

Chapter 2

Nation-state, Citizenship Identity, Minority Autonomy: Orchestrating Civil Religion and Ideology Through Political Socialization Process in a Post-communism Asian State

In this chapter, different sections of concepts will be discussed to present how could the power dynamic be possibly formulated between state and civil society under communism ideology and authoritarian political governance. How could the politicized and instrumentalized policy such as autonomy achieve an “appeasement” between state’s political interest and civil society’s pursuit of emancipation in shaping minority citizens’ identity.

Citizenship Identity, Origins, and Way Ahead

Although many scholars had anticipated in the early twentieth century that “primordial phenomena” like nationalism would decline in importance and eventually vanish in the modern and postmodern history (Weber 1980; Fukuyama 1992), history has proved the opposite. Culture and value differences originated from ethnic diversity and various political cultures remain as a major source of conflicts and unrests in many parts of the world. In a big nation with diverse ethnicities, it is often challenging for minorities to tailor their own ethnic identity out of the national identity, especially if the state strives to maintain a strong political authority riding above subnational differences and interests. “A nationalist holds the view that political boundaries should be coterminous with cultural boundaries” (Eriksen 1993, p. 6), this belief has to invite a supreme authority from the state to territorialize a national culture above local and minority cultures, during which process political socialization serves as an important instrument to facilitate knowledge input into citizens’ minds and filter information exposed to them. Nation, thus different from the concepts of state and country, is a politicized cultural concept that could hold up to several or even more different ethnic groups within certain political boundary. Taking the Korean Diasporas for example, people of the Korean ethnicity mainly live in three different political regimes on the contemporary Korean Peninsula, although sharing the same original ethnic culture, they now live under

three political ideologies of socialism (China), communism (North Korea), and democracy (South Korea). The North Korea and South Korea both still carry a strong willingness to reunite with each other and rejuvenate a politically unified Korean nation as a whole, while Korean population in other Asian countries is considered as overseas compatriots migrated outside of the Peninsula at different generations. Members of the Chinese-Korean minority, as Chinese citizens, have been considerably socialized by their state and tend to consider themselves more culturally rather than politically connected to the Korean Diasporas.

Colin Mackerras has discussed the conceptualization of minority by studying the translation of the term “nation” and “minority” in Chinese, which are *Minzu* and *Shaoshu Minzu* separately. The character “*min*” and “*zu*” refer to “citizen” and “ethnicity”, respectively (Mackerras 1994, p. 3), which is more political than anthropological compared to its original English term as it emphasizes “*min*” before “*zu*”; and “*shaoshu*” means the minority’s weakness in a numeric sense compared to the majority “*duoshu*” for the word of majority. Yet as “*shaoshu*” appears before both “*min*” and “*zu*”, so different from the English word, it interestingly refers to minority’s weaker stance as both “*citizen*” and “*ethnicity*” compared to majority in Chinese. This perspective also indicates that in China everyone is considered as a citizen of the regime primarily before they fit in as ethnic member or other social cultural roles, thus a marginalized number as an ethnic group further extends to impact how they are treated as citizens. With both inborn and postnatal factors included, ethnic identity is shaped out of minority’s citizen and ethnic experience in China, under the political supervision formulated and implemented from the top of the political machine. Abner Cohen emphasizes the important relationship between ethnicity identity and political power, he reminds us that “ethnicity is a matter of degree”, which indicates how dependent the development of ethnic minority is on its political circumstances. Sometimes ethnic identity confusion and conflict show up in unthreatening forms, but some other time it might lead to serious violence and bloodshed, as power interaction and its derived form in presentation between the ethnicities and political authority varies. The Korean minority has been crowned the “model minority” in China, yet the absence of superficial contention does not represent the complete success of political socialization, nor there is no depression or grudge accumulated at all. In other words, from peace to riots, there is neither clear boundary drawn nor clear tipping point locked as the contributing factors that lead to identity formation are accumulated over history and contemporary political development instead of taking place overnight. Most importantly, this dynamic of fluidity and mobility exists all the time so it is not up to a fixed status for good, it evolves with history. The potential failure to secure self-esteem and happiness has a latent effect on the superficially harmonious coexistence when we explore deeper into the specific development of certain minorities’ ethnic identity. One typical nonviolent reaction would be the *counter-political-socialization* process during which people embed their social and cultural relationships from other dimensions as a demonstration to the unsatisfying and hegemonic political socialization process enforced by the state. To various degrees minority groups absolutely long for an opportunity to change at least their economic and cultural status in those illiberal

democratic or authoritarian states, the cultural habitus of ethnic groups become the universes of their nonpolitical pursuits, though more than often these actions are still considered in politicized terms by politically conservative state (Cohen 1996).

Identity politics is “broadly defined as political action oriented on the needs, values, and interests of particular collective groups possessing a shared identity” (Thiel and Coate 2010, p. 1), the shaping process of collective identity takes place in both vertical and horizontal directions alongside the development of various nation-state politics. The first wave of identity politics study rise along with the civil rights movement in the 1960s, power and how it shapes various groups of people’s identification has since become the central focus of identity politics research in the United States. Entering the twenty-first century, the “globalization certainly augmented competitive pressures” for identity politics among different cultures and regimes, it also enforces the international identity political dialogue to become more transparent by a more commonly acknowledged universal standard.

As a number of international organizations as well as numerous NGOs and civil groups are surging around the globe, identity development and relevant discussion involve more participants at multilevels of governance and invite more ferocious discussion on the traditional hegemonic role of nation-state. The global ideology flow from the technologically and economically advantageous Global North has further consolidated its leading status and secures its existing advantage in setting an international standard, if there could be any, for citizenship development everywhere. For the Global South, looking up to the Global North for its comparatively more successful experience obviously does not answer all the questions derived from its own postcolonial or post-communism/authoritarianism experience sufficiently. The historical experience about power has proved that domestic cultural background and political development is a primary and prior determinant factor of domestic groups’ identity politics dynamic, identity politics thus remains strongly attached to territory and sovereignty, though it is not doubted that the self-actualization of any specific group should be encouraged in a multivalue and free society, as a universal human right (Thiel and Coate 2010; Turner 1990, 1993). In liberal democratic countries, relevant legislative practices and government policies serve as powerful instruments to unite and regulate citizens from different ethnic and social backgrounds, which guarantees minority groups with institutional support that they do not feel left out or marginalized in the political and socio-economic development process. However, to authoritarian regimes, the reconciliation with cultural pluralism increasingly rises as a challenge in the new century (Young 1976; Henders 2004), as reaching unanimous political and cultural agreements among groups with various ethnic backgrounds inevitably and constantly involves conflicts over resource distribution and power competition. In the context of East Asia, what has been argued by the plural society critics is that the use of force is less uncommon due to the existence of “deeply divided multiethnic societies” and the traditional appreciation of strong political leadership, which are “wielded by a colonial or other authoritarian government, or a dominating ethnic group” (Henders 2004, p. 3). In China, the post-communism state and a strong Party in political leadership spend persistent efforts to reshape a superficial ethnic

cultural diversity from top-down in order to create and maintain harmony among minorities. In other words, cultural and ethnic diversity is more an artificial decoration for the regime's political legitimacy rather than an authentic pursuit as a belief of the regime. Lee Kuan Yew's Singapore is a positive and exceptional example to illustrate this perspective and prove that how a nation-state can implement minority policy under its reign on ethnic cultural fusion and guide it toward an authentic social harmony. In a similar vein, China is trying to implement a minority governance policy to guarantee a united interethnic relationship and a unified citizenship identity through maintaining their diverse languages' and cultures' coexistence. Through institutional school education, through daily informal media exposure, the governmental strategy of the state tries to reach as many citizens as possible with extra efforts labeling minority members as Chinese citizens, promoting their support for the Party, and maintaining their harmonious relationship with the Han majority.

Multiple scholars' works focus on the power and impact of state's ideology, which is believed to be able to weigh on people's identity formation. Through examining human society's development in different historical stages, it is not doubted that collective identity formation and development is a natural accompanying product of institutional and informal socioeconomic, political development (Gellner 1983, 1994, 1997; Anderson 1991; Arendt 1973, 1978, 1998; Gramsci 1971; Forgacs 1988; Jessop 2005). When the state came into existence and struggled to survive there arrives the collective identification of citizens to themselves and to the political institution they develop within, and this collective identity develops on the foundation of accumulated cultural and political heritage invented or obtained by the state. During this process, "high culture" is invented by the state and dominated by its ideology to homogenize citizens' identity throughout the modernization process. Transforming or reforming the state politics successfully and acceptably can grant a regime more authority and legitimacy, more resources and accountability to further govern its people without rebellion. Policies serve for this purpose thus essentially serve as instruments for the implementation of state's ideology rather than value-free policy frameworks. Meanwhile, the by-product of these political, socioeconomic developments and reforms, such as a growing supportive middle class, better foreign exposure, higher religious freedom, or more pragmatic cooperation from the political opponents, are expected to facilitate to harmonize politics among different ethnic and socioeconomic groups rather than taking place for granted (Chang 2004; Mackerras 1994, 1995).

From the 1970s to the 1980s, the Great Debate on nationalism already has focused intensively on how has nation-state come into existence and has been maintained, the discussion on its development yet has not become out-of-date at all as new challenges emerge confronting the traditional role of state as our world globalizes. At the start, the argument was about the order of nation-state's becoming and citizenship identity's birth between modernists and perennialists; while nowadays, either being ethnic-rooted or citizenship-significant, citizenship identity is discussed to observe how it serves as an outcome of intermingled cultural and sociopolitical developments. It is argued in this book that the state, especially a

less democratic one, could not only invent or “imagine” nation to a decisive degree, but also learns to maneuverably deploy strategies that do not explicitly indicate the governmental ideology behind to influence minorities’ identification, by territorializing a governmental space either coincides with their geographical autonomous terrain or not, with the state. By implementing these instrumental policies in the regional autonomy mechanism, especially through political socialization campaigns at school and via media in China, minority citizens’ citizenship identity development is nurtured by the historical, cultural heritage and contemporary political dynamic, it possesses real power in facilitating to maintain the political discourse and even enforce the political authority to adapt its strategies.

Believing that human freedom is the ultimate purpose for which the history is becoming, quite a number of philosophers’ arguments on the role that state plays are also reexplored in terms of identity politics research. From communitarianism, totalitarianism, to cultural hegemony and metagovernance, cliché and niche concepts are reinterpreted within the globalizing context to understand how illiberal/nondemocratic state is reinventing instruments to realize its governing ideologies and to facilitate its citizens to reach their equilibrium between being autonomous and being governed (Hegel and Miller 1998; Plant 1984; Arendt 1978; Habermas 1994; Hoig 1988; Gramsci 1971; Jessop 2006). Inheriting the philosophical arguments from the masters, later researches propose how the formation of citizenship identity notably happens through state’s supervision of education, propaganda, and other relevant political socialization channels (Bourdieu et al. 1993; DiMaggio 1979; Habermas 1994; O’Mahony 2010). Various terms about the territorialization process of this (Elden 2005, 2006, 2009, 2013; Crampton and Elden 2007; Bourdieu and Passeron 1990; Bourdieu 1993; Habermas 1994, Verstraeten 1996), such as habitus, public sphere, terrain, are raised to illuminate the process of citizenship identity formation and maintenance within the cultural boundary of nation and the political boundary of state. The autonomy practiced within state hence could expand beyond geographic boundary as the possibility of a new mobile public space arises, more importantly it serves or is originally expected to serve as an instrument of governmental ideology for nation-state (Crampton and Elden 2007; Lears 1985; Barry et al. 1996; Larner 2000; Lemke 2002). State as a source of coercion, and instrumental policies as real practices, manage to mediate global capital expansion’s impact on domestic political power maintenance by paying attention to citizens’ collective identity (Castres 2007; Deleuze and Guattari 1987). The citizens within a nation-state can obviously be ethnically and culturally diverse, when their citizenship identity socialized through state’s policy is expected to be developing at a unanimous pace, common ideological and cultural collective memory become catalyst to accelerate the process of identity socialization, such as cultural customs, civil, religious, and political believes. One fundamental different perspective neo-Marxism offers differently from neoliberalism in terms of citizenship identity formation is that how state could consciously and deliberately monitor this process with instrumental policies (Fukuyama 1992; Dimitrova-Grajzl et al. 2010; Turner 1990, 1993, 2004). State, still as a force of coercion through much less rigid and overt policy implementation different from the past, is more

capable and aware to manage to recruit stateless people and to consolidate minorities' identification under the reign of its governmental instruments in the new era (Scott 2009).

Ideology of Communism and Civil Religion of Confucianism: Discretionary Power Over Civil Society for Chinese Citizenship Identity Development

Continue from the discussion above, ethnic cultural diversity underpins the flexibility of citizens' identity formation while cultural hegemony constrains it throughout political socialization process. Political ideology or ideology-like way of thinking from the superstructure level has the dominant impact on economic and social life of citizens, while with the degree varies from the most politically and economically liberal societies to the illiberal ones, it tends to be realized through both social cultural and political measures without explicit distinction. Not entirely divergent from the Marxist tradition, it does embrace an emancipation from political manipulation of resources by recognizing that the sustainable maintenance of its own political discourse cannot stay away from being a conjuncture of social, cultural, and economic history. However, difference and diversity are not particularly well preferred on the traditional Left. A communism state tends to rationalize its policy making and governance by claiming its representation of the common good and justice for its citizens, which overpasses the significance of a variety of rights and demands from the citizens. Facing political diversity, the Marxism tradition reveals its impoverished condition as the monologist concept of class struggle stays as the sole foundation, thus plurality is not considered but antagonism is welcomed (Derrida 1993; Borradori 2003). Identity, instead of being a transparent accomplished fact, should be conceived as a product of infinite historical fluidity representing civil society's relationship with state. The more constrained or even nonexistent a civil society is, the more dominant cultural hegemony will be from the state (Turner 1986, 2001; Marshall 1981). Especially in a society with both political and cultural traditions of worshipping the belief of becoming oneness and making all citizens "equal", there would be less struggle and resistance from the civil society in response to the enforced governmental or even political strategies from the state. Diasporas culture also has an indispensable impact on an ethnic or cultural group's identity formation in terms of oneness and shared culture, which both profoundly impact the identity politics in the postcolonial and postmodern world as it provides another dimension with transnational geopolitical and governmental boundaries. A collective "one true self" is a delicate equilibrium reached via balancing the many superficial or artificially imposed "selves" by multilevel authorities along these boundaries, constructed by a shared history, collective memory, or one common ancestry, one fatherland (Schopflin 2000; McCarthy 2009).

In some societies, just as why we are discussing the post-communism ideological legacy, the secularization effort of either religions or civil cultural believes cannot be complete, because civil culture is an complicated composition of cultural, religious, and ideological elements inherited from different stages of history and development. Communism, as one of the most powerful ideologies existing in our world, has “kept societies in a cocoon of ignorance about the rest of the world and thereby deprived them of acquiring the cognitive equipment for dealing with rapid change” (Schopflin 2000, p. 107; McCarthy 2009), which makes the post-communism ideological transition a rather long and volatile experimental process. Problems arise as communism fades into history, because actions have already been taken to destroy the old moral criteria without establishing new ones and getting the according universal acceptance, it is thus still challenging to enhance state’s legitimacy to end the questioning and threats it faces. The assumed political aliens, the ideological others at this time function as the buffering zone toward where political resentment could be directed, they could be a common historical enemy like Japan, or a local ethnic minority who is politically uncompetitive. Usually ideological thinking, like many other collective believes, is regarded as incompatible of their counterparts within one society. By antagonizing its competitors, conservative ideological thinking functions in a destructive spiral rather than a constructive pattern. Even within one Diasporas ethnic culture, there cannot be one homogeneous belief due to political and economic development divergences. Cultures, especially Diasporas cultures, always contain elements that could serve as either advantage or disadvantage for identity development within a certain political discourse. If the cultural elements reaffirm the ideological value advocated by the state, political identity is re-enhanced; if the cultural elements clash with the mainstream political value, then the political identity would face more challenges and uncertainties rather than blesses.

In the post-Cold-War era, the pervasive Western discourse convinces us to follow and think in the so-called “global” power layout and experience ourselves as either insiders or outsiders against the Global North (Said 1978; Crampton and Elden 2007; Barry et al. 1996; Lerner 2000; Lemke 2002). No matter in Eastern or Western political cultures, the representation of citizens in politics explains how people distribute power and compromise to resources distribution mechanisms, knowledge is transferred and consensus is consolidated through the multidimensional power interactions. The transfer of knowledge greatly impacts people’s identity formation, which is in a more internalized way even though indirectly guided by external powers. Positioning a subject or a group of people as one of “others” then govern it in a politically hegemonic discourse which is different from subjecting them to a type of “knowledge”, as the latter focuses on the inner compulsion of power and subjects’ voluntary willingness to compromise and convert their identity. Even though traditionally communism does not prefer this soft socialization strategy, adapted version of this ideology or derived forms of this collective belief bear impressive potentiality to the political authority as a channel to generate more inner compulsion within citizens to strengthen their identification with state’s legitimacy.

Ideological development process, being significant in terms of shaping people's collective identity, is defined to be both the cause and re-enhanced outcome of "the impact of inherited patterns of cognition, the types of reasoning, and the structure of expectations and self-definitions" within a society (Arendt 1978, 1998; Schopflin 2000, p. 99). The common belief and self-identification with a transcendental law is the beginning of accepting an ideology, in this sense civil religions accumulated through cultural and historical experience have always in fact prepared citizens for their later ideology digestion and selection. Ideological thinking therefore is a power game of logically reinventing the preexisting cultural and ideological codes in one society while decoding the other ideological signals introduced from other resources (Arendt 1973). As for ethnic minorities with Diasporas connection, hybridity is one constant feature under the combined influence of globalization and state politics, the dynamic of which also offers state an opportunity to approach various resources to reproduce themselves anew. An emancipation from the dominance of communism ideology has made the impact from Diasporas more significant, when people have the capacity of re-innovating these diverse ideologies for their own development, the moment would become free instead of constraining for the minority (Miller 1995), the occurrence of many social and political conflicts could be explained by this observation and interpreted differently with less judgment based on cynicism. Culture by nature is not homogeneous, through the reinvention of it could work in a manner to facilitate cooperation and compromise for identification unity to secure political legitimacy of nation-state (Schopflin 2000). Even within a homogeneous culture, it might still be slow and difficult to transform the ideology belief and people's identification with it, its specific combination with culture would turn itself and the world surrounding it into its unique version of world-making, either as a faulty or authentic cognitive process. The group of people in power of leading the ideology shaping, such as cultural elite groups, political governing authority, or ethnic majorities, often selectively utilizes the part of history or reality in its preference, converts it into a normative proposition before imposing it on the people collectively. Whoever in charge of distributing the relevant resources is in great power to manipulate the governmentality process and other relevant governance instruments. In an imbalanced political power pattern, how ideological context is shaped often becomes risky, just like the situation in many communism, authoritarian, and illiberal democratic countries. "No community comes innocent into the world" (Demick 2010), when certain ideology embeds itself within certain culture, power distribution and relevant application could decide the derived collective thinking and generate immense power in shaping people's collective social behavior. In a society with a strong political state leadership such as communism, it provides ground rules with the support of state political apparatus and thus could afford to care less about the authenticity of policy efficacy, such as through prison, police, and media censorship. Currently, many states emphasize the development of ethnic nationalism as they realize how much power they can still extract from this traditional idea. Through market reform and ideological depoliticization, the obverse of discretionary power has left behind societies with a hazy idea of what can and cannot be

achieved through politics, which explains why in many post-communism political cultures there is either belief vacuum or belief chaos. Religion, or any pervasive collective belief, plays a similar role like culture in “the conservation of ideological thinking, though not in the most obvious way” (Schopflin 2000, p. 104). The populist discourse or relevant ones become popular as it tends to explain the regime’s own political govern failure by referring to an antagonized “enemy”, as a weak way to demonstrate who “we” are.

As pursuing a neo-nationalism civil collective belief offers new hope, we have to come back to what we have already briefly discussed in the introduction, Confucianism. Confucian cultural tradition is another path explored by reflecting on political ideological development in the post-communism China. More than a century ago when intellectual predecessors like Kang Youwei and Liang Qichao were blueprinting China’s civil religion development before communism was introduced and bloomed in China, both argued that a renewed China under traditional Confucian ideology would entitle the Chinese with “both the ability and responsibility to subjugate the ‘white race’ and rule the world” (Chang and Turner 2012). “Confucian universalism” could work with and coexist with Han chauvinism well in terms of stabilizing social harmony (Gries 1999, p. 64). China has been ruling its “barbarians” living by its ancient kingdoms’ border for thousands of years within the ancient tribute system, it has also gone through a rough modernization path by fighting against different foreign colonization powers on the international political stage. There is an opaque boundary between the positive and negative interpretation of this cultural legacy as China’s expected and becoming role in current international politics stays unclear. It both wants to get rid of the image shaped by its humiliating modern history and restore its ancient “central kingdom” glory, yet has to be careful as its rise still often is read as the rise of the last communism that works. Homogenous and hegemonic root of ideology evolvement in China goes back earlier before the import of communism ideology, as Kang Youwei, Liang Qichao, and Sun Yat-sen, the most famous masters as China’s last great Confucians, all argue for the importance of a renewal of “yellow race” against “white race”. The great ethnic unity thus is not only about ethnic harmony within China, it is also about unifying diverse ethnicities as “one Chinese” to confront the “Western other”, which is almost identical with what communism claims during the Cold-War era. The longing for a great rejuvenation of Chinese Nation could thus be interpreted as reviving another version of the ancient tribute system of Chinese Han-centered orders by combining with its modern political experience of semi-colonization and communism. Since its very ancient history, the strong belief in the universal availability of its own value leaves China as a rough partner who could “harden boundaries when barbarians do not accept Chinese values” (Gries 1999, p. 64), which is also not new and unique to its communism experience alone. Thus as long as the identification with its sole political authority is not challenged, the Communist Party concurs the adoption of Confucianism in reinstalling a prosperous nationalism, many core values of Confucianism advocates are about loyalty to the existing political, gender, and familial authority, which helps the authority to socialize its Han and minority citizens to maintain as certain social order. Neither

Confucianism nor communism would necessarily thin out nationalism, all together they could contribute to a racism-sponsored and ideology-supported nationalism. As communism pursues ideological dominance and Confucianism culturally seeks to become the common moral foundation for civil religion, they naturally become armament tools for an unconditional defense of Han-superior culture, China-centered and state-dominant political worldview. This kind of national aspirations or patriotism complex serves as a kind of seemingly dilution yet actual enhancement of political ideology, as they could be more flexible and less didactic to approach legitimacy for the political authority's governmentality process. However, the communism state's role is viewed as the society's exploiter, and its central focus has often been regarded as "an enormous concentration of power and a homogenization of society" (Schopflin 2000, p. 171). As an ironic consequence, the more difficult the state finds about rooting out nationalism and other relevant traditional cultural elements, the more likely it ends up in aligning with it or arms itself up with this instrument. Partially because how limited the communism state trusts civil society and the culture nurtured within it, also partially because how dependent it has to be on civil society in order to maintain its legitimacy in the long run. The communism state usually ends up in constructing or maintaining easy, visible but mostly unauthentic cultural legacies, thus modernization and industrialization cannot be a complete and organized process due to a lack of authentic cultural foundation and ideological emancipation, which in long term would threaten the legitimacy and accountability of nation-state.

"Just", "mutual obligation", and "civil contract (*minyue*)" are emphasized values by Confucianism, which accepts that the governing is in power and the governed is passive. How citizens and civil society view and accept this power pattern exactly explains why the Western sample of democracy has not rooted in Chinese society (Chang and Turner 2012). Conflicts and solving them through social contract is not considered to be real success, a regime within which the ruler cares for the spiritual and material development of the subjects it rules with the latter understanding and trusting the former with their welfare and well-being is more commonly considered as the ideal type of governance in Confucianism. Thus deriving a common understanding from common ideological belief, be it Confucianism or communism, and further configuring out common interests then obeying a certain social order to pursue the goal, is a potential formula for political harmony within Chinese society. Both the contemporary China and other East Asian countries once heavily influenced by its ancient cultural ideology have revealed how conservative they can be when the issue of *individual autonomy* or *sovereign individual* rises, because this kind of term is totally new to the Confucian cultural tradition.

When communism revolution came to China, it embeds and interweaves its ideological components within the established cultural context rather than being able to root the old pattern out. In other East Asian countries, even when Western democracy has been introduced and adapted to develop impressively, ethnic homogeneity and loyalty to traditional Confucianism culture can still keep brewing the belief in collectivism but not individualism. China, being ethnically diverse, replaced it with a politically homogeneous belief of communism to guarantee

collective loyalty to the political authority. It reckons less rising challenges at the start because it connects itself up to the Comintern as universal standard and down to the proletariat as universal care for the grassroots interests, yet it has to look for new directions as ideological confrontation and absolute state authority fade into history. Among the communism pioneers, Lenin from former Soviet Union formulates the policy of “national in form, socialist in content”, which aims to unite people from different ethnic backgrounds but eventually implement communism ideology. In communists’ view, the class struggle and the proletarian mission of overthrowing the capitalism, usually represented by the USA, enjoys the primary priority. Hence the social, cultural, and ethnic development of minority is the governing mediation rather than goal, and relevant autonomous policy serves as instrument rather than the purpose. This belief is widely adopted in most communism countries, as the ideology itself never aims to mediate interethnic cultural differences, the hermeneutical high-land communism claims have allowed political authority to store criticism up as long as it constructs the discourse of ultimate class struggle (McCarthy 2009). This belief has naturally granted supreme power to the communism state, which monitors the development of multiculture and languages from an ideologically conservative stance. Communism believes that by setting out to destroy the old cohesions within a society, which blindly believes that unity and harmony would be easily achieved because other “superficial” measures do not solve concrete social conflicts anyway. Like many other religions or civil religions like Christianity and Confucianism, becoming one within the society is the ultimate goal, even though the path leading to becoming one and how to define the one in specific format could differ tremendously. Further danger lies in the understanding and reinterpretation of subgroup differences such as local ethnic histories and relevant legitimacy of political regimes. Communism holds a static perspective over the political evolvement, as it obviously foresees “an ultimate classless society” as the goal. Thus it does not favor diversity and dynamic essentially, neither trusts nonzero-sum political game because battles among classes are necessary and only one class should win out. It barely has constructed any mechanism in monitoring the potential political and cultural transformation, the sense of obligation and mission to establish an ultimate happy society has explained the arrogance of communism party in being ineffective to find a more convincing alternative to replace the coercive and discretionary manner of governance.

In terms of minority political life, communist party usually consider itself as the savior of minorities from their previous original and disadvantaged political development stages, which further waives the possibility of negotiating to define real autonomous right in minorities’ favor since it is already considered as a gift. Class is the dominant form of social group categorizing criteria, and class remains as the only criteria that need to be worked on until it “disappears”. This mentality explains phenomenon beyond communism period in China, in the post-Cultural Revolution China especially since the Opening and Reform in 1978, the economic development has benefited not only the Han majority but also the minorities, among whom especially the growing middle class have highly recognized the legitimacy and authority of political leadership for endowing them with economic prosperity.

Yet the economic development itself has not concretely answered the political identity confusion at all, though it temporarily creates a false consciousness of harmony, the foundation for its sustainable development could not be consolidated as long as the political disparity exists. As the political and social discourse still works in majority's advantage, minorities cannot secure their economic and cultural achievement facing the overwhelming competition with the majority, they are doomed to end up suffering a double disadvantage as being marginalized citizen and economic development victim in the long run. Cultural Revolution has represented this situation in its apex, since ethnic identity and its development are regarded as an outcome of class inequality rather than a culturally divergent ethnic diversity, minority's development is considered as the class conflict and a lower stage minority "thing". The formal political minority representation in cultural, social, and political institutions thus becomes more symbolic decoration of the political slogans instead of being authentic and meaningful. Since communism emphasizes the singular discourse of class difference, social and cultural diversity is antagonized totally in order to "block the potential for the evolution of cross-cutting, multilayered identities" (Schopflin 2000, p. 246). As a way to waive out political risk for the political regime, a state machine under the leadership of communism party, or even a post-communism one, thus would only experiment to develop without an emancipated civil society, where responding to citizens' diverse identity demands does not have to be considered as a necessity like in a Western democratic civil society.

Historical Evolvment of Chinese Nationalism as a Construction of Civil Religion

Liang Qichao (1873–1929) is one of the earliest intellectuals who started questioning the relationship between individuals and political system within Chinese cultural and political contexts when the Qing Dynasty began to collapse in early twentieth century. He put "an important emphasis on the idea of the citizen as a new creation with a moral purpose" (Chang and Turner 2012, p. 28) and suggested to renew and recreate these terms from top-down by reestablishing Confucianism as the national civil religion, even though it did not happen but somehow was achieved by another "political religion" of communism. The ancient Tributary System, Sinocentrism (*Huayi* Order), and Confucianism as the national civil religion have greatly impacted scholars' thinking about ethnic politics and minority governance in China. In the modern history of China, Sun Yat-sen is another most influential predecessor advocating and promoting the idea of Chinese nationalism. His early perception of this issue is expressed somehow in racial terms by arguing that Chinese is a *single pure yellow race*. He promoted this idea by claiming the illegitimacy of Manchu ruling Qing Dynasty (AD 1636–1912) and Mongolian ruling Yuan Dynasty (AD 1271–1368) in Chinese history, as Han is the only

ethnicity that can legitimately rule the massive central plains (*Zhongyuan*) of China. This claim of his is highlighted by his famous slogan of “drive out the Tatar slaves and revive China” (*Quchu Daru, Huifu Zhonghua*).¹ In the early years of Sun Yat-sen’s researches on the concept of Chinese nationalism, being anti-Manchu (*fanqing*) is an indispensable component of his blueprint for a revived nation and a free republic for the Chinese (mainly Han) people. The interesting finding is that even before communism was introduced, Chinese culture has a tradition of xenophobia. However, Sun later modified his racial view of Chinese nation by proclaiming the “Republic of Five Nationalities” (*Wuzu Gonghe*),³ with an emphasis on the paternalism and superiority of the Han ethnicity. The coexistence and codevelopment of multiethnicities later had become the governance philosophy of Japanese Manchukuo yet only not in a Han-centered manner. According to him, it is anticipatable that all the nationalities would join “a single cultural and political whole” (Mackerras 1995, p. 56), all the Chinese should be a unified nation embracing all the different nationalities under the leadership of the Republic. On the basis of this concept, Sun Yat-sen first raised the appellation “Chinese Nation” (*Zhonghua Minzu*) in his declaration speech given to foreign countries representing the Nanjing Provisional Government of the Republic of China in January 1912, when he also announced that the form of government was going to be the Republic of Five Nationalities.

As communist ideology spread over China in the early twentieth century, the Chinese Communist Party brought up a different solution for the multiethnic issue in China. In 1931,⁴ the First National People’s Congress of the Chinese Workers, Peasants, Soldiers under the Soviet Regime passed the *Constitution Outline of the Soviet Republic of China* and *Resolution on the Minority Issues within Chinese Territory*, which criticized the phenomenon of “great Han chauvinism”. The 1931 Constitution of the Chinese Soviet Republic has confirmed that “all Mongols, Huis, Tibetans, Miaos, Lis, Koreans, and others living within the territory of China enjoy the full right of self-determination, that is, they may either secede from the Union of Chinese Soviets or set up their own autonomous regions” (Mackerras 1995, p. 72). Although the CCP later withdrew this prerogative proposal in 1935 by only asserting the unsurpassable rights of the working class (Knight 1985), the basic autonomous right of minorities was justified for the first time in official documents

¹The revolutionary guideline of Chinese Alliance founded by Sun Yat-sen in Japan, 1905.

²At that time, many ethnic groups were not living within a legitimate regime together, so here I adhere to the academia’s definition on multiethnic relationship at that time using the term “nationality”.

³According to him, China is a unity of five “nationalities”, namely the Han people, the Mongols, the Manchus, the Tibetans, and the Muslim Turks (Hui).

⁴The Soviet Republic of China, which was founded on November 7, 1931 and announced as canceled on October 6, 1937, is an initial experiment during the early years of CCP as a rudiment government, with the capital in Ruijin of Jiangxi province. The official legitimate government representing China at that time is still the Republic of China, who regards the Soviet Republic of China as the armed rebellion separatism.

in China. According to these legislative documents, the nature of ethnicity governance in China is defined as the relationship between the Han majority and other ethnic minorities, and these minorities were assumed to entitle to full autonomous rights. It is fair to comment that the Chinese Communist Party for the first time in modern Chinese history set the tone of ethnic minority governance by defining the multiethnic governance in a Han-centered discourse and granting minorities the basic but complete autonomous right to govern themselves.

When People's Republic of China was founded, the Party and the central government had highly supported the general liberal approach of minority governance. Among different concepts and theories that scholars and officials had explored, one of the most commonly cited view is Fei Xiaotong's United in Diversity (*Duoyuan Yiti*) of the Chinese nation. It argues that Chinese Nation contains 56 ethnicities, but the whole Chinese Nation is much more than just summing up these 56 ethnicities, as with the proper integration of these interdependent 56 ethnicities, two layers of identities would function, namely their own ethnic identity and an integrated higher level national identity. The central tenet of this integrated identity is a shared destiny and responsibility, which were further illustrated by Fei's followers into the multilayer identity about ethnic belongingness (Chen 1994, 2000; Li 2007). What Fei Xiaotong emphasized here is that when the integration takes place, there must be a central player to unite everyone around itself, and Han majority will be the center of Chinese Nation, it has to unite and transform the multiple players into an integrated unity. This point about multilayer ethnic identity is very ideal as it assumes that the central common Chinese national identity on top of other layers would not compete or even compress the diverse sub-ethnic-identities.

However, "the cultural apparatus, so to speak, allowing one to identify with the Chinese nation, no longer exists" after Cultural Revolution (Turner 2004, p. 10). Both domestically and internationally, China needs to re-position itself and remedy its people's spiritual development path. But there is only fragment debris left from the past of the nation's culture and history. The weakening Confucianism or traditional Chinese value system in general has already announced a less possible complete return to Confucianism for the reshaping of Chinese nationalism (Levenson 1964; Tu 1985; Kim 2014). There are contending views on how China, as a whole nation, should seek a new position for its national identity in the postcolonial modern era (Tu 1985). Especially since the Opening and Reform policy was implemented, the demand for exploring a renewed collective identity as Chinese citizens exploded, yet the traditional Confucianism and the dominant Western discourse in globalization do not seem to naturally codevelop well in meeting this demand. There is no doubt that how does one political regime brew its own culture through digesting different cultural assets is a gradual and complicated process, it is even argued that the collapse of Confucianism as a civil religion started when Manchu ethnicity grasped political power in China during Qing Dynasty, as Confucianism traditionally depends on Han-ruled political apparatus to survive (Tu 1995). The residue of Confucianism and other relevant cultural elements deeply rooted in Chinese individuals' daily practices still provides the

foundation for a political utilization or institutionalization of Confucianism. By encouraging the revival of Confucian traditional values, civil religion and civil society could even cultivate a healthier citizenship identity in long term because it is gradually developed out of history and properly consolidated within the grassroots society. Han chauvinism, with the minorities surrounding it whose portrayal is objectified and exoticized “is essential to the construction of the Han Chinese majority, the very formulation of the Chinese ‘nation’ itself” (Gladney 1994, p. 94). The political authority in China has been persistent about creating the political “otherness”, through the exposure to usually the exotic traditional ethnic customs and cultural traditions. During Cultural Revolution, many minority bilingual schools were forced to convert to only Chinese teaching. Many minority teachers and cadres were also persecuted simply because they are minority, “more than 75 % postsecondary school instructors were dismissed” in Korean-minority autonomous region during the Cultural Revolution (Lee 1986, p. 91). A natural consequence is that even two decades ago, “20–30 % of teenagers in Yanbian do not speak Korean and 50–60 % of children under school age cannot speak Korean” (Lee 1986, pp. 91–93). The new *Constitution of 1982* redefined and guaranteed the right of autonomy and freedom of minority nationalities, and the actual outline of how things will change was introduced 2 years later with the *Law on Regional Autonomy for Minority Nationalities* (LRAMN) in May of 1984. Article 36 of LRAMN has articulated that in accordance with the educational policy of the state and legal provisions, autonomous organs of the national autonomy areas can decide on the establishment of various kinds of schools, educational system, guiding principle for running schools, contents of courses, languages of instruction and admission system of the schools. The political authority representing Han majority’s interest predominantly has been investing efforts to renew a re-representation of minorities in terms of shaping itself as a multicultural governance authority. By exploring local minority tourism resources, encouraging minority art activities launched by either Han or minority artists, such as music and literature, the element of minority culture is borrowed to reshape the image of CCP’s multiethnic and multicultural civil space governance capability (Oakes and Sutton 2010). For example, in Jilin Province, the tourism resources of *Changbai* Mountain, *Ji An* county, and *Maple Valley* (*Hongye Gu*) are explored intensely in recent decades to reclaim the state’s ability to shape and market an authentic minority cultural image representing relevant minorities. The market is not always absolutely authentic, minority cultural branding by the majority political authority thus could become a legitimate practice for a state like China, whose governance hegemony is backed up by the central Party and the Han majority.

Nowadays, the Chinese authority emphasizes “raising comprehensive national power” and “rejuvenating the Great Chinese Nation (*Zhonghua Minzu Weida Fuxing*)”. Mandarin, alongside with other Han-majority cultural assets, increasingly become the prior resources utilized by the political authority to socialize minorities; besides knowledge transfer and potential increase of social capital, national collective memory of all the citizens is expected to be reshaped under supervised political socialization process. For instance, the Japanese invasion history during

WWII is heavily utilized in cultivating xenophobia complex and re-enhancing historical patriotic memories among both majority and minority citizens; in 2015, China held an unprecedented military parade on the Victory Memorial Day of WWII, later in October, the Nanjing Massacre also successfully applied to become the UNESCO's cultural heritage. As the suspicion over the continuous necessity of minority regional autonomy rises due to minority population drain into big cities in China or foreign countries, Xi raised the guideline of *Eight Insists* in October, 2014, with the last "insist" restating the significance of ethnic issues and national unity. A liberal minority governance reform, suggested by scholars such as Ma Rong, appears unlikely as Xi's governance philosophy proves that international discourse somehow would have to surrender to domestic power politics in China.

From the above discussion we can conclude that culture and history paths contribute to ideological forming contingency in their own way in the post-communism China. During Cultural Revolution, the Party disastrously scaled back its governance of civil society and destroyed the foundation of civil culture in China. The pressure for the post-communism China to transit its political dialogue contribute to a still conservative governmentality philosophy, as liberalizing one's economic status or even cultural status (assuming it is authentic) is far from being considered as realizing real individual autonomy until politically one can reign itself.

Culturally Nurtured Human Rights Perspectives, Territorialization, and Instrumental Autonomy

The culturally nurtured and politically fostered understanding about minority rights within certain geopolitical areas become greenhouse for instrumental autonomy, through which the state connects with civil society by mobilizing political socialization process. The attitude toward the state does not shape overnight, it takes shape through history and should always be thickly interpreted within its historical scenario. Turner, in his series of works, argues for the distinction between social rights granted from one's citizenship and human rights granted from one's human being identity within a society (Turner 1986, 1990, 1993, 2001, 2004, 2007). Social rights bring guarantee of social upward mobility, and provide the citizens with other political or social benefits. The consensus on it derives from the common belief on certain political ideology, through implementing the political contract in one society, different groups of people fit in their habitus and realize their social rights. Human rights is a different and wider concept though, it is intermingled with the concept of social rights yet it goes further beyond that, the culture and history nurture different political and nonpolitical believes, which all ultimately impact the way citizens think who they are and how do they realize themselves within a society. Communism, as the ideology that shapes citizenship of Chinese citizens, benefit more than conflict with the believes that shape the general perception of

human rights in China, such as education and family culture nurtured by Confucianism. “Human rights rather than citizenship rights are better equipped to deal with modern migrations, Diasporas, and multicultural societies than the narrow and restrictive assumptions of citizenship” (Chang and Turner 2012, p. 19), it is thus flexible to understand that, beyond the political context, there are many factors that shape individual’s belief in who they are and how should their social life function. The natural evolvement of culture through thousands of years of history naturally grants people their own version of understanding human rights and the according role of the state. If people have different degrees of acceptance regarding the coerciveness of the state, how diverse and dynamic policies can be implemented in certain political contexts become understandable, as citizens’ acceptance of contemporary politics has historical reasons (Hegel and Miller 1998; Plant 1984). By the time it can be called community, it has acquired a quantity of cognitive baggage that will allow it to see certain process and to screen out others. Collectivity by being collective, already indicates that citizens have reached certain social or even political consensus, which dynamic process has make the entire history and lived past or memory significant.

In the context of either democratic or authoritarian regimes, either Eastern or Western cultures, politically socializing the citizens is one of the most efficient tools of governmentality. Various collective believes such as ethnic nationalism, patriotism, and political believes would all have a chance to compete for becoming the dominant governmentality instrument. “The Confucian self is a social self, not a self-choosing autonomous individual”, which appreciates the harmonious relationship with society, the kind and the quality of sociality brewed within a Confucian culture generates “a relatively thicker social self than its liberal counterpart”, in its most authentic sense, is driven from within by means of what Locke called ‘inward civility’ (Kim 2014, p. 29 and 39). Pluralism, as the core of a democratic civil society (Kim 2014), is categorized into three pluralism features liberty, market, and the plurality of material interests (Kim 2014, p. 101). In the case of modern China, the moral well-being of its citizens only gets to enjoy a development within a homogenous ideological context. Although it does not indicate that some of the core values nurtured by Confucianism and other cultural believes would not be collectively applied within a communism or post-communism context. The appreciation of social harmony and the peace after semicolonialization, Civil War and Korean War, naturally makes people coordinate their individual needs to prioritize the nation-state’s stability maintenance. In the case of Korean minority, it does not only work top-down as state’s policy implementation and propaganda, it also takes place from bottom-up as citizens play their Confucian role ethics while reconfiguring their standard of diversity as a cultural and ethnic value. In the case of Korean culture, many essential values of Confucianism, not only in a sense of ceremonial conducts, have become a habit of heart in daily life despite Korean-minority citizens’ different political memberships and religious believes. Besides an individual’s own family, individuals in a Confucian society considers themselves members of a bigger family, the critical thoughts that have laid out solid foundation for citizens’ acceptance of communism

later in China, “despite their awareness of the value of individual identity, individual rights, and value pluralism, nevertheless see themselves as related brothers and sisters or fathers and mothers, who have resolve to sustain their familial public norms and virtues” (Kim 2014, p. 148).

In China or communism states in general, industrializing and urbanization are the primary criteria to assess the success of social transformation, “the city had been used as means of assimilation” especially in a pragmatic and materialistic sense, peasants move from rural areas to cities and workers move from bottom-up within cities, in order to secure one’s social, political status and future upward mobility within the urban discourse, the ethnic code and cultural origin are supposed to fade and stay in the periphery. Through land reform and autonomous regions’ establishment, CCP has built up its legitimacy and consolidated minorities’ consent to be governed on their “domestic territory”, which greatly contributes to shape their identification with their “homeland”. As many minorities reached consent with CCP when PRC was founded over their “land issues”, they found later in civil society that there is no possibility for them to argue for a renewed pattern of discourse, the only solution left is for them to leave their “homeland” if they want something different and more satisfying, even though in the new territory where they land there will still be prejudice and struggles await them. In the communitarian view individual autonomy is important and communism does also emphasize of individual values within a society, but it can only be understood as socially constructed, which is opposed to the more complete autonomy characteristic of much liberal individualistic thinking (Walzer 1995). Further, communitarianism views personal autonomy implying substantial respect for the autonomy of other individuals, as well as preserving the process of self-actualization, hence there is common consensus agreed about the collective welfare in one society.

Ethnicity makes it more complicated, or even more dangerous, rather than useless in the citizen governmentality realm as it incorporates rules and regulations the citizens generally all experience within the state, it further constructs a more emotional rather than rational castle for defending this discourse’s interests. The rigidity of communism and its previous aftermath proves that once legitimacy and authority is set, in the reality the challenge and change against it would have to stay one direction rather than mutual direction. A real democratic regime acts in representing all its citizens, the problems of China’s Democratic Centralism (*Minzhu Jizhong Zhi*) and quota for minority cadres are that it does not stand as a natural right for minorities to represent themselves in the mainstream power game, instead it becomes a total decoration of political mechanism so that representatives would sacrifice what their groups primarily care to incline closer to the mainstream discourse.

For minorities within this territorialization and governmentality process, how to maintain an autonomy becomes a natural concern, minorities in China mostly live and develop through consistent “grudging toleration”, by taking all the civic duties such as “taxation, military service” and being politically obedient without few exceptions from the region and actually still being treated as “second class citizens”. Han majority in China the CCP regime still consider minorities as others,

even when practice is very tolerant, they will be inclined to patronize the minority who live on the same territory thus the latter develops at a lower developmental stage with less authentic autonomy. In 1990s, the “ladder doctrine (*tidui lilun*)” was raised to “encourage uneven development between Han majority areas and national minority areas”, which in fact resulted in the dual marginalization of minorities as they both live in minority autonomous and poor remote regions. For a big nation like China, this differential way of policy shaping seems inevitable, but it challenges the more universally agreed value on basic human and citizenship rights. Critics of China’s way in territorializing its minority citizens claim that it is no different from domestic colonization (Bell 2015), as “a typical colonial economy has been developed in terms of minority–majority relations because minority groups sell their raw materials at a cheaper price and then have to pay a higher price for their consumer goods” (Zheng 1999). Autonomy and territorialization thus have an interesting relationship, as even when minorities are granted with permission of territorial autonomy, there is a chance that the autonomy is hardly an authentic one as governmental strategies are deployed by the political authority to control citizens’ public space and ability to autonomously govern them or to be governed (Crampton and Elden 2007; Elden 2005, 2006; Jessop 2000, 2003).

“Autonomy can be defined as operating at three levels, personal, cultural, and territorial, all three of which have political, cultural, legal, administrative, and other related implications” (Schopflin 2000, p. 283). The highest and most free stage would be personal autonomy, referred to as the ultimate freedom by Hegel as one can authentically and fully decide their identity upon his/her ethnicity, gender, social and educational background, the ideal role of the state would protect this development and guarantee that it would not be discriminated on any ground. The diversity and creativity of one state and the human society as a whole could thus be truly emancipated through pursuing personal autonomy, even though most of the time there are various territorialized boundaries to segregate autonomies from each other. A less ideal but still attractive situation is cultural, or depoliticized autonomy (Desai 2006). By dividing different functions of autonomy, there are three types of autonomy could be categorized, namely territorial autonomy, cultural autonomy, and political autonomy, it offers space for freedom even though not in a comprehensive sense. By paying provision of education and political resources to promote minority’s development through formal institutionalization and various informal exposure, minorities and citizens in general are expected to consolidate their adherence to the political legitimacy of their state. Interestingly, cultural autonomy in reality usually falls within the realm of territorial autonomy, or at least is utilized to facilitate the realization of state’s political interests in a depoliticized way.

Territorialization could be so visible and powerful that it becomes an instrument to explain or a carrier for the development of less institutionalized cultural autonomy. Diversity, not necessarily appreciated, is monitored to develop within single-dimension geopolitical space with the help of cognitive instruments such as propaganda and education in communism and post-communism states. The epistemological belief in ideological homogeneity is the breeding ground for groundless but powerful unfriendliness toward any “otherness”, the moral acceptance of diversity

thus only stays on the territorially segregated different autonomous zones, and they are all under tight political supervision under the state machine. This idea of territorializing both an ethnic group's geographical and cultural space of development is well exemplified in implementation of policies to engage minorities' daily cognitive and social development, until an identity habitus for individuals to realize their maximized autonomy within takes shape. This would continue to exist even when they migrate to other places as internalized habitual space where they would feel at home and at peace. Thus the ideal individual autonomy should actually not be constrained by territorialization at all.

The above-mentioned grudging toleration would have its tipping point, and some minorities would feel the exacerbation of conflict has to result in violent contention, some minorities would skillfully choose to deorbit from the track by protecting both their survival and harmony with the majority, while manage to maximize its benefits in terms of a depoliticized development. However, as for minority, the prejudice they receive in one dimension could be remedied and compensated by respect and recognition in another dimension, which explains the tranquility of some minorities' identity development under political supervision. This proves that the seemingly successful assimilation of minorities is often invalid, the transformation takes too much to be complete and thorough, though with ideological intimacy people would often get the impression of real integrity and harmony.

The sovereignty of nation-state is the hegemonic source of power in facilitating territorialization of geographical and abstract habitus for its citizens, through the instrumentalization and channeling of policies, such as political socialization, rights, and obligations for a group of "us" are clarified for members to commit to unanimously. As aforementioned, the practical problems of a universal human right originate from the irresistible power and willingness of nation-state to interfere (Arendt 1998; Habermas 1994), the Party-led government in China has already in fact ratified a series of international documents in terms of protecting and preserving language and cultural diversity of minority, but at the same time, the enforced or coerced implementation takes place under the regulation of nation-state, since there is no clear and universal checklist of human rights duties and rights, it is up to different nation-states to adapt it to their specific contexts. In this sense, minority and citizen governmentality is more intricately challenging and immeasurable than issues like climate change governance that involve common interests and less politicized governing process.

By establishing the minority autonomous regions, the CCP had been socially and institutionally encouraging Han Chinese people to migrate into Manchuria, which in fact diluted the minority population proportion in autonomous regions. Another evidence is the geopolitical urbanization process, during which Chinese authority propagandizes about the benefits of socioeconomic integration between Han majority and minorities. The democratic and seemingly respectful governing of minorities have hidden the real purpose of hegemonic control, which contains both geopolitically securing territorial sovereignty and governmentally securing positive identification with the state (Bell 2015).

As globalization increasingly takes over state autonomy, “state structures have lost considerable leverage over the economy and this, in turn, has significantly impaired their overall capacity to act”, though state often proves itself of great flexibility and adaptability to still dominate the process of socializing its citizens with primary and fundamental impact (Pierre and Peters 2000, p. 166). China, as a reformed post-communism state, remains as a model of strong state, where its civil society is considerably underdeveloped and not expected to be developed. Creating or cultivating a civil society is the authentic way of allowing real public space to grow for citizens so that they can participate in political life and practice their rights; in other words, it is important to let active citizenship to grow rather than coercively imposing its own version to civil society. North Korea is a typical example indicating how would a state look like when the party and its government install the political and “social” agencies for its citizens to practice their “rights” and realize “autonomy”. A powerful political agency can socialize its political goals through making party membership a social label of being successful instead of interrogating what is really needed in its civil society. The biggest and most outstanding difference between China’s historical revolutions and Western countries is that, Chinese people collectively chose to depend on the “politicized bureaucracy” and grant it supreme power to govern themselves, instead of creating “a conducive environment for the growth of civil rights” (Vogel 1974; Chang and Turner 2012). In this sense, global capital and idea flow shape nation-state’s politics, and civil society nurtured from grassroots level rises to join the transnational dynamic discourse under varied degree of power supervision by nation-state.

National governance developing in the globalizing context invites compelling reasons for the state to invest on identity movements, the traditional discourse is challenged with emergence of universal international standards and a rising global civil society, different cities and various groups of citizens are weaved into an interdependent web of economic and social transnational relations. In a democracy, it operates in the hinge that articulates civil society and state in an open-ended or indeterminate relationship. While in the globalizing and postmodern era, the image of “citizens” has been radically pluralised and hybridized (Thiel and Coate 2010; Turner 2004). Singapore represents a well fitted-in model of national citizenship for especially urbanizing areas and megacities in East Asian political culture. As an urban cosmopolitan state, it glues its highly ethnically diverse citizens not too “stickily” together by providing excellent social welfare and citizen services. Meanwhile, the single-party democracy conducts political conservative governance through innovative urban programs such as “Smart City” in return, in the hope of embracing personal prosperity and civil security at the cost of a more liberal style of democratic politics. If, like Singapore, socially well-hierarchical order and politically democratic order could coexist well, it seems highly probable to inherit both Confucian and communism legacy at the same time. Most importantly, it has to happen in a fairly authentic way. This way of governance leaves space for governmentality and makes it a much easier task to monitor education and media political socialization process as citizens would more likely to be willing to, instead of having to, accept the strategic plan of the state.

State can structure citizens' identity from top-down, but over time it definitely needs "civil society to remain open to change, to variety, to challenges, to living with difference" (Schopflin 2000, p. 29; Turner 2007). Civil society, nation-state, and ethnicity are three conflicted and supplementary elements for a democratic nationhood, if different ethnicities have their roles to play in a civil society and their values to realize in a political state, in the process of forming collective national identity, the ethnicities would follow the political state's choice without resistance. Unlike in democratic countries, where legitimacy is usually a two-way process, the dynamic is not at-all-time mutual in illiberal democratic states (Schopflin 2000). Ruled by consent is the ideal situation for both the rules and the ruled, for non-democratic states the challenge lies in that how to achieve consent in new or changing situation constantly. What if the ruled over time wishes to be ruled differently? Then the problem of trust rises, if the rulers carry no trust then certainly they are not willing to share any power with the ruled. However, if the ruled agrees to be ruled once for all, the rulers are very likely to nurture the sustainability of this momentum to save political costs. The state in China, if stays weak and confused over its transiting period, when the ethnic diversity and civil society's rise warns with instability and uncertainty, would lose citizens' trust and support. Challenges are often exacerbated in the process of seeking consensus in a multiethnic state, the political authority needs to manage multidimensional dynamics to secure continuous recognition of ethnic groups cross their boundaries, and scaling back is the most costless way (Schopflin 2000).

Political Socialization and Identity Habitus

In line with the discussion above on how does nation-state map out strategies to territorialize identity habitus for its minority citizens and facilitate to realize their autonomy through generating the "inner compulsion", a closer look at the relationships among three concepts of objectivity, subjectivity, and intersubjectivity would assist us to better access identity development through political socialization. During the process of political socialization, a collective identity is forged through interactions between "subjects" and "objects". School, state propaganda, family, media, and other political socialization channels are the "objects" that transfer political knowledge, train citizens and implant influences into "subjects' minds" in order to achieve the goal of governing citizens' mental development, and shape a sense of citizenship and political loyalty. The numerous individuals in different political socialization institutions, as "subjects", respond to these political socializing efforts with their collectively formed identity. The construction of ethnic identity is "simultaneously political and psychological" (Allahar 2001, p. 197), the objective perspective is *social* and *institutional* with a focus on the facts during the inputting process, and the subjective perspective is *psychological* and *situational*,

emphasizing the output of identity. Both of these take place in certain political and social contexts, which function as the final catalyst for intersubjectivity to take place. The “intersubjective account of self-consciousness”⁵ that one establishes and confirms one’s identity on the basis of recognition and confirmation from others, and this process is composed of diverse interactions between “objects” of institutions and “subjects” of individuals. This gradual process of accumulating cognitive and attitudinal knowledge takes place intersubjectively. Barry Buzan has also argued that the continuous compromises between culture, political structure, and individuals construct the identity of “us” intersubjectively within a society (Buzan 1997). This identification as a member of “us” is very powerful as it suits the homogenous requirement of most of political ideologies and civil religions, not to mention if the ethnic group is demographically homogeneous already, like Korean minority.

Jessica Benjamin, has further modified the concept of intersubjectivity as “the dynamics of recognition”, claiming the movement of which is multidirectional and ongoing among different “subjects” and “objects”. One way to connect them two is to view them through the perspective of social negotiation, which could be explained by *rational choice* and *power struggle*. Max Weber has pointed out that people with more political power often pursue the support of the majority to legitimize and maintain their power (Weber 1980). In a state with diverse ethnic groups, there would always be a dynamic and collective rational choice process through which minorities would find a balance between their real life choices and their identity. Under the authoritarian Chinese regime, the state no doubt has the overwhelming power and tremendous resources to mobilize political socialization activities and to influence different ethnicities’ political choices that later shape their identity. The Korean minority is selected for its representativeness in developing its own ethnic identity through both the *subjective motives*, which is the ethnicity’s own choice in standing out as Chinese model minority and the *objective influences*, which is a state-led “successful” and peaceful political socialization in China (Okamura 1981).

The conceptual framework of political socialization in understanding identity development is an innovative application that this research contributes to within the field of identity politics study. In China, the role that the state plays in this process can bring a unique understanding or measurement of political institution’s power in minority identity’s construction. This research has chosen one traditional political socialization channel of bilingual education and one transforming political socialization channel of media to observe intersubjective formation of identity in a post-communism society.

⁵He mentions three levels of political identity formation: *love relations* on which the ontological security and the self-confidence of oneself is built, *respect relations* which represents the feeling of being taken into account and civil presence, and the last is *esteem*, which is attributed to a different political culture value criterion.

In terms of governmentality and political socialization's impact on citizens' identity development, contemporary literature could be divided into several major views:

- (1) The *assimilation view* was popular through the early half of the last century. It argues that ethnicity intends to be a cultural term more than a biological one, which means that its identity could be assimilated through political socialization. Stephen Cornell and Hartmann argue that the construction of "new nations" in the postcolonial and post-Cold-War era proves that ethnic identity could reassert itself (Cornell and Hartmann 1998, p. 44). The case of North Korea and South Korea as two countries under different ideologies would be one example that proves different political attitudes at least could be cultivated through different political socialization processes even for the same ethnic group. From this point of view, approaching the political socialization process from the Chinese context becomes necessary to understand the case of the Chinese-Korean Minority's identity formation.
- (2) *Primordialism view*. Clifford Geertz outlines three distinctive ideas in this approach: apriority, ineffability, and affectivity (Geertz 1963). This view holds that ethnic identity is naturally given rather than acquired artificially in a sociological sense, and that its influences are overwhelming and emotional. Be it so with the existence of other socialization processes, the biological links are decisive rather than being just supplementary. Radical as the view seems, it does remind us to pay attention always to the root of the ethnic culture. With a comprehensive understanding of the Korean Diasporas culture, it would be more precise to interpret their attitudes and behaviors, even in the Chinese context.
- (3) The *Circumstantialism view* is also used synonymously with *instrumentalism*, which argues that ethnic identity is a "strategic choice" according to relevant social circumstances, through which members of an ethnic group could get a sense of belonging and certain privileges (Bell 1975). Interest, utility, and rational choice are essential features of this approach. Essentially, circumstantialism views ethnic identity as reforgeable, fluid, and contextual; it argues one step further forward than the assimilation theory by arguing the possibility of different ethnic groups' making pragmatic choices. This view is closer to a modern concept as it brings the subjective collective choices and objective influences together to interpret the formation of ethnic identity, hence the final ethnic identity might be the outcome of numerous interactions on multiple layers.
- (4) The *Constructionism view* shares the fundamental idea with circumstantialism that ethnic identity could be shaped through certain political socialization processes. Additionally, it argues that ethnic identity is not rooted in an ethnic nature but socially constructed with a certain political will that has been implemented from the top-down. Like argued above, ethnic feature is only an instrument. This approach emphasizes the continuous and historical characteristics of ethnic identity construction, which almost abandons the

ethnological features by purely emphasizing collective memory and political education. In other words, collective memory shaping and political education construction would even surpass kinship intimacy in forging an ethnic group's identity. Ethnic identities are "created, elaborated, and recreated in the interaction" between circumstances and the actions of people (Cornell and Hartmann 1998, p. 101). This view provides the understanding of ethnic identity formation as being channeled from both objective influences and the subjective negotiations as a politicized process within a certain political context.

- (5) More updated interpretations of ethnic identity have arisen as we entered the era of globalization. As diverse reinterpretations of the "*new ethnicity*" spring up in recent years, most of them tend to combine the advantages brought along by historic characteristics of ethnicity and our globalization era's core feature together. *Diaspora ethnicity* offers one representative perspective as a loose and broad term that could include labor migrants, refugees, and colonized people in the discussion; especially in this era of globalization it involves increasing demographic and geographic mobility. As more and more attention goes to transnationalism and cultural globalization, "the mobility of people with diverse ethnic affiliations could hardly be overstated" (Anderson 2001, p. 218). The representative works⁶ have pointed out that in the context of globalization, there are mainly two opposite views concerning Diasporas ethnic identity. On the *positive side*, the acceleration of communication and a greater exposure to each other might lead to a higher degree of "tolerance and acceptance" of diversity; on the *negative side*, one might argue that the potential danger of conflicts increases as people become less likely to "ignore one another", especially in a disturbing sense and a conflictual perspective (Allahar 2001). It is positive for a certain state to allow its minorities to communicate more with their diasporas neighbors and develop a border economy; however if the process is not well supervised and controlled, there is a danger from them coming too close in that a potential threat to social stability would be posed. For Korean minority in China, it is a perfect example to examine both positive and negative aspects in its communication with its Diasporas, as it borders both politically with the communist North Korea and economically with the capitalism South Korea. Benefiting from a more open China, the Diasporas layer of its identity has not faded and anticipates an increasing influence in the coming future.

All the above dimensions have emphasized the objective contextual influence on the subjective identity formation, under either the influence of a political authority or the Diaspora culture. Another dimension through which to access ethnic identity

⁶Such as A. Melucci's *Nomads of the Present*, K. Yoshino's *Cultural Nationalism in Contemporary Japan: a sociological enquiry*, A.H. Richmond's *Global Apartheid: Refugees, Racism, and the New World Order*, and L.L. Wong's *Transnationalism, Diaspora Communities and Changing Identity: implications for Canadian citizenship policy*.

is *the timeline view* of ethnic identity development. If we follow any view admitting the influence of postnatal factors in forging ethnic identity, it would argue that ethnic identity is obtained through accumulated knowledge obtained in the political socialization process, especially during one's adolescence period. As Phinney has summarized Henri Tajfel's definition of ethnic identity, it is "part of an individual's self-concept" and derives from his location of himself inside "a social group" with "the values and emotional significance attached to that membership" (Phinney 1992). To developmental psychologists, identity formation is crucial during one's adolescent period, for the memories of this period would generate a huge influence on a single person in his later years. This research, as in most of the ethnic identity research, has chosen the adolescent group as research targets, dividing them further into high school and university groups.

Seems to be more dazzling than it is, political socialization can be understood in three dimensions: first, there are major agencies such as family, school, social network; second, there are different processes such as state-dominated political process, economic process, cultural process; lastly, one person has different stages of political socialization in his life, with the education receiving stage as a teenager as one of the most important and valid stages. Ethnic groups have the tendency toward gregariousness, people tend to collectively evaluate their best interests and reach agreement with a minimum cost. Minorities usually tend to obtain negative identities during this process due to their marginalized political even social space, as Paul Hoggett argues with alien identities or melancholic identities.

Why do some societies make their minorities feel safe, and some others do not? Identity could be either the document that proves you a legal citizen of a certain country, or the "felt identity" (Hoggett 2009, p. 39) that might not always be consistent with the documents, but is telling one where his home is. Different social discourses would forge totally different identities in the corresponding social context—from shame to pride, from grief to anger, from satisfaction to passive assimilation. The Korean minority in China is a minority of high mobility; it is an ethnic minority with frequent transnational activities and diverse local adaptations. It enjoys a bilingual system of education, and has communicated frequently with overseas Diasporas. According to Marcel Mauss, even though persons are aware of their own identity, many social environments may not have effective social channels for them to implement it (Mauss 1950). Even though the Chinese-Korean minority comes from the same ethnic and historic background as North Koreans and South Koreans do, it has certainly formed a system of identity with certain elements unique to itself, by adapting to its political environment for survival and development. Would this unique multidimensional environment be the reason for its peaceful coexistence with other ethnicities in China? Heller argued that "ethnicity becomes important only when social groups come into contact with each other" (Padilla 1999, p. 118), the more complicated the communication process is, probably the more complicated people's political identity would become. Korean minority's identity is a complicated case as it involves multidimensional development, its identity thus needs us to take time and observe.

In the existing literature on studies of the Chinese-Korean minority, Li Jing has already suggested a comprehensive framework with three layers of Korean-minority ethnic identity and initially confirmed its existence through qualitative interviews and field participant observations (Li 2007). Li's work is not based upon theoretical evaluation, as she instead chooses to stratify the concept of ethnic identity according to her empirical observations. Going through other works on Chinese minority governance, there have not been too much surprises in searching for an innovative theoretical debate as most of them carry very limited discussion about minority governance norm. This research tries to compare two channels as an initial effort to find a new way to study Chinese minorities' identity.

Recreation of Public Discourse Space, Bilingual Education and Media as Medium

Both common individual human right and citizen right need space to consolidate and practice itself. "Recognizing the fluidity of identities, their (de-) construction and reconstruction" through political socializing agents thus become interesting to observe (Thiel and Coate 2010), this research will focus on the two political socialization agencies of bilingual education and media, and explains how, along these two processes, the Korean-minority identity could be critically interpreted from the neo-Marxism perspective; and minority youth's identity formation could be rationalized within the state-dominant governmentality politics.

Bourdieu (1993) argues that bilingual education is the governmentality to secure citizens' identity development, "the theory of cultural reproduction is concerned with the link between original class membership and ultimate class membership, and how this link is mediated by the education system" (Sullivan 2002, p. 144).

The goal of ultimate class membership is both about a secure outcome for the governing authority and about a better opportunity for citizens within the specific political system. Social upward mobility and the possession of cultural capital would be the usual expected outcome of the citizens. In an authoritarian regime, the challenge for the state lies in how to configure a balance between the majority and the minorities, as it very likely the dominant culture and language access and advantageous resources. For citizens in a more disadvantaged position, contributing the meritocracy discourse, or whatever the society is taking as the mainstream one, is much more valid and pragmatic than challenging it.

Further argued by Bourdieu, economic capital, social capital, as well as symbolic and cultural capital (Bourdieu 1993) became the content of a constructed *habitus*. Habitus prefers to "a system of embodied dispositions which generate practice in accordance with the structural principles of the social world" (Nash 1990, pp. 432–433). "Cultural capital consists of the possession of legitimate knowledge, habitus is a set of attitudes and values, the dominant habitus is a set of attitudes and values held by the dominant class" (Bourdieu 1989, p. 149), how much people accept the

objective probabilities of future would be reflected as how much they would like to participate in the education and knowledge in-taking process. By internalizing one's "designated fate" socialization takes place in shaping one's identification within a political regime, it is essentially about how to immerse people in a certain culture and brew cultural habitus.

However, either structuralist determinism or phenomenological individualism is systematically pursued, though the society often "objectively" announces the victory of dominant culture and authority, people from all directions shape it together. The socially different educational outcomes have announced the separation between integrated and independent cultural habitus, as compromising to the mainstream discourse is considered as the only way that leads to certain class upward mobility. Because the habitus mediates between structural principles as a property of the culture and as an embodiment of the governmentality principles, the concept of habitus can be categorized into "collective habitus", "dispositional habitus", and "manifest habitus" that further indicate their diverse subdimensions, it is a form of public space (Bourdieu 1989, 1993; Habermas 1989, 1994). Most minority bilingual education programs would emphasize the multiethnic culture feature as the essential tools for preserving one ethnic group's self-consciousness. Tove Skutnabb-Kangas has pointed out that a good educational program should accordingly contribute to ethnic identity development in the following perspectives: "high levels of multilingualism; a fair chance for academic achievement at school; a strong, positive multilingual and multicultural identity, and positive attitudes toward self and others" (Skutnabb-Kangas 1999, p. 42). The purpose of education is about self-realization within a political and social context, they work better when these goals not only satisfy the minority but also satisfy the majority. In China, the ideology of *Chinese Nation Construction* and the *Chinese Nation's Great Rejuvenation* has been a historical task and goal of the Party for years, and the design of all relevant education also operates within this framework. A successful and strong Chinese National identity represents a complicated task of balancing linguistic, cultural, and social diversities. Yet a more brutal and efficient way to conduct this for a state is the coercive path. The Chinese state has initiated various campaigns and programs to create more conditions for this integration.

Language is an omnipresent and indispensable carrier of political socialization information that forging ethnic identity is "a crucial element of what constitutes ethnicity for many individuals" (Padilla 1999, p. 115). In an authoritarian state like China, the parents of Chinese-Korean-minority student could choose to send their children to a Korean-minority bilingual school or to a Han-majority monolingual school. Where the teaching is conducted in Korean and Chinese separately, and the content though still goes under strict system of textbook censorship. From kindergarten level to high school level, bilingual education is available in Chinese minority autonomous regions. Bilingual education at this period is essential to ethnic identity development as it could allow students to inherit the value and obtain cultural capital. Successful bilingual education would also allow a friendly interaction to take place between the minority and the majority in one society. In other words, the minority would have a higher chance to integrate itself into the

majority's mainstream culture. In China, when Korean-minority parents and students themselves see they are not doing well at school, they would worry and show a strong willingness to learn the majority language well because they believe being successful in China means respecting the majority's dominant existence; bilingual education provides both an access to, and a cause of, this loyal pursuit of mainstream culture.

As previously discussed in the introduction, the Korean minority is not a big ethnic group in China in terms of its population and autonomous area, its language and culture thus are on the verge of marginalization. Tove Skutnabb-Kangas has developed two models for education in a multiethnic society: immersion programs for majorities and language maintenance (language shelter) programs for minorities (Skutnabb-Kangas 1999, p. 49). John Edwards has also discussed the concept of "language maintenance" for minority groups, which "assumes greater importance when a minority group and its language are at some risk of assimilation by a more powerful linguistic neighbor" (Edwards 2010, p. 31) like many places in their autonomous regions.

Most minority languages in China are facing quite overwhelming influences of Mandarin, Korean minority is one of the minorities who does impressively in preserving its own linguistic and cultural legacies. A very influential factor that facilitates the objective maintenance, recognition, and even popularity of the Korean language and culture in the autonomous region is the trend of South Korean pop culture (called *Han Ryu* in Korean). Starting in the early 1990s, South Korea became a symbol of fashion, beauty, and traditional Asian virtues as a series of TV dramas, alongside South Korean beauty products, were introduced to many countries in Asia. Attributed to this trend, many Han people increasingly become curious about and interested in Korean culture. This phenomenon has brought unprecedented development opportunities for the Korean minority in China, many of whom start joint-venture businesses with South Koreans, or become active participants in the culture and social communication between China and South Korea. This phenomenon even gains state-level pretermission as it is apolitical and in line with traditional Confucian virtues, as different high-level CCP leaders openly recommend cultural products exported from South Korea. Hence, the promotion of Korean-minority education could be considered as help in the promotion of both a minority education model and Han cultural values.

With the case of Italian migrants overseas, Fortier argues that "habitual spaces" of migrated Diasporas could be reshaped through creating new spaces with its own unique icons (Fortier 2000; Bourdieu 1993), and "media utilization and media impact—the mediatization process by which reality and reactions are increasingly constructed", offers another dimension to observe (Thiel and Coate 2010). Even though Habermas is commonly regarded as a cosmopolitanist, its argument about media and its shaping of citizens' identity actually argues in the favor of a strong state-level governance. Since its origins in the mid-fourteenth century, print media "became new bases of symbolic power which stood in ambivalent relationships with the political institutions of the emerging nation-states", it challenged the

traditional dominance of the Church and the state in controlling information diffusion (Hirst and Thompson 1995, pp. 52–53).

In the twenty-first century, with the emergence of digital media, and especially the widespread popularity of digital news reading and SNSs, technological innovation once again explored a new platform for information sharing and more possibilities for propaganda campaigns, which is not only transnational, but interactive as it is also open to individuals as their own information releasing platforms. Habermas (1989) argued that the media modernity would ultimately generate a transformative impact on modern states' politics, because that the transformation of media would reshape a "public sphere" for people by exposing dissimilar views and "encouraging greater interpersonal deliberation and intrapersonal reflection" (Himmelboim et al. 2013, p. 156).

The major feature of new media in our current era includes "new forms of interaction, new kinds of visibility and new networks of information diffusion", which is expanded with more dialogical possibility beyond restraints of time, space, and language as the modernity of media deepens (Thompson 1995, pp. 52–53). By reinventing the public space, contemporary new media, with the help of information technology, creates new forms of public life that lie beyond the state. Meanwhile, the state can also reshape or re-enhance citizens' collective memory over designing history education and propaganda campaigns on both old and new media platforms. If transnational communication brings more opportunities, individuality can also bring changes in terms of civil society space shaping to respond or even challenge political authorities. Habermas (1989) highlighted the emergence of the bourgeois public sphere and anticipated that media can shape this sphere in a more detached form from the state. In the new mediated public sphere, openness, interaction, and participation are the main highlights, without demanding a common locale, propaganda activities can also detach themselves from political supervision of the state with more possibilities and frequencies.

The increasing presence of new public space balanced by new media is reshaping our contemporary remembrance culture and collective memory, "the rising popularity of the Internet as a vehicle of memory and as a supplement to older forms of commemoration deserves a closer look" as it gains more people's preference (Haskins 2007, p. 401). Not only is the public memory of history being reconstructed and disseminated for the people, but also by the people. Thus depoliticization becomes a powerful trend in citizens' mental development within a political regime. In the modernized digital public sphere, the rhetoric of interwoven historic and contemporary political focuses has generated both more complexity and more possibilities. However, in the case of China, the problem lies in that the original metadiscourse presents a broken record of authentic historical memory, especially after Cultural Revolution. So the state is terrified and fights back by politicizing the media it can control and instilling information to reshape citizens' knowledge and identity.

As more democratizing attributes of new media surge, more individuals can promote history interpretation, and they can freely relate the issues to the contemporary political world. In the encyclopedic environment of new media (Murray 1997),

which functions as a social ideology device, technologies shape our social memory by both the past and the present (Sparacino et al. 2000; Reading 2003). The new media transforms how do we accept, digest, and exchange our ideas and form the identity as “us”. It generates serious challenges to the authoritarian way of governmentality, as how omnipresent and dispersive it can be. New media involving Internet technology and interactive value become a very significant dimension of the reinvented public sphere (Olson 1994; Saljo 2010). The development of new media in a post-communism which is deepening its industrial reform suits the booming demand for individual development, more importantly.

As new media values individuality over conformity, it has brought real challenges for the state. Different digital media users demonstrate different interests, diverse cultural entitlements and varied degrees of authority, how do they navigate their options within the hierarchy of multimedia system is configured around contemporary political dynamic and the different advantages of the media tools they use (Reading 2003). Media, as the continuum of the traditional interpretative and explanatory socialization channel distinguish its political and nonpolitical dimensions more among “a variety of interpersonal and mass media sources” (Reading 2003; DeGennaro and Brown 2009).

This open-ended public sphere in digital media world also has limitations, the validity and authority of information shared are often harshly questioned, which grants an illiberal government perfect reasons to enter and embed its impact. Top-down and political management of media is the efficient way of governing people. Besides, some scholars call for “a normative or ethical dimension to the new kind of publicness created by the media” (Thompson 1995, p. 263). Propaganda, dependent on traditional mass media tools for political communication, is now permeating new media platforms especially social media too (Lumezanu et al. 2012; Himelboim et al. 2013). The intersection of contemporary remembrance culture and media technologies presents a mixed package of promises and problems: on one hand, many digital media platforms which do not represent a strong supervision efficiency of the information spread through them, lack of neither content-based nor user-based filtering attributes to the insufficient accountability of digital media propaganda information, even rumors could earn positive responses (Lumezanu et al. 2012, p. 211). On the other hand, it is effective in facilitating communication among different political orientations and in creating possibilities for cross-ideological interactions through nonpolitically organized and informal online spaces (Conover et al. 2011; Wojcieszak and Mutz 2009; Mendelberg 2002; Turner 1991).

In the propaganda theory illustrated by Herman and Chomsky (1988), the significant role of politicized media information is to inculcate individuals in the society with political values and codes of behavior that would integrate them into the institutional structures. In the traditional political context, this process takes place under state-led supervision, but this process would become a multidimensional process in the digital media era as diverse participants and media platforms emerge.

Nowadays, individuals can form their virtual communities in digital space transnationally as it is a globalized anarchy space, not in the sense of chaotic and disorganized, but in the sense that the whole enterprise represents “no central governing hierarchy on either policy or technical levels” (Rheingold 1993, p. 119), at least on certain issues. People can easily form their virtual communities transnationally in the cyberspace instead of depending on national media information release. Carrying the features of grassroots, anarchy and global, digital media allows the formation of a global civil society with increasing individual propagandists’ participation in it. Learning about history and contemporary politics thus could easily become an independent process as both information and disinformation are raw, multidirectional, and unsupervised. In the era of new media, humanity projects, especially the historical ones, are finding new ways to construct and display social space, about which surging topics and researches carry enthusiasm to focus upon (Hayles 2012). Promoted by national governments, media socialization especially stimulates younger generation’s interests to seek their identity development, which indicates no difference across cultural and political differences.

Minority Governance Evolvement in People’s Republic of China

International Discourse and Chinese Minority Governance

The international identity research focus, especially about minority issues, has been focusing on human right perspective. “Adopted by No. 5. Consensus in 1992 (*the United Nations Minorities Declaration by Consensus Resolution 47/135*), the United States Minorities Declaration in its Article 1 refers to minorities as based on national or ethnic, cultural, religious, and linguistic identity, and provides that States should protect their existence”.⁷ As most of the minorities living in a marginalized space would have the common wish to retain and promote their ethnic identity through culture and language preservation, the relationships among language, education, and minority identity have been discussed further from the human rights perspective more legislation and international documents’ ratification.

However, the universality of human rights might be perceived differently in Asia as often some Asian countries claim that the international norm does not “take into account Asia’s history and culture” (Asciutti 2009, p. 21). In the field of minority development, the human rights discussion about relevant linguistic and cultural rights has been the focus for decades internationally. The United Nations proposed the definition of linguistic genocide when it delivered preparatory work for what

⁷“Minority Rights: International Standards and Guidance for Implementation,” *United Nations and United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner*, February 2010.

later became the *International Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide* in 1948. Linguistic and cultural genocide were defined alongside physical genocide as serious crimes against humanity (Capotorti 1979). Article 3 of it says linguistic and cultural genocide was voted down in the General Assembly, which makes it not a valid part of the final official convention of 1948. However, the definition of linguistic genocide as “prohibiting the use of the language of a group in daily intercourse or in schools, or the printing and circulation of publications in the language of the group” has indicated to us that there is still a significant amount of serious work that needs to be done in order to protect the basic human rights of minorities in a cultural and linguistic sense.

There is a series of international provisions stating the prohibition of discrimination or the violation of minorities' basic human rights ratified since then. In the UN Charter and the 1948 *Universal Declaration of Human Rights* (UDHR), that nondiscrimination toward minorities as a fundamental human right is clearly set out as the international norm. The *International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights* (ICCPR) and the *International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights* (ICESCR) further “called for member states to respect the rights of all individuals without regard to national or racial background” (Tursun 2011, p. 30).

Article 27 of the ICCPR is a minority-specific provision that emphasizes the importance of protecting the religious and linguistic rights of minorities, especially the right “to use their own language for positive integration” (Tursun 2011, p. 30). This article later inspired the *Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious, and Linguistic Minorities* (UNDM), which laid out more specific measures a state should take for healthy minority integration and development. After that, there has been the *International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination* (ICERD) in 1965 and the *Program of Action of the World Conference against Racism, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance* in 2002.⁸ Countries usually have two ways of implementing the articles in these documents, through ratification of them thus making them directly applicable domestically, or by incorporating them into domestic laws and provisions through domestic legislation. As might already be familiar to us in many other dimensions, China chooses the latter model. It currently conducts its own domestic legislation, jurisdiction, and civil governance of minority affairs, which indicates the country's reservations about handling minority autonomous rights fully as

⁸Other main sources of minority rights include The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, the Convention on the Rights of the Child, Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law, the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, the ILO Discrimination (Employment and Occupation) Convention, the ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work, the UNESCO Convention for the Safeguarding of the Intangible Cultural Heritage, and the UNESCO Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions.

human rights. This research would relate its conclusions to the international norm of universal human rights, but the observation of both universal and oriental norms would facilitate us to achieve a deeper and more mature understanding of Chinese minority governance.

In its earliest years, the Chinese Communist Party appears to “have accepted unquestioningly Marxist-Soviet pronouncements on minorities with little regard to how they should be adapted to the Chinese milieu” (Dreyer 1976, p. 63). The founding of the People’s Republic of China in 1949 signals the arrival of a real independent modern nation-state in China and makes tremendous efforts to promote the modern understanding of nation and ethnicity for the common Chinese people. “Particular minorities were recognized and dealt with in a pragmatic way with regard to their size, influence and capacity to challenge government policies” (Tsung 2009, p. 35) especially considering the difficulty of maintaining and developing the legitimacy of the new regime at that time. The unification of language and culture under the leadership of the superior Han cultural was already encouraged by the Kuomintang before the Chinese Communist Party took power, which was not close to success in terms of the real implementation process. As minorities are in a numerically weaker position, most of them struggle persistently with a nondominant or dependent status regarding social, political, and cultural affairs (Sigler 1983, p. 5). Thus, they would often show a sense of solidarity in taking actions to preserve their culture, tradition, religion, and language (Capotorti 1979, p. 96). The CCP knew well enough that if a governing power wants to use attitudes and relevant mechanisms to construct strong supports for guarding a national cultural uniqueness, it would need to take more efforts to establish the legitimacy of that toward minorities first. This attitudinal support for minority education and cultural development has been the CCP’s tradition long since the early years.

The current minority autonomous governance model of the People’s Republic of China mainly derives from the former Soviet Union’s model promoted by its previous leader Stalin. It also combines with the previous bilingual education policy experience that Kuomintang had left from the era of the Republic of China. When Chinese Communist Party took over and established a new regime, it founded the minority governance model on the basis of several cornerstones laid down by the Kuomintang: the KMT’s First National Congress in 1924 had recognized the right of self-determination for all nationalities within China; and the equal rights of all “races” as organic component parts of China were later confirmed in the 1936 KMT Constitution. The KMT’s respect for linguistic and other forms of autonomy at the start only applied to those big ethnic groups in consideration of their population size and political power. Later, it adopted Sun Yat-sen’s Three People’s Principles (*Sanmin Zhuyi*) and launched more systematically organized knowledge campaigns to propagandize the nationalism and other ethnic unifying ideas.

The adoption of this regime of regional autonomy for governing minorities should be regarded as a case of *realpolitik*. Conciliatory policies were promised when the CCP was expected to take over the situation. The first time the minority issue was raised was at the Second National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party held in Shanghai, 1922. At this conference, “the right of self-determination”

and “the right to create independent national republics” were discussed. At the start, the groping for a solution to the minority issues in China was strongly influenced by the Soviet Union’s practice, which to a certain degree had neglected the characteristics of the social and political situation that were unique to China. The theme of regional national autonomy was officially mentioned by Mao Zedong at the Sixth Plenary Session of the Sixth Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party in 1938. Four points were emphasized: a united republic of China established on equal grounds among different ethnicities together with the Han; the establishment of a special committee for national minorities; respect for different cultural, religious, and other folk customs; and the opposition of the Han chauvinism (Zhu and Yu 2000, p. 49).

Later due to governing difficulties encountered at the time in the Inner Mongolian region and within the *Jin-Cha-Ji* Central Bureau, the Secretariat of the CCP Central Committee issued a directive in 1945 related to the basic policy of regional autonomy and implied a departure from the Soviet model of self-determination and federalism formulated by the CCP in 1922. Starting then the CCP began exploring a regional autonomy governance modal with its own characteristics, and it issued two important documents between 1946 and 1947 as the cornerstone for Chinese minority governance legislation. Separately, they are the *Draft Program for the Peaceful Establishment of the State* in January 1946 and the *Declaration of the People’s Liberation Army of China* in 1947. After these two documents, the general policy guidelines for minority governance basically took its current shape by scaling back a little from the Soviet Union model. The Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference was convened in September 1949. A draft-like constitutional document for the PRC called the *Common Program*, in which the autonomous regional model of minority governance was reconfirmed, was promulgated at this conference.

The autonomous regional model finally adopted by the CCP allows Chinese minorities to conduct their regional autonomy within a certain geographically clustered area, and granted the basic freedom to preserve their own cultures and life styles. The official full name of this “fusion-style” (Mackerras 1994) governance model is Minority Regional Autonomous Policy (*Shaoshu Minzu Quyu Zizhi Zhengce*). The actual mechanism for construction of this model is recognized and promoted in the document *Program for the Implementation of Regional National Autonomy* issued by the central government in 1952. The other two foundations of minority governance legislation are the *Constitution* and the *Law of Regional Autonomy of Minorities*. Chinese authority governs the minorities by allowing limited political autonomy and censored cultural and social autonomy.⁹ In fact, this kind of politically conservative concern has been proven in recent years to be an actual policy of integration, if not assimilation. Through this policy ethnic groups

⁹Ulanhu, a Mongolian minority Politburo member in CCP ranking the highest official position (1988) a minority has ever achieved in China, regarded the “fusion” policy as a necessary historical strategy of CCP in long term.

are expected to gradually shift their loyalties, expectations, and political identity toward a Han-oriented mainstream social value system (Dreyer 1976).

There is not enough systematical legislation in protecting and guaranteeing ethnic minorities' development in China. One characteristic of legislative protections of the Chinese minority development being fragmented, principles and specific articles concerning Chinese minority's rights scatter themselves in high-officials' speeches, Constitution, criminal, civil, and administrative laws.¹⁰ In *Some Questions on National Policies in China*, Zhou Enlai, the then Premier of the State Council, criticized the discrimination of minorities, as well as the phenomenon of local nationalism, which could give rise to the potential danger of generating separatist tendencies (Zhu and Yu 2000, p. 51) back in the 1950s. It has been a tradition within the Party that the attitude of the central government toward the minority issue is usually delivered in their important speeches.¹¹

After the Cultural Revolution, the system of minority regional autonomy was restored at the Third Plenary Session of the Eleventh Central Committee held in December 1978. In 1982, the Fourth Revision of the Constitution was passed by the National People's Congress, which systematically laid out all the details of regional minority autonomy in contrast to the ambiguous and general wording in previous legislative documents. Additional relevant legal details of current Chinese minority governance were explained in the *1984 Law on Ethnic Regional Autonomy [LERA]* and its 2001 amended version. From 1952 to 1954, a series of policies and documents such as the *Guidelines for Regional Autonomy of Minority Nationalities in the PRC* confirmed and further enhanced legal rights for minorities. For example, considering the education of minorities, they are entitled to "adopt a commonly used minority language when carrying out official duties with the selected language used to promote local culture and education."¹² Through these mechanism and documents, many rights of minority people are guaranteed.

Minorities in many autonomous areas do enjoy a certain degree of freedom in their social and economic development, as they have "the legislative power to make regulations", and with permission from upper institutions, it can defer some orders, make cultural and economic policies, and decide the ownership and rights of natural resources (Wang 2004, p. 165). Most of the Chinese minority regions are located in

¹⁰The Criminal Procedure Law, the Civil Procedure Law, and the Administrative Procedure Law have confirmed that citizens of any nationality shall have the right to use their own languages in written or spoken forms.

¹¹As China further develops, both the third and the fourth generation leaderships reiterated the significance of these guidelines. Jiang Zemin declared minority regional autonomy as "one of China's three fundamental political institutions" in 1997. Hu Jintao declared in 2003 that this principle is "one part of 'three insists' (*sange jianchi*) along with adherence to socialism and CCP leadership". In a speech given by Hu Jintao in 2005, he emphasized minority regional autonomy again, and also the need for more understanding about them. At the same time, he reiterated the unshakable adherence to minority regional autonomy under the *absolute and unified* leadership of the Party.

¹²"Collections of Provisions of Minority Nationality Autonomous Regions of the PRC," *State Council of the People's Republic of China*, (accessed February 22, 1952), 429.

the remote and underdeveloped areas of China. The “Go West” policy launched in 2000 covers eleven provinces, one municipality and three other minority autonomous prefectures,¹³ all the five minority autonomous regions and Yunnan province, with the most ethnically diverse provinces in China were included. These regions occupy approximately 71.4 % of the total territory of China; however produce only around 15 % of the national GDP, often having poor education opportunities for the minority population. These minority autonomous regions are of strategic significance with their abundant natural resources and vast territory; hence, both central and local governments provide many preferential policies from economic well-being to social and cultural development for the purpose of reducing development imbalances among these regions in a Han-dominated society.

The preferential policy is promoted through different channels. Politically, it encourages the promotion of more minority cadres, and mobilizes more minority youth to join the Chinese Communist Party. Minority people are allocated a certain proportion of representation in the National People's Congress, as well as in the standing committee and many other government offices. Economically, it provides preferential fiscal policies having different forms of subsidies or reductions in the financial expenditure of the autonomous governments; it also encourages local minority governments to develop cross-border trade with foreign countries. Culturally, all the minority autonomous regions are granted the freedom to enjoy religious believes and linguistic independence. The Chinese government has implemented a bilingual education policy and offers a lower entry threshold for minority students to enter university for further study. These generous terms provided through this all-round preferential policy are offered on the grounds of the absolute political authority of CCP, which accordingly leads to the loophole that being unsatisfied with certain elements of governance is considered as being unsatisfied with the legitimacy of the ruling Chinese Communist Party.

The CCP used to learn a lot of lessons from the governing of religious and cultural minorities in history, and especially from some ethnic minorities with a strong willingness and determination to preserve their own cultures and traditions.¹⁴ The dissatisfaction with many depoliticized social issues falls easily into the sensitive category of political challenge. In some of the minority regions, resentment increases as unsolved social problems accumulate, though the resentment is more about local governance rather than substantial political challenges to the CCP's leadership of minorities. For example, some riots would break out in big coastal cities such as Guangzhou, where Uyghur people sell barbecued mutton on the streets without a license. When the local policemen checked them, these street vendors would turn violent and even threaten the policemen with knives and steel pipes. Local news media would hold ethnic tensions rather than the license issue

¹³Hunan Xiangxi Tujia and Miao Autonomous Prefecture, Hubei Enshi Tujia and Miao Autonomous Prefecture, and Jilin Yanbian Korean Autonomous Prefecture.

¹⁴Two prominent examples could be the “Sex Customs” book incident in 1989, and the “Strange Marriage Sex Customs” book incident in 1995. Both of them caused serious ethnic tension in Muslim autonomous regions of China.

responsible for this kind of conflict, which would only later intensify the interethnic relationship. The very existence of the preferential policy indirectly causes the dissatisfaction over local and central governance to be interpreted as a lack of gratitude for the Chinese authorities, which in turn causes the scaling back of the policy to become a trend in recent years.

Ever since the Cultural Revolution, there have been two rounds of minority governance tightening in the contemporary history of China. These resulted from the shifting of global power shifting and the necessity of foreign policy transition in China. First, the collapse of the former Soviet Union in 1991 caused shudders through the regional and international political world as the United States become the only super power left on the planet, with more pro-capitalism states neighboring China. China feared a chain effect of the newly disintegrated 15 states from the USSR would influence the PRC ethnic minority regions' stability (Dreyer 2005, p. 70). This has brought more new neighbors under disappeared communism influence for China, especially in minority autonomous regions in the northern and northwestern regions. With the potential instability and diplomatic complexity added to the CCP's minority governance especially along the border, the policy on minorities faced an all-round tightening at that time. The second historical watershed event took place in 2001, which was the "9-11 Incident" that forced the U.S.'s foreign policy to shift toward antiterrorism in the Middle East and to other battlefields globally. Soon after this event, both the U.S. and the Chinese authorities were surprised and reluctant to find out that Al Qaeda had also trained a certain number of Chinese Muslim people for potential terrorist activities in Chinese territory. This led to a direct tightening of policy on general minority governance over a serious diplomatic concern. Minorities were told that if religion interfered with socialism, it was the religion that has to give way (Dreyer 2005, p. 70). The CCP had further scaled back minority rights in favor of tighter control by constraining the age of Uyghur people who could go on pilgrimage trips to Mecca, or even who could enter mosques.

By and large, the minority regional autonomy is an innovative invention that suited the characteristics of the Chinese minorities when the PRC was founded, though there has been a consistent question about to what degree minorities have been allowed to conduct a real and free autonomy. There is also the question of whether or not, politicizing the issue of minority governance as the CCP did during the past scaling-back experience helps construct a sustainable and welcomed mechanism in the long run? Over the past decades, the CCP's preferential policy on minority governance has not been changed, and is a legacy inherited from the revolutionary period. As China develops, pattern of discourse needs to shift fundamentally in order to fight against inequality. "The question of whether or not minority regions should be modernized was never officially debated in China" (Wang 2004, p. 164), the policy mechanism was originally designed from an aiding perspective and there is still a wide discourse gap between the government and minority civil society in China. In the minority autonomous areas, demographic structure is changing, prominent social developmental problems are changing, and people's demands are changing, neither politicizing the issue nor suppressing

minority people's needs would fundamentally satisfy the people and win supports for the government.

There is a reason that why ethnic minority is considered as such an important factor in influencing the overall political stability of China, as for the instability in different minority regions of China, most of the riots through history and nowadays are related to foreign influences or overseas connections. A prominent subgroup within Chinese minorities is the group that borders on neighboring countries coming from the same Diasporas as them, such as Tibetan, Uyghur, and Korean people who share cultural roots with their Diasporas neighbors but have developed under a different political and social environment. This further escalates the CCP's level of alertness as complicated situations with overseas or neighboring countries brings a potential growth in ethnic conflicts and even a tendency toward separatism as well as a demand for fiddly diplomacy. Thus, the foreign relations with this kind of minority Diaspora's neighboring countries is an important factor influencing the scaling back of Chinese authorities' minority policy. Minorities usually have different cultures and value systems from Han people. Due to these differences, many minorities view the necessity of fast urbanization and the extensive exploration of natural resources differently from Han people. Both domestic and transnational factors have forged an interwoven context for minority governance ranging from political, and economic, to social dimensions, and the reality is that many reported "interethnic" or "anti-Han" conflicts in recent years have been caused by environmental and other social problems rather than pure political resentment. The politicized image of Chinese minority governance hinders the development and innovation of non-state-led governance at both the grassroots and transnational levels. This perception of minority governance is the core constraint on further interethnic communication and integration into international/universal human rights values. Of course, it has generated a tremendous influence on the minority education system in China too.

A long list of structural causes for this "politicizing-minority-governance" tradition can be found throughout Chinese history. Ever since the Qin Dynasty was established as the first unified dynasty of China in BC211, Confucianism and Han-centered discourse have been the keywords of Chinese political life. John King Fairbank has raised academia's attention on tributary system of ancient Chinese dynasties by arguing its dominant status as the system ruling East Asia through history (Fairbank and Chen 1968), and more than one non-Han ruling dynasty in Chinese history has become "Hanized" as they adopted Confucian values as their ruling philosophy and inherited the traditional political belief in Chinese unification (*Huaxia/Zhonghua Dayitong*). This identification on a political level has gradually changed some minorities' ethnic and cultural characteristics, such as in the case of the Hui and the Manchurians. The minority issue in China is about centralized political control on the top and intermingled ethnic and social conflicts at the locality. Nowadays, maintaining the integrity of *Chinese Nation* is still the dominant ideology in considering the minority governance, as no minority should be allowed to make its own choice by disregarding the unshakable doctrine of national unification and ethnic integration.

A Need for Reform? Placing China's Minority Governance Within Its Contemporary Political Reform Agenda

Minority autonomy means that minorities are supposed to be able to transmit their own values and social heritage to their children, but the ideology and value in a communism country has to share such a unanimous pattern that educational enterprise becomes the prime battleground for political authority to negotiate autonomy and identity formation possibilities. From this section's introduction, we could see that ethnic identity has both biological and cultural roots as subjective and objective political socialization channels to be shaped. Moreover, it would need to be interpreted in both domestic and transnational contexts to make sense.

In the context of the People's Republic of China, the issue of minority governance is born with the destiny of being a politicized one. Four issues would be the top tasks for the CCP in its current phase of political development, corruption within the Party and the government, social instability especially in the minority autonomous regions, the staggered reunification process with Taiwan, and the stuck political reforms compared to the dynamic economic development. All these challenges are closely related to maintenance of Chinese political authority and legitimacy, as for maintaining social stability in minority autonomous regions, it has been one of the prior concerns of the CCP, which also catches a considerable amount of international attention in recent years. Minority issue is of fundamental strategic significance to the Chinese government both in a symbolic and a substantial sense. Minority autonomous regions have the advantage of massive space, rich natural resources, and cheap labor, thus they have been integrated into the Chinese government's bigger blueprint for fast urbanization and marketization since the opening up and reform. As many senior CCP leaders have stressed on different occasions, the central government should always support the economic growth of minority regions to promote urbanization and industrialization. However, this mode has encountered increasing problems in recent years, many of the contentions taking place have directly questioned the lack of sustainable development plan while local resources are exploited and misused. In the past decade, increasing social and political demonstrations took place in major minority autonomous regions, and quite a number of them were related to the issues generated by the developmental mode of disparity.

The mainstream and dominant voice supporting the current conservative policy on diverse political issues is still strong enough to surpass other voices of objection. The discussion on minority governance within the Party still seems centered on a one-sided preference of suppressive style. Reading the official and unofficial materials, talking with people at the field research sites, political stability is confined to be a holy principle whose significance is without any possibility to be challenged. Either out of the need to maintain national unification or maintain the Party's authority and social stability, minority autonomous regions would be the last battlefield on which liberalism infiltration is allowed in the foreseeable future. China is now both "in the midst of a generational leadership transition" (Li 2012)

and at the crossroads of economic and political reform, and the long missing linkage between political reform and economic development has already started indicating hindrance rather than concentration on a more sustainable economic growth for the long run. The current Chinese development modal faces a bottleneck which is that without an improved political system, many attempted structural economic reforms could not be carried out. For example, this March China's new leaders assigned a new chief to be the country's top securities regulator for the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) to replace Guo Shuqing, a graduate of Oxford in the 1980s who has been a keen economic reformer tackling the real structural problems of Chinese financial markets. On April 17, 2013, Moody's¹⁵ downgraded its outlook on the Chinese economy from "positive" to "stable", as concrete progress has been less than anticipated in the areas of both "reducing latent risks by making local government contingent liabilities more transparent and in reining in rapid credit growth".¹⁶ The rapid flooding of shadow bank systems, the irresponsible local governments' expansion of financial debt, and other economic problems with structural political causes, would be the stumbling block on the road to China's rise as a new global power.

The debate on the necessity, the possible timeline, and the proper way for political reform has been loud and clear in recent years both domestically and overseas. One reason that has kept China hesitating is the unpredictability of China's fundamental political reform support, as how far China carries out political reform would have different short-term and long-term outcomes. Taking minority governance for example, if the current regional autonomy model is restructured, more than half of China's territory would be influenced, and this could easily turn into a political earthquake if not handled smoothly. Another important factor is the rising sentiment of nationalism among ordinary Chinese citizens alongside the rising economy. In recent years, the Chinese government and its people, rarely hand in hand, have obviously showed a tougher stand on demonstrating the territorial and sovereignty interests of China. This nationalism complex has been encouraged and leveraged by the Chinese authorities as an effective mediator to balance the citizens' resentment toward corruption and other social inequalities domestically. At least in the predictable short term, there would be no major shift in China's minority governance reform regarding its stake in the whole game of Chinese politics.

All the above reason has left meager space for the discussion of minority autonomous areas' liberal political development and reform. Among all the possible

¹⁵Moody's Investors Service, often referred to as Moody's, is the bond credit rating business of Moody's Corporation, representing the company's traditional line of business and its historical name. Moody's Investors Service provides international financial research on bonds issued by commercial and government entities and, with Standard & Poor's and Fitch Group, is considered one of the Big Three credit rating agencies, thus a provider for authoritative indicators of a country's economic long-term potentiality.

¹⁶*China Economic Review*, "Moody's Downgrades China Outlook," Wednesday, April 17, 2013, <http://www.chinaeconomicreview.com/moodys-downgrades-china-outlook> (accessed April 30, 2015).

measures the Chinese government could take to influence minority populations, education and the media have been the most effective and the mildest tunnel for the CCP's political socialization campaign. The chief director Li Dezhu of The State Ethnic Affairs Commission of the People's Republic of China (SEAC) published *To Handle the Ethnic Issues Correctly in Order to Build a Harmonious Society* on *Study Times* in 2004. He emphasized the superiority and significance of the minority regional autonomy mechanism by demonstrating it is an indisputable "scientific nature". In this article, economic prosperity is regarded as the fundamental drive for ethnic unity, followed by the significance of encouragement for both ethnic minority culture development and cadre promotions (Li 2013). Minority populations, especially the youth, have been the prior target for the state's political campaigns. In order to reduce political dissent to the minimum possible level, the CCP has been keen to promote its minority bilingual programs at the elementary and middle school level in minority autonomous regions.

The real and serious structural challenges for minority education's further development are: first, the mobility of minority populations is witnessing an unprecedented growth, which is fundamentally shaking the core of Chinese minority governance that has been built on the premise of regional minority clusters. How could the current bilingual education of different minorities' continue to be monitored if more and more minority migrants choose to settle down in bigger cities and send their children to local Han schools? A more comprehensive and integrated curriculum would be needed to replace the current ethnicity-oriented educational system. Second, the following issue of the minority population's social welfare and other social protection would not be able to be discussed within the framework of a minority preferential policy, as minority people would live their social lives among Han people in big cities. In the long term, as a more integrated pattern of coexistence between the minority and Han populations takes shape, how to preserve minority cultures and educate minority youth would become a delicate question that China would have to face. In the past, the Chinese government has proven to be careless in this dimension. Taking the Manchu and the Hui for example, these two big minorities that have now been almost fully Hanized do not enjoy too much of a well-preserved cultural and value heritage from their own minority roots anymore.

The most unique characteristic of Chinese minority governance is that it is a region-oriented form of autonomy, which not only separates different minorities from each other because regional situations vary tremendously, but also puts the Party and the Han majority in the center as the dominant preferential policy provider who often neglects some of the basic human rights issues. From macro-educational policy making to micro-educational administration, it adjusts itself according to different minorities instead of integrating all the ethnicities into one single comprehensive program, and this essentially puts minorities in a weak bargaining position. Most of the international pressure and attention on Chinese minority governance has been political and religious; nonetheless, many of the interethnic misunderstandings sprout during the education of the minority youth. Generally speaking, considering the Chinese minority governance, the political

reform is too sensitive to forge a starting ground and the development is comprehensively speaking too fragile. By far the educational and cultural dimensions would be milder and more accessible dimensions for a thorough academic observation of Chinese minorities' development.

Ethnic identity derives from the deepest level of identification individuals develop within a society or a state, but it often ends up in a marginal status compared to individuals' identification with social and political resources. Ironically, especially in the post-communism and post-Cold-War era, ethnic minorities have reacted actively and positively to the political authority who reaches to offer labeling of their ethnic identity, even in a basic and symbolic sense. The outcome is that the labeling or coding of ethnic minorities stands out and stays prominent, though it offers poorer allocated social resources and political power. Political power could be monopolized by the ethnic majority, as the symbolic and liturgical aspects are usually in fact designed or represented by the majority until its cultural reproduction becomes the overriding concern, thus ethnic minorities are in fact marginalized in many dimensions (Turner 1990, 2007), because "in long term, ethnicity is not sufficient on its own for the creation of stable democratic responses, only civic loyalty and equality before the law can achieve that", however, the upsurge of ethnic nationalism exactly explains that how have different states come back to this idea for new power in governing their citizens.

Rather than purely explaining from economic and social roots, communism and post-communism states tend to confuse diverse agendas within its political reign by creating outside reasons as the primary causes for problems. The alien antagonist would forever appear more vicious and worrying compared to the domestic hegemony and troublemakers. For Chinese minorities with strong Diasporas connections, their attitude toward "foreigners" is carefully monitored by the state through political socialization. As many young Han people are getting angry about China's status versus Western countries in the world, many domestic conflicts are transferred toward foreign countries and reobtaining its self-esteem lies in the premise of regaining its ancient "fame", and this could not be even more radical when it comes to domestic ethnic minority governance.

Neo-Marxism and neoliberalism both argue about the irreversible trend of accelerating global capital flow, yet the neo-Marxism suits the case of the authoritarian China regarding how much power the nation-state demonstrates. The governmentality strategy derives from ancient cultural, religious, and ideological roots, as well as the political power pattern. From the literature exploration and review above, this book would focuses to explain how Manchuria is territorialized as a political and geographic space for Korean minority to modernize its citizenship identity habitus in the post-communism transiting China. The major research focus is that, how have bilingual education and media life-shaped Korean-minority youth's citizenship identity, and as Manchuria's historical and modern geopolitics have indicated, how is this citizenship identity formation process predominantly decided by historically embedded cultural, social, and political factors in the case of Korean minority.

References

- Allahar AL (2001) The politics of ethnic identity construction. *Identity Int J Theor Res* 1(3): 197–208
- Asciutti E (2009) Asia and the global world: identities, values, rights. In: Kolig E, Angeles V, Wong S (eds) *Identity in crossroad civilisations: ethnicity, nationalism and globalism in Asia*. Amsterdam University Press, Amsterdam
- Anderson BO (1991) *Imagined communities: reflections on the origin and spread of nationalism*. Verso, London
- Anderson AB (2001) The complexity of ethnic identities: a postmodern reevaluation. *Int J Theor Res* 1(3):209–223
- Arendt H (1973) *The origins of totalitarianism*. Harcourt Int, New York
- Arendt H (1978) *The life of the mind*. Harcourt Int, New York
- Arendt H (1998) *The human condition*. The University of Chicago Press, Chicago
- Barry A, Osborne T, Rose N (1996) *Foucault and political reason*. Routledge, USA
- Bell D (1975) Ethnicity and social change. In: Glazer N, Mognihan DP (eds) *Ethnicity: theory and experience*. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA
- Bell D (2015) *The China model: political meritocracy and the limits of democracy*. Princeton University Press, San Francisco
- Borradori G (2003) *Philosophy in a time of terror: dialogues with Jurgen Habermas and Jacques Derrida*. The University of Chicago Press, London
- Bourdieu P (1989) Social space and symbolic power. *Sociol Theor* 7(1):14–25
- Bourdieu P, Raymond G, Adamson M (tr) (1993) Identity and representation. In: Bourdieu P (ed) *Language and symbolic power*. Polity Press, UK, pp 223–235
- Bourdieu P (1993) *Language and symbolic power*. Polity Press, UK
- Bourdieu P, Passeron JC (1990) *Reproduction in education, society and culture*. Sage, UK
- Buzan B (1997) *Security: a new framework for analysis*. Zhejiang Renmin Press, Hangzhou, China
- Capotorti F (1979) *Study of the rights of persons belonging to ethnic, religious, and linguistic minorities*. United Nations, New York
- Castres P (2007) *Le Societe contre L'Etat*. Nancy, France
- Chang K-S, Turner BS (2012) *Contested citizenship in East Asia: developmental politics, national unity, and globalization*. Routledge, New York
- Chang M (2004) Understanding contending nationalist identities: reading Ernest Gellner and Benedict Anderson from Taiwan. In: Hender SJ (ed) *Democratization and identity: regimes and ethnicity in East and Southeast Asia*. Lexington Book, New York, pp 67–94
- Chen L-K (1994) *The initial exploration of Chinese Nation Research*. Zhishi Press, Beijing
- Chen L-K (2000) The origin of chinese civilization and basic characteristics of its early-stage development. *Cent Ethn Univ J* 5:65–92
- Cohen A (1974) The lesson of ethnicity. In: Sollors W (ed) *Theories of ethnicity: a classical reader* (Werner Sollors, London 1996), pp 370–384, 376
- Conover MD, Ratkiewicz J, Francisco M, Goncalves B, Flammini A, Menczer F (2011) Political polarization on Twitter. In: *Proceedings of the fifth international AAAI conference on weblogs and social media*, pp 89–96
- Cornell S, Hartmann D (1998) *Ethnicity and race: making identities in a changing world*. Thousand Oaks. Pine Forge Press, CA
- Crampton JW, Elden S (eds) (2007) *Space, knowledge and power: Foucault and geography*. Ashgate Publishing Limited, UK
- Demick B (2010) *Nothing to envy: ordinary lives in North Korea*. Granta Books, London
- Derrida J (1993) The other heading: memories, responses, and responsibilities. *Publ Mod Lang Assoc Am* 108(1):89–93
- DeGennaro D, Brown TL (2009) Youth voices: connections between history, enacted culture and identity in a digital divide initiative. *Cult Stud Soc Educ* 4:13–39

- Deleuze G, Guattari F (1987) *A thousand plateaus*. University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis
- Desai R (2006) Neoliberalism and cultural nationalism: a danse macabre. In: Plehwe D, Walpen B (eds) *Neo-liberal hegemony*. Taylor & Francis, UK, pp 222–235
- DiMaggio P (1979) On Pierre Bourdieu. *Am J Soc* 84(6):1460–1474
- Dimitrova-Grajzl V, Simon E, Fischer A (2010) Political efficacy of emerging elites in post-socialist countries: the impact of disciplinary culture and political opportunities. *Transit Stud Rev* 17:807–821. doi:[10.1007/s11300-010-0171-1](https://doi.org/10.1007/s11300-010-0171-1)
- Dreyer J (1976) China's forty millions: minority, nationalities, and national integration in the People's Republic of China. Harvard University Press, Cambridge
- Dreyer JT (2005) China's vulnerability to minority separatism. *Asian Aff* 32(2):69–85
- Edwards J (2010) *Minority Languages and Group Identity: Cases and Categories* Philadelphia: John Benjamins Publishing Company
- Elden S (2005) Missing the point: globalization, deterritorialization and the space of the world. *Trans Inst Br Geogr* 30(1):8–19
- Elden S (2006) The state of territory under globalization: empire and the politics of reterritorialization. *Thamyris/intersecting: place, sex and race*
- Elden S (2009) *Terror and territory: the spatial extent of sovereignty*. University of Minnesota Press, London
- Elden S (2013) *The birth of territory*. University of Chicago Press, USA
- Eriksen TH (1993) *Ethnicity and nationalism*. Pluto Press, Sterling
- Fairbank JK, Chen TT (1968) *The Chinese world order: traditional China's foreign relations*. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, USA
- Forgacs D (1988) *A Gramsci reader*. Lawrence & Wishart, London
- Fukuyama F (1992) *The end of history and the last man*. Free Press, USA
- Fortier A-M (2000) *Migrant belongings: memory, space, identity*. Berg, New York
- Gellner E (1983) *Nations and nationalism*. Cornell University Press, Ithaca
- Gellner E (1994) *Encounters with nationalism*. Blackwell, Oxford
- Gellner E (1997) *Nationalism*. Weidenfeld & Nicolson, London
- Geertz C (ed) (1963) *Old societies and new states*. Free Press, New York
- Gladney DC (1994) Representing nationality in China: refiguring majority/minority identities. *J Asian Stud* 53(1):94
- Gramsci A (1971) *Selections from prison notebooks*. Lawrence & Wishart, London
- Gries PH (1999) A “China threat”? power and passion in Chinese “face nationalism”. *World Aff* (Fall) 63–75
- Habermas J (1994) Multiculturalism and the liberal state. *Stanford Law Review* 47:849–862
- Habermas J (1989) *The structural transformation of the public sphere*. MIT Press, Cambridge, M.A
- Hayles NK (2012) *How we think digital media and contemporary technogenesis*. The University of Chicago Press, Chicago and London
- Herman ES, Chomsky N (1988) *Manufacturing consent: the political economy of the mass media*. Pantheon Book, New York
- Himmelboim I, McCreery S, Smith M (2013) Birds of a feather tweet together: integrating network and content analyses to examine cross-ideology exposure on Twitter. *J Computer-Mediated Commun* 18(2):40–60
- Hirst P, Thompson G (1995) Globalization and the future of the nation state. *Econ Soc* 24(3): 408–442
- Hoggett P (2009) *Politics, emotion and identity*. Paradigm, Boulder, CO
- Hegel GWF, Miller AV (tr) (1998) *The phenomenology of spirit*. Motilal Banarsidass Publishers, Delhi, India
- Henders SJ (ed) (2004) *Democratization and identity: regimes and ethnicity in East and Southeast Asia*. Lexington Book, New York
- Hoig B (1988) Arendt, identity and difference. *Polit Theor* 16(1):77–98
- Jessop B (2000) The crisis of the national spatio-temporal fix and the tendential ecological dominance of globalizing capitalism. *Int J Urban Reg Res* 24(2):323–360
- Jessop B (2003) The future of the state in an era of globalization. *Int Polit Soc* 3:132–154

- Jessop B, Sum NL (2006) Neo-communitarianism In: Barry A, Slater D (eds) *The technological economy*. Routledge, New York, pp 178–192
- Jessop B (2005) Cultural political economy, the knowledge-based economy, and the state. In: Barry A, Slater D (eds) *The technological economy*. Routledge, New York, pp 142–162
- Kim S-M (2014) *Confucian democracy in East Asia: theory and practice*. Cambridge University Press, New York
- Knight DB (1985) Territory and people or people and territory? Thoughts on Postcolonial Self-determination. *Int Polit Sci Rev (Revue Internationale de Science Politique)* 6(2):248–272
- Larner W (2000) Neo-liberalism: policy, ideology, governmentality. *Stud Polit Econ* 63:5
- Lemke T (2002) Foucault, governmentality and critique. *Rethinking Marxism* 14(3):49–64
- Lears TJJ (1985) The concept of cultural hegemony: problems and possibilities. *Am Hist Rev* 90(3):567–593
- Lee C-J (1986) *China's Korean minority: the politics of ethnic education*. Westview Press, Boulder
- Levenson J (1964) *Confucian China and its modern fate*, vol I. University of California Press, USA
- Li C (2012) Leadership transition in the CPC: promising progress and potential problems. *Project Muse China Int J* 10(2):23–33
- Li DZ (2013) Handle the ethnic issues correctly in order to build a harmonious society. www.china.com.cn/chinese/zhuanti/xxsb/822807.htm. Accessed 18 Apr 2013
- Li J (2007) *The ethnic identity of the Korean minority*. Ph.D. Thesis of Minzu, University of China
- Lumezanu C, Feamster N, Klein H (2012) Measuring the tweeting behavior of propagandists. In: *Proceedings of the sixth international AAAI conference on weblogs and social media*, pp 210–217
- Mackerras C (1994) *China's minorities: integration and modernization in the twentieth century*. Oxford University Press, Hong Kong
- Mackerras C (1995) *China's minority culture*. Addison-Wesley Longman, USA
- Marshall TH (1981) *The right to welfare and other essays*. Heinemann Educational Books, London
- Mauss M (1950) Une categorie de l'esprit humain: La notion de personne, celle de 'moi'. *Sociologie et Anthropologie Paris* 336–362
- McCarthy SK (2009) *Communist multiculturalism: ethnic revival in Southwest China*. University of Washington Press, Seattle
- Mendelberg T (2002) The deliberative citizen: theory and evidence. In: Carpinì D, Michael X, Huddy L, Shapiro RY (eds) *Political decision-making, deliberation and participation*, vol 6. JAI Press, Stamford, CT
- Miller D (1995) *On nationality*. Oxford University Press
- Murray JP (1997) Media violence and youth. In: Osofsky JD, *Children in a violent society*. The Guilford Press, 72–96
- Nash R (1990) Bourdieu on education and social and cultural reproduction. *Br J Sociol Educ* 11(4):431–447
- O'Mahony P (2010) Habermas and communicative power. *J Power* 3(1):53–73
- Oakes T, Sutton DS (eds) (2010) *Faiths on display: religion, tourism, and the Chinese state*. Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, USA
- Okamura JY (1981) Situational ethnicity. *Ethnic Racial Stud* 4(4):452–465
- Olson DR (1994) *The world on paper: the conceptual and cognitive implications of writing and reading*. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, England
- Padilla AM (1999) Psychology. In: Fishman JA (ed) *Handbook of language and ethnic identity*. Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp 109–21
- Phinney JS (1992) The multi-group ethnic identity measure: a new scale for use with diverse groups. *J Adolesc Res* 7(2):156–176
- Pierre J, Peters GB (2000) *Governance, politics and the state*. St. Martin's Press, New York
- Plant R (1984) Hegel on identity and legitimation. In: Pelczynski ZA (ed) *The state and civil society: studies in Hegel's political philosophy*. Cambridge University Press, UK, pp 227–243
- Reading A (2003) Digital interactivity in public memory institutions: the uses of new technologies in Holocaust museums. *Media, Culture and Society* 25(1):67–85

- Rheingold H (1993) *The virtual community: homesteading on the electronic frontier*. Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, Reading, MA, p 1993
- Said EW (1978) *Orientalism*. Pantheon Books, US
- Saljo R (2010) Digital tools and challenges to institutional traditions of learning: technologies, social memory and the performative nature of learning. *J Comput Assist Learn* 26(1):53–64
- Schopflin G (2000) *Nations, identity, power: the new politics of Europe*. C. Hurst & Co. Publishers, London
- Scott JC (2009) *The art of not being governed: an anarchist history of upland*. Yale University Press, New Haven
- Skutnabb-Kangas T (1999) Education of minorities in handbook of language and ethnic identity. In: Fishman JA (ed) *Handbook of language and ethnic identity*. Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp 42–59
- Sigler JA (1983) *Minority rights: a comparative analysis*. Greenwood Press, London
- Sparacino F, Davenport G, Pentland A (2000) Media in performance: interactive spaces for dance, theater, circus, and museum exhibits. *IBM Syst J* 39(3.4):479–510
- Sullivan A (2002) Bourdieu and education: how useful is Bourdieu's theory for researchers? *Neth J Soc Sci* 38(2):144–166
- Thiel M, Coate R (2010) Identity politics and political identities: local expressions in a globalizing world. In: Coate R, Thiel M (eds) *Identity politics in the age of globalization*. Lynne Rienner Publishers, Colorado, pp 1–30
- Thompson JB (1995) *The media and modernity: a social theory of the media*. Stanford University Press, USA
- Tsung L (2009) *Minority languages, education and communities in China*. Palgrave Macmillan, UK
- Tu W-M (1985) *Confucian thought: selfhood as creative transformation*. State University of New York Press, New York
- Tu WM (1995) *The living tree: the changing meaning of being Chinese today*. Stanford University Press, Stanford, p 63
- Turner BS (1986) *Citizenship and capitalism: the debate over reformism*. Allen & Unwin, London
- Turner BS (1990) Outline of a theory of citizenship. *Sociology* 24(2):189–217
- Turner BS (1991) *Religion and social theory*. Sage, US
- Turner BS (1993) Outline of a theory of human rights. *Sociology* 27(3):489–512
- Turner BS (2001) The erosion of citizenship. *Br J Sociol* 52(2):189–209
- Turner BS (2004) Making and unmaking citizenship in neoliberal times. In: Ku AS, Pun N (eds) *Remaking citizenship in HK: community, nation and the global city*. Routledge, London, pp xiv–xxiii
- Turner BS (2007) The enclave society: towards a sociology of immobility. *Eur J Soc Theor* 10(2):287–303
- Tursun G (2011) Integrating minorities through legislation: a Chinese point of view. *Asia-Pacific J Hum Rights Law* 1:27–55
- Verstraeten H (1996) The media and the transformation of the public sphere: a contribution for a critical political economy of the public sphere. *Eur J Commun* 11(3):347–370
- Vogel EF (1974) *Deng Xiaoping and the transformation of China*. Harvard University Press, Cambridge
- Wang SP (2004) The People's Republic of China's policy on minorities and international approaches to ethnic groups: a comparative study. *Int J Minor Group Rights* 11:159–185
- Walzer M (1995) *Toward a global civil society*, vol I. Berghahn Books, US
- Weber M (1980) *Economy and Society*. University of California Press, USA
- Wojcieszak ME, Mutz D (2009) Online groups and political discourse. *J Commun* 59:40–56
- Young C (1976) *The politics of cultural pluralism*. University of Wisconsin Press, Madison
- Zheng Y-N (1999) *Discovering Chinese nationalism in China: modernization, identity, and international relations*. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge
- Zhu GB, Yu LY (2000) Regional minority autonomy in the PRC: a preliminary appraisal from a historical perspective. *Int J Minor Group Rights Issue* 7:39–57

Instrumental Autonomy, Political Socialization, and
Citizenship Identity

A Case Study of Korean Minority Citizenship Identity,
Bilingual Education and Modern Media Life in the
Post-Communism Transitioning China

Yu, M.Y.

2017, VIII, 177 p. 57 illus., Hardcover

ISBN: 978-981-10-2692-8