

Contents

1	Introduction	1
1.1	Oligopoly Theory	2
1.1.1	The Classical Literature	2
1.1.2	Modern Times: Game Theory and Oligopoly	3
1.1.3	Mechanism Design and Regulation	5
1.1.4	Concluding Remarks on Oligopoly Theory	6
1.2	Auction Theory	6
1.2.1	Why Study Auction?	6
1.2.2	Basics of Auction Theory	8
1.2.3	Basic Results of the Canonical Model	10
1.2.4	Interdependent Values	11
1.2.5	Some Other Extensions	12
1.2.6	Recent Work and Practical Auction Design	12
1.2.7	Concluding Remarks on Auction Theory	14
1.3	Market Quality	14
1.3.1	Basic Concepts	16
1.3.2	Definition and Measures of Market Quality	17
1.3.3	A Historical Background	20
1.3.4	Concluding Remarks on Market Quality	22
1.4	Summary of the Book	22
2	Allocation of Scarce Resources	29
2.1	Introduction	29
2.1.1	The 2G Spectrum Scam in India	29
2.1.2	The Coal-Block Scam	31
2.1.3	Appropriate Policy for Allocating Scarce Resource	32
2.1.4	Summary of Our Findings	34

2.2	The Model	36
2.3	Equilibrium Outcome When Costs Are Not Interrelated	38
2.3.1	Third Stage Equilibrium	38
2.3.2	Second Stage Equilibrium	40
2.3.3	First-Stage Equilibrium	42
2.4	Equilibrium Outcome with Interrelated Costs	46
2.4.1	Third Stage Equilibrium	46
2.4.2	Second Stage Equilibrium	49
2.4.3	First-Stage Equilibrium	49
2.5	Strict Capacity Constraints	60
2.5.1	Third Stage Equilibrium	61
2.5.2	Second Stage Equilibrium	64
2.5.3	First-Stage Equilibrium	65
2.6	Conclusion	73
3	Effects of Corruption and Incompetence in the Quality Monitoring Process	75
3.1	Introduction	75
3.1.1	Market Quality: Quality of Information and Products	75
3.1.2	Poor Product Quality: Some Examples	76
3.1.3	Incompetent and Fraudulent Inspection	78
3.1.4	Summary of Our Findings	80
3.1.5	Related Literature	83
3.2	The Basic Model	85
3.3	Model 1: Corruption in Quality Monitoring	86
3.3.1	Model 1-Third-Stage Equilibrium	86
3.3.2	Model 1- Second-Stage Equilibrium	89
3.3.3	Model 1- First-Stage Equilibrium	93
3.3.4	Example	96
3.3.5	Model 1: Discussion of the Results	102
3.3.6	Concluding remarks on Model 1	103
3.4	Model 2: Incompetence in Quality Monitoring	104
3.4.1	Model 2 - Third-Stage Equilibrium	104
3.4.2	Model 2 - Second-Stage Equilibrium	105
3.4.3	Model 2 - First-Stage Equilibrium	108
3.4.4	Concluding Remarks on Model 2	112
4	On Some Aspects of Scoring Auctions	113
4.1	Introduction	113
4.1.1	Scoring Auction: The Baseline Model	114
4.1.2	Examples of Scoring Auctions	114
4.1.3	Relevant Literature	115
4.1.4	Summary of Our Findings	116
4.2	The Model	118

4.3	Equilibrium in First-Score and Second-Score Auctions	120
4.3.1	Order Statistics: Some Notations and Preliminaries.	120
4.4	Equilibrium Characterization	128
4.4.1	Equilibrium Score, Quality and Price	128
4.4.2	Impact of an Increase in n (The Number of Bidders)	136
4.5	Expected Scores	139
4.5.1	Some Preliminary Results	140
4.5.2	Expected Scores: Second-Score Versus First-Score.	142
4.6	Extension: Total Welfare with ‘Quality over Price’ Scoring Rule.	149
4.6.1	Total Expected Welfare.	150
4.7	Conclusion	153
5	Some Specific Market Quality Issues in Emerging Economies.	155
5.1	Introduction	155
5.2	Delegation in Scoring Auction	155
5.2.1	Delegation: Some Related Issues.	156
5.2.2	The Model and the Main Results	157
5.2.3	The Main Results	158
5.2.4	Discussion of the Results	159
5.2.5	Delegation and Market Quality	160
5.3	Restricted Entry and Market Quality	161
5.3.1	Some Basic Definitions	162
5.3.2	Main Results.	163
5.3.3	Remarks on Entry and Market Quality	165
5.4	Public Sector Leadership	166
5.4.1	Relevant Literature	166
5.4.2	Model and Assumptions	167
5.4.3	Preliminary Results	168
5.4.4	The Main Results	169
5.4.5	Public Firm Leadership and Market Quality	170
5.5	Designing Credit Institutions	171
5.5.1	An Extension	173
5.6	Corruption and Union Leadership.	175
5.6.1	Related Literature	175
5.6.2	Links to Market Quality	177
5.7	Concluding Remarks	178
	References	179
	Index	187



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