

Contents

1	Theoretical Context of Institution Reform	1
1.1	Transaction Nature of Institution Reform	5
1.2	Classification Limitation of Institution Reform	8
1.3	Equilibrium Constraint of Institution Reform	11
1.4	Logical Structure and Arrangement	14
2	Theoretical Natures of China Institution Change	21
2.1	Institution Absence of Neoclassical Economics	22
2.2	Improper Substitution of the Transaction Cost Concept	28
2.3	Paradigm Misuse of the Social Choice Theory	32
3	The Social Scientific Value of the Bargaining Game Theory	39
3.1	Cooperative Essence of Transaction	40
3.2	Social Efficiency of Generalized Transaction	47
3.3	Fair Value of Generalized Transaction	50
3.4	Bargaining Programming of Generalized Transaction	54
3.5	Cooperative Order of the Bargaining Transaction	58
4	The Logic of Bargaining Game	61
4.1	Core, Competitive Equilibrium and the Four Elements of Bargaining	62
4.2	Nash Bargaining Problems	70
4.3	Perfect Equilibrium of Rubinstein Sequential Bargaining	74
4.4	“Nash Bargaining Programing” of Binmore	77
4.4.1	“Cooperation” Culture Based on the Equilibrium Concept	78
4.4.2	Cultural Meanings of the Original Position	80
4.4.3	Bargaining Game Based on Empathy Preference	83
	Appendix of Chapter 4: Basic Solutions of Bargaining Game	91

5	An Economic Expression of Institution Theory	105
5.1	General Characteristics of Institution Expression	106
5.1.1	Contract Theory of the Institution	107
5.1.2	Equilibrium Logic of the Institution	109
5.2	Properties and Principle of Institution Expression.	111
5.2.1	Principle of Individualistic Rationality.	113
5.2.2	Principle Utilitarian Economic.	114
5.2.3	Principle of Consistency Between Normativeness and Empiricalness	114
5.3	Institution Expression Based on the 2D Social Index	116
5.3.1	Set of Social Members	116
5.3.2	Behavior Space of Social Members and the Behavior Universal Set.	119
5.3.3	Topology Structure of the Institutional Function	120
5.4	Institution Classification Based on Utilitarian Expression	122
6	The Bargaining Context of General Institution Reform	125
6.1	The Complete Information of Institution Reform	126
6.2	The Two-Person Game Nature of Institution Reform	132
6.3	Asymmetric Game Nature of Institution Reform.	134
6.4	Non-violence Hypothesis of Institution Reform	137
	Appendix: Definition of the Bargaining Game of General Institution Reform	141
7	The Bargaining Context of China Institution Reform	145
7.1	Institution Reform Based on the Same Ideology.	147
7.2	Political Connotation of China Institution Reform	155
7.3	The Bargaining Ability of China Institution Reform.	159
7.3.1	Institution Connotation of the Social Index	159
7.3.2	The Value of the 2D-Social Index.	161
	Appendix: The Bargaining Game Definition of China's Institution Reform	165
8	Bargaining Equilibrium of Institutional Reform	171
8.1	Axiomatic Solution of General Institution Reform	172
8.2	Institutional Reform Equilibrium Based on "Nash Bargaining Programming".	176
8.3	Institutional Reform Equilibrium Based on "Asymmetry"	180
8.4	Bargaining Solution of Institution Reform Based on 2D Social Indexes	183
9	Practice Explanations of the Bargaining Institutional Reform of China	187
9.1	Examples of China Bargaining Institutional Reform.	189
9.2	A "n + 1 Persons" Bargaining Solution of "The Mass Line"	196

9.2.1	Basic Hypotheses of the Model	199
9.2.2	The Bargaining Solution of Nonparticipation Behavior of the Publics	200
9.2.3	Institutional Implementation Cost	203
9.2.4	Institution Equilibrium of the Mass Line	205
9.3	Compromise Value of China Bargaining Institutional Reform	207
9.4	Fair Value of China Bargaining Institutional Reform	210
9.5	Efficiency Value of China Bargaining Institutional Reform	211
10	Logical Defects of the Two-Person Bargaining Institution Reform	215
10.1	Logical Paradox of Non-violent Culture	217
10.2	The Agent Cost of the Two-Person Game	220
10.3	Incomplete Information Solution of Institution Reform	225
11	A Naturalism Understanding on China's Institution Reform	229
11.1	Institution Reform Concept in Hume's Sense	232
11.2	"The Mass Line" and the Naturalism Politics of Bargaining . . .	235
11.3	Discussion on Political Democracy	238
	Appendix	245
	References	249

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