying poverty’ is a social orientation towards ‘the poor’ and ‘the excluded’ which generates collective anxiety as the membership of this stratum grows, and the number of its potential members increases correspondingly. This specific form of poverty is most likely to develop in societies faced with high unemployment and an unstable job market, linked to changes in the productive sphere and the globalization of economies (Gallie and Paugam 2000; Gallie, Paugam and Jacobs 2003). Normally in this type of society, the role of family ties, although not completely absent, has diminished: far from balancing economic and social inequalities, they may in fact exacerbate them. Furthermore, the parallel, or underground, economy is too regulated by public institutions to offer any stable support for the most disadvantaged. The processes which help soften the effects of unemployment under what we have

termed ‘integrated poverty’ are less effective, and certainly less organized under ‘disqualifying poverty’.

Just after publishing *Les formes élémentaires de la pauvreté*, I started to study the different types of social bonds and to give them conceptual definitions. In this present paper, I would like to revisit the main results of my comparative research on poverty from a social bonds perspective. I argue that we cannot study the relationship between the poor and society without a conceptual framework of social bonds. It is important to clarify the intertwining of these social links in a global system of attachment. In every society, everyone is integrated into its fabric by several bonds. These bonds have a normative definition. The social institutions regulate each of them in order to ensure control on social life and to give a normative orientation to individuals and social groups. In what follows, I will first define the different types of social bond. Then I will suggest a framework that can be built for comparative analysis of poverty.

1 Four types of Social Bonds

In this section I consider the different types of social bond. Each type can be defined on the basis of two dimensions: protection and recognition. Although the bonds are multiple and different, they all serve to bring individuals the protection and recognition necessary for social existence (Paugam 2008, 2014, 2016b). Protection refers to all the resources (family, community, professional, social) on which individuals can draw when facing difficulties in life; and recognition refers to the social interaction that stimulates individuals by providing evidence of their existence and value in the eyes of others. The expression ‘*to count on*’ sums up quite well what individuals can expect from their relationship with others and with institutions as regards protection; while the term ‘*to count for*’ expresses the expectation of recognition, which is just as vital. The emotional attachment of individuals to a ‘we’ is all the stronger if the ‘we’ corresponds to an entity—concrete or abstract—*on* and *for* which they know they can count. It is in this sense that the ‘we’ completes the ‘me’. The bonds that provide an individual with protection and recognition therefore assume an affective dimension that reinforces human interdependence.

As an extension of this preliminary definition, four major types of social bond can be distinguished: the *lineal bond*, the *elective participation bond*, *organic participation bond* and the *citizenship bond*. (See table 1)

Tab. 1 Typology of social bonds

Types of social bonds	Forms of protection	Forms of recognition
Lineal bond (between parents and children)	Counting on intergenerational solidarity Close protection	Counting for one's parents and one's children Affective recognition
Elective participation bond (between partners, friends, selected acquaintances...)	Counting on the solidarity of elective acquaintances Close protection	Counting for elective acquaintances Affective recognition or by similarity
Organic participation bond (between actors of the occupational life)	Stable job Contractualized protection	Recognition through work and consequent social esteem
Citizenship bond (between members of the same political community)	Legal protection (civil, political and social rights) as per the principle of equality	Recognition of the sovereign individual

The *lineal bond* takes two forms. The first refers to consanguinity that is, to the 'natural' line of descent based on proof of sexual relations between the father and the mother, and on the recognition of a biological relationship between the child and his/her parents. We start from the premise that each individual is born into a family and—in principle—is thrust at birth into the ambience of both, father and mother as well as the extended family, to which he/she inevitably belongs and which is not self-chosen. However, we should not overlook the case of adoptive filiation, recognized by the Civil Code and distinct from relations forged in the context of a foster family. Adoptive filiation is hence a form of social filiation. Generally speaking, it should be noted that biological and adoptive filiations both function as the genuine foundations of social belonging. It is also worth noting that, in France for instance, following the principle of consanguinity, children have the right to inherit from their parents, but also have a legal obligation to care and provide for them. Beyond the legal issues around the definition of the lineal bond, sociologists, psychologists, social psychologists and psychoanalysts place emphasis on the socializing and identity-building function of this very bond; it contributes to the individual's equilibrium from birth, ensuring both, protection and recognition, physical care and emotional security.

The formation of the *elective participation bond* takes place in the context of extra-familial socialization, during which the individual comes into contact with and learns to know others through participation in various groups and institutions. Socialization itself takes place in numerous places: neighbourhoods, gangs, groups

of friends, local communities, and religious, recreational and cultural institutions. During this process of social learning, individuals are compelled by necessity to integrate themselves into groups and institutions, but at the same time remain autonomous insofar as they can assemble their own social networks in which they can affirm their personalities. Our analysis of this bond does not share the view that social integration in modern societies is based on a multiplicity of elective memberships or on a process of positive disaffiliation (Singly 2003). It is furthermore necessary to distinguish the *elective participation bond* from other types of social bond by highlighting its specificity—its elective character—which enables individuals to establish interpersonal relationships freely depending on their desires, aspirations and emotional valence. This bond can refer to a plethora of forms of elective attachment. The formation of a partnership is one of them: the individual becomes a member of a new family network and his/her circle of belonging widens. While there is no freedom of choice in the *lineal bond*, individuals have autonomy in the *elective participation bond*. Nevertheless, this autonomy is controlled by a series of social determinants. Moreover, the marital relationship is like a game of mirrors. Besides the protecting function that it provides to both partners—each partner being able to count on the other—the function of recognition can be understood from four perspectives: the man's perception of his wife, the wife's perception of her partner and lastly, how the two partners judge how the other perceives them. It is thus a game of constant validation of the value each partner has for the other. Unlike the family and the couple, friendship is loosely institutionalized. It can be publicly appealed to and encouraged when associated with the notion of fraternity, for instance, but it is not subject to strict regulation. It is socially acknowledged and valued. It corresponds perfectly to the definition of the elective participation bond perceived as selfless and is void of the social contingencies that characterize other forms of sociability.

The *organic participation bond* differs from the previous bond, being characterized by learning and the carrying out of a specific function within the division of labour. As we well know, functional complementarity, together with organic solidarity is, according to Durkheim (2007), what essentially fuels social integration in modern society, as each individual is provided with a social position guaranteeing access to a basic level of protection and to the feeling of being useful. This bond is established at school and then extends into working life. While this type of bond takes on its full meaning in association with the logic of productivity prevailing in the industrial society, it should not be thought of as being fully dependent on the economic sphere. As Elias has pointed out, in a society characterized by a high level of interdependent functions, the economy is not an independent sphere (Elias 1991). It can only evolve in parallel with political and public organizations. The implemen-

tation of a system of obligatory social insurances based on work-life participation has modified the very essence of professional integration. In order to analyse the organic participation bond, we must take into account both the individual's relation to work, in accordance with Durkheim's analysis of functional differentiation and complementarity, and his/her relation to employment, which refers to the protective logic of the welfare state. Put differently, professional integration refers not only to professional fulfilment but also to the connection—beyond the world of work—to basic protection, negotiated in the context of social conflict but regulated by a given welfare regime. Hence, for a wage-earning worker the expression 'having a job' implies the possibility of an enjoyable productive activity, and at the same time, a guarantee of protection in the future. We can therefore define ideal professional integration in terms firstly of the material and symbolic recognition of labour, and secondly of the social protection assured by employment.

Following up on this analysis, it can be said that social insecurity has two different meanings today. Using Robert Castel's approach (Castel 1995), the first can be understood as the absence (or, at the very least, the feeling of absence) of protection against social risks such as unemployment and poverty, or the weakening of that protection. The second is close to what Pierre Bourdieu refers to—at least implicitly—as 'misery of position' as opposed to 'misery of condition', when he analyses the conditions under which social relations and the forms of domination that characterize them are constituted (Bourdieu et al. 1993). Following the first definition, social insecurity is, at least partially, the result of loss of social support. According to the second, it results from an implied confirmation of a person's social inferiority, which leads on to suffering and various forms of psychological distress, in particular to loss of self-confidence and a feeling of worthlessness. In both cases, it is a threat that weighs heavily on individuals and their families.

Both understandings of insecurity are present in the concept of professional precarity (precariousness) depending on whether we take into account the relation to employment or to work as the analytical basis (Paugam 2000). The relation to employment refers to the protective logic of the welfare state; the relation to work to productive ways of thinking prevalent in an industrial society. Employees are said to be in a precarious situation when their employment is uncertain and they cannot predict their professional future. This is the case for employees with short-term contracts, as well as for those who are consistently faced with the risk of being laid off. Their situation is characterized by high economic vulnerability as well as by a greater or lesser restriction of social rights, as these are largely based on stable employment. The wage-earning worker occupies an inferior position in the hierarchy of social status defined by the welfare state, and in this sense we can speak of *precarity of employment*. However, workers are also in a precarious posi-

tion when they perceive their job as irrelevant, badly paid and poorly recognized within the company they work for. If their contribution to productive activities is not valued, they feel more or less worthless. We can then speak of *precarity of work*. These two dimensions of insecurity must be addressed simultaneously. They reflect profound transformations of the labour market as well as structural changes in the organization of labour.

Lastly, there is the *citizenship bond*. This is based on people's sense of belonging to a nation. In principle, the members of a nation have rights and duties, making them full citizens, and in democratic societies, all citizens are equal before the law. This does not mean that economic and social inequalities disappear, but rather that the nation state makes efforts to ensure that all citizens are treated equally, and together form a body with a shared identity and values. It is common today to distinguish between civil rights, which protect individuals in the exercise of their fundamental freedoms, political rights, which enable participation in public life, and social rights, which guarantee individuals some form of protection against the vagaries of life. The expansion of individual fundamental rights corresponds to the elevation of the universal principle of equality and to the role assigned to each citizen, all citizens being perceived as fully belonging to the political community irrespective of social status. The citizenship bond is also based on the recognition of the sovereignty of the citizen. Article 6 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights states that 'Law is the expression of the general will. Everyone has the right to take part in the government of his country, directly or through freely chosen representatives'. The citizenship bond is also rooted in the protective logic of democratic equality. Citizens must possess the 'material means necessary to remain the independent and self-sufficient beings that the notion of political legitimacy relies upon. The organization of education, employment protection and assistance to the most unfortunate is justified by the fact that citizens must have the capacity to be independent.' (Schnapper 2000) Protection and recognition, the foundations of social integration discussed above with regard to the other three types of social bond, are also present in the citizenship bond, which for its part is based on a demanding conception of the rights and duties of individuals.

To use the framework of social bonds for comparison, we can analyse the strength of integration in the intersection of the four types of bond. These bonds refer to different normative systems individuals must respect, even though, in some historical circumstances, conditions do not favour their doing so. Not all individuals inherit the same advantages from the lineal bond link, nor can all maintain this bond throughout their life cycle. Neither do individuals have the same assets for developing regular and diversified elective participation bonds. Moreover, the norm relating to stable employment is not accessible to all, and not all individuals

are consistently treated in a perfectly equal manner by the institutions that sustain the citizenship bond. In other words, taking the four types of social bond as our starting point, it is possible to shed light on the inequalities of integration which the intertwining of the social bonds makes intelligible. These inequalities have an impact on the processes leading to poverty and social exclusion. The risk of undergoing the experience of a cumulative breakdown of social bonds is deeply unequal.

2 Poverty and Attachment Regimes

The typology of social bonds we have developed makes it possible to analyse, on the one hand, what binds individuals to each other, and on the other, what binds them to society in general. The theory also allows us to examine how—in different societies—the different types of social bond intertwine, and the kind of normative regulation the bonds and their imbrications are subject to. The distinction between the dimensions of intertwining bonds and of their normative regulation overlaps—at least partially—with the distinction Durkheim makes between the concepts of integration and regulation: the first refers to the integration of individuals *into* society, the second to the integration *of* society itself. We could thus argue that integration *into* society is assured by social bonds that individuals build with others during their socialization in accordance with the prevailing social norms, and that regulation stems from the normative intersection of these social bonds, enabling integration into society as a whole. It is in the sense of the specificity of the social regulation of bonds and their intertwining that we refer to attachment regimes. The function of an attachment regime is to produce the overall normative coherence that enables individuals and groups, beyond differentiation and their potential rivalry, to form a society together. Defining the type of attachment regime that corresponds to a given society implies examining—within the different layers of its history and the anthropological roots of its development—what its specific tessitura is made of. In other words, we face the challenge of shifting our analytical focus from the analysis of social bonds and their meaning for individuals and groups to that of analysing types of attachment regime and the meaning of normative regulation of social bonds in modern societies. Here it is necessary to introduce further analytical precision: in each attachment regime our theory identifies, the four types of social bond can have either an integrating or a regulating function. While an integrating bond attaches individuals to groups, a regulating bond has the additional function of producing a set of rules and norms which influence and modify the initial normative conception of the other types of social bond within any given regime. The

regulating bond, thus defined, generates values and principles of moral education likely to permeate the rest of society.

Given this preliminary definition, four types of attachment regime can be further defined: the familialist regime, the voluntarist regime, the organicist regime and the universalist regime—as shown in Table 2.

Tab. 2 Typology of attachment regimes

	Integrating bonds	Integrating and regulating bonds
Familialist regime	EB/OB/CB	LB
Voluntarist regime	LB/OB/CB	EB
Organicist regime	LB/EB/CB	OB
Universalist regime	LB/EB/OB	CB

LB: lineal bond, EB: elective participation bond, OB: organic participation bond, CB: citizenship bond

The main characteristic of the *familialist regime* is that it is regulated by the lineal bond, while the elective participation bond, the organic participation bond and the citizenship bond have an integrating function. The *voluntarist regime* is regulated by the elective participation bond, with the lineal bond, the organic participation bond and the citizenship bond functioning as integrators. The *organicist regime* is based on normative regulation through the organic participation bond which intertwines with the lineal bond, the elective participation bond and the citizenship bond in integrating individuals into society. Finally, the *universalist regime* is regulated by the citizenship bond which influences the functioning of the lineal bond, the elective participation bond and the organic participation bond as integrators.

Let us now explore the factors most often associated with these four regimes. We will explore four factors: level of economic development, relationship to inequality and poverty, the welfare system and civicism.

A perfectly satisfactory assessment of the level of economic development of a country is difficult to achieve, as the benchmarks traditionally used to measure development are debatable. We will not enter the endless philosophical debates these benchmarks generate here. For the purposes of the present article, let us use Gross National Product per capita as a central indicator of the level of economic development of any given national economy. It is common to line up countries (or regions) with the most developed ones at one end and the least developed at the other. However, development economists have not focused solely on this indicator, which provides a unilinear and quantitative representation of development.

Indeed, following widespread criticism of Rostow's simplistic model of the stages of growth (Rostow 1960), it is preferable to admit from the outset that countries do not necessarily follow an identical trajectory of development; rather, there are several routes to development they can take.

I suggest that we start out by defining an industrial society more precisely. A modern society is primarily defined by the type of organization of labour within it, its use of science and technology, and the economic and social consequences of the rationalization of production. The French political scientist Raymond Aron has identified five criteria for defining industrial society: (1) separation of the workplace and the company from the family (though this separation is not universal and we can still find a considerable number of craft enterprises where economic and family functions merge); (2) division of labour between specific economic sectors as well as within companies, depending on technological needs; (3) capital accumulation; (4) rational calculation of the lowest possible costs so as to renew and increase capital; and (5) concentration of the labour force at the workplace (Aron 1962). Application of this definition clearly reveals that there are significant differences between countries and regions, even within the European Union. Some countries fall within the defining characteristics of an industrial society more easily than others. Moreover, within countries, regions may vary with respect to their rural character or the prevalence of small businesses as the foundation of economic activity.

Secondly, the relation to inequality and poverty can also be identified as a factor explaining differences between attachment regimes, as perceptions of inequality and poverty vary considerably from one society to another. In some societies, these two strongly associated phenomena are considered inevitable and do not raise any particular moral condemnation. In other societies, by contrast, they are perceived as an expression of social dysfunction or as problems that need to be addressed with urgency. Sensibility to this issue can fluctuate too according to the economic climate, the latter also varying among societies.

Thirdly, we approach the systems of social protection from the perspective of the *decommodification* criterion. At the end of the Second World War, the task of making individuals more than mere tradable commodities was a major challenge for the welfare states: the level of social security that employing companies should offer individuals facing life's uncertainties and the risk of poverty became a major socio-political concern. However, the process of decommodification has not advanced equally in all Western countries, and consequently, as Gøsta Esping-Andersen (1990) has demonstrated, significant cross-national variation needs to be addressed by social scientists.

Lastly, civicism is a fundamental concept for analysing individuals' engagement with collective entities, typically reflected in their coming together in associations.

Robert Putnam (2000) has turned this into a key dimension of social capital. It is an important concept in analysing attachment regimes as it conveys a particular conception of the social bond.

The *familialist regime* is regulated by the grasp the lineal bond has on the other social bonds. This regime is more prevalent in regions characterized by low industrial development, in rural zones where the economy is still largely based on small units of production relatively withdrawn into themselves, and in geographically isolated areas. However, it can maintain itself within more developed regions by providing a familialist base to a capitalism of small business-owners tied to each other by relations of mutual solidarity. It can also characterize the mode of development of an emerging country where modern economic structures combine with persisting traditions marked by family solidarity. This regime is accompanied by strong social inequalities which encounter no significant opposition. Inequalities appear somewhat naturalized. Poverty is often an integral part of the social system, the poor accepting their condition as a fate they cannot escape. Survival is therefore primarily sought in the family network, which is essential for integration. The welfare system is not only incomplete, but often it is client-oriented. Application of the decommodification principle is extremely limited, preventing the poorest individuals and households from securing protection against life's uncertainties. Lastly, civicism too is very low. The labour market can be controlled by the mafia or by organized micro-local networks. Politicians are often corrupt, and public institutions can be diverted to serve the interests of particular individuals or groups. For example, in southern Italy, we were able to develop the thesis of 'amoral familialism' to account for the empirically proven association where social life is anchored into a system of constraining family relations and an absence of civicism (Banfield 1958; Putnam 1993). The familialist regime also encourages strong family solidarity to cope with poverty, which remains massive because the labour market provides little generalized protection and has allowed an informal economy to develop with wages below the legal minimum (Paugam 2016c). This regime is characteristic of the Mediterranean countries. For the poor, it has the advantage of providing a general framework for their social integration, and stigmatization is weak. But they suffer a lot because the public social protection system is very inadequate. By itself, this regime explains the form of *integrated poverty* (see Table 2).

As we have seen, the *voluntarist regime* is regulated by the elective participation bond. The regime is fundamentally shaped by the principle that nothing must hinder freedom of association based round interpersonal affinity, whether or not individuals' choices are driven by the pursuit of personal interests. This regime therefore maintains an intense complicity with the ideal of freedom of enterprise insofar as the majority of the population readily accept the legitimacy of labour market rules

that are consistent with the desire for individual fulfilment. It is therefore only logical that this regime offers all the necessary conditions for capitalist development. High levels of social inequality prevail, and poverty is often perceived as an inevitable social outcome, thought of as a just punishment for the less capable and/or the least courageous individuals. The notion of merit is mobilized in order to rationalize inequality. The poorest can only rely on themselves to better their standing, a fact that accompanies the myth of the 'self-made man'. The social protection system is overall inadequate. Risk-taking being limited to private discretion and mediation through insurance companies; it essentially focuses on the very poorest among the general population. In this regime, civicism is particularly strong, and this is perfectly reflected in the thriving sector of associations and the dynamism of private foundations that defend the interests of civil society. Civicism is primarily rooted in a system consisting of each individual's membership in a particular community and in a shared aspiration to full citizenship. The voluntarist regime ultimately embraces a low level of social protection and incitement to solidarity within peer groups. In times of crisis, these groups are nevertheless incapable of countering the devastating impact of unemployment. This regime is compatible with a liberal model of welfare regimes, because it is based on the principle of individual responsibility vis-à-vis the main risks of life. This regime gives the poor the opportunity to find protection and recognition in local and elective groups, but it can also generate a low level of public social protection and a high marginalization of certain ethnic communities. A prime example of this regime is, of course, the U.S.A. (see Fischer 2010). Here, the cumulative disadvantage process is most likely to affect directly ethnic groups that are strongly stigmatized. This regime thus reinforces the risk of *disqualifying poverty*.

The *organicist regime* is dominated by the organic participation bond which governs all other types of social bond. With recourse to Durkheimian terminology, it is possible to see the culmination of industrial society here, as organic solidarity is the ultimate expression of a modern society, being based on the differentiation of individuals and the complementary of their functions. The organicist regime is thus logically associated with high economic development, and with the intensification of relations within the spheres of work and business. However, this regime is not simply an expression of an advanced phase in the historical development of modern societies. It is also the expression of a particular relation between individuals and the state. In this regime, participation in relations of exchange involves a quasi-mandatory attachment to an intermediate structure (a professional corporation) which is, however, never entirely self-sufficient. Each such group thus mediates relations with other groups and with the state, enabling relationships of interdependence to be formed based on the principle of complementarity. This regime implies a

centralized state, capable of creating and maintaining corporations within strategic sectors—hence a form of state corporatism. It is capable too of regulating the other sectors, thus ensuring the proper functioning of the economy. While the different corporations are often called upon to cooperate, they may also enter into competition with each other. Inequality therefore appears as constitutive of social life, not in terms of naturalization as in the previous regime reviewed, but rather in the sense of a constant struggle to be classified within a prestigious rank and to gain the material benefits such domination provides. In practice, the groups that make up society are inevitably complementary but are also in competition with each other, and the state is then required to coordinate and pacify the battles. In this regime, the system of social protection is fairly well advanced along the path of decommodification but remains fragmented into a myriad of separate sub-systems, thereby expressing a logic of statutory distinction and categorical claims with regard to accessing specific rights and the defence of benefits already gained. The state here has an important classification function: it has established a statutory hierarchy among its civil servants as well as among the socio-professional groups emanating from civil society. Finally, it acts by targeting the categorically vulnerable through specific policies. Civicism is globally less developed than in the voluntarist regime, since the general interest is only considered after the interests of specific, competing groups, which often expect the state to play the role of arbitrator, a task they themselves are unable to manage. Finally, and notably in times of crisis, this regime presents the risk of normative hesitation leading to a cumulative weakness in solidarity. This regime is characteristic of the continental European countries. For the poor, it has several disadvantages: conditional access to family solidarity (attachment to the norm of autonomy from the family), restrictive conditions on public support and a high risk of cumulative disadvantages. The organic regime also promotes *disqualifying poverty*.

The *universalist regime* is primarily regulated by the citizenship bond. It involves a very high capacity to put the democratic principle of equality of all individuals into practice—not only with regard to rights, but also more broadly, in the functioning of economic and social life. This regime is perfectly compatible with a high level of economic development. Market rules are accepted and appear, in many respects, more consensual than in the organicist regime. The issue here is not to reject or avoid markets, but rather, to socialize them. In order to achieve this, numerous negotiations take place between social stakeholders, who must manage to overcome their vested interests so that the public interest and the value of belonging to an enveloping community of citizens can be upheld. In the universalist regime, the state engages each individual directly. Contesting its legitimacy hence seems synonymous with contesting one's own personal value as the first is thought precisely

to represent the former, and vice versa. Warding off extreme inequality and poverty also expresses a quasi-general consent amongst citizens to live close to each other without conspicuously exhibiting any eventual statutory superiority. The notion of a constraining and stifling subordination is contrary to the principle of an ordinary social life. Nothing must obstruct the desire for individual emancipation, given that the institutions enabling this very objective are so respected. The social welfare system is advanced. Funded by both taxes and social insurances, it facilitates the achievement of an advanced level of decommodification. Civicism is also very strong. Associative engagement is not more developed than in the voluntarist regime,

Tab. 3 Poverty and attachment regimes

	Normative regulation of social life	Experience of social integration	Advantages and risks for the poor
Familialist regime	Based on the lineal bond	Strong family solidarity to fight poverty, unemployment and social isolation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Weak stigmatization • Low level of social protection • Integrated poverty
Voluntarist regime	Based on the elective participation bond	Strong commitment in elective groups such as ethnic communities or civic associations to be integrated into the society	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Low level of social protection • Marginalization of ethnic communities • Disqualifying poverty
Organicist regime	Based on the organic participation bond	Strong commitment in an intermediate structure (i.e. a professional corporation) which is, however, never entirely self-sufficient. Each such group thus mediates relations with other groups and with the state, enabling relationships of interdependence based on the principle of complementarity	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Conditional access to family solidarity • Restrictive conditions for public support • Risk of cumulative disadvantages • Disqualifying poverty
Universalist regime	Based on the citizenship bond	Individualistic participation in social life with strong guarantees of being protected by public institutions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • High level of social protection • Strong social control and stigmatization • Marginal poverty

but civic engagement always manifests an unwavering respect for common public institutions. This regime ultimately combines highly protective employment conditions with a conception of citizenship and individual rights that facilitates autonomy from primary forms of solidarity. It is likely to create favourable conditions for an individualistic participation in social life, partly because individuals are strongly protected by public institutions. This type of regime is actually limited to very few countries in the world: the Nordic countries. For the poor, the advantage, of course, is that they can benefit from a high level of social protection and have a better guarantee of a stable job than is found in other countries. But they also have the inconvenience of being subjected to strong social controls and to an intensive stigmatization. The universalist regime is likely to generate *marginal poverty*.

3 Conclusion

In this communication, I have defined four types of social bond. These social bonds are complementary and intertwining in their nature. They constitute the social fabric enveloping the individual. When identifying themselves, individuals can refer to their nationality (the *citizenship bond*), their profession (the *organic participation bond*), their membership of groups (the *elective participation bond*), or their family (the *lineal bond*). In each society, the existence of these four social bonds is prior to any given individual's existence: it is through drawing on them that individuals are called upon to develop a sense of social belonging, and this happens throughout the process of their socialization. While the intensity of the social bonds varies from one individual to another, depending on the specific conditions of their socialization, it also depends on the relative importance societies grant them. The roles played by family solidarity, for instance, and collective expectations with regard to social bonds vary from one society to another. The forms of sociability arising from the elective participation or organic participation bond are multiple and largely depend on lifestyles. The emphasis on the principle of citizenship as the basis for protection and recognition is not equally intense in all countries. In more general terms, when universal protection based on citizenship is challenged, even partially, individuals seek complementary forms of protection within private spheres of social life, and this tends to increase inequalities. Faced with the risk of losing both self-esteem and the respect of others in an open and liberal society, there is a great temptation for some individuals to revert to more communitarian modes of social organization and to fall back on traditional forms of identification.

It is precisely for this reason that poverty cannot be analysed without referring to the plurality of bonds that attach individuals to groups and to society as a whole.

Since these social bonds are regulated by specific rules in each society, we must also provide an analytical framework that takes into account several types of attachment scheme (in the sense of normative configurations of social bonds). We have outlined four in the second part of this paper, adopting Durkheim's conceptual distinction between integration and regulation. If, in each regime, four types of social bond provide an integrating function by enabling individuals to be attached to groups and to society as a whole, the regulation is based each time on a special link. Therefore it is important to identify the latter, knowing that it has a decisive influence on the other links. In a familialist regime, this role is played by the linear bond, in a voluntarist regime by the elective participation bond, in the organicist by the organic participation bond and, finally, in a universalist regime by the citizenship bond.

The elementary forms of poverty are largely determined by these attachment schemes. *Integrated poverty* manifests itself primarily in a familialist regime. The poverty can be massive, but it is compensated by the material and symbolic resources the family and local networks can provide. This amounts to what Durkheim called mechanical solidarity. *Marginal poverty* is an expression of the effectiveness of the universalist regime. The regulative principle that all citizens are equal justifies preventive government intervention, and this has an immediate effect on the extent of poverty, including poverty in times of crisis. *Disqualifying poverty* is, however, an expression of the limits of regulation both in the voluntarist regime and the organicist system. In the first case, poverty is defined as the flip-side of a social system that prefers individual achievement and merit. Citizenship based on civic engagement does not constitute a sufficient resource to prevent poverty, especially in times of crisis and personal withdrawal. In the second case, poverty expresses the loss (actual or risked) of the status that results from participating in the world of labour and the stigma that accompanies this process. It reflects an inferiority of status granted to those receiving assistance which is often reinforced by the welfare state itself through its mode of interaction with a population poorly integrated into the sphere of work.

This typology of attachment regimes should not be confused with the typology of welfare regimes, however close they may sometimes seem. Even if the typology takes up the dimension of decommodification as the central element of all institutionalized forms of social protection, it must systematically underline the normative intertwining of several types of social bond as the decisive factor in the integration of each individual into society and in the integration of society as a whole.

When studying poverty, sociologists need not only to explain the empirical characteristics of the poor, but strive to gain a better understanding of their patterns of social integration; and for this a theoretical framework of different attachment regimes is needed. These regimes are the results of a very long historical and social evolution.

Bibliography

- Aron, R. (1962). *Dix-huit leçons sur la société industrielle*. Paris: Gallimard.
- Banfield, E. C. (1958). *The Moral Basis of a Backward Society*. New York: The Free Press.
- Bourdieu, P. et al. (1993). *La misère du monde*. Paris: Seuil.
- Castel, R. (1995). *Les métamorphoses de la question sociale. Chronique du salariat*. Paris: Fayard.
- Durkheim, É. (2007 [1893]). *De la division du travail social*. Paris: PUF.
- Durkheim, É. (2012 [1902–3]). *L'éducation morale*. Paris: PUF.
- Elias, N. (1991). *The Society of Individuals* (trans. E. Jephcott). Oxford: Blackwell (original, 1987, *Die Gesellschaft der Individuen*).
- Esping-Andersen, G. (1990). *The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism*. Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Fischer, C. S. (2010). *Made in America. A Social History of American Culture and Character*. Chicago: Chicago University Press.
- Gallie, D., & Paugam, S. (eds) (2000). *Welfare Regimes and the Experience of Unemployment in Europe*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Gallie, D., Paugam, S., & Jacobs, S. (2003). 'Unemployment, Poverty and Social Isolation. Is There a Vicious Circle of Social Exclusion?'. *European Societies*, 5(1), (pp. 1–32).
- Paugam, S. (1991). *La disqualification sociale. Essai sur la nouvelle pauvreté*. Paris: PUF (new edition, 'Quadrige', 2013).
- Paugam, S. (2000). *Le salarié de la précarité. Les nouvelles formes de l'intégration professionnelle*. Paris: PUF (new edition, 'Quadrige', 2007).
- Paugam, S. (2005). *Les formes élémentaires de la pauvreté*. Paris: PUF ('Le lien social', new edition, 2013). [Translated in German: *Die elementaren Formen der Armut*, Hamburger Edition, 2008].
- Paugam, S. (2006). 'L'épreuve du chômage: une rupture cumulative des liens sociaux?'. *Revue européenne des sciences sociales*, XLIV(135), (pp. 11–27).
- Paugam, S. (2008). *Le lien social*. Paris: PUF ('Que sais-je?').
- Paugam, S. (dir.) (2014). *L'intégration inégale. Force, faiblesse et rupture des liens sociaux*. Paris: PUF ('Le lien social').
- Paugam, S. (2016a). Poverty and Social Bonds: Towards a Theory of Attachment Regimes. In R. Lutz, S. Tamara & B. Althammer (eds), *Rescuing the Vulnerable: Poverty, Welfare and Social Ties in Modern Europe* (pp. 23–46). New York: Bergham Books.
- Paugam, S. (2016b). The Levels of Social Integration. Analysing Inequalities from a Social Bonds Perspective. In A. Franzen, B. Jann, C. Joppke & E. Widmer (eds.), *Essays on inequality and integration* (pp. 17–45). Zurich: Seismo.

- Paugam, S. (2016c). Social Bonds and Coping Strategies of Unemployed People in Europe, *Italian Sociological Review*, 6 (1), (pp. 27-55).
- Paugam, S. (2016d). La perception de la pauvreté sous l'angle de la théorie de l'attachement. Naturalisation, culpabilisation et victimisation, *Communications*, n° 98, (pp. 125-146).
- Paugam, S., & Gallie, D. (2004). 'L'expérience du chômage: éléments pour une comparaison européenne', *Revue suisse de sociologie/Swiss Journal of Sociology*, 30(3), (pp. 441-460).
- Putnam, R. D. (1993). *Making Democracy Work. Civic Traditions in Modern Italy*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Putnam, R. D. 2000. *Bowling Alone. The Collapse and Revival of American Community*, New York: Simon & Schuster.
- Rostow, W. W. (1960). *The Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Schnapper, D. (1981). *L'épreuve du chômage*, Paris: Gallimard (new edition, Folio, 1984).
- Schnapper, D. with Bachelier, C. (2000). *Qu'est-ce que la citoyenneté?*. Paris: Gallimard.
- Simmel, G. 1965 (1908). 'The Poor', *Social Problems* 13, (pp. 118-140).
- Singly, F. de. (2003). *Les uns avec les autres. Quand l'individualisme crée du lien*. Paris: Armand Colin.

Soziale Bildungsarbeit - Europäische Debatten und
Projekte

Social Education Work - European Debates and
Projects

Schroeder, J.; Seukwa, L.H.; Voigtsberger, U. (Hrsg.)
2017, VII, 242 S. 10 Abb., 9 Abb. in Farbe., Softcover
ISBN: 978-3-658-17015-8