

Chapter 2

Developing the Thoughtful Practitioner

Donald Gillies

2.1 Introduction

The concept of the ‘reflective practitioner’ has been prominent in educational discourse for some decades. Within initial teacher education, students are often encouraged to engage in ‘reflection’ but rarely is this theorised effectively or operationalised meaningfully. At times, ‘reflective practice’ reduces to an exercise in cursory self-evaluation. The theoretical work of Hannah Arendt (1906–75) on ‘enlarged thought’, however, offers opportunities for both clarifying the nature of professional reflection and for aiding the development of sound practice.

It is a truth, if not universally acknowledged then at least of widespread disciplinary concern, that the link between theory and practice in professional education remains as contested as it has ever been. The *longue durée* of teacher education could well be this clunky dispute about the extent to which theory does, or should, influence classroom practice. Yet, in one basic sense at least, this debate is inadequately grounded. Theory is silently present, however, much we imagine that we are free of it: it precedes, constricts and infuses our observation. And, of course, the very notion that theory has no useful place in the classroom is, itself, a theory—and one that is irreparably self-contradictory. Thus, we come always to our professional practice guided and informed by theory however unconscious, inchoate, or flimsy its omnipresence may be.

In this chapter, the work of Hannah Arendt, her thinking around the concept and exercise of judgement, is employed, without apology, as a means of illuminating what ‘reflective practice’ means in action and how it may be better developed. If theory is ever-present in our professional lives, then it seems eminently reasonable to endeavour to seek out the most robust and persuasive examples to make sense of our work and to improve our practice.

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In addition to this defence of the place of theory in education, a further warrant for the particular approach—eclectic and selective—deployed in this chapter comes from the work of Hannah Arendt herself where she talks of the value of explorations into the past which seek to illuminate the present. Arendt uses the image of the pearl diver to illustrate this idea of seeking out something ‘rich and strange’ from the depths of published thought which may transform our current thinking—something lasting, ‘immune to the elements’ which can be recovered to assist pressing concerns (Arendt 1999, pp. 54–55). In what follows, only a small part of Arendt’s work will be referred to and no attempt will be made to cover her work as a whole nor to argue that this is either typical or representative of her output. The key positional belief underpinning this approach, therefore, is that if we are unavoidably influenced by theory, then we should employ those that are of value, which have been tried and tested by deep human thought and informed action. Arendt’s work on judgement is claimed in this chapter to be such a treasure.

2.2 The Reflective Practitioner

The concept of the reflective practitioner is one that is very prevalent within teacher education and within the profession itself. It re-emerged most powerfully in recent decades through the highly influential work of Schön (1983), but from there its roots can be traced back to Dewey (1916). More recently, influenced by Schön’s attack on technical rationalism, others have turned to Aristotle’s concept of *phronesis*—practical wisdom—as a source of inspiration on the topic.

Its prevalence cannot be doubted. In 2014, Google Analytics show that about 33,100 research outputs dealing with reflection and teaching were published, equivalent to around 22% of all teacher-related research. Some 1560 articles on *phronesis* and teaching were published that year, and around 1660 which addressed both reflection and *phronesis*. Such data do suggest that the topic is of widespread interest and importance and, given the scale of the interest, an issue which remains live and contested rather than settled and agreed.

When Zeichner (1994) first critiqued the concept, he argued, amongst other things, that it was a ‘slogan’ which had been embraced worldwide and that ‘everyone, no matter what his or her ideological orientation, has jumped on the bandwagon’ (pp. 9–10). Given that in 1994 only 107 of the 114,000 research outputs on teachers that year referred to the concept of the ‘reflective practitioner’, one can state that current publication statistics suggest any ‘bandwagon’ that existed 20 years ago is miniscule in comparison to what is evident now.

This chapter is also positioned from a critical standpoint by questioning what is understood by reflection and questioning the capacity of beginning teachers, in particular, to reflect effectually on their practice without there being a context established within which it is to be conducted, and a knowledge base, a range of reflective resources, available to assist such activity. The danger is that we replicate what is happening currently in social media and elsewhere, where opinion, neither

considered nor informed, is expressed boldly and authoritatively. Thus, the risk is of beginning teachers, pre-service teachers, being encouraged to pass judgement on their practice without sufficient care being taken to ensure that such judgements are soundly based. In addition, reflection without wider reference-points risks becoming ‘ritualistic’ (Moore 2004, p. 105), ‘pseudo-reflection’ (p. 109), solipsistic navel-gazing, or an exercise in narcissistic self-affirmation. If reflection is to be purposive, then it needs to be set up in such a way as to allow chosen ends to be realised. The literature base would seem to suggest that the main aim of teacher reflection, either implied or expressed, is that of improved practice, howsoever understood. In that sense, therefore, there is a professional imperative to see that such activity is set up in a way that would enable such an outcome to follow. This chapter suggests that the work of Hannah Arendt, drawing on her Kantian affinities, offers some suggestions about ways in which teacher professional reflection could be undertaken in a more robust and coherent manner.

2.3 Reflection

Although the work of Schön (1983) only deals fleetingly with teaching, it is considered to be the source of the current fascination in the concept of the reflective practitioner within educational literature. Schön’s critical focus was what he labelled ‘technical rationality’, an essentially positivist stance, which judged that professions, including teaching, required robust improvement through ‘instrumental problem solving made rigorous by the application of scientific theory and technique’ (p. 15). This approach suggested that the teacher, for example, simply required to learn a series of actions which could be applied in given situations to achieve desired results. Schön claimed that this not only reduced the professional to the role of a skilled worker or functionary but also failed to acknowledge and take into account the nature of the context within which teachers work. Schön argued that the professional context could not provide the invariable site for a scientist approach because, firstly, the pace of technological change was such that it required of professionals ‘adaptability that is unprecedented’ (p. 15), and, secondly, that it was marked by ‘uncertainty, complexity, instability, uniqueness and value conflict’ (pp. 16–17).

Schön set out to show how professionals worked in reality and analysed various aspects of reflection which were identified by him as being central to their practice. Schön’s work on reflection-in-action showed how professionals constantly reviewed the situations that they found themselves in and considered their choices of action in the light of these evolving understandings. This underpinning of the key role of professional judgement, founded on a form of continuous action research, clearly struck a nerve and over the decades since, the importance of reflection in teacher education has never waned, as the volume of journal articles and books cited above would indicate.

Although Schön never referred to the work of Dewey, nor, indeed, to Aristotle, his concept of the reflective practitioner can be seen to resonate with the work of these two. For Dewey, thinking was the key ingredient which turned mere activity into experience, and thus something from which teachers could learn. Dewey's concept of thinking in teaching (1916) is focused on how the teacher thinks through potential actions by replaying and anticipating the causal connections evident in any given situation, the key factors and the potential effects. Dewey argues that it is this applied thought, grounded in professional knowledge, which avoids the haphazard risk of trial and error. The opposites to 'thoughtful action' are caprice and routine (p. 74) where the teacher engages in activity either merely through habit or without thinking through issues of purpose and effectual means. 'Thought', Dewey argues, is 'the sole method of escape from purely impulsive or purely routine action' (2012, p. 14). 'Reflective thought' aims at 'reasoned conclusions' (p. 5) and consists of 'active, persistent and careful consideration of any belief or supposed form of knowledge in the light of the grounds that support it, and the further conclusions to which it tends' (Dewey 2012, p. 6).

In recent times, researchers, as has been noted, have returned to the work of Aristotle and his concept of *phronesis* as a way of further understanding professional practice. *Phronesis*—practical wisdom—combines both the selection of virtuous goals and the means to achieving them. Thus, it elevates the teacher from merely being concerned with the instrumentality typified in technical rationality and, instead, stresses how practical wisdom is about the selection of virtuous ends, or goals, as well as the choice of effective means to their realisation. It is in Aristotle's distinction of *phronesis* from scientific knowledge (*episteme*) and craft knowledge or skill (*techne*) that further value is seen in his work. *Techne*, which is art or skill, can be seen to be typical of the technical rationalist approach to teaching which Schön rejected.

The work of Brookfield (1995) stresses the element of criticality in reflective practice, highlighting the importance of reflection going beyond the immediate classroom experience to consider wider issues about systemic goals, policy context, power relations and governance arrangements. Drawing on the critical theory tradition, it sees reflective action as positioned in an emancipatory role.

2.4 Perceived Strengths and Weaknesses of Reflective Practice as Concept

The perceived strengths of reflective practice as concept within teacher professionalism can be summarised as having five main elements: it places 'thoughtful action' at the heart of teaching and so elevates the notion and importance of professional judgement; it provides the basis for rejecting the claims of technical rationalism and its twin risks of limiting teachers to a functional role and misrepresenting the contexts of teaching as invariable and so susceptible to a scientist

model; it reasserts the moral aspect of teaching in relation to the choice of virtuous ends and means; it enhances, and entrenches, the professionalism of teaching by seeing it as not something for which one can be merely ‘trained’ but rather as a practice where nuanced judgement is required on a daily basis; and, finally, it lends itself well to the current model of continuing professional learning, where reflection is seen as a crucial ingredient, from the novice to the expert levels, from the unpromoted to the most senior rank.

From the very beginning, a number of critics took issue with the way in which reflective practice came to assume such a central role within teacher education. Zeichner (1994), an early and repeated critic, argues that it is used in an imprecise and fuzzy manner, and so it is unclear on what exactly the practitioner should be reflecting; it is unclear which tools and processes should be deployed in this reflection; and, it is similarly unclear as to the purpose of the reflective activity. Further critics observed that reflection which was limited to thinking was quite a different exercise from that which was focused on action. It is possible to reflect on practice, and even come to an evaluation of it, without that being further utilised to affect future action. They also show how the use of different time-frames can create quite different models so that reflection-in-action can lead to ad hoc, instant changes in practice whereas other forms of reflection may gestate for some time before any resultant action is appropriate or envisaged. As with Brookfield (1995), they also point out how different levels of criticality can affect the range of issues considered in the reflection and so produce radically different responses.

Without clarity on the nature and aims of reflection, therefore, it is hard to see how beginning professionals can engage in it in any systematic and purposive manner. The concepts of single-loop and double-loop learning can be used to illustrate how one form of reflection may involve consideration of the means or methods employed to reach a planned goal (single-loop), whereas a second form of reflection will call into question not just the methods but the very goals themselves (double-loop). This distinction serves to stress just how diverse the possible approaches to professional reflection are, from that which leads to some minor adjustment and tinkering to reflection which can lead to radical transformation.

A further criticism is founded on the lack of clarity about the practice so that at times, and especially with early professionals, it can seem to involve merely a superficial exercise in self-evaluation, which Moore (2004) terms pseudo-reflection: often self-congratulatory without an obvious evidence-base.

2.5 Hannah Arendt

In addressing the concept of reflective practice, particularly in relation to beginning teachers, this chapter will deploy some of the ideas of Hannah Arendt, as has been indicated, to illuminate what is involved in professional reflection, and to suggest how the exercise of judgement, central to reflective practice, can be developed.

Hannah Arendt was born into a secular Jewish family in Hanover, Germany in 1906. She studied philosophy at the University of Marburg under Martin Heidegger, with whom she formed a passionate, if brief, relationship. She moved later to the University of Heidelberg where she completed her doctorate in 1928 under the supervision of Karl Jaspers. Following the rise of the Nazi party in 1933, she fled Germany and finally settled in America in 1941, gaining citizenship some ten years later. She taught at a number of universities in the USA, latterly at the New School of Social Research in New York City. Despite the importance to her work of the world of classical philosophy, she declined the designation ‘philosopher’ herself, apparently preferring to be described as a ‘political theorist’ (Strong 2012, p. 328). Amongst her published works are *The Origins of Totalitarianism*, *The Human Condition*, and *Eichmann in Jerusalem*. Her final, unfinished work—*The Life of the Mind*—returned to the Kantian focus on thought, the will, and judgement. Devoted to caffeine and nicotine throughout her adult life, she suffered heart trouble in her latter years and died in 1975, aged 69.

Her work is marked by clarity of thought, and conceptual rigour, but also by a commitment to addressing genuine political and moral issues in their social reality, in actual human experience rather than as theoretical abstractions. Her work is disparate but could be seen to have a central attachment to maintaining a notion of humanity and democratic co-existence within a world tormented by totalitarian excess and post-modern uncertainty. She thus probes how communal existence—political life—can survive in a world where we have lost the ‘yardsticks’ and ‘rules’ which once guided us (Arendt 1994, p. 321).

2.6 Kant, Arendt and Judgement

Arendt draws her work on judgement—the key ingredient of reflective practice—from the work of Immanuel Kant, one of whose three great works was devoted to the topic: *A Critique of Judgement* (1790). What Arendt’s work does is to suggest a way of understanding judgement that both gives it strength and avoids the risk of subjective whim. In other words, for teacher reflection to overcome the risks identified above that teacher reflection is shallow or narrow or lightweight, Arendt’s analysis of judgement offers a way forward, a means by which judgement can be developed and better enacted.

Arendt touches on the nature of judgement in a number of her published works, often in the context of the ‘crisis’ of late modernity, as she sees it, where there is a struggle amongst humans to find common ground, to achieve agreement, in a world where the old fundamentals of religion and society have gone. Without the shared orthodox beliefs of the past, humans struggle to find anything permanent and fixed upon which to rely: she terms this development as necessitating ‘thinking without a banister’ (Strong 2012, p. 334), where one has nothing external to rely on but where humans need to work together instead to achieve common understanding and mutual recognition in a world without fixed truths. Arendt sees in Kant’s work on

judgement the potential for establishing stronger foundations for our thinking and beliefs, a means of progressing beyond the despair of judgemental relativism or the abandonment of any hopes of rapprochement or overlapping consensus. It is in her lectures on Kant's political philosophy (Arendt 1992) that she devotes most attention to the issue of judgement but it also arises in a number of her other works on philosophy and politics. In outlining Arendt's treatment of judgement, some of Kant's ideas are subsumed within but it is easier to deal with the issue in this singular, interpreted form rather than to have to alternate repeatedly between the two theorists.

In the *Critique of Judgement*, Kant outlines two mental operations in judgement. The first is operation of imagination so that we can represent in our minds an object or experience even although it is no longer present with us. The second part of judgement is identified as 'the operation of reflection' (Arendt 1992, p. 68). This establishes very clearly, therefore, how pertinent and relevant is this discussion of judgement to the concept of the 'reflective practitioner'. In approving or disapproving that which is brought into the mind's eye through the process of imagination, one is no longer directly finding the object or experience pleasing, but rather one is judging it to be, or to have been, pleasing or not. In a somewhat difficult argument (p. 69) Arendt claims that the act of approbation creates pleasure in the one judging and that we judge between approval or disapproval on the 'criterion of communicability or publicness'. The criterion for approval or disapproval is said, therefore, to be communicability 'and the standard for deciding about it is common sense' (p. 69). This term has a particular meaning for Kant and is central to his discussion of judgement. The expression of judgement is dependent upon a community of humans that one has confidence share the same faculty of judgement. One appeals to 'common sense' when one makes a judgement 'and it is this possible appeal that gives judgements their special validity'. We feel that our judgements are valid if they attract community agreement—'common sense'. The insane may be quite capable of communication: it is the fact that their expressed judgements are alien to common sense, that they do not square with those of others, that is a significant criterion for suspecting them to be mad, or at least strange or eccentric.

In coming to make, and communicate, a judgement, therefore, one considers its likely worth in relation to an appreciation of its expected reception: our anticipation of what 'common sense' would suggest. It is from this phenomenon that Kant develops his concept of 'enlarged mentality' which he explains as the capacity to put oneself in others' standpoints and compare one's judgement with what one imagines would be theirs. The faculty of judgement, therefore, takes account of 'the collective reason of humanity', as envisaged (p. 71). Persons of 'enlarged thought' are capable of overcoming their own biased or partial judgements by disregarding 'the subjective private conditions' of their own judgements (p. 71) and, instead, by reflecting on the issue from the perspective of others, and so establishing a *general* standpoint from which to judge.

It is this concept of the 'enlarged mentality' which especially appeals to Arendt. Her related idea of 'enlarged thought' is used by her in a number of her works and

needs also to be understood for one to make sense of her claim that at the root of Eichmann's crime is 'thoughtlessness', a failure to reflect *thought-fully* on action and a failure to either develop or make use of an 'enlarged mentality'. Arendt deviates in an important way from Kant in her conceptualisation of 'enlarged thought'. In a sense, it can be considered as more a political than a moral judgement. For Kant, the person of 'enlarged mentality' attempts to stand in the place of all others when making a judgement; the person of 'enlarged mentality' adopts 'the standpoint of the world citizen' (Arendt 1992, p. 44). Arendt does not subscribe to this 'universal' position but rather prefers the 'general'. By this is meant, that while Kant sees sound judgement and enlarged mentality as seeking validity for 'every single judging person', Arendt instead narrows this to those who judge, in other words, to those who have an interest in the particular instance of judgement (Strong 2012, p. 344). Arendt thus lays stress on intersubjective validity to counter subjective vagaries but without any claim to Kantian certainty.

Representative thinking is the key to enlarged thought. It involves the capacity to bring to one's mind the potential perspectives of all who would have a claim to be judges in the specific instance.

Political thought is representative. I form an opinion by considering a given issue from different viewpoints, by making present to my mind the standpoints of those who are absent; that it, I represent them ... The more people's standpoints I have present in my mind while I am pondering a given issue, and the better I can imagine how I would feel and think if I were in their place, the stronger will be my capacity for representative thinking and the more valid my final conclusions, my opinion. (Arendt 2006, p. 237)

Thus, Arendt moves forward in this world without banisters on the basis that, in a world lacking objective moral standards, we need not be at the mercy of subjective whim but rather have the potential to use Kant's insights on taste and judgement to create moral boundaries based on communication, intersubjectivity and shared judgement.

Arendt makes two further key points on the implications of the centrality of enlarged thought in coming to sound judgement. She uses two related but distinct metaphors to convey how enlarged thought can be developed. The first of these is the concept of 'visiting': 'To think with an enlarged mentality means that one trains one's imagination to go visiting' (Arendt 1992, p. 43). Thus, the development of enlarged thought is achieved through its very practice: by visiting the viewpoints of others one increases one's capacity for enlarged thought and representative thinking. Arendt, however, adds a second metaphor by which to add a qualitative element to this 'visiting'. Indiscriminate 'visiting' may not assist our goal of sound judgement unless those whom we visit comprise 'good company'. The cultivated person, the person of sound judgement, Arendt asserts will be the one 'who knows how to choose his [sic] company among men, among things, among thoughts, in the present as well as in the past' (Arendt 2006, p. 222). It is those whose thinking we visit who must be good company themselves if our judgements are to be sound, either morally or politically: '...our decisions about right and wrong will depend

upon our choice of company, of those with whom we wish to spend our lives. And again, this company is chosen by thinking in examples, in examples of persons dead or alive, real or fictitious, and in examples of incidents, past or present' (Arendt 2003, pp. 145–6).

Arendt, therefore, drawing on Kant's concepts of taste and judgement, presents the possibility of circumstances where judgement, by reaching out to the plural, by anticipating and weighing up relevant potential perspectives, has the capacity to reach a form of intersubjective validity, rooted in the notion of common sense.

2.7 Implications for Reflective Practice

This brief excursion into Arendtian thought can be brought to bear on the problematic aspects of reflective practice as outlined earlier. The basic principle underlying a putative Arendtian viewpoint on reflective practice would be that the possibility of such reflection being soundly based and of its having the potential for improving practice depend upon the extent to which it is rooted in a broad spectrum of relevant perspectives and of having been subject to this form of communal consideration, which in turn gives rise to a form of intersubjective validity.

Smith (2001) argues persuasively that the implications of this for (initial teacher) education are twofold. The first consequence is that learners need to be exposed to a wide, and growing, spectrum of potential viewpoints and perspectives. Smith, in dealing with school education *per se*, suggests that this means—as has been the case generally in schools, even if not explicitly so labelled—that students are introduced, through literature, and through the study of history and the humanities in general, to different people, to different outlooks, to different cultural, social and moral values. The role of education involves this introduction to human plurality in all its forms. An Arendtian outlook would suggest that this should be pursued strenuously so that the capacity for representative thought, of being able to anticipate and reflect upon what a wide range of others would think in a given situation, is extended and maximised.

If applied to teacher education, then one can suggest that the capacity for improved reflective practice will be increased through the exposure of beginning teachers to as wide a range as possible of relevant voices and views on education and schooling. The more relevant perspectives that the beginning teacher can bring to bear on their own practice, then the greater the prospect for that reflection to be soundly based and to be effectual in relation to desired improvement.

The second implication for education of Arendt's concept of judgement (Smith 2001, p. 86) is that learners, in addition to developing the capacity for enlarged thought, need to have opportunities to exercise related judgement. As learners develop the capacity for representative thinking, so they need opportunities to practise making judgements. As with all sound pedagogical practice, this needs to be enacted in a graduated way, so that the scenarios in which judgement is exercised develop from the basic and relatively inconsequential to the more complex and more significant. After all, the purpose of enlarged thought is to enhance the

capacity for exercising sound judgement and so the two, it would appear, ought to be developed in tandem. Exercising judgement would develop, one would expect, from activity which is more concrete, more explicit and more staged, to that which becomes increasingly implicit, ‘natural’ and embedded. As with all such activity, expertise at the highest level seems more effortless and spontaneous, but this impression belies all that has gone before in terms of development and activity.

If applied to teacher education, then one would expect to see beginning teachers having the opportunity to exercise judgement, and to share and discuss such decisions, on a regular basis, again starting from more simple and inconsequential issues before progressing to the more complicated and weighty. It is perfectly feasible for these opportunities for practice to be undertaken in relation to hypothetical situations which still require the professional to consider the reported facts of the matter, contemplate different potential perspectives and viewpoints, and then make a judgement. In some ways, this sort of activity is of double benefit as the debate and discussion with peers thereafter also contributes to the growth of representative thinking, and so to enlarged thought.

It is important to stress that all of this, for Arendt, is assumed to be conducted in a world ‘without banisters’. There is no secret truth about professional practice to be unearthed, no immutable laws of practice to be discovered. Instead, our judgement is not just required in terms of reflection on practice, but even in terms of the viewpoints and perspectives which we choose to deploy in our internal consideration prior to a judgement being made. There is an inherent paradox within this concept of professional judgement in that to make sound judgement, the chances are improved through considering as wide a range of perspectives and potential viewpoints as possible and, yet, judgement is also required in terms of selecting those perspectives which are deemed to be relevant and valued in the first place. As Arendt says, our decisions depend upon ‘our choice of company’ (2003, p. 145–6)—in other words on the viewpoints which we select as being important and helpful.

Thus, one could add to the position of Smith (2001) that part of developing sound judgement is not just developing enlarged thought, through encounters with myriad outlooks and viewpoints, nor having opportunities to practise making judgements, but also the development of a set of values and professional principles which would enable one to sift through these viewpoints and decide which to choose to be influential and on what basis. As Arendt indicates, at bottom this is a matter of choice: from all the ‘visiting’ we do, we have to choose the ‘company’ we wish to keep, those to whom we will elect to refer when judgements have to be made.

2.8 A Developmental Approach to Teacher Reflective Judgement

This study has been conceptual and nothing yet has been said, or claimed, about current professional practice itself: what teachers actually do when reflecting on practice and how they come to the decisions they make and the corrective actions

which result. Nevertheless, even in the absence of such data, in applying Arendt's views on judgement to teacher professional practice, one can make some tentative suggestions about how this might operate in relation to initial teacher education.

The first issue, as was recognised above, is that beginning teachers need to be encouraged to develop a moral stance in relation to their professional responsibilities. It is this overall moral outlook which will be key to selecting the 'company' they will frequent when reflecting on practice and when making related judgements. One would expect these to reflect democratic values suited to the social and political context within which schooling is undertaken, and to have been encouraged already through previous educational experiences prior to entering the teaching profession.

Of more direct significance to the issue of reflective practice, however, the development of enlarged thought would involve exposure to, and increasing familiarity with, a range of relevant viewpoints and perspectives. To be enabled to make sound judgements about their work, beginning teachers would need to bring into professional consideration outlooks drawn from three broad categories: self; others; and literature. In relation to self, reflective practice would involve consideration of prior experience, values, principles, and how they relate to the situation in question. Drawing on the thinking of others would be that of such relevant persons as peers, professional colleagues, tutors, pupils, parents, other stakeholders. In terms of literature, what would be considered is evidence from relevant research, relevant educational theory, policy of various forms, insights from philosophy, psychology, sociology, history and pedagogy. In addition, personal reading of all forms could be relevant and applicable. As the professional develops, more and more of these insights become part of the practitioner's enlarged thought and so the need to seek out external sources to bolster reflection would recede as more of this professional knowledge and expertise is assimilated and internalised. For the beginning teacher, however, the need to go visiting for such insights is more pressing and a teacher education programme endeavouring to apply Arendtian principles would need to be explicit about how this was to be practised, and developed in a graduated manner.

Thus, for the beginning teacher, going visiting could involve the following:
Self

Personal experience—*drawing on situations and circumstances already encountered which provide insight to the matter in question; drawing on relationships, advice, memory;*

Personal reading—*applying insights from one's own reading—personal, pleasure, academic, journalistic, professional, practical—to instances from practice;*

Principles and values—*considering how these personal views position the situation in question; reflecting if these are helpful or require refinement;*

Others

Peers—*eliciting the opinion of others in a similar situation, either generally or as observers of own practice;*

Partners—*seeking views from others involved in one's context—support staff, parents, external and internal stakeholders;*

Pupils—*eliciting the views of those taught, of those for whose ultimate benefit teachers are employed;*

Professionals—*eliciting and drawing from tutors, from the views of the wider profession, from written and spoken data, and from wider relevant professional standpoints.*

Literature

Publications—*applying evidence from research studies of various forms and from various contexts such as philosophy, psychology, sociology, politics, and history; applying theory and research evidence from such;*

Pedagogy—*considering and applying to context, learning theory and debate on teaching methods;*

Policy—*drawing from policy and guidelines relevant data, and subjecting it to critique, where appropriate;*

Such a list is by no means exhaustive but indicates the complexity, indeed, of teacher professional practice and, given the extent of potential perspectives, the need for beginning teachers to be introduced gradually and systematically into such reflective practice. The beginning teacher would need to be encouraged to articulate in specific detail the sources which were deemed to be relevant, the ideas being drawn on, and why, when reflecting on a particular professional issue or experience. At the earliest stages, this might involve a very few factors. Over time, that range would be extended as they became more familiar with different thinkers, different research evidence and with wider social and cultural viewpoints. As more of this breadth of thought is assimilated so there reduces the need to be explicit and detailed in citing the sources being deployed. As Schön suggests, the experienced professional reflects-in-action, drawing almost unconsciously on this body of knowledge; it becomes part of their daily, hourly, professional practice.

However, what an Arendtian perspective also indicates is that this introduction to sound professional judgement is also an introduction to the very leadership practice so valorised in current policy. If leadership is a combination of vision and influence, then it is through the development of sound professional judgement that the capacity for 'vision' is also developed—the ability to identify and select sound educational goals. Thus, the encouragement of a systematic approach to professional reflection ought also to sow the seeds for increased leadership capacity—not in the generic skills of influencing and motivating, but in the far more important and crucial area of developing sound professional judgement in relation to the problems and puzzles of professional life and the contested world of educational values, aims and ultimate goals.

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A Companion to Research in Teacher Education

Peters, M.A.; Cowie, B.; Menter, I. (Eds.)

2017, XIX, 850 p. 33 illus., Hardcover

ISBN: 978-981-10-4073-3