

The Players: Greeks vs Germans

Abstract Chapter 2 explores the multifaceted ways conjured up by Greeks and Germans to represent each other in the newspaper coverage of the Greek debt crisis. It is structured around five thematic patterns, each exhibiting a different kind of entanglement between the images of the Self and the Other: the emergence and contestation of the stereotypes of lazy but merry Greeks versus hard-working and miserly Germans; the different ‘moral languages’ invoked on each side; the psychosocial undercurrents of identifying the Other with one’s own innermost demons; the politics and manipulation of memory; and the topoi of power and resistance.

Keywords Stereotypes • Rule of law • European solidarity • Fear • Memory • Power • Resistance

Let us introduce the players in the Greco–German game of mutual recognition at the time of the Greek sovereign debt crisis. How did they represent each other and themselves, and how did perceived ascriptions by the Other reflect back on their self-image as well as their representations of that Other? What impact did the crisis have on such perceptions and representations?

We pay special attention to stereotypes in the players’ mutual representation, break them up into different layers and situate them in the webs of cultural and historical meanings that condition their

interpretation by different sections of the Greek and German societies. But we question them too. Was Greece always the swindler and Germany always the imperialist in the other country's newspapers? Was no common ground projected at all? And if there was some diversity in the portrayal of the Other by the media of each country, if there were some seeds of seeing the Other in greater complexity, was this appreciated in the other country, or was it mostly lost in translation?

Surprisingly perhaps, we found that even the most lurid and incendiary texts often toned down their insulting stereotypes with more nuanced representations. What is more, our analysis indicates that even stereotypes may, somewhat paradoxically, be important steps in making mutual engagement, and ultimately mutual recognition, possible. For, to recognise someone requires knowing them on some level, in addition to feeling reasonably at ease with who we think we are ourselves. We produce such knowledge of one another and of ourselves partly through stereotypes, by producing as well as contesting them. Perhaps it is part of being human that stereotypes have to be produced before they can be broken up and replaced by more nuanced understandings.

Moreover, even tropes of prejudice and othering can ironically work to project a vision of a common core. This is because our ontological knowledge of Selves and Others is essentially *relational*, because in each country Selves and Others are defined in relation to each other, and because these representations feed back onto each other. In other words, our conceptions of the Self and the Other are mutually constitutive both within national borders and transnationally. As in an infinity mirror cabinet, our own faces and the faces of our Others overlay each other and ultimately blur into one another on some level. In our Others, we recognise ourselves, and in ourselves, our Others. But at the same time, with recognition comes separation. The three faces of recognition mentioned in Chapter 1 fundamentally overlap and condition each other: *epistemic recognition*, or the recognition of someone as someone is presupposed by, and presupposes, both *self-recognition* and *mutual recognition*.¹

This chapter is structured around five topoi or thematic patterns which stood out in how the Greeks and Germans confronted their national Selves and Others. We start by considering the core stereotypes, contrasting the lazy but merry Greek to the hard-working but miserly

German. Next, we explore different ‘moralities’ at play in invocations of values such as law-abidingness, solidarity and decency. We move on to psychosocial undercurrents of identifying the Other with one’s own innermost fears or aspirations. This leads us to the politics and manipulation of memory. Finally, we investigate what roles the topoi of power and resistance played in the debates.

2.1 OF GREEK SQUANDERERS AND GERMAN MISERS

La Fontaine’s tale of the cicada who sang all summer only to find herself penniless come winter and promptly went to see her neighbour the thrifty ant provides the most basic prism through which Germans initially made sense of the demands that were made on them by Greeks as they woke up to the enormity of their sovereign debt. German press coverage of all things Greek was marked prominently by a wide variety of images and storylines depicting immense Greek private wealth, overspending, laziness and, on a more positive note, a distinct fascination with Greek *savoir vivre*. Stereotypes of the other side served to construct and reconstruct oneself, as many Germans dwelled almost obsessively over images of luxury yachts, party scenes, private mansions with swimming pools such as the one *Der Spiegel* used to illustrate an article on the crisis dividing Greek society (Image 2.1), or alternatively images of Greek scenic, culinary, female or social beauty symbolising the good life.²

The Good Life

The idea of a ‘poor country with very rich people’³ took hold of German imagination, strengthened by a survey comparing household finances in various Eurozone countries (ECB 2013) and finding household assets to be higher in Southern Europe than in Germany—which made a big splash in the German media, not least because of the misleading inference that Southern Europeans were ‘on average much richer than the Germans’.⁴

Several German journalists seemed to try to arouse contempt and anger at such undeserved bounty, but the feeling was mitigated by some degree of envy. What had the Greeks done to deserve their ludicrously generous state pensions and low retirement age or more annual leave than the Northerners, including the Germans?⁵ After the German retirement age had just been increased after much debate, *Bild*’s cover



Image 2.1 *Der Spiegel* 20/11/2012 (Nr 46/2012): ‘Greece—Rosaries from Chanel: The rich Greeks are watching the crisis with equanimity. Many have taken their assets to safety abroad long ago. Solidarity with the lower 20% is not a matter of the heart for the upper class’

catch line ‘Why are WE rescuing this Greek billionaire?’⁶ did resonate.⁷ The Greek media did appreciate the issue of asymmetries, as when *Kathimerini*’s Germany correspondent cited two German pensioners, speaking to the Greeks ‘with the tenderness of a parent scolding Europe’s naughty child’: ‘How can one not get angry when you go on strike at the first increase of the pensionable age, while in Germany it is considered already certain that we will retire at 67?’⁸

Representations of the Greek *dolce vita* fuelled an underlying German fear of helping someone ultimately better off, or happier and more attractive than oneself, while missing out on the good life oneself. The headline of a *Spiegel* cover featuring an old man on a donkey with euro notes spilling over from his saddle baskets read: ‘The Poverty Lie: How Europe’s Crisis Countries Are Hiding Their Assets’ (Image 2.2), and the accompanying article ‘Poor Germany!’ asked: ‘how just are the Euro-rescues, when the people in the receiving countries are richer than the



Image 2.2 *Der Spiegel*, cover 15/04/2013 (Nr 16/2013): ‘The Poverty Lie: How Europe’s Crisis Countries are Hiding their Assets’

citizens of the donor countries?’⁹ In other instances, this line of argument was applied not only to Greek citizens, but also to the state, as when an op-ed in *Die Zeit* by an economics professor asked: ‘Why help Athens? The Hellenic state disposes of sufficient assets’.¹⁰

A deeply entrenched, but no less trite, German image for Greece comes from the 1974 pop song ‘Greek Wine’ by Udo Jürgens, which is quite possibly known to nearly every German—a ballad of a lonely and melancholy German being invited by a group of ‘men with brown eyes and black hair’ to join them in drinking this ‘blood of the earth’ to the tune of ‘foreign and Southern’ music. We hear him revelling in his longing for a lost home, community and an Arcadia of affordable ‘small happiness’. Now, according to a *Bild* comment, ‘It looks like it will be above all us Germans (who else?) who fill up the Greeks’ glasses’, and who will enable the Greeks to continue their enviable existence.¹¹ As in the song, German scorn was now still often tempered by an implicit admiration for the Greeks’ ability to get away with a less stern approach to life, work and finances, managing to pull it all off in the end: ‘Drama, pathos, last-minute panic—that can do the trick. This is what happened during the modernisation of the 1970s when Greece aspired to join the EC. Or the Olympic games of 2004, which the Greeks pulled off splendidly. They can absolutely do it’.¹²

Conflicted Cheapskates

If German images and discourses around the Greeks’ good life and wealth betrayed this classic mix of admiration and envy, they also reflected a reconstruction of German collective self-perceptions as uptight, miserly Scrooges. To be sure, many Germans resented such a collective representation, aghast at all those who conversely embraced it with pride. ‘*Geiz ist geil*’ (stinginess rocks), the exceptionally successful advertising slogan of a big electrical retail chain had, in the early to mid-2000s, captured the mentality a whole country of savers and become part of the mainstream public vocabulary before losing its appeal.¹³

At the same time, the German stereotype of lazy and wasteful Greeks went hand in hand also with the reassertion of the old, equally commonplace and equally ambiguous, German self-perception as a nation of hard-working people. Again, clichés about Greeks betrayed and promoted a certain German uneasiness with the self-ascription of being overly serious, correct and industrious. A sentiment made worse by the

dreaded impression that everyone else saw Germans that way too. What is worse than a world where ‘those behaving correctly are duped’ (*Die Korrekten sind die Gelackmeierten*) and wind up as correct but naïve idiots in the European game?! All while Greece was being rewarded for manipulating its accounts for years.¹⁴

Inequalities and Suffering

However, some of the German, and much of the Greek, coverage did seek to counter the depictions of rich and lazy Greeks by highlighting the suffering of most ordinary citizens and the impoverishment of growing sections of society stemming from the behaviour of its moneyed elites. Greeks predictably objected to projections of Greek affluence as characteristic of society at large. With much higher unemployment rates and lower per capita income, stressed the Greek press, Greeks were on average relatively poor by European comparison, and certainly not as well off as the foreign media stereotypically portrayed them to be. Germans needed to understand that Greece was a country with high inequality: beyond the rich Athenian neighbourhoods of ‘Kolonaki, Kifisia and Ekali there is another world of toil and day-by-day work, where people bleed to send their children to university and don’t find a bed when they are sick’.¹⁵ On these grounds, ‘the ease with which Greece is treated at the European councils and the international press as spendthrift and indifferent about the public debt’ was widely felt to do ‘injustice to the majority of hard-working Greeks’,¹⁶ who may have failed on the competitiveness charts for many other reasons than being overpaid.¹⁷ The leader of the then small left-wing party Syriza, Alexis Tsipras, encapsulated these discourses when he asked ‘to whom the German finance minister referred’ when he talked ‘about the bliss of the Greeks’: ‘The 800,000 unemployed? The over 1,000,000 in precarious employment? The employees earning an average of 1000 euros, which is less than half of the corresponding German salary? The pensioners taking home an average pension of 600 euros? The 22% of Greeks who live under the poverty threshold?’¹⁸ Another way of objecting to crude generalisations about the behaviour and experiences of Greeks was to go on the offensive, as *Real News* did when running a photograph that featured a *Bild* journalist, whose reports had perpetuated ideas of Greek extravagance, being in an unmistakable state of debauchery and inebriation in ‘night-time Athens’.¹⁹

In fact, and contrary to the dominant perception in Greece, much of German reporting was infused with sympathy for ‘the suffering of the simple people in Greece’ as a result of the austerity policies.²⁰ The media prominently covered increasing Greek pauperisation, widespread lack of access to medications and health or even maternity care (leading to reliance on Doctors Without Borders), mass unemployment and especially youth unemployment, as well as creative grass-roots initiatives such as the delivery of lacking services locally. Basic welfare state functions were described, over and over, as failing, as provided as charitable favours rather than entitlements to the increasing numbers of those left without income, insurance or papers.²¹ Witness *Die Zeit*: ‘In Athens the lights come off; the winter is imminent, and many Greeks have no more money for electricity and fuel. The parties have ruined the state and the economy. What is to become of Greece’s youth?’²² Or see *Bild*, which ran a story on impoverished Greek parents increasingly resorting to extreme solutions such as giving up their children to orphanages.²³

These examples illustrate a further important pattern in the German coverage. While German representations of Greek wastefulness did at times extend to ordinary citizens, they more dominantly targeted the Greek government, political class and administration, as well as the moneyed elite. As many German journalists saw it, ordinary Greeks were the victims of their immoral and incompetent elites.²⁴

The Age of the Lobster Pasta

Many Greeks would have agreed readily with their German counterparts that their government had engaged in unsustainable spending using borrowed money. In fact, many Greeks referred to the pre-crisis years as the ‘age of the lobster pasta’, which became an emblem used to describe this period as a time of reckless spending and effortlessly acquired, unsustainable prosperity.

The Greek press frequently used the phrase against Greek economic and political elites presented as a group of unproductive spendthrifts. For example, Syriza leader Alexis Tsipras warned foreign politicians and journalists that ‘when you talk about bliss, you should refer specifically to those who refuse to put their hands in their pockets and contribute to an exit from the crisis’. In direct parallel to narratives found in the German press, Tsipras went on to describe these people as ‘owning villas in Ekali and Kavouri that belong to an offshore

company, four cars that belong to another offshore company, and a yacht that works as a touristic enterprise, but that is unfortunately not going well and is therefore not taxed'.²⁵ Tsipras defined this capitalist elite in vague enough terms to call on practically everyone in his target audience to join the struggle against it, under the banner of the "suffering people". The Greek media also widely blamed Greek politicians for bringing about the crisis in the first place, not least through ruthless public overspending; this bunch of good-for-nothing squanderers used taxpayers' money to 'finance their extravagant clientelistic policies, having decided to transfer the burden and responsibility to those who would govern next'.²⁶

Still, a substantial part of the Greek press did include *all* levels of the Greek society in the ascription of the "lobster pasta nation", extending the criticism of wastefulness and having lived beyond one's means far beyond the elites alone. An emblematic and extremely controversial early intervention in public dialogue that implicated society at large in the recklessness of the pre-crisis years came from the long-time PASOK politician Theodoros Pangalos, who said in parliament:

The answer to the outcry against the political personnel of the country that comes from people who ask 'how did you waste the money?' is the following: we appointed you in public-sectors jobs. We wasted the money together, in the context of a relationship based on clientelism, corruption, bribery and debasement of the very notion of politics.²⁷

Regardless of what one thought of Pangalos' statement, which to this day arouses fury among commentators from across the spectrum, the idea that Greek society was not wholly innocent was widespread. For instance, Greeks even more than Germans bemoaned the fact that the country had more Porsche Cayenne cars per head than any other in Europe.²⁸ Several Greek journalists argued that Greek society at large benefited from clientelistic relations with corrupt politicians who were elected time and again, and exploited the loopholes offered by the Greek labour market or tax system, to the detriment of the economy as a whole. A *Kathimerini* journalist, for example, commented in the following way on a 1988 ministerial decision to grant public sector employees who worked with computers six extra days of paid annual leave, a provision that was retained in Greek law until September 2013:

It is with crazy things like this that we used to cook the lobster pasta that we enjoyed. These are the things we used to borrow for [...]. Everyone has been talking for so many years about the “big interests”, but it is the many, the small and allied interests from the grass roots that proved undefeated. It is under their weight—that is to say, under our weight—that we collapsed.²⁹

A common metaphor was that of Greece waking up after a long and “lavish party”, now needing to “sober up” and “tidy up”: ‘our homeland [...] looks like a group of “nice guys” who have spent an unforgettable night at the bouzoukia’ (Greek popular nightclubs). Once the bill comes and the drunkards realise they have no money to pay, they find out that they need to ‘wash the dishes in the shop kitchen, sleeves up’.³⁰ The similarity to the imagery found in some articles of the German press is indeed striking. Calls for rediscovering self-restraint and sobriety would demand cutting ‘wastefulness’ in public sector spending as well as entrenched entitlements such as permanency in public sector employment.³¹ But the story was not just about the state. Individual expectations regarding such perks would also have to be adjusted: ‘the time when Greece acted like a spoiled teenage girl with other people’s money and had established her profligacy and immunity from control as inalienable rights, has probably ended’.³²

Blame Games

Beyond these voices in Greece that found a large part of the blame for the crisis within the country, there were of course also those who rather sought outside enemies to blame.³³ The Euro crisis provided a great many candidates for the role of external bogeyman, ranging from Brussels, the Troika, the IMF, the Commission and the credit-rating agencies—all largely replacing the USA as the traditional main object of Greek anti-Westernism. With time, however, and as some of the difference of views began to emerge between them, criticism became increasingly targeted on Germany itself.

There were shades of criticism of course, from emotionally charged accusation to carefully reasoned analysis. But still, critics of Germany seemed to echo each other across registers on three interrelated themes.

First, on the left, Germany was accused of ‘dogmatic entrenchment in support of the neo-liberal orthodoxy’.³⁴ The external imposition

of neoliberal recipes and ‘fierce austerity’ was represented as sapping advantages acquired by Greek workers and employees through decades of struggles.³⁵ Even in reform-oriented newspapers, many blamed the German government, and above all Chancellor Angela Merkel and Finance Minister Wolfgang Schäuble, for imposing an excessive and punitive degree of austerity on Greece that was thought to miss any aim of ‘national survival and recovery’.³⁶ Beyond the fate of Greece itself, Schäuble and Merkel were vilified, personally as well as allegorically, for the ills of the European and international financial and economic system and for scheming to impose neoliberal fiscal discipline on the whole of Europe. When Schäuble explained in an interview that ‘Greece has been living for years beyond her means’ and would have to ‘make savings and help herself’,³⁷ *Avgi* accused him as well as ‘the markets’ and ‘the Commission’ of turning Greece into a ‘laboratory of experiments for the disciplining of all European societies’ and of making a ‘bad example’ out of Greece so as to ‘convince European citizens to accept the harsh measures that lead to “growth with unemployment”’.³⁸ *Avgi* sent the message loud and clear to Merkel in her 2012 visit to Athens, by calling upon ‘everyone’ to go to Syntagma Square and ‘welcome’ Merkel with protests ‘against the harsh austerity’.³⁹

Second, the Greek press also charged Germany for inducing borrowing and deficit spending on the part of the weaker countries by maintaining a huge trade surplus and ‘not spending more herself’. Seen like this, ‘Greece’s “prodigality” appear[ed] to be the other side of the coin of Germany’s “prudence”’.⁴⁰ Pro-reform commentators also pointed to the logical correlation in the Eurozone between current account surpluses and deficits.

And third, some narratives went, Germany did not even gain such competitive advantage fairly but through its ‘social dumping’ policies of the preceding decade: ‘exploiting the battered workforce of former East Germany, the Schröder and Merkel governments decreased workers’ incomes for seven years’.⁴¹ This not only led to ‘German surpluses and Mediterranean deficits’ but also entangled the Eurozone countries in a ‘race to the bottom, encouraging salary cuts, part-time employment, and flexibility’. Unsurprisingly, ‘Germany won the race’.⁴² If that was the case, ‘why should we decrease the salaries of deficit countries instead of increasing the salaries in surplus countries?’⁴³ Why, in other words, should unfair advantage be compensated for through further unfair emulation?

To sum this up in neutral terms: even if Greeks did have a party, the German government failed to respect the basic requirements of proportionality (refrain from killing the patient), reciprocity (admitting shared responsibility) and fairness (adjusting in socially fair ways). How did these criticisms chime with the German side?

Greece, Relentless Mirror

Ironically for the Greeks, the Germans often perceived their own experience of social cutbacks not as reprehensible but as giving rise to a certain sense of entitlement: the recipients of European support should be subject to the same discipline. Some in Germany took for granted that their country's current strong position was due to prior austerity measures and held this up as a glowing example for the now struggling European economies. *Der Spiegel*, for example, juxtaposed a report on the suffering and unemployment ensuing from the labour market reforms imposed on Southern Europe with an account of how Germany had solved its equivalent problem of unemployment by rearranging—and effectively cutting down—its welfare state.⁴⁴ This, for the Germans, was not unfair advantage but an admirable achievement. Reciprocity was invoked but not in terms of balanced adjustment *now*, but *across time*. The Germans had paid a high price themselves for their current wealth and were not prepared to grant their fellow Europeans an easier ride than they had had themselves. Just like Greeks suffered today, Germans had suffered yesterday.

On the other hand, German public debate, as its Greek counterpart, did uphold the role of the EU in the debacle. Greek overspending was commonly portrayed as a consequence of cheap borrowing due to EMU, which led to a 'boom on tick', ever rising salaries, generous redundancy protection and a reduced pressure to carry out painful labour market reforms.⁴⁵ The narrative was that Greece, whether the state or citizens, had effectively received an invitation to overspend since joining the Euro.⁴⁶

Remarkably, the German political and opinion-making elite, including Angela Merkel, willingly concede that 'we, too, live on borrowed money'⁴⁷ as with the case of German politicians buying votes.⁴⁸ The problem of public overspending, bemoaned by so many German press commentaries on Greece, was attributed, in a quirky *Zeit* article, to the

whole of Europe—earning Greece the distinction as essentially part of Europe:

The Athens stage shows the Europeans how states can degenerate to the point where politicians hardly dare pronounce uncomfortable truths. Where citizens flee into the private sphere and complain that the state does not function. Where governments drown future generations in debts, as austerity here and now costs too many votes. All of this the West Europeans are getting to know as well, not only in Italy. Greece belongs to Europe—at the moment it is our relentless mirror.⁴⁹

Arguably, and after six long years of mutual recrimination, such projections of common ground were to provide the basis for more constructive discussions. And throughout the period, we find seeds of the recovery of recognition as the other side's predicament hits embarrassingly close to home. Despite the fact that othering occurred and it was real, many in Germany continued to express empathy for suffering in Greece. Germans heatedly debated the desirability and moral defensibility of the policies imposed on Greece, debates which were to reach another climax around the 2015 referendum and elections leading to Syriza-led coalitions.⁵⁰ At the same time, many in Greece engaged in honest, soul-searching discussions about Greece's own mistakes, the ways in which the German government's policies were right or wrong and the things that Greece could learn from Germany. There was clearly more to mutual perceptions than casting victims against perpetrators.

2.2 SWINDLERS VS. HEARTS OF STEEL: MORALITIES OF RULE OF LAW, PUBLIC SPIRIT, AND SOLIDARITY

Turning to another category in the stereotypical register, we find a mutual ascription which we capture as swindlers vs hearts of steel, or conmen vs tin men. To the German side, the Greek traits of laziness and irresponsibility seemed compounded by a broader pattern of moral decadence having to do with a widespread lack of public spiritedness, a lack of identification with the state and a disregard for rules, the rule of law and the common good. Nepotism, tax dodging, account-cooking and lax attitudes towards contractual commitments were all manifestations of this mentality, as well as most prominently the kind of widespread

corruption usually observable outside the West, corruption among elites and across different sectors of society.

Greek Diseases

This picture of moral indulgence and even depravity was fed, for instance, by a recurrent story, endlessly repeated on the news cycle, of ‘phantom pensions’ claimed and paid out for long departed relatives.⁵¹ Moreover, in early 2012 *Der Spiegel* took stock of the meagre results of the Greek anti-corruption fight as observed by a mission of OECD experts,⁵² and later that year, *Bild* reproduced a letter to Angela Merkel by the leader of a small Greek party, Thanos Tzimeros, who asked her not to ‘give a single euro more’ to Greece’s politicians without forcing them to change their behaviour, as ‘they will steal it’. Tzimeros supported his claim by describing numerous cases of corruption, while blaming the state and the ‘party mafia’s’ corruption for ‘destroying the country’ and its ‘great potential of young and intelligent people’.⁵³ The message was powerful. Even Greeks, Greeks above all, denounce the same fundamental flaws.

The same could be said about variants on corruption, such as nepotism, where the widespread allocation of jobs, commissions, funds and so on to friends and family mirrored a political class where power had been shared for several decades by two family dynasties.⁵⁴ As for tax evasion, too, a *Bild* reporter referred to it as ‘the Greek disease’, illustrating his claim with his own experience of cab drivers, fuel station attendants or newsagents, all refusing to provide receipts for his purchases.⁵⁵ *Der Spiegel* joined in on the litany of the all-pervasiveness of tax dodging practices, for instance, by covering a crime novel on murdered tax dodgers, or reporting that even the Orthodox Church was insisting on its tax exemptions, thus ‘exacerbating the crisis’.⁵⁶ All these means of self-enrichment were seen as criminal in their contempt for common welfare, not only through their direct effects but also with a view to their effect on morality and respect for the rule of law.

The German press often saw Greek insistences on reneging on the commitments the country had entered in exchange for the bailouts as further evidence of duplicity. For example, the disturbing ease with which some Greeks treated breaches of the European rules of the game became apparent in the context of the 2012 Greek legislative elections, when ‘Tsipras said that his main objective was to cancel the “barbarous”

agreement of the country with her creditors, because Athens' obligations towards the lenders were rendered "null and void" by the election'.⁵⁷ Such critiques were widespread in 2012 when the first default scenarios were seriously considered, and were to gain currency again when Syriza came into government. They coincided, however, with a considerable intellectual fascination with the latter's open claim that its grounds for questioning Greece's international commitments were legitimate as part of a fundamental critique of the capitalist international economy, a position which could be seen as both principled and utterly self-destructive. Either way, could the German media disagree with many Greeks' surprise at Schäuble's declaration that 'Greece is not implementing the Memorandum'?⁵⁸ Was this not an obviously unfair accusation, when everyone, starting with the German press, had reported on the hardships brought about by the Troika's plan? While economists were to debate for many years the reasons why the austerity measures implemented in Greece cut so deeply into its growth rate, there was little doubt that some implementation there had been.

Only Greeks?

Of course, German representations of Greek mentalities towards the rule of law were not black and white. Take for example the German references to the proverbial Greek 'lack of public spirit'.⁵⁹ If the average citizen failed to take into account the common good of society as a whole, whose fault was it? Take capital flight, whereby 'those who can afford it have taken their savings abroad; they now lie on the accounts of Swiss banks or in London properties. The money is in safety, the country is doomed'.⁶⁰ If this was about tax evasion, the German case stands. But if individuals were simply taking their savings to safety, was it not the government's fault for squandering safety in the first place? Or take cuts in public spending. In the words of a *Bild* commentator, 'Everywhere in Athens the crisis is issue number one. But to cut, slash, curtail state services? The Greeks say; OCHI—ME MOY DEN. No, not with me'.⁶¹ Under the moralising and indignant tone, we read a subtext, whereby *Bild* readers could relate all too well with the refusal to pay the price for the mistakes made by a failing and corrupt political class.

Self-restraint in criticism could turn into outright self-criticism hitting much closer to home.⁶² First of all, Germany, it did not go unnoticed in the German press, did 'demand a more binding character' for

the rules of the game, ‘but was itself one of the countries that liked to adjust’ these rules ‘to its own benefit’, for example in the question of current account surpluses, where Berlin lobbied in favour of raising the ceiling so as to avoid action against it by the European Commission.⁶³ What is more, it was no secret that German companies were actively participating in the ‘established practice’ of bribery across the world, and had actively promoted a ‘corrupt system that had pushed the Greek state into bankruptcy and that now Europe’s tax payers have to answer for’.⁶⁴ German banks, too, had irresponsibly bought risky bonds.⁶⁵ Of course, self-criticism could also be directed against domestic opponents, as when in May 2017 the fiscal spokesmen of the SPD parliamentary group, Johannes Kahrs, turned the hypothetical fraudster blame away from Greece, and against Schäuble: ‘Schäuble cheats and fudges’. The minister, Kahrs explained, had made the IMF’s participation a condition of ‘Greece’s rescue’ but was now refusing the debt relief demanded by the organisation.⁶⁶

Last but not least, there were abundant *aides-mémoires* in the German coverage, too, of how Germany had broken the Stability and Growth Pact.⁶⁷ Less frequent, but still present, were reminders that the ‘greatest debt sinner of the 20th century’ was in fact Germany itself, which arguably owed its current financial stability and wealth to the USA as well as the victims of German occupation—not least Greece.⁶⁸ But such admissions remained all too rare in the eyes of Greeks, for whom the forced loans to Germany in 1944 remained a quasi-obsessive theme in at least part of the press coverage.

These themes also resonated in the Greek press. Accounts of German businesses as well as politicians being involved in corruption scandals bolstered accusations that Germans applied double standards in their denunciations of Greek corruption. Greek journalists regularly reminded their readership that some of the biggest corruption scandals in Greece involved Siemens, a German company,⁶⁹ to the extent that ‘corruption’ is probably the first word that a Greek would associate with the word ‘Siemens’. In addition, Greek newspapers did not fail to note that a series of other German companies were implicated in corruption scandals also involving Greek politicians, with bribes having been paid for German military equipment sales to Greece.⁷⁰ This explained, to them, the German politicians’ failure to demand government cuts on military equipment expenditure while insisting on every other sort of austerity cuts.⁷¹

A Liar Will not Be Believed

Notwithstanding sporadic admissions of shared guilt, the German media never let go of the number one exhibit for the Greek conman narrative, namely the fudged ‘Greek statistics’ that had sparked the crisis in the first place.⁷² German commentators employed a strongly worded moral register to denounce the way Greece had ‘systematically swindled its way into the Euro with systematically forged numbers’.⁷³ ‘If I as head of a small—and medium-sized enterprise had behaved as Greece has in manipulating its accounts’, the President of the Federal Association Wholesale and Foreign Trade, for example, pointed out, ‘I would have rendered myself liable to criminal prosecution’.⁷⁴ Moral incriminations echoed a German proverb, itself a take on Aesop’s fable, that there was no believing a liar even when he spoke the truth.⁷⁵ As *Bild* put it to the Chancellor in an interview: ‘Greece has blagged its way into the Euro with systematically forged numbers. Why should one believe Greece now that they really will durably economise and pay back the credits?’⁷⁶ The idea that Greece could never be trusted again was a major reason for the ‘suspicion’ that characterised the lenders’ relations with Greece particularly during the early phase of the crisis—along with wider public indignation that Greece was to receive new money despite not having met its austerity conditions.⁷⁷ The loss of trust, the ‘most important currency of cooperation’, between Greece and the rest of the Eurozone often served as the backdrop for the conditionality imposed on Greece, as when Merkel justified the as yet ‘unprecedented’ conditionality of the June 2015 bailout arrangement in this light.⁷⁸ The federal government’s relentless motto according to which ‘there will only be money if you do what we demand from you’ was the only moral thing to do if Germans and other Europeans were not going to be fooled again.⁷⁹

Put in a more charitable light, if Greeks were to escape Aesop’s pithy maxim, they needed to ‘stand by their word’, for the ‘breaking of agreements’ was ‘precisely what had led to the crisis’.⁸⁰ The mantra mattered since it was about assigning blame and therefore responsibility. Greece had brought this crisis on itself by lying and cheating and was in no position to dictate the conditions of how the other Eurozone and EU members would rescue it at great expense to themselves. Standing by one’s word or *pacta sunt servanda* was an imperative which justified all manners of imposition on Greece if only because letting Greece off the hook would be unfair to Spain and Portugal, who were more readily standing by their word.⁸¹

The Two Greeces

On the other hand, Germans like Greeks often employed a competing trope of the “two Greeces”: the Greece of wasteful squanderers and immoral elites, against the Greece of decent, upright and ethical citizens, who we should see as victims. Ordinary Greeks were carrying on producing, making ends meet and living a life of hard work and decency, while being governed by hopeless politicians and bearing the brunt of a failing and in effect bankrupt state as well as grim austerity measures.⁸² Perhaps then, the average Greek was to be absolved, having fallen prey not only to inept governance and the ‘old jog trot’ reigning in the bureaucracy, incapable of getting structural reforms right,⁸³ but also to the ‘unabashed self-enrichment’ of the rich, ‘corrupt politicians’ and other criminal individuals, even within the Orthodox Church.⁸⁴

As one may have expected, this counter-discourse of the two Greeces was most popular in Greece itself, a Greece redeemed by the existence of the “good” Greeks now paying the price for the wrongdoings of the “bad” ones. The most straightforward definition of the two Greeces focused on the same simple distinction between the corruption and self-seeking behaviour of the elites and the smaller-scale misdemeanours of the common people. In the early phases of the crisis, *Angi* published the headline ‘we are paying for the mistakes of decades’,⁸⁵ but directed its blame for making those mistakes against politicians, big business and the very rich. For instance, according to *Angi*, Tsipras claimed that 30% of the economy was dominated by the very rich who exploited legal loopholes ‘generously granted by the governments of recent decades’ to dodge paying taxes on their properties used commercially or as ‘countryside villas’, while the remaining 70% of the middle and lower social strata had to bear the brunt of taxation. This, Tsipras informed the then government, made ‘people laugh when they hear you talk about cracking down on tax evasion’.⁸⁶

Calls for punishing the guilty and cracking down on corrupt practices were even louder in Greece than in Germany. One headline of *Real News* read: ‘the citizens who are being tried hard demand...The Guilty To Prison!’ The cover page did not specify explicitly who ‘the guilty’ were, but the clear implication was that they belonged to the domestic political class.⁸⁷ Commenting on the Papandreou government’s early aspirations to solve Greece’s public finance problems through structural changes

and a crusade against corruption in particular, a *Kathimerini* journalist warned:

the aim is expedient, but it is good to remember how this corruption came about: who tolerated it, who fosters it, and who exploits it. The political elite of the country banks on the long-established system of clientelist relations, where all sorts of favours (in hiring, payments, and impunity) undermine meritocracy, the smooth functioning of the public sector, and any hope for a fair remuneration system. This creates a vicious cycle that entraps those who want to do their job properly (and they are many), who stumble upon all those who only do what is in their interest.⁸⁸

As a result, we find a great deal of pessimism in our early Greek sample, according to which in the same way as ‘no government dared to touch these wrongdoings in the past’,⁸⁹ the Papandreou government would prove to be unwilling or unable to effectively tackle corruption at present. In the years to come, many pro-reform journalists never tired of calling for a change of attitudes both among the political class and among the common people—as opposed to more systemic change *à la* Tsipras, according to whom ‘for corruption to be tackled and for the problem of the economic crisis to be solved, a change of the economic model is required’.⁹⁰

But Greek sources also often stayed clear of the temptation to peddle the narrative of the two Greeces and the simplistic people vs. elite dichotomy. Far from being the domain of only “the few”, the problems which had engulfed the country permeated Greek society more deeply and called for a far-reaching change of mentality. This way of seeing the crisis as an opportunity to “reset” Greece chimed with the concerns expressed in the German press on Greek corruption, tax evasion, nepotism, disregard for the common good and disregard for the rule of law. *Kathimerini*’s editor, for example, described Greece’s prosperity and self-confidence in 2004 as a ‘palace built on sand’:⁹¹

Instead of seeking knowledge, we learned to progress in the universities through syndicalism and ‘connections’. [...] We learned the art of taking advantage of the funds of the dumb Europeans by pretending we are farmers to get the subsidies, while in reality we were at the coffee shop. We got used to deception and bribery at the tax agencies, the urban planning departments, and wherever else it was needed.⁹²

In a similar vein, a commentator in *Avgi* blamed Greece's demise on 'the destruction of human creativity with a short-sighted and parasitic attitude towards help that came from the European convergence programmes', a 'party system that remained nepotistic and only minimally democratic', a 'syndicalist movement that exhausted its assertive power by pursuing the interests of small groups' and 'the fixation on acquired advantages that didn't have a corporate character, but functioned as privileges of minorities'.⁹³ Greeks were often the first to denounce special interest groups and individuals who relentlessly offered self-serving resistance to change, such as '150 protesters' who 'paralyze an entire city'.⁹⁴ 'There is a limit', *Kathimerini* affirmed, 'to the behaviour of any pressure group or special interest faction. Under today's conditions, overstepping this limit practically means that you are throwing your homeland a step closer to the abyss'.⁹⁵

The resonance of such concerns with the German disquiet on the lack of public spirit in Greece was obvious. But the difference seemed to be about magnitude. While German journalists usually seemed to imply that a majority of Greeks were shirking their responsibility to help their country in crisis, Greeks were less prone to generalising, attributing the lack of public spiritedness to a minority of interest groups in a Greek society that was overall making sacrifices to safeguard a better future. Perhaps this difference was due to the selective reporting by the foreign media of activities such as strikes, demonstrations and riots in Greece, which was widely perceived by Greece as being out of sync with reality. Tendentious quotes of 'ordinary citizens' such as those adduced by *Bild*'s reporters certainly did not help in tampering the generalisation.⁹⁶

Playing by the Rules

In addition to the discourse about the lacking public spiritedness, the Greek press also expressed concern that many Greeks failed to understand that it was unacceptable not to play by the rules, in domestic life and politics as well as in international politics. But Greece would no longer get away with rule-bending behaviour, as evidenced by oft-quoted pronouncements of European officials such as 'the game is over, we need serious statistical data',⁹⁷ or the hardly concealed threat 'if a member of a team doesn't want to respect its rules, then they should better abandon the team'.⁹⁸ *Kathimerini*'s editor captured the essence of Greek dismissiveness on the rule of law by branding it an 'internationalized version' of the frequent student occupations of Greek universities, of street

blockades and of the “I don’t pay” movement (refusing to pay toll and public transport fees on the grounds that they are overpriced):

We threaten that we won’t pay our debts and that we will run a protest show, hoping that our partners will get scared and give us money without conditions. Can this recipe work? The international community, from Berlin to the IMF, hasn’t learned to operate like that. They make agreements and expect the observance of their terms.⁹⁹

This sort of behaviour or strategy would not ‘work’ beyond Greek borders. Instead, Greeks should strengthen the rule of law in wider societal practices as well as internationally. Disagreements came to a head when after the May 2012 parliamentary elections, attempts to form a government failed and some politicians started to brand Greece’s debt as ‘illegal’ and the second memorandum of understanding for Greece as ‘invalid’, since they had been imposed on Greece unfairly. *Kathimerini* called these claims ‘amazing’ and ‘crazy’—above all since the debt had been amassed over the years by a democratic regime. The paper’s editor welcomed as ‘one of the good consequences’ of the politically inconclusive election result that the notion of the ‘illegal debt’ was now being publicly challenged and debated, dismissing it as publicist populism eying audience and circulation rates. *Kathimerini* called it ‘absurd for a country like Greece to think that it could freeze or cancel decisions that have already been taken’. Failure to comply now would only make the country look ‘untrustworthy’ and weaken its negotiating position.¹⁰⁰

Solidarity

While these Greek views echoed the German pronouncements on trust, contracts and commitments discussed earlier, and exhibited a shared concern with the rule of law, there was also a Greek comeback, a way of putting both countries on the same morality plane, namely pointing to an equally reprehensible vice on the German side: the vice of heartlessness, and the lack of team spirit and fair play that Germans were accused of displaying at the European level. After all, Greeks could claim that the language of the rule of law was not the only moral language in Europe; indeed, they could argue that their own solidarity concern, grounded on basic human decency, was at the very centre of the European project and should constitute the prime moral requirement of crisis management.

Germany's (and Europe's) failure to show solidarity was discussed in a dramatic tone in much of the Greek coverage. When Schäuble declared that Greece had to 'help itself', indignant coverage seemed to imply that he only had the interests of German (and other European, but not Greek) taxpayers in mind.¹⁰¹ The measures required by German and European officials in successive memoranda were described as 'antisocial',¹⁰² a crushing 'shock therapy',¹⁰³ and a 'slaughter[ing] of people'.¹⁰⁴ The consequences were devastating: 'Social despair, political deposition [...] six out of ten Greeks declare that they are exposed to poverty'.¹⁰⁵ In other words, 'society has cracked. The shattering of the electoral map and the ensuing lawlessness are predictable outcomes'.¹⁰⁶ It seemed that 'nothing' could 'shake' Angela Merkel's neoliberal orthodoxy and her 'faith in fiscal orthodoxy and the Pact of Stability and austerity, which she imposes on the Eurozone together with Sarkozy'.¹⁰⁷ When *Avgi* quoted her at the time of the first Memorandum deal in 2010 as having said that 'the future of Europe and Germany [was] at stake', the editors replied: 'Who cares about the future of Greece?'¹⁰⁸ Each of her pronouncements was seen as evidence of her unfeeling negligence towards the Greeks. Not surprisingly, since Greek journalists emphasising this side of the equation typically downplayed the public spiritedness side, their demands for solidarity often overlooked the reciprocal.

In fact, as we suggested earlier, the German press and wider public debate at large did express deep sympathy with the Greeks and beyond, a desire to honour Germany's 'obligation to solidarity'.¹⁰⁹ By 2012, as the Euro crisis reached a turning point from emergency to management mode, even Angela Merkel openly recognised obligations of German solidarity with Greece.¹¹⁰ More generally, in the shadow of the Greek plight, a new discourse began to complement traditional EU narratives focused on European solidarity as a matter of moral obligation. In Germany, there was a tendency to rely on historical responsibility—e.g. to stand by those struggling for peace and democracy—perhaps because it was easier to justify transfers in the name of Greeks of yesteryears:

There is a moral obligation to solidarity among us Europeans; it has been in the Basic Law [the Federal constitution] for twenty years. The main reason for receiving Greece into the EU was to support Greek democracy after the Greeks had managed all by themselves to remove their military dictatorship. Today solidarity with the Greek people is as necessary as then.¹¹¹

On the other hand, the argument from fairness was in fact a double-edged sword since it could be invoked equally to support the application of strict disciplines towards Greece on the grounds of equal treatment with Spain, Portugal and Ireland as well as supporting the theme we discussed above of “why should we pay for the rich Greeks”.

Leftist (as opposed to ethical or moral) arguments for solidarity were also used in Germany. Such arguments typically made reference to the polarisation of Greek society into winners and losers from the crisis, which mirrored in part that between bad and good Greeks discussed earlier and played an important role in the German press representations of Greece. The Troika reforms, not just trade unionists warned, made the rich richer and the poor poorer.¹¹² This, to many German commentators, constituted a central reason for viewing austerity and excessive conditionality with a good deal of scepticism and for showing solidarity with the “losers” in the story. As in Greek reporting, we see transnational dividing lines emerging not only along class lines but also along increasingly divergent views within EU member-states on how to cope with the widening pools of losers of globalisation and Europeanisation.

Some Greek journalists did acknowledge the many German displays of solidarity. *Avgi*’s acknowledgement of this solidarity rarely went beyond reports on the political support that the German far-left party *Die Linke* offered to Syriza. Emphasising transnational class and economic-ideology lines rather than national lines, *Avgi* portrayed *Die Linke*’s Members of the Bundestag and the European Parliament as among Greece’s most ardent international supporters¹¹³ and as ‘our Germans’, who ‘stand in solidarity with the Greek workers’,¹¹⁴ but rarely problematised how a wider concept of solidarity encompassing larger sections of the German and Greek societies could materialise. On the other hand, and contrary to prevailing impressions on the German side, some Greek papers did also recognise expressions of German solidarity more broadly beyond the left. For example, in covering Merkel’s visit to Greece in October 2012, German newspapers focused mainly on the anti-Merkel demonstrations that took place in the centre of Athens including the display of anti-Nazi symbols. We will return to this theme shortly. Suffice it to say that such crude anti-German manifestations only constituted a very small portion of what was said in the Greek press about the German government at the time. While some journalists expressed mild discontent about the ‘careful’ and ‘measured’ tone of her statements stopping short of bolder promises, Merkel’s trip was widely welcomed as a gesture of solidarity

and a strong message of support for the new Greek government.¹¹⁵ The day after her departure, *Kathimerini* printed a large picture of the Chancellor confiding to the smiling Greek Prime Minister that ‘she [saw] light at the end of the tunnel’.¹¹⁶

In conclusion, Greeks and Germans seemed at first sight to use different languages of morality that invoked alternatively the rule of law, public spiritedness, human decency or solidarity. These different moralities served as means of othering and stereotyping. Yet, they also served to create nuances and project a more complex picture of the Other, creating considerable space for identification, empathy and solidarity with those on the other side exempt from moral reprimand. After all, even a cursory look at publications on the other side reveals that, contrary to the possible reactive association of the language of the rule of law with Germany, and the language of solidarity with Greece, commentators from both countries in fact invoked all the moral languages analysed in this section. The more complex rifts acknowledged as running through the collective of the Other helped to replace cross-national divides with ones of class, moral probity and victim versus perpetrator status, thus highlighting new commonalities across the boundaries of European demoi. Languages of solidarity in particular helped to project such commonality, acting as special bonding agents against the backdrop of the cruder opposition between swindlers and hearts of steel.

2.3 GREECE MIRROR OF GERMAN DEMONS

If the Greco–German affair starts with representations and misrepresentations of the other side, these are not necessarily about that Other, but ultimately about oneself as this Other comes to serve as the projection screen for one’s own innermost insecurities and fears. We found that on both sides, the fear seemed to boil down to a loss of control, the spectre of disasters past. This shared psychosocial *Angst*, to be found in implicit undertones that only allow for very tentative readings, was more clearly discernible in our German sources, on which we focus more in this section. In the Greek corpus, it featured more indirectly, but was arguably hidden somewhere in the proclamations of resistance in the face of external domination and of agency in the face of a growing loss of mastery over an intractable situation, to which we shall turn subsequently in this chapter’s remaining two sections on the politics of memory and the *topoi* of power and resistance in the debates. Of course, Greek bravery may

also have had to do with their worst fears actually coming true on a regular basis, without the luxury of dwelling on anxious anticipation for long.

Bankruptcy Greeks

In our German sources, then, many of the representations of Greece's situation spoke to a spellbound fascination mixed with underlying deep-seated collective fear of the possibility of unravelling. Such collective fear was conveyed not least by *Bild's* shorthand of '*Pleite-Griechen*'—'washout', 'bust' or 'crash Greeks'—standing for the country's sovereign debt and resulting social and economic crisis overall.¹¹⁷ This label connoted the idea of an individual caught in an irresistible downward spiral inexorably propelling him into financial disaster and social disgrace, at the mercy of his debtors or "the banks". Eliciting both sympathy and criticism on the part of its readers, *Bild* free-rode on the success, and the established stereotypical associations, of the reality TV show '*Raus aus den Schulden*' [Out of Debt], in which a private default advisor takes indebted individuals under his wing, convincing most drastically to curtail their lifestyle and spending habits.

Sensationalism often goes hand in hand with *Schadenfreude*, this most German expression for a most universal feeling. Clearly, revelling in the misfortunes of someone is about deeper-rooted fears for oneself: 'We do not all want to become Greeks'.¹¹⁸ *Bild's* initial report when the first Greek bank collapse loomed in April 2010 was replete with scaremongering and exclamation marks: 'Trust gone! Europe is trembling! The markets are under the sway of blind horror. Fear is going round'.¹¹⁹ As for the German press coverage at large, *Bild's* editors seemed to bask in the magnetising expectation of disaster—of the kind that cannot just be witnessed from afar as if oneself, the observer, could not but be swept along in an irresistibly widening downward spiral. Many early accounts of the Greek debt crisis conjured up the spectre of a 'domino effect' or 'chain reaction' on the whole of the Eurozone as 'Peeks into the Abyss' revealed dark images of stock market and financial crashes, the 'annihilation of the assets of billions', the record unemployment and political tragedy all too present still in Germans collective memory.¹²⁰ Despite assurances that deflation posed a more serious threat than inflation this time around, the Euro crisis as a whole played into entrenched collective German fears of economic catastrophe and the 1923 trauma of hyperinflation—a 'collective psychosis' still alive after almost a century.¹²¹

This time around, however, the downfall would not just be Germany's but rather include the whole of the Eurozone and EU member-states. *Bild*, along with most of the German press, painted the Europeans as united in their panic at stock markets and the euro 'nose-diving'—all the while acknowledging that the Greeks were particularly hard hit, having had to move their savings abroad and even losing 'faith in the survival of their country'. If this *Bild* author, for instance, assumed a dividing line, this was not one between Greeks and Germans, but one between those who had nothing to lose in terms of savings anyway and those who did—and the author expressed sympathy with both.¹²²

In this light, the EU's actions regarding Greece came to be attributed as much to its 'psychosocial condition' as to objective material facts. *Der Spiegel* went as far as attributing the European Council's decision to rule out the option of dissolving the currency union to a simple fear of uncontrollable consequences: 'one might say, their fear of a financial and social crash, the look into the abyss of Nothing'. It was, in essence, a 'fear of death' the author went on to argue, citing Georges Bataille.¹²³ The author could have equally referred to Judith Shklar's liberalism of fear or the idea that the ultimate role of state authority should be the alleviation of sources of fear for the citizenry.¹²⁴

Indeed, there seems to have been a hypnotising fascination in the German press coverage with Greece's catastrophe. As for the ambiguity of moral judgment combined with envious admiration of Greek *savoir vivre*, German representations of the political effects of the crisis in Greece were caught in a paradoxical tension between (repressed) esteem and repulsion, a fear of what the Greek story was revealing about what Germans could not or would not be—easy going, charming on one hand or at least magnanimous and generous on the other. Misrecognition here, or downplaying Greek qualities, became crucial in redeeming oneself and papering over these perceived character flaws.

Traumas Resonating

This mix between fascination and anxiety also accounted for the endless reproduction of still and video images of violent protests in Greece.¹²⁵ Violent clashes, 'severe unrest',¹²⁶ 'total escalation' or even a 'revolution' were reported or foreseen in reaction to the austerity measures or to the eventuality of a failure to provide the next credit tranche. Those who had 'nothing left to loose because they have already

lost everything’ were out in the streets and increasingly ‘talking of a revolution’.¹²⁷

Indeed, German fascination with the implosion of order and popular uprising, especially on the left, carried an undertone of revolutionary romanticism on the part of Germans who rarely get to flirt with truly revolutionary actions—at least since the red Brigade.¹²⁸ This was ok at least as long as things did not get uncontrollably out of hand, hence the imperative for international action. This is what was meant when *Der Spiegel* captioned a photograph of flames, running policemen and gas mask-wearing rioters with ‘The rest of Europe got scared’. And it also explains with what resolve ‘Europe [was] determined to save the country, if need be without a plan’.¹²⁹ The harsh police clampdown on the protesters and escalating violence resonated with old, deep-seated collective German memories and traumas.¹³⁰

But the fascination was sustained in spite of—or perhaps because of—this trauma, and the *Bild* picture series reproduced in Image 2.3, for example, reflected and spoke to both. German sources amplified what they framed as the radicalisation of politics in Greece and thereby political developments that perhaps more than anything could justify what can be interpreted as denying Greeks recognition as equal political partners. For instance, the May 2012 election in Greece, in which radical parties received more than 42% of the vote, was explained as a ‘vote of anger’—and a sign of ‘the political system disintegrating’ and of the collapse of



Image 2.3 Excerpt from *Bild* picture gallery ‘After Vote [in parliament on austerity plans]: Chaos in Greece’ (30/06/2011, <http://www.bild.de/politik/fotos/griechenland-krise/fg-18606070.bild.html> [accessed 13/07/2017]). Individual captions: (a) ‘The police are acting with tremendous brutality on the rioters. Eyewitnesses report how persons were beaten up’; (b) ‘Total escalation! The rioters are throwing whatever they can find’; (c) ‘The police are not controlling the situation any more, they are just trying to protect themselves and to keep the protesters away from the parliament’

the ‘unwritten social contract’ that had so far determined Greek politics. Having lost faith in the established parties and political class, the Greeks were ‘running after’ Syriza’s ‘pied piper’ Alexis Tsipras and his promises built on sand.¹³¹

Even more disturbing to many German minds, Greeks were now falling prey to the ‘Greek Neofascists’.¹³² Much was made of the rise and success of the extreme right in a Greece, which now stood for what Germans had been socialised into fearing and or seeking to repress for generations. There was a sense that the Greeks were crossing a line, forfeiting their right to be treated in a certain way by doing the unspeakable in German eyes. The link to Germany’s historical burden was obvious, as was parallel to how this part of the German national psyche and memory had been condemned to repression. Germans couldn’t take their eyes off radicalisation in Greece but were at a loss on how to deal with it. And the Greek visual references to Nazi Germany, much amplified in the German coverage, hit this very nerve.

On the other side of our playing field, Germany, with its disdainful history and its now newly emerging position of European hegemony, did serve as a projection screen for the Greek demons of foreign domination and occupation, but also for fears of losing one’s identity and agency. At the same time, the German demon of World War II mirrored Greece’s proud history of resistance. We will now turn to how Germans and Greeks re-remembered their pasts over their Euro crisis affair and then to how power and resistance played out in their debates. Can a past that divides also become a shared predicament because it constitutes a threat that can affect everyone?

2.4 YOUR HISTORY, MY HISTORY

Two powerful images anchored the politics of memory in the Greco-German affair with particular force: the notorious *Focus* magazine cover featuring Venus of Milo performing the rude gesture¹³³ and the various Nazi references used in Greek media and demonstrations. Both image-ries refer to the other nation’s past. But there is a critical asymmetry in ascription. The slandered Venus and other references to Greece’s history evoked a glorious past so as to denigrate a present decline. Greek Nazi references by contrast evoked an inglorious past so as to denigrate present pretensions of power. Uses of the past mirrored each other as inverse images.

The German coverage, and especially its visual illustrations, was pervaded by stereotypical references to Greece's history as the cradle of 'civilisation', including architecture, philosophy, democracy, drama and historiography.¹³⁴ They typically went along with assertions that Greece was the cradle of *European* civilisation and 'a central component of Europe'.¹³⁵ The cradle-of-Europe narrative in the German press often bolstered demands to help Greece now in the name of the past. It provided a central argumentative ground that the 'Hellenics must be kept in the euro zone under all circumstances' (here in the words of Schäuble).¹³⁶

Heir of Antiquity vs Err of Antiquity, and the War of Clichés

Yet, as the Greek debt crisis unfolded, concurrent German references to Greece's glorious past took on an unspoken undertone suggesting sins of betrayal, questioning the worthiness of modern Greece to succeed the Ancients and casting the rest of Europe including Germany as the more rightful heirs. In the traditions of German humanism, *Bildungsbürgertum* and philhellenism, German national identity had historically laid some claim to this past themselves, as the starting point of German culture.¹³⁷ This take on history was made more plausible by the German contention to be the "better", as in more committed, Europeans including as the (unwilling) Eurozone's paymaster. Both understandings dented claims that Greeks somehow embodied Europe's essence, and mitigated any postulated obligation unconditionally to stand by Greece on these grounds.

More importantly, over the course of the crisis, German references to Greek civilisation came to be increasingly paired with labels of present decadence or the visual of a collapsing built environment. Albeit often with a sound degree of empathy, many of our sources dwelled on Greece's present predicaments, the various facets of the failure of the Greek state, political system, and elite, and the resulting multi-layered crisis of Greek society. The *Spiegel* reportage 'Greece: Crumbling Civilisation' used the allegory of architectural disrepair to zoom in on the 'dilapidation' of central Athens, now turned into a kind of a 'favela'—as a prism for the Greek 'demise of the commonwealth' and 'social bankruptcy'.¹³⁸ It described formerly elegant neighbourhoods as sites of street prostitution and homelessness, with Greeks moving

elsewhere, ‘the neo-fascists hunting down immigrants’, many in the police allegedly sympathising with *Golden Dawn*, and increasing incidences of violent crime as well as syphilis, tuberculosis and HIV infections. Another *Spiegel* cover took up the crumbling metaphor again, in this case displaying a disintegrating column to illustrate the cover story ‘Goodbye Acropolis: Why Greece Now Has to Leave the Euro’. This time around, *Der Spiegel* ascribed responsibility to the Greek people as a whole for their own crumbling state since the ‘majority of the Greeks’, in the May 2012 parliamentary elections, ‘decidedly rejected the austerity policy demanded by the EU’.¹³⁹

The highpoint of German narratives of Greek decline, and of mendacious (or at the very best ignorant and sloppy) defamation in the German press, was *Focus* magazine’s Milo cover and the shockingly slanderous accompanying article ‘2000 Years of Decline’ (Image 2.4). The modern Greeks, it claimed, had little left in common with their superior ancestors; unlike the Ancients, they had not produced a single ‘poet, composer, fine artist or philosopher of significance’, owned no more than ‘one single opera house and proper concert hall’ and, unlike modern Italy, lacked any distinction even in matters of fashion, gastronomy and winemaking.¹⁴⁰

Greek retaliation was swift if equally crude, as the *Focus* cover triggered a wave of reactions among Greek journalists and politicians as well as diplomatic protest. Indeed, the cover became a symbol of German crudeness for years to come.¹⁴¹ For example, the President of the Greek Parliament Philippos Petsalnikos felt obliged to rectify that Greece had in fact ‘received two Literature Nobel prizes in the last forty years’, and retorted: ‘What does Germany, a country of 85 million, have to show us? Did they produce a new Beethoven and we didn’t realize it?’¹⁴² Imagery associating Nazi symbols with contemporary Germany started appearing more frequently in the Greek media, while voices connecting the issue of Germany’s unpaid war reparations with the Greek debt crisis became stronger. Neither was lost in Germany.¹⁴³ To be sure, the *Focus* cover and lead story were widely criticised in the German media as well—awakened to it not least as a result of the backlash from Greece and elsewhere.¹⁴⁴

The *Focus* dispute reflected and reinforced a dynamic, whereby perceived offences from the other country were repaid in kind. The resulting ‘war of clichés’¹⁴⁵ and populist stereotyping and othering



Image 2.4 *Focus* cover 22/02/2010 (Nr 08/2010): ‘Swindlers in the Euro Family: Is Greece Mulcting Us—and What About Spain, Portugal, Italy?’

was recognised and criticised in both countries' debates. In the Greek papers, Greek references to Germany's Nazi past were often framed as responses to statements by German politicians and newspapers that were seen as anti-Greek. As an *Avgi* journalist commented, 'racist generalizations about all of us in general by specific German circles [...] light a fire among local sources of foolishness, audacity, unsubstantiated arrogance, and evasion of difficult problems'. In other words, 'a nationalist turns other people into nationalists'.¹⁴⁶ Even *Bild*, showing some promise of halting this vicious circle, explained a photomontage by the Greek daily *Eleftheros Typos* showing the goddess Victoria on Berlin's iconic Victory Column holding a swastika as part of the 'squabble' triggered off by the *Focus* cover.¹⁴⁷

Even though the *Focus* affair inflated the war of clichés, some Greek journalists and politicians had already been drawing connections between the Nazi period and Germany's current role in handling the debt crisis at least a month or two earlier, in the first weeks of 2010, and particularly in *Avgi*. Until the autumn of 2009, by contrast, references to Germany had been conspicuously absent from the Greek press coverage of the context of the incipient debt crisis. But then, Schäuble said in a *Bild* interview in late December 2009 (already quoted, but it is important to rehearse his precise phrasing here): 'Greece [...] will not be able to get around making savings and helping itself. We Germans cannot pay for the mistakes of the Greeks'.¹⁴⁸ While *Kathimerini* reprinted these words in its cover article (on the *European Commission's* concern about Greece), commenting no further than on the German finance minister's 'particularly strict tone',¹⁴⁹ *Avgi* cultivated a remarkable wave of outrage at these words, creating at least some general resentment. It did so not least by actively linking the theme of German war guilt, forced loans and unpaid reparations and compensations, with how Germany was now handling the Greek debt crisis. Specifically, *Avgi* invited a number of veterans of the Greek resistance to comment on Schäuble's statement.¹⁵⁰ Manolis Glezos, famous in Greece for his role in the resistance and for having taken down the German flag from the Acropolis in May 1941, and who was then a Syriza MEP as well as chair of the National Council for the Claim of German Debts to Greece, declared: if 'the Germans can't pay for the mistakes for the Greeks', then 'the Greeks can't forget the crimes of the German army in Greece during the Occupation'.¹⁵¹ Memory had become a pawn in a tit-for-tat game.

*German Guilt, German Debt,
German Responsibility*

This statement encapsulated an entrenched understanding that underlay the use of Nazi imagery and references to World War II more broadly. This was a widespread sense that, due to history, Germany owed Greece, not only materially and legally in terms of the occupation loans and reparations, but also morally on grounds of German guilt or responsibility. As to Germany's *material* debt, Deputy Prime Minister Theodoros Pangalos reminded his audience in a BBC interview that the Germans 'took away the Greek gold that was in the Bank of Greece ... and they never gave it back', advising the German government not to 'complain much about stealing and not being very specific about economic dealings'.¹⁵² As to the deeper, *moral* or ethical debt owed by Germany to Greece, this was seen as a debt of both gratitude and guilt. New Democracy party spokesman Panos Panagiotopoulos, for example, asserted: 'if Europe is free and democratic today, this is because hundreds of thousands of Greek men and women struggled to end Nazism and fascism'.¹⁵³ A Greek Jewish survivor of World War Two, quoted in *Argi*, found that Schäuble acted

as if he were forgetting (a) the tragic mistakes of the Germans that the Greeks had to pay for willy-nilly during the Second World War; (b) the concentration camps, in which the prisoners were led to horrible death or to forced exhausting labour, which hasn't been compensated by Germany. [...] Does the German Minister know what the Nazi transgressions, the flattening of cities and villages, the destruction of infrastructure, the amputations and deaths, have cost Greece?¹⁵⁴

To be sure, the Greek discourse of Germany, or anyone else, owing Greece was subject to controversy and self-critical deconstruction in Greece itself, not least in response to the *Focus* controversy and the perceived effects of the debt crisis on Greece's image abroad. *Kathimerini*'s editor argued that 'in the end, no one feels they owe us because we are the chosen people. The world has thanked us for Pericles [i.e. the age of classical Athenian democracy] and the epical struggle of 1940, and now we are just another country that has messed up and can't cope'.¹⁵⁵ The extent to which the sovereign debt crisis threw into question this deep-rooted story about Greek national identity is reflected further in the verdict published in another *Kathimerini* article a couple of months

later: 'It isn't easy at all to grow up as a country with the fairy tale that everyone owes to you, and to wake up one day to suddenly discover that (a) nobody owes you anything and (b) you owe to everyone'.¹⁵⁶ Even if the sentiment was not shared across the country, this lament expressed a widespread disillusionment among Greeks, especially the younger generations.

Nevertheless, Greek references to German debt and corresponding Greek entitlements were clearly attempts at re-establishing a degree of symmetry of power between Greece and its creditors, in other words those who had the power to bail it out. *Avgi* welcomed that 'the issue of Germany's war reparations to Greece [...] shook Greece's "good kid" attitude towards the European institutions and especially the German government'.¹⁵⁷ Instead, Europeans had to reconsider who owed whom what, and who was entitled to what in recognition for past sacrifices. From such a standpoint, indebtedness ought to be viewed as a more general currency in European history.

A concurrent implication in this search for historical continuities in the period 2010–2012 was of course the return of German hegemony, a theme that was starting to pervade European politics as a whole. In the Greek press, this sometimes took the form of repeated conflation between wartime Nazi Occupation and Germany's current 'peculiar, economic hegemony'.¹⁵⁸ This discourse used visual and narrative references to familiar historical events in pointing to the foreign origins of the current crisis. Among the blunter ones was an *Avgi* cartoon set in front of a crystal shop in 'Berliner Straße 19-38', on the window of which was written: '*Achtung, Achtung: Greek Swindler*'. The cartoon showed a German passer-by asking his wife: 'What happened? Did we begin the pogroms here in Germany again?'¹⁵⁹ Even more bluntly, *Proto Thema* featured a photograph of Merkel pasted in front of marching soldiers, against the title 'Merkel is designing a new Europe without Greece'.¹⁶⁰ And the historical comparison has continued to pop up. In July 2014, the Public Electricity Company's (DEH) trade union leader reacted to the government's decision to conscript the company's workers after they had declared a strike by tearing up his conscription note and placing it on 'the monument of the 11 heroes of the Greek People's Liberation Army (ELAS) who fell on 13/10/1944, defending [...] the factory of DEH at Keratsini, which today you, as lackeys of MERKEL, want to sell out to the big interests'.¹⁶¹ In February 2015, following the election to power of Syriza, *Avgi* published the shocking cartoon of the German

Finance Minister in *Wehrmacht* uniform wanting to produce soap from the Greeks' skin, and fertiliser from their ashes, in explicit reference to the holocaust (Image 2.5). Finally, in July 2015, in the context of the extreme tension and polarisation after the referendum, *Avgi* published the headline title 'Germany is destroying Europe again', followed by the comment: 'Germany doesn't have the right to destroy Europe for a third time within 100 years. The civilised world doesn't have the right to let her. And Greece doesn't have the right to accept it'.¹⁶²

The German press, and especially the tabloids, readily picked up on the Nazi and militarist imagery used in Greek protests as well as the media.¹⁶³ Posters with Nazi motifs in the protests in the early summer of 2011 were widely covered,¹⁶⁴ as they were during Merkel's visit to Athens in October 2012.¹⁶⁵ Under the headline 'Nazi always works', *Der Spiegel* reported that 'Greek commentators and caricaturists only cultivate[d] one enemy image [*Feindbild*]: the evil German who wants to establish a "Fourth Reich" in Athens'.¹⁶⁶ *Bild* in particular made a meal of the 'desecration' of the federal eagle at the German consulate general in Thessaloniki, running a photograph of a protester attaching a swastika to the national coat of arms: 'It is individual protesters. But don't they know that they are hurting the feelings of millions of Germans?'¹⁶⁷



Image 2.5 *Avgi* 08/02/2015 (Tasos Anastasiou): Title: 'The negotiations have started'; Schäuble: 'We insist on soap from your body fat... We are discussing about fertilizer from your ashes!'

Note also how the tabloid called for the recognition of German sensitivities in bemoaning ‘revolting protests against Merkel in Athens’: ‘Germany Does Not Deserve This!’ (Image 2.6).¹⁶⁸

This did not mean that German observers were insensitive to Greek historical wounds. On the contrary, the country’s shameful occupation of Greece featured prominently in the German coverage, with Greek Nazi references serving a specific discursive purpose in the German debate. On one side of the debate, hitting a nerve in German sensitivities of guilt, they were picked up and echoed at face value to then be processed as part of a broader argument. By way of a stereotypical German reflex of collective self-flagellation, the German Ur-guilt complex and the taboos of the Nazi past as well as xenophobic excesses since then could be instrumentalised to incriminate opponents of the bailout policy, and those even considering the option of a Greek exit from the common currency: ‘Greeks-out reminds me of the nastiest rallying cries’.¹⁶⁹



Image 2.6 *Bild* 10/10/2012: ‘Germany Does Not Deserve THIS! Revolting Protests Against Merkel in Athens! And We Are Paying Even MORE’

Indeed, most articles covering Greek Nazi imagery did make a connection with Greek demands for World War II reparations, and thus between German guilt and obligation.¹⁷⁰

Overall, Germany's historical responsibility and sins did function, in German press commentary, as an imperative for helping Greece and the other debtor states in the Eurozone. In *Die Zeit's* analysis: 'Most of the time, the Europe debate follows the following pattern. Here the critics with many confusing numbers and statistics, and there the euro-friends with great emotions: Never again war! Historical responsibility!'¹⁷¹

On the other side of the debate, there were of course more self-protective German reactions and accusations of Greek "ungratefulness". *Bild*, in particular, juxtaposed Greek uses of Nazi imagery to the large amounts of money contributed by Germany and Europe as a whole to helping Greece.¹⁷² This seemed to betray a kind of collective wishful thinking, an implicit belief that money could stand as redeemer—as if Germany's significant contribution to the bailout payouts could somehow change how Germany viewed its own relationship with the past, and how it could expect its European partners to view it. The Greek sense of deserving special treatment or "being owed" on the grounds of the nation's heroic sacrifices and suffering was mirrored by a German sense that its own special treatment could finally be ended. Further, *Bild's* indignation conveyed a self-righteous message, or implicit threat, that the Greeks' refusal to recognise and appreciate the (at least hypothetical) magnitude of German support somehow effectively absolved Germany of further obligations, unless the Greeks changed their tone.

Lost in Translation

Such defensiveness notwithstanding, on the whole historical references to the Nazi era in the German press articulated mainly German guilt and Greek victimhood.¹⁷³ Lost in translation was thus a key dimension of what this period stood for in the Greek public imagination: not just victimisation, but rather heroic resistance to foreign occupation and imperialism. The flip side to the depiction of the Germans as a people who still owed the rest of humanity for the sins of their past was a portrayal of the Greeks as a people with a history 'inextricably linked with struggles for freedom, human dignity, self-determination, and national independence'—who deserved special treatment as a result.¹⁷⁴ As a result, to a Greek audience, the portrayal of current German leaders as Nazis

evoked the self-portrayal of Greeks as heroes resisting oppression today like yesterday.

The word ‘Ochi’ (Greek for No) adorned countless protest placards and news headlines throughout the Greek debt crisis (and long before the Yes/No referendum in July 2015). Like no other single word, it embodied this theme of resistance, which, in collective memory, is closely associated not least with the suffering of the Greek people during the Second World War. As every Greek schoolchild learns, Ochi is remembered in Greece as the laconic reply that the Greek ruler Ioannis Metaxas gave to the Italian fascist government on 28 October 1940, when Mussolini issued an ultimatum to the Greek government demanding the right of passage through Greek soil and the use of Greek strategic locations to facilitate the war efforts of the Axis. The 28th of October, or “Ochi Day”, is annually commemorated in Greece as a celebration of heroic resistance against fascism and foreign aggression. With the crisis, Ochi became a pervasive response against perceived German coercion, as per *Angi*’s headline ‘Ochi to Merkel’s Ultimatum’.¹⁷⁵ The message was clear. No to all ultimatums, whether 70 years ago or now.

German papers, with some exceptions,¹⁷⁶ were initially oblivious to the Greek symbolism behind the Ochis on which they did report extensively—receiving only the message of defiant opposition to subsequent memorandum conditions or shorter-term negotiation proposals. Interestingly, however, in 2015, when the Greeks voted No in the referendum, the German press did catch on to Ochi’s connotations of ‘pride’ and ‘dignity’ in a wave of articles. Even if mainly for the sake of an engaging background story, this surge of interest represented a moment of engagement with the other side’s historical sensitivities.¹⁷⁷

Mirror, Mirror on the Wall

In addition, and more self-centredly, the perceived resurgence of the Nazi past in Greek visuals often invited a true engagement in Germany with how the Germans were seen abroad. *Der Spiegel*, for example, looked into how Nazi symbolism in Greek cartoons compared against public opinion in Greece. It cited a poll that had found that over three-quarters of respondents thought Germany was hostile to them, sixty-nine percent believed that German politicians indeed aimed to erect a ‘Fourth Reich’, and one in three associated terms such as ‘Hitler’, ‘Nazism’ or ‘Third Reich’ with Germany. Before the crisis, by contrast,

the Germans had still been the Greeks' 'favourite people'.¹⁷⁸ In 2015, a *Spiegel* cover story from across Europe, including Greece, presented an investigation of what people thought of Germany in an effort to explore and explain why the Nazi period had become an issue again in the Euro debate and in the discussion around Germany's leading role. The cover played on external perceptions by depicting a smiling Merkel visiting the Parthenon, surrounded by Nazi grandees (Image 2.7).

A *Spiegel* article entitled 'Are we Germans ugly again?' captured particularly acutely the concern that Germany's popularity in Europe was suffering:

How beautiful we were in 2006. The world loved us because we were able to celebrate with such exuberance. The Germans danced to the tune of the football world cup in their own country, and almost everyone shared their joy. 60 years after World War and Holocaust, the nation of perpetrators seemed to have liberated themselves from their despondence, and the world showed itself ready to take these Germans to heart. Now we appear ugly again. When Greeks or Spaniards demonstrate against the supposed dictates of the Germans in the euro policy, some posters show Nazi motifs.¹⁷⁹

Whereas hosting the world cup had temporarily liberated the Germans from their terrible past and made them likeable to the world, the Merkel governments' Euro policy, and more broadly the new power position Germany found itself in, albeit reluctantly, was destroying this re-invented image of the new Germany. Germany was once again reputed to 'want to seize the rule over Europe through economic detours, through credits and emergency aid'. *Bild* here quoted the British *Daily Mail*, disclaiming this assertion as just as absurd and unspeakable as the *Mail's* conclusion 'Welcome to the Fourth Reich'.¹⁸⁰

This concern chimed with the Greek frustration that the country's 'brand name that was created with the organization of the 2004 Olympic games has been irreparably damaged',¹⁸¹ not least by perceptions of Greeks as lazy, corrupt or spendthrift. Generalised denigrations in the German media of "the Greek mentality" or defilements of symbols of the ancient Greek civilisation were widely picked up in the Greek media. They prompted Greek commentators to note that the Germans 'consider[ed] Greece a toxic country',¹⁸² who 'deserve[d] what it is going through',¹⁸³ even if Greeks were not alone in this predicament,



Image 2.7 *Der Spiegel* 21/03/2015 (Nr 13/2015): ‘How Europeans view the Germans: The German Hegemony’

since ‘for the Germans, any country south of the Alps [was] synonymous to mismanagement and corruption’.¹⁸⁴ Greek comedian Lakis Lazopoulos went on an anti-Memorandum tour across Europe that he dubbed ‘Sorry I’m Greek’,¹⁸⁵ trying to make light of Greeks’ perceptions of themselves as the objects of foreign contempt. While *Kathimerini* made some conscious effort to publish alternative views of Greece from German newspapers such as *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, overall, in reading the Greek press one understood that ‘the leitmotif of the German view of things’ was that ‘it is impossible that the prudent, productive Germans will go on paying for the black holes created by the irresponsible, consumerist Mediterraneans’.¹⁸⁶

In an interview with *Frankfurter Allgemeine* in May 2015, the then newly appointed Syriza Foreign Minister Nikos Kotzias—himself a fluent German speaker—expressed his regret about this turn of events, very much in tune with the above *Spiegel* article:

We are expected to tell our youth that so far nothing has been done well [in Greece], and that our Greek way of life was not worthwhile. My response to this is: the Germans used to admire us once, this great nation with its great culture. They were the ones who in fact made us important again on the basis of Greek philosophy. This was an act of love in history. We are indeed merry, optimistic, joyful. And now this attitude to life is supposed to be “unproductive”?¹⁸⁷

As in Germany, the perception that Greece’s reputation abroad had received a serious blow during the crisis led some Greeks to strive to improve their country’s image and to make an effort to be liked and appreciated again. A characteristic example was *Kathimerini*’s attempt to turn around the trope of the degenerating Greek civilisation by publishing two images of Greek works of art that were being displayed abroad under the titles ‘The Charm of the Art of the Greeks’ and ‘The Radiance of the Byzantium is “illuminating” Bonn’.¹⁸⁸ Moreover, as we were finishing writing this book, a materially and symbolically important event for Greco–German relations was the co-hosting of the 2017 documenta art exhibition in Athens, for the first time outside Kassel, Germany, under the title ‘Learning from Athens’. On the occasion of the exhibition, several Greek and German politicians gave speeches about the Greco–German friendship and the power of culture to unite, including

the Greek and German ministers responsible for European Affairs, who wrote in a joint article: ‘The documenta exhibition encourages us to widen our horizons, builds bridges, and changes our point of view. If we can’t see the world through the eyes of the Other, then we can’t have empathy. Having empathy is exactly what is needed today, if we want to talk not only about numbers but also for people and their livelihoods’.¹⁸⁹

Greek Historical Memory Revised

Perhaps related to the fact that Greeks were also hurt by the negative portrayals of Greece in the foreign press, Greek historical references to both the Nazi period and Greek history more broadly became the object of a lively controversy in the Greek press. A number of journalists debunked the use of Nazi imagery as a populist tactic, employed not least by politicians to divert attention from their own responsibility for Greece’s economic crisis.¹⁹⁰ This was not helpful, they warned, in a situation where Greece simply could not afford losing Germany as an ally. Since Greece had no acceptable alternative than to rely on a good relationship with Germany, it could not go on relying on the ‘good old tactic “I am rude to you, but also give me the money”’.¹⁹¹ Any gestures that threatened this relationship were reminiscent of ‘the joke of the desperate husband who threatens his wife that he is going to castrate himself’.¹⁹²

In the context of a deep-reaching critical revision of Greece’s collective understanding of its national history, moreover, others called upon their countrymen not to hide between the Greco–German stand-off in historical references, but instead to acknowledge Greek responsibility in bringing about the debt crisis. A commentator in *Kathimerini* warned against using appeals to our ‘three-thousand-year-old glorious ancestors’ and to ‘ghosts and international conspiracies’ so as to duck out of admitting that ‘our own strategic mistakes are the principal root of our dire economic situation in the Eurozone’. This old national identity reflex had not served the country well and would have destructive effect now: ‘We spent the whole 20th century, and we continue in the 21st, thinking in terms of those mentalities and tactics. We handled the big “national issues” in this way, and with nationalist outbreaks—and moved from defeat to defeat’.¹⁹³

Self-critical notes of caution were sounded against any smugness in claiming to have been on the right side of history in buffering claims

that Greece deserved or was “owed” special treatment on the international stage, as well as against unduly simplifying historical complexities of resistance and responsibility:

Suddenly we have all become anti-Nazi. But [it] is one thing to remember the Nazis when they no longer exist, and another to fight them when they are in front of you. It is one thing to remember those who fought the Nazis, and another to forget that it was not the Nazis who later sent those who fought to the execution squad or to prison.¹⁹⁴

This type of argument extended to other periods of Greek history as well. A commentator in *Avgi* traced one of the most important cultural causes of Greece’s current demise back to the day ‘when the Junta collapsed’ in 1974, when many Greeks ‘pretended that the dictatorship collapsed due to their own, personal bravery’. Instead of ‘facing up to its compromise’ during the years of the Junta, the ‘Greece of silence and accommodation’ did not embrace its responsibility ‘for its tolerance towards the ridiculousness and the tragedy of the colonels, but instead hurried into arbitrary actions and excesses, selfishly claiming a peculiar immunity’. Although far from entirely warranted by historical facts, a discourse of victimisation prevailed in the post-1974 period, whereby ‘everything is now considered a privilege and we never consider our duties and responsibilities’. ‘Because always, “we then”, etc.’¹⁹⁵ To our knowledge, no German criticism of Greeks had gone that far.

2.5 POWER AND RESISTANCE

The connection established in the Greek press between German coercion and Greek resistance spoke to another theme: of power and its sources in a seemingly incontestable asymmetry between the two sides. If the language of domination and resistance was used ubiquitously in Greece, the German side struggled continuously to replace raw assertion of power with what could be construed as legitimate authority. From this angle, the credibility of each side’s blackmail relied on the same threat, which was a Greek exit from the Eurozone. Hence the underlying source of relative power: for whom would Grexit be more costly, materially and symbolically.

German Despots and Their Greek Collaborators

A popular type of self-understanding among Greeks in the context of this power relationship was as the victims of Germany's position of absolute dominance in the Eurozone. In this narrative, Germany was seen not only as dictating the terms of the Memorandum, but as attempting to acquire control of every aspect of Greek political, social and economic life. For example, under the headline title 'OCHI to Merkel's Ultimatum' in the context of the second election campaign of the summer of 2012, *Avgi* accused the German government of using 'raw blackmail' towards the Greek government, 'demanding a "correction" of the vote of the Greeks'; of 'ordering' the formation of a 'pro-Memorandum government by New Democracy and Pasok'; and of demanding that a Greek referendum 'on the question of the Eurozone' be held with the second, June elections.¹⁹⁶

The domination-resistance schema of German coercion and Greek victimisation and defiance was often extended to include the Troika as well as Greek "collaborators", who had a vested interest in upholding the status quo of Germany's influence in Greek life.¹⁹⁷ For instance, an *Avgi* cartoon depicted party leaders Evangelos Venizelos (centre-left PASOK) and Antonis Samaras (centre-right New Democracy) standing next to a three-headed dog called 'Troika' (Image 2.8). Together, they are plotting to sell Greek assets to a pawnshop called 'the Memorandum', specialised in buying 'gold, silver, teeth, medals, beaches'. The cartoon shows Venizelos, who is wearing a badge reading 'Benito', in reference to both his Christian name and Mussolini's, saying: 'If Tsipras gets any more votes, the loan shark will take his pawnshop and go to Bulgaria', to which the Troika replies: 'what horror!'

In a similar spirit, a cartoon published by *Avgi* in the run-up to the 2015 referendum showed a family watching the news on TV. The news presenter was saying: 'The preparations for the creation of a "pro-European" front in our country are reaching a peak! The River,¹⁹⁸ Mr. Dijsselblöm, Pasok, Mr. Schäuble, the banks, New Democracy, and *Bild* decided to run together!'¹⁹⁹ The cartoon's implication was that anyone identifying themselves as 'pro-European' (*philo-Evropaïos*), which at the time was an allusion to politicians and simple citizens alike who supported the 'yes' campaign, belonged to the group of the German government's and the Troika's collaborators in Greece. Extreme versions of this narrative branded not only political parties but also entire social



Image 2.8 *Argi* 30/05/2012 (Yannis Kalaïtzis): Placard: ‘Pawnshop The Memorandum: I buy gold, silver, teeth, medals, beaches’; Man: ‘If Tsipras gets any more votes, the loan shark will take his pawnshop and go to Bulgaria’; Three-headed dog: ‘What horror!’

groups in Greece as traitors. The images of these collaborators were juxtaposed to those of the representatives of the true interests of the Greek people, who would not shy away from using Greece’s leverage to resist foreign domination, break away from the shackles of the Memorandums and strike a better deal with the lenders.

The Power of the Weak

Greece’s greatest negotiating chip in this new confrontation would be its leverage over the fate of the Eurozone, since the latter would collapse under the weight of a Grexit. The following headline title by populist daily *Avriani*, published the day after Syriza’s unexpectedly good performance in the May 2012 Greek general election, is an extreme example of this narrative: ‘Sovereignty is restored to the people and to Tsipras: *Take the memorandum and go away*, is the message of the overwhelming

majority of the Greeks to the Troika. *Otherwise we will leave the Eurozone by ourselves and we will blow up the whole of Merkel's system*.²⁰⁰

The message was heard in Germany. Greece's clout was recognised here as a "power of the weak", resulting from the palpable 'catastrophic consequences' of a Grexit and its social and political ramifications not only for Greece, but also for the rest of the Eurozone.²⁰¹ The question became whether this prospect constituted a threat or simply a prediction and cause for common action.

Unsurprisingly, Germans often did not see themselves merely as the stronger party, but rather as the righteous party enforcing the rules of the game for the common good and bearing the responsibility for that common good in their role as the effective "paymasters" of Europe. Germany too was capable of its own Ochi, digging its heels against any concessions on the conditions attached to the memorandum. As summed up by the Sociologist Ulrich Beck, this was 'the crucial power lever: Merkel ties the German willingness to supply loans to the willingness of the debtor countries to meet the conditions of the German stability policy'.²⁰² Yet, even the most dogged insistences on such conditionality took on a slightly desperate tone, as if to acknowledge in the end the effective power of the weak: 'Our "iron chancellor" is promising that German aid will not flow unless the Greeks finally start making tough economies. But who is to still believe the Greeks that they will?'²⁰³

Germany and Europe's destiny was at the mercy of Greeks, whose politicians had proved utterly unable and unwilling to stand by their word. In this Greco-European or Greco-German power struggle of the weak against the strong, Syriza's anti-austerity promises and rejection of the bailout conditions already in the run-up to 'Greece's destiny election' of May 2012 (and even more so when it entered government in January 2015) were a game-changer. Threats of renegeing on the subsequent memorandum agreements were read in part as attempted 'blackmail', this time on the part of the Greeks. The success in May 2012 of 'parties that rejected the "Dictate of the Troika"'²⁰⁴ tilted the balance of power noticeably in favour of the supposedly weak, who speculated that the rest of the Eurozone would not let it come to a Grexit for fear of its consequences.

Against this, the *Frankfurter Allgemeine*, for example, insisted that a breach by Greece of the bailout conditions would leave the other Eurozone governments 'no option but to stop the help to Greece in its current form' for otherwise 'the message would be clear: the Eurozone can be blackmailed. Why should other states save money, when they see

that someone smart at the end of his thirties in Athens can bend the whole Eurozone to its knees?’²⁰⁵ There were calls in the German press to bully Greek voters into not electing parties that did not own up to Greece’s commitments (here again in May 2012). Otherwise, ‘Greece will exit the Eurozone [...]; the Eurozone will not let itself be blackmailed by the fear of possible punishment from the financial world’.²⁰⁶

At this point, Greece and Germany seemed to have achieved a sorry relationship: a stand-off between threats and blackmail. Nevertheless, even though these were the stories most prominently picked up by the other country’s newspapers, in reality there was far more complexity in both sides’ discourses on power relationships.

Greece, for its part, did a lot of soul-searching regarding the limits of its influence, and many commentators were not so sanguine about the country’s international position. Soon after Syriza’s rise to power, a *Kathimerini* cartoonist humorously captured this scepticism by adapting what is known in game theory as the ‘game of chicken’ to fit what he perceived to be the context of the Greco-German power relationship. The cartoon showed two vehicles quickly approaching each other from opposite directions: a tiny old-fashioned car with Finance Minister Varoufakis on the wheel and Prime Minister Tsipras on the back seat, and an enormous truck with Chancellor Merkel driving at full speed. As a frontal collision seems to be imminent, Tsipras asks Varoufakis: ‘And what will we do if she doesn’t turn, Yiannis?’ to which Varoufakis replies, ‘We’ll pass from underneath’ (Image 2.9).

In fact, many journalists in the Greek newspapers reported systematically and with great concern the reactions of German policymakers to Greek intentions of moving away from some of the Memorandum commitments: ‘Keep your commitments’, said Merkel;²⁰⁷ ‘Greece must keep its commitments’, warned German Vice-Chancellor Sigmar Gabriel;²⁰⁸ ‘Return to realism’, advised President of the European Parliament Martin Schulz.²⁰⁹ What some commentators viewed as ‘raw blackmail’, others viewed as ‘clear messages’;²¹⁰ what some believed to be Greece’s ‘leverage’, others viewed as a ‘dangerous illusion’;²¹¹ what some journalists presented as ‘scaremongering’ was for others simply ‘the reality’, ‘the facts’;²¹² ultimately, what some journalists viewed as an all-too-ready caving into Chancellor Merkel’s wishes was for others a desperate plea to their fellow countrymen not to take risks that would result in the ruin of everyone’s livelihoods, a plea that was grounded in a genuine belief that Grexit would hit the Greeks first and foremost.



Image 2.9 *Kathimerini* 15/02/2015 (Ilias Makris): Tsipras: ‘And what will we do if she doesn’t turn, Yiannis?’; Varoufakis: ‘We’ll pass from underneath!’

The Reluctant Hegemon

On the other hand, the steadfast determination with which the German debate insisted on the strict conditionality of German (and European) bailout loans represented on some level a new note of resoluteness and confidence in Germany being in a position to set the tone.

This had to do with a deeper shift in German national self-understandings as to the country’s new power and leading role in Europe. Germany’s transformation since reunification from ‘semi-sovereign’ over ‘tamed power’²¹³ to ‘normalized power’²¹⁴ was now translating into policy stance, starting with Greece. The Euro crisis had ushered in a new chapter in this transformation with the country emerging as Europe’s ‘reluctant hegemon’²¹⁵ or ‘accidental empire’²¹⁶ according to the academic narratives widely debated in the press debate.

The new chapter in the discursive history of German representations of German power involved, first of all, the acceptance that, after ‘sixty years of taking a back seat, enclosed by the benedictory community with

the West' and doing 'splendidly' by making itself 'smaller than it was', the country was now finally standing big again. Commentators almost universally portrayed Germany's new political power as the natural result of Germany's economic pre-eminence: 'No tanks rolled, just the German Euro'.²¹⁷ The crisis of the Eurozone had created a situation—appreciated by 'the other member-states'—where 'without Germany' there was no way out, the Euro could not be rescued. 'Everything may now ultimately depend on Germany in saving the Euro because it seems to be the only country strong enough economically to bear the burden for the others'.²¹⁸ This analysis was often linked with claims that Germany had no choice but to lead in shaping Eurozone and the EU's immediate crisis response as well as more medium-term reform.²¹⁹ In fact, according to the emerging public narrative, Germany had long held a role of economic predominance but had avoided 'forming the economics of its country into a claim to power'.²²⁰ Only the gravity of the Euro crisis was now forcing Germany openly to embrace this political power role:

Political power is like millions of Euros on one's account; one does not talk about them. One just has them. Germany has been doing pretty well on this in Europe for decades—being important without loosing too many words about it. Every Germany government was great at making itself small politically if needed. But this is over now. German influence is audible now.²²¹

Owing up to German hegemony, however, was usually accompanied with reassurances that this role had come about almost involuntarily: 'It was not our choice, but Europe's destiny today depends on Germany'.²²² *Die Zeit* prominently took up and systematically explored William Paterson's concept of the 'Reluctant Hegemon',²²³ emphasising that Germany had 'not wanted, and even less conquered' this role.²²⁴ *Bild* protested with great indignation ('PARDON ME?' in capital letters) against a 'serious lapse' by the *Daily Mail*, which had 'alleged' that, 'through economic detours, through credits and aid, the Germans want[ed] to pinch command over Europe', and likened the situation to a 'Fourth Reich'. Apparently, Greek sensitivity to historical echoes had become uncomfortably contagious. *Bild's* fury was directed at the allegation that they had willingly set out to achieve European dominance as well as the historical comparison.²²⁵

Indeed, German public and political discourse expressed ample reservation about Germany's new power role and the taxing expectations that came with it.²²⁶ *Die Zeit* editor and former Chancellor Helmut Schmidt, for instance, warned that Germany should 'beware' of assuming the leading role that many assigned it in the European crisis response (advocating instead reviving the Franco-German tandem, who 'alone can lead in Europe to this day', and including Poland as well); 'if the EU does not work, the Germans will be blamed for it'.²²⁷

Descriptions of Germany as bound to lead in shaping Eurozone reforms, as well as in picking up the bill, were often focused almost allegorically on Angela Merkel as the personified incarnation of the nation:

She is the woman watched by Europe, no other politician on the continent excites so much hope, but also so much hatred as she does. When she flies to Greece, protesters in Nazi uniforms march the streets of Athens, but one word from her can cause a euro country to be saved from bankruptcy. It is her who holds the fortunes of the continent in her hands at the moment. If the euro is going to be rescued, it will have been above all her achievement. Should it break apart, she will conversely be declared guilty. No other chancellor was as powerful on the continent as Merkel.²²⁸

To be sure, Merkel's personal influence could be attributed not only to Germany's strong economic position, but also to her personal aptitude. *Die Zeit* quoted Romano Prodi: 'the Lady takes the decisions, and the French President then gives a press conference to explain the decisions'.²²⁹ It is not least in this light that Greek concerns about insufficiently balanced and even effectively unchecked German domination should be seen, as should Greek impulses to assert resistance to it.

With Great Power Comes Great Responsibility

Perhaps in an effort to attenuate any such (understandable) mistrust, mainstream German discourses on German power emphasised how 'with great power comes great responsibility', to quote Spiderman's uncle.²³⁰ There was much talk in our German corpus of 'our responsibility' for ensuring the preservation of the Euro.²³¹ It was the Germans' assuming this very responsibility that made all the difference in 'The Miraculous Transformation of the Once Feared Germans' into a 'Good Hegemon'.²³² Radoslaw Sikorski's appeal to the Germans to

take responsibility for a viable Eurozone found great resonance in the German debate. The Polish foreign minister assured them that Poland would not misinterpret Germany's living up to the role of the hegemon, giving up its historic ballast: 'I fear Germany's power less than its inactivity'.²³³ His famous dictum bolstered the storyline that Germany was duty-bound to overcome its own reluctance to assume power in Europe. But critical voices did also caution against the use of the language of responsibility and of a 'responsibility ethics' which connects duty to act with accountability for the consequences of one's actions; for, if the Chancellor were to fail, 'she alone [would] have to assume responsibility'.²³⁴

Germany's new political power seemed to play out the main precepts of 'hegemonic stability theory' and especially its ideas of 'benign hegemony' according to which the hegemon's authority is underpinned by material resources and the provision of public goods such as a stable currency or access to its own markets—in other words, disproportionate burden sharing.²³⁵ Yet, such goods come at a price, namely general acquiescence with the hegemon's normative dominance, as a German newspaper article explains: 'It is, if you will, part of the construction principle of a currency union that there is a strong one, who has to be willing to shoulder more than others, to keep the union together—and who in exchange determines its direction'.²³⁶ This (voluntary) contract is what buys the hegemon its legitimacy.²³⁷ The beauty of this logic for a German public eager for moral cover was the plausibility of the common storyline according to which other Eurozone members, like Sikorski, were actively 'requesting' measures and a lead from Berlin.²³⁸

The hallmark of stable hegemonic arrangements is that the interests of both the hegemon and their partners are served, albeit sometimes sacrificing short-term for long-term interests. The partners reap material benefits while the hegemon creates and sustains a system that serves its own interests as well as those of the whole. Indeed, a recurrent theme in the German press was that, as the country benefiting most from the Euro—a point we will discuss in Chapter 3—it remained in Germany's interest to keep the currency intact:

Of course Berlin needs the Euro and Europe for selfish reasons. Two thirds of exports of the vice world champion go to the Eurozone. With the EU, this classic growth machine would crash, too; the renationalization of the currencies would unleash a devaluation race to the bottom of the weaker

economies, which would force a new Deutschmark skyward. The political disaster would be even more horrific. The Germans would once again be where they must never be again: too strong to be left alone, too weak to bully the rest of Europe.²³⁹

In another version of the economic interest argument, Green MEP Franziska Brantner argued that saving the Euro, even at the cost of partial debt reliefs, was not about ‘altruism’ but about preserving the Germans’ own wealth; even a ‘Swabian housewife’ (the typecast of thriftiness) knows ‘that is its better to pay part of someone else’s debt than to completely lose one’s own assets by not doing so’.²⁴⁰ The interest of the ‘good’ German hegemon extended as far as paying ‘the bulk of the bill’—its ‘terrible problem’ being that ‘its interest in preserving the “public good” named “Europe” is the greatest’ and that it has ‘the greatest wealth’ and thus the ability to pick up the bill.²⁴¹ In fact, the acknowledgement of this German interest was underlying much of *Bild*’s rants against the (assumed) costs incurred by Germany in connection with the crisis. But interest alone never seemed to settle the argument. When German journalists requested of the Greeks that they refrain from hurting the feelings of Germans with Nazi references, this was from a position of wounded power—we are owed at least that!²⁴² Perhaps, the most common plea in our sample more broadly, beyond *Bild* and reflected not least in the *Bundestag*’s debates around the votes on the European Rescue Mechanism, was that in return for German cash injections ‘the others’ had to play by ‘our rules’.²⁴³ Taking the paymaster meant accepting the rule setter.

Nevertheless, for many Germans, with responsibility also came magnanimity: Germany had to recognise not only the Greeks’ interests and needs, but also their dignity and pride. The discourse along these lines was that the hegemon had a responsibility to wield its power gently: ‘The Germans of all people are not allowed to bang their fists on the table but rarely and gently. They have to “take the others along” while they work on building the institutions that can ensure fiscal virtue’.²⁴⁴

With a view to recognising the sensitivities of those subject to their power, they had to exercise it with sympathy and respect. This implied also that agency and responsibility also belonged to the Greek side. For instance, a *Zeit* article advocating a Greek referendum on the austerity package as early as 2011 argued that ‘heteronomy [Fremdbestimmung] hurts more than the austerity measures’:

The Greeks are suffering under the European austerity stipulations and rebel against them. Yet, no one knows how much of their resistance is due to a sense of powerlessness and incapacitation, to the humiliation by a Brussels punishment and aid machinery chattering away in unreachable distance. This offending heteronomy might be counteracted by the direct question “Do you want this”. Being able to, but also having to, decide, to assume responsibility: this can discipline and free up force. It offers a chance to overcome victimhood and to reclaim the upper hand over their destiny at least in political-symbolic manner. Greece could regain its dignity and self-respect.²⁴⁵

The dark sides of the Troika’s power over Greece and the other current debt sinners—in other words the irresponsible wielding of power—did not go unnoticed in the German press. *Der Spiegel* criticised delays in clearing imminent aid payments and the postponement of the decision as having ‘just one purpose: to demonstrate to the givers that the takers are in their hands’. The same article quoted Juncker that the Greeks had ‘delivered all right’ on their austerity obligations.²⁴⁶ Representations of the kind of raw power at play pointed to the psychological temptations of the givers’ power: ‘Contrary to official assurances, the governments of the Eurozone are threatening Greece with the sack from the Eurozone’.²⁴⁷ Power, it seemed, could be enjoyed for its own sake too.

In sum, our story of how Greeks and Germans perceived their struggles of power and resistance over the course of the European sovereign debt crisis, as this whole chapter’s story of how the Greek and German players represented each other and themselves in debating this crisis, has been a tale of denying the other side recognition in their complexities and multiplicity, a tale of hurtful stereotypes and unfair exaggerations and generalisations. Yet, it also did harbour some promise in the form of discourses that opened up this “black box” of the other side, acknowledging the many shades that defined this other side. Moreover, we found plenty of discourses that pointed to commonalities and common points of view between Greeks and Germans, be it as Europeans or as human beings, in all their differences. Ironically, this could occur even in the worst instances of offensive and generalising typecasts, as we argued that these could be in effect projection screens of one’s own fears, demons and insecurities. We found a final possible seed for recovering the mutual recognition among the Europeans in their complex and multiple identities, needs and interests expressed in discourses around solidarity. These

gained significant strength in both Greece and Germany not least in response to the acute asymmetries of suffering under the Euro crisis and in engagement with how the European power balance had shifted over its course. New fault lines of class and economic ideology have come to counterbalance and at times overpower those of nationality at least in some discourses.

NOTES

1. Section 1.1 and Bartelson 2013: 108; drawing on Ricoeur, P. (2005). *The Course of Recognition*. London, Harvard University Press; for an account of identity formation as involving both integration and separation, see Brewer, M. B. (1999). 'The psychology of prejudice: ingroup love or outgroup hate?' *Journal of Social Issues* 55(3): 1999; on identity formation as being integrative rather than exclusionary, as resting on the emulation and the incorporation of characteristics rather than contradistinction to any real or imagined others, see Lebow, R. N. (2012). *The Politics and Ethics of Identity: In Search of Ourselves*. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
2. See images in *Spiegel* 46/2012, 42/2012, and 24/2012 or *FAZ* 10/05/12.
3. *Spiegel* 26/2012, citing the Greek Finance Minister.
4. Headline *FAZ* 21/03/2013, see also *Bild*'s on 06/02/2014: 'Fewer Taxes, Higher Pensions, and More Assets: Greeks Richer than Us! Official: household assets twice as high as in Germany'; but see Jones, E. (2010). 'Merkel's Folly'. *Survival* 52(3), for a critique of such statistics.
5. For example, *Bild* 08/02/2012 'An average German works for 38.8 years ... a Hungarian only 29.3 years'.
6. *Bild* 01/04/2010, see, e.g. 06/02/2014.
7. See Tzogopoulos, G. (2013). *The Greek Crisis in the Media: Stereotyping in the International Press*. UK, Ashgate, p. 90.
8. Kathimerini 21/02/2010, p. 8 (Xenia Kounalaki).
9. *Spiegel* 15/04/2013. See similarly, *Bild* 06/02/2014: 'Fewer Taxes, Higher Pensions, and More Assets: Greeks Richer than Us!'.
10. *Zeit* 10/02/2011 (Paul J.J. Welfens).
11. *Bild* 27/04/2010 'Who is to Still Believe the Greeks?'.
12. *Zeit* 17/12/2009 (Michael Thumann).
13. *Spiegel online* 29/06/2007 '*Werbeslogans: Geiz war geil*'.
14. *Bild* 15/04/2010.
15. *Avgi* 23/02/10, p. 2 (George Bramos).

16. *Kathimerini* 15/02/10, cover page, comment (Nikos Konstantaras).
17. *Avgi* 21/02/10 (Syriza economist Yannis Dragasakis).
18. *Avgi* 24/12/09, p. 5.
19. *Real News* 02/05/10, cover page.
20. For example, *Bild* 20/08/2012 Interview with newly elected Prime Minister Antonis Samaras.
21. For example, *Zeit* 26/05/2011 and 01/12/2011; or *Spiegel* 13/2012 'Crumbling Civilization', 31/2012, 35/2012 'The 2300 Euro Baby'.
22. *Zeit* 01/12/11 (Petros Markaris).
23. *Bild* 11/11/11; quoted also in Tzogopoulos 2013: 116–117.
24. See *Spiegel* 42/2012 'Greece: "Rotten To The Core"'.
 25. *Avgi* 24/12/09, p. 5.
26. *Avgi* 20/12/09, p. 6 (Dimitris Hristou).
27. 21/09/2010, as quoted on <http://pangalos.gr/portal/%CE%BC%CE%B1%CE%B6%CE%AF-%CF%84%CE%B1-%CF%86%CE%AC%CE%B3%CE%B1%CE%BC%CE%B5/> [accessed 23/12/2016].
28. For example, *Kathimerini* 28/03/10, cover page, 'Greek lead in Cayennes'.
29. *Kathimerini* 15/09/13, 'Big Things are the Result of Small Things' (Stefanos Kassimatis).
30. *Kathimerini* 28/02/10, 'A night at the bouzoukia with Greece' (Stefanos Kassimatis).
31. *Real News* 28/02/10, cover page headline 'Cut wastefulness and permanency!'.
32. *Avgi* 23/02/10 (George Bramos).
33. On the 'rhetoric of blame-shifting populism' of Greek political elites between 2009 and 2011, see Vassilopoulou, S., D. Halikiopoulou and T. Exadaktylos (2014). 'Greece in Crisis: Austerity, Populism and the Politics of Blame'. *Journal of Common Market Studies* 52(2): 388–402, p. 392.
34. *Avgi* 21/03/10, cover page.
35. *Avgi* 06/01/10, cover page.
36. *Kathimerini* 12/05/12, cover page, comment (Nikos Xidakis).
37. *Bild* 21/12/2009, reported in *Avgi* 22/12/09, p. 5. It is noteworthy that *Avgi* made a mistake in the translation of Schäuble's statement, reporting that the Finance Minister claimed that Greece will not be able to get round 'saving itself and helping itself' rather than 'making savings and helping itself'. This reinforced the perception that the German government was denying solidarity to the Greeks.
38. *Avgi* 22/12/09, cover page.
39. *Avgi* 09/10/12, cover page.
40. *Avgi* 10/01/10, p. 16 (Eliza Papadaki).
41. *Kathimerini* 21/02/10, p. 18, 'The German Problem'.

42. *Kathimerini* 21/03/10, p. 19, 'Berlin's responsibility for the crisis'.
43. *Avgi* 21/02/10 (Yannis Dragasakis).
44. *Spiegel* 16/2012.
45. *Spiegel* 16/2012.
46. See further, e.g. *Spiegel* 28/2012, *Zeit* 16/05/2012 'The first sacrifice'.
47. *Focus* 19/05/2010.
48. *Spiegel* 44/2012.
49. *Zeit* 17/12/2009 (Michael Thumann).
50. See above and e.g. *Zeit* 26/05/2011, 01/12/2011 and 01/01/2012; *Spiegel* 13/2012 'Crumbling Civilization', 31/2012, 35/2012.
51. For example, *Spiegel online* 26/11/2011 'Fraud of Millions: Greece Presumably Has 21,000 Phantom Pensioners'.
52. *Spiegel* 05/2012.
53. *Bild* 20/06/2012 'Greek Party Leader Advises Merkel: Let My Country Go to Hell'.
54. For example, *Spiegel* 43/2012 'Greece: Jobs for Good Friends', *Zeit* 16/05/2012, citing an OECD report, or *Bild* 27/04/2010 'Coterie, Corruption, Family Ties: How the Greek System Works'.
55. *Bild* 26/04/2010 (Paul Ronzheimer).
56. *Spiegel* 40/2012.
57. FAZ 10/05/2012, see *Bild* 19/05/2012.
58. Schäuble's statement was reported, without further comment, in *Kathimerini* 13/06/12, cover page.
59. For example, *Zeit* 17/12/2009 (Michael Thumann).
60. *Zeit* 16/05/2012 'The first sacrifice', see similarly *Bild* 27/06/2012 'The Lacerated Bust-Country'.
61. *Bild* 26/04/2010, see also, e.g. 27/04/2010, 16/05/2012.
62. For example, again *Zeit* 17/12/2009 (Michael Thumann).
63. *Zeit* 20/12/2013.
64. *Spiegel* 35/2012 'Opportunists and Illusion Artists'.
65. See, e.g. *Spiegel* 20/2012 'Spiegel Conversation: "Our Future is Called Europe"' (interview with Poland's foreign minister Radoslaw Sikorski)
66. *Süddeutsche Zeitung* 25/05/2017 'SPD Attacks Schäuble in Greece Debate', see also 16/06/2017 'Schäuble has used tricks in Greece agreement' (Cerstin Gammelin), arguing that he refused the IMF's demands in anticipation of the imminent federal election in September muting any domestic resistance.
67. *Spiegel* 20/2012, Sikorski interview.
68. *Spiegel online* 21/06/2012 'Euro Crisis: "Germany is the Greatest Debt Sinner of the 20th Century"'.
69. For example, *Kathimerini* 23/02/10, p. 11 (Evridiki Bersi).
70. *Kathimerini* 28/03/10, cover page, 'Record bribes for the submarines'.

71. *Eleftherotipia* 08/01/10, quoted in *Argi* 09/01/10, p. 22.
72. *Spiegel* 8/2012, citing Bavaria's Minister President Horst Seehofer; see also Tzogopoulos 2013, p. 81.
73. *Bild* 02/05/2010, interview with Merkel; see also 27/04/2010 'Who is to Still Believe the Greeks?'; or *Spiegel* 02/2012 on Greece having 'cheated', or 15/2015, using MEP Chatzimarkakis's fraudulent PhD thesis as a starting point.
74. *Bild* 15/04/2010; see also 27/04/2010 'Who is to Still Believe the Greeks?'.
75. For example, *Bild* 27/04/2010 'Who is to Still Believe the Greeks?'.
76. *Bild* 02/05/2010, interview with Merkel.
77. Papadimitriou, D., A. Pegasiou and S. Zartaloudis (2017). 'European Elites and the Narrative of the Greek Crisis: a Discursive Institutional Analysis'. Paper presented at the EUSA Fifteenth Biennial Conference on 4–6 May 2017, in Miami, Florida; see, e.g. again *Bild*'s Merkel interview 02/05/2010, and 26/04/2010 on the TV debate of the front runners in the North-Rhine-Westphalian election; *Spiegel* online 21/06/2012 'Greatest Debt Sinner'.
78. Merkel, speech to *Bundestag*, 17/06/2015, <https://www.bundesregierung.de/Content/DE/Rede/2015/07/2015-07-20-merkel-bt-griechenland.html> [accessed 13/07/2017]; see Boergerding, L. (2016). An End to 'Merkelism'? German Decision-Making in the Eurozone Crisis as 'Stigma Management'. Department of Politics and International Relations, University of Oxford. MPhil International Relations.
79. *Spiegel online* 21/06/2012 'Greatest Debt Sinner'.
80. *Spiegel* 34/2012, interview with Volker Kauder, leader of the CDU/CSU group in the *Bundestag*.
81. See, e.g. *Spiegel* 21/2012 'Ultimatum to Greece' or again Merkel's 17/06/2015 speech. See, however, Bundesbank President Jens Weidmann's defence of Greece that the Greeks *were* doing their part, only the markets were not responding; interview 'Like a Drug', *Spiegel* 35/2012.
82. For example, *Spiegel* 24/2012 'The Blood of the Earth'.
83. *Spiegel* 07/2012 and 42/2012, respectively.
84. *Spiegel* 42/2012 'Greece: "Rotten To The Core"', *Bild* 08/04/2012, *Spiegel* 40/2012.
85. *Argi* 25/10/09.
86. *Argi* 24/12/09, p. 5.
87. *Real News* 02/05/10.
88. *Kathimerini* 20/12/09, p. 20 (Nikos Konstantaras).
89. *Ibid.*

90. *Avgi* 16/12/09 'A Meeting Off Topic'.
91. *Kathimerini* 13/12/09, p. 24 (Alexis Papahelas).
92. *Kathimerini* 02/05/10, p. 20 (Alexis Papahelas).
93. *Avgi* 18/04/10 (George Bramos).
94. *Kathimerini* 13/12/09, p. 24 (Alexis Papahelas).
95. *Kathimerini* 19/02/10, cover page, main article.
96. For example, *Bild* 26/04/2010, 27/04/2010, 16/05/2012.
97. *Kathimerini* 20/10/09, quoting Luxembourg's Prime Minister Jean-Claude Juncker.
98. *Kathimerini* 12/05/12, quoting Commission President José Manuel Barroso.
99. *Kathimerini* 13/05/12, comment (Alexis Papahelas).
100. *Kathimerini* 20/05/12, comment (Alexis Papahelas); and 23/05/12, main article.
101. For example, *Avgi* 22/12/09, p. 5, referring to *Bild* 21/12/2009; or similarly *Avgi* 13/12/09, p. 17, and 24/02/10, p. 12.
102. *Avgi*, 11/12/09, cover page, 'Electric shock... with dialogue'.
103. *Avgi* 15/11/09, cover page, 'Shock-therapy by the government'.
104. *Avgi*, 23/02/10, cover page, 'The measures that are coming slaughter people'.
105. *Avgi* 09/05/10, cover page, headline title.
106. *Kathimerini* 12/05/12, cover page, comment (Nikos Xidakis).
107. *Avgi* 11/05/12, cover page, 'Merkel-Schäuble insist on austerity'.
108. *Avgi* 09/05/10, p. 3, Verba Manent.
109. *Zeit* 2013/01 'Euro Crisis' (former chancellor and *Zeit* editor Helmut Schmidt), see also *Zeit* 06/06/2012; for a study that explains the German government's Euro crisis response as 'motivated by a concern for the moral hazard generated by other member states', see Newman, S. (2015). *The Reluctant Leader: Germany's Euro Experience and the Long Shadow of Reunification. The Future of the Euro*. M. Matthijs and M. Blyth. Oxford, Oxford University Press.
110. For example, *Stuttgarter Zeitung* 04/09/2012; see further, e.g. Merkel's *Bundestag* speech on 17/06/2015.
111. *Zeit* 27/12/12 'The Obligation to Solidarity'; see further, e.g. 11/08/2012.
112. *Spiegel* 31/2012, see similarly *Zeit* 06/06/2012.
113. *Avgi* 23/05/2012, cover page, 'Attack against Merkel from the leaders of the German Left, G. Gysi and Kl. Ernst'.
114. *Avgi* 28/02/10, p. 11.
115. See, e.g. *Kathimerini*'s headline title on 06/10/12: 'Visit of Support from Merkel'.
116. *Kathimerini* 10/10/12, cover page.

117. For example, *Bild* 18/05/2010, 27/10/2010 (the infamous ‘Why don’t you sell your islands, bankrupt Greece’), 16/05/2012, etc. A search on 04/10/2013 on www.bild.de for ‘Pleite-Griechen’ resulted in 183 hits, on 10/06/2017, in 829.
118. *Spiegel* 48/2012 ‘Europe’s Black Plague’.
119. *Bild* 08/04/2010 ‘Euro crisis: Are Greeks on Brink of a Bank Collapse? Stock Markets Across Europe in Downward Suction +++ Euro Nose-Diving’.
120. For example, *Spiegel* 26/2012, *Bild* 27/04/2010 ‘The Greeks: Cuts? Why? They’d rather go on strike!’.
121. *Spiegel* 06/2014 ‘In the Delirium of the Billions’, see also 08/10/2012 ‘Mind the Inflation! The Creeping Dispossession of the Germans’.
122. *Bild* 08/04/2010 ‘Are Greeks on Brink of a Bank Collapse?’.
123. *Spiegel* 48/2012 ‘Europe’s Black Plague’.
124. Shklar, J. N. (1989). *The Liberalism of Fear*. Liberalism and the Moral Life. N. L. Rosenblum. Cambridge, Massachusetts, Harvard University Press: 21–38.
125. See, e.g. *Spiegel* 20/2012, 40/2012:98, the dramatized hanging scene in *Spiegel* 37/2012; or *Bild*’s videos and picture galleries ‘After Vote [in parliament on austerity plans]: Chaos in Greece’ (30/06/2011, <http://www.bild.de/politik/fotos/griechenland-krise/fg-18606070.bild.html>) showing images of ‘total escalation’ in violent clashes between rioting protesters and police ‘acting with monstrous brutality’, or similarly ‘Greece in a state of emergency’ (29/06/2011, <http://www.bild.de/politik/ausland/griechenland-krise/griechenland-so-blutig-war-der-schicksalstag-in-athen-18590816.bild.html>) and ‘Nazi Comparisons and Bloody Street Battles’ (30/06/2011, <http://www.bild.de/politik/ausland/griechenland-krise/griechenland-das-denken-die-griechen-ueber-die-deutschen-koennen-wir-dort-urlaub-machen-18607720.bild.html>) [all accessed 06/07/2017].
126. *Stuttgarter Zeitung* 16/06/2012.
127. *Bild* 05/02/2012, 27/06/2012 ‘The Lacerated Bust-Country’.
128. See, e.g. *Spiegel* 21/2012. In 2014, *Die Zeit* in particular expressed a wave of regret for the nonappearance of a European revolution (see, e.g. 17/04/2014 or *Zeit* 13/08/2014).
129. *All Spiegel* 40/2012.
130. See, e.g. *Bild*’s coverage on 09/10/2012 on Merkel’s visit to Athens, reporting not only on the demonstrations and riots, but also the harsh police action and popular resistance.
131. *Spiegel* 20/2012 and 21/2012 ‘Sick Conditions’.
132. For example, *Spiegel* 20/2012 and 21/2012.
133. *Focus* 22/02/2010.

134. For example, *Spiegel* 21/2012 'Ultimatum to Greece', *Stuttgarter Zeitung* 25/09/2011, FAZ 10/05/12.
135. *Stuttgarter Zeitung* 25/09/2011 (citing Wolfgang Schäuble); even *Focus* 22/02/2010 (the Venus story) made this concession.
136. *Stuttgarter Zeitung* 25/09/2011.
137. On philhellenism as the 'private passion' and 'institutionally generated and preserved cultural phenomenon' of the German educated elite's obsession with the ancient Greeks, dating back to the mid-eighteenth century and not declining until the 1930s, persisting in cultural reflexes to this day, see Marchand, S. L. (1996). *Down from Olympus: Archaeology and Philhellenism in Germany, 1750–1970*. Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press.
138. *Spiegel* 13/2012, see also, e.g. 24/2012 'The Blood of the Earth'.
139. *Spiegel* 20/2012.
140. *Focus* 22/02/2010, see, e.g. *Kathimerini* 28/02/10, 'Populism, the Guilty and the Truth' (Paschos Mandravelis).
141. A Greek court case against *Focus's* slander of Greek national symbols resulted in the acquittal of the *Focus* editor in chief and a dismissal of the case against the article's authors (see, e.g. *Spiegel online* 03/04/2012 'Bird Affair: Greek court lets "Focus" people off the hook').
142. *Kathimerini* 28/02/10, 'Populism, the Guilty and the Truth' (Paschos Mandravelis).
143. See, e.g. SZ 01/03/2010 'Greece/Germany: The Hour of Blitz Clichés' (Kai Strittmatter).
144. See, e.g. SZ 01/03/2010 'Blitz Clichés.'
145. SZ 01/03/2010 'Blitz Clichés'.
146. *Avgi* 27/02/10, p. 32, 'Germany and the finger' (Thanasis Karteros).
147. *Bild* 24/02/2010 'Athens Press—Greeks Outraged by "Focus" Cover', see likewise *Die Zeit* 26/02/2010 'Consumers call to boycott of German products'.
148. *Avgi* 22/12/09, p. 5, referring to the original interview in *Bild* 21/12/2009.
149. *Kathimerini* 22/12/10, cover page, 'The Commission is deeply concerned about Greece'.
150. *Avgi* 06/01/10, pp. 8–9.
151. *Avgi* 24/12/09, back page, 'M. Glezos on Schäuble's statements'.
152. *BBC News* 25/02/10 'Greece angers Germany in Gold Row', <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8536862.stm> [accessed 11/07/2016].
153. *Kathimerini* 24/02/12, p. 4, 'Anti-German "hysteria" from part of the political world'.
154. *Avgi* 06/01/10, pp. 8–9 (Ganis Solomon).
155. *Kathimerini* 24/02/10, cover page, comment (Alexis Papahelas).

156. *Kathimerini* 02/05/10, p. 20 (Alexis Papahelas).
157. *Avgi* 27/02/10, cover page (Maria Karamesini).
158. *Avgi* 06/01/10, p. 8, 'Schäuble Adds Insult to Injury', see *Spiegel* 13/2015 (21/03/2015) cover showing Merkel among Nazis visiting the Parthenon, and the cover story 'How Europeans view the Germans: the German Hegemony'.
159. *Avgi* 27/02/10, p. 30.
160. *Proto Thema* 04/12/11, cover page.
161. *To Vima* 07/07/14.
162. *Avgi* 13/07/15, cover page, main article, 'Three times a sinner?'.
163. For example, *Bild* 20/06/2011, 30/06/2011, 08/02/2012, 21/07/2012, 10/10/2012, 24/02/2010; *Spiegel* 09/2012. *Bild* 13/02/2015 'Radical Greeks agitate against Schäuble, for example, reported on *Avgi*'s Schäuble cartoon reproduced as Image 2.5, and the minister's spokesman calling it 'repugnant': 'its author should be ashamed'.
164. For example, *Bild* 20/06/2011 'Nazi Posters, Abuse' or 30/06/2011 'Nazi Comparisons and Bloody Street Battles'.
165. For example, *Bild* 10/10/2012 'Chancellor in Greece—Germany Does Not Deserve This! Revolting Protests Against Merkel in Athens! And We Are Paying Even More'. *Bild* invited readers to vote, under the heading of 'Ungrateful Greeks', on whether it was 'right, regardless, that Merkel went to Greece'. Sixty percent voted No, forty Yes, with the vote closing on 30/10/2012.
166. *Spiegel* 09/2012 'Prejudices: Nazi Always Works', see also *Bild* 08/02/2012 in 'Anti-German Agitation in Athens Worsening'.
167. *Bild* 21/07/2012 'Greece—Federal Eagle Desecrated with Swastika!' See further 22/07/2011 'Greek apologises for Swastika Attack'.
168. For example, *Bild* 10/10/2012 'Chancellor in Greece—Germany Does Not Deserve This!' or 22/06/2011 'With Swastika!'.
169. Here, Munich's Lord Mayor and SPD lead candidate for the Bavarian land election in 2013, in a speech at a Lower Bavarian Oktoberfest-type fair in Gillamoos at which the crème of German politics spoke, including the Chancellor, with all the inflammatory rhetoric that may be expected for such an event (*Stuttgarter Zeitung* 04/09/2012).
170. For example, *Zeit* 26/02/2010 'Consumers call to boycott of German products'.
171. *Zeit* 14/06/2012 'Three months to go for Europe'.
172. For example, *Bild* 10/10/2012 'Revolting Protests Against Merkel in Athens! And We Are Paying Even More', or 22/06/2011 'With Swastika! Greeks Scorn Europe ... and Get New Billions Anyway!'.

173. See, e.g. *Spiegel* 24/2012; and Kalantzis, K. (2012). "Crete as Warriorhood: Visual Explorations of Social Imaginaries in 'Crisis'" *Anthropology Today* 28(3): 7–11.
174. *Avgi* 06/01/10, pp. 8–9 (Ganis Solomon).
175. *Avgi* 19/05/2012.
176. *Handelsblatt* 03/11/2011 'Ochi! Why the Greeks Like Saying "No" so much'; *SZ* 01/03/2010 'Blitz Clichés'; *Tagesspiegel* 25/12/2012 'Parade without Tanks'.
177. *taz* 05/07/2015 'The History of "No" in Greece: Ochi is More than Just a Word', see, e.g. *Die Welt* 29/06/2016 'The Greek Cult of Saying No'; *FAZ* 11/07/2015 'Greek Debt Crisis: Ochi, As If!'; *Spiegel* 28/2015 (04/07/2015) 'Greece—Operation "Ochi"'; *SZ* 28/10/2015 'Greece celebrates Ochi-Day. A Country Says No'.
178. *Spiegel* 09/2012 'Prejudices: Nazi Always Works'.
179. *Spiegel* 50/2012 'Are we Germans ugly again?'.
180. *Bild* 18/08/2011 'Euro Rescue—British Author Insults Merkel with Hitler Comparison'.
181. *Kathimerini* 14/02/2010, cover page.
182. *Kathimerini* 14/02/10, cover page.
183. *Kathimerini* 21/02/10, cover page.
184. *Kathimerini* 21/02/10, p. 8, 'Goodbye Karl Marx and Lenin'.
185. *Proto Thema* 23/10/11, cover page.
186. *Kathimerini* 21/02/10, p. 18, 'The German Problem'.
187. *FAZ* 29/05/15, 'Lacking Visions and Real Values', interview with Nikos Kotzias (Hansgeorg Hermann).
188. *Kathimerini* 14/03/10.
189. *Kathimerini* online 07/04/17, 'Lessons for the EU from documenta 14' (George Katrougalos, Michael Roth).
190. *Kathimerini* 24/02/10, p. 2 (Stefanos Kassimatis); see further, e.g. *Avgi* 27/02/10, 'Rage against the Bundesbank'.
191. *Kathimerini* 24/02/10, cover page, comment (Alexis Papahelas).
192. *Kathimerini* 21/03/10, p.2 (Stefanos Kassimatis).
193. *Kathimerini* 28/02/10, p. 20 (Antonis Karkayannis).
194. *Ta Nea* 26/02/10, reprinted in *Avgi* 27/02/10, p. 30. The statement makes a reference to the Greek Civil War.
195. *Avgi* 18/04/10, 'Post-1974 distortions' (George Bramos).
196. *Avgi* 19/05/2012; on the same incident, see also Ntampoudi, I. (2014). 'The Eurozone crisis and the politics of blaming: the cases of Germany and Greece'. *Political Perspectives* 8(2): 1–20. p. 10.
197. Vassilopoulou et al. describe a tendency of Syriza and the Greek Communist Party to accuse the mainstream parties of collaborating with external enemies (2014: 397).

198. 'The River' (Potami) is a centre-left political party in Greece, which strongly supported the 'yes' campaign in the summer 2015 referendum.
199. *Avgi* 03/05/15, cover page.
200. *Avriani* 07/05/2012, cover page.
201. *Spiegel* 26/2012.
202. *Faz.net* 24/05/2013.
203. *Bild* 27/04/2010 'Who is to Still Believe the Greeks?'.
204. *FAZ* 25/05/2012.
205. *FAZ* 18/05/2012 'Greece's Destiny Election'.
206. *FAZ* 25/05/2012.
207. *Kathimerini* 09/06/12, cover page.
208. *Kathimerini* 29/01/15, cover page.
209. *Kathimerini* 30/01/15, cover page.
210. See *Kathimerini* 27/01/15 'Clear messages in a mild tone by the Eurozone' and compare it with other titles evoking a language of black-mails, ultimatums and colonization.
211. *Kathimerini* 12/02/15, cover page, 'Dangerous illusions' (Kostas Iordanidis): 'It is a dangerous illusion that Syriza can torpedo the Valhalla of the European establishment'.
212. *Kathimerini* 05/02/2015, cover page, main article, 'Facts and illusions'.
213. Katzenstein, P. J. (1997). *Tamed Power: Germany in Europe*. Ithaca, N.Y., Cornell University Press.
214. Bulmer, S. J. and W. E. Paterson (2010). 'Germany and the European Union: from "Tamed Power" to Normalized Power?' *International Affairs* 86(5): 1051–1073.
215. Paterson, W. E. (2011). 'The Reluctant Hegemon? Germany Moves Centre Stage in the European Union'. *Journal of Common Market Studies* 49(s1); Bulmer, S. and W. E. Paterson (2013). 'Germany as the EU's reluctant hegemon? Of economic strength and political constraints'. *Journal of European Public Policy* 20(10): 1387–1405.
216. Beck, U. (2013). *German Europe*. Cambridge, Polity Press.
217. *Zeit online* 09/01/2012 'The "Good Hegemon"' (Josef Joffe); see also 11/08/2012 'Because We Aren't Honest' (MEP Franziska Brantner), but see Bulmer/Paterson 2013 on Germany's pre-eminence being largely confined to the economic sphere.
218. *Zeit* 27/10/2011 'Euro-Crisis: All Power to the Germans? Reluctant Hegemon'.
219. For example, *Spiegel* 20/2012 Sikorski interview.
220. *Zeit* 11/08/2012 'Because We Aren't Honest'.
221. *Zeit* 27/10/2011 'Reluctant Hegemon'.
222. *Zeit* 11/08/2012 'Because We Aren't Honest'.
223. See Paterson 2011, Bulmer/Paterson 2013.

224. *Zeit online* 09/01/2012 'The "Good Hegemon"'; see *Zeit* 27/10/2011 'Reluctant Hegemon'.
225. *Bild* 18/08/2011 'Euro Rescue—British Author Insults Merkel With Hitler Comparisons'.
226. *Zeit online* 27/10/2011 'Reluctant Hegemon'; for an academic account of domestic political contestations of, and constraints on, Germany's role of hegemon, see Bulmer/Paterson 2013.
227. *Zeit* 27/12/2012.
228. *Spiegel* 50/2012 'Government: No Wonder'.
229. *Zeit* 27/10/2011 'Reluctant Hegemon'.
230. *Zeit online* 09/01/2012 'The "Good Hegemon"'.
231. *Zeit* 27/10/2011 'Reluctant Hegemon'.
232. *Zeit online* 09/01/2012 'The "Good Hegemon"'.
233. See, e.g. *Spiegel* 20/2012 'Sikorski interview'.
234. *Zeit* 10/11/2011, see also 27/12/2012.
235. Bulmer/Paterson 2013:1389; see also Keohane, R. O. (1984). *After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy*. Princeton, N.J., Princeton University Press: 32, 39–41; and Lentner, H. H. (2005). 'Hegemony and Autonomy'. *Political Studies* 53(4): 736. But see Matthijs, M. and M. Blyth (2011). 'Why Only Germany Can Fix the Euro: Reading Kindleberger in Berlin'. *Foreign Affairs* (17 November), on Germany not actually having provided public goods. For explicit discussions, see *Zeit* 09/01/2012 'The "Good Hegemon"' and 27/10/2011 'Reluctant Hegemon'.
236. *Zeit* 27/10/2011 'Reluctant Hegemon', see *Zeit* 09/01/2012 'The "Good Hegemon"'.
237. Bulmer/Paterson 2013: 1389–1390; Clark, I. (2011). *Hegemony in International Society*. Oxford; New York, Oxford University Press: 32.
238. *Zeit* 27/10/2011 'Reluctant Hegemon'.
239. *Zeit online* 09/01/2012 'The "Good Hegemon"'.
240. *Zeit* 11/08/2012 'Because We Aren't Honest'.
241. *Zeit online* 09/01/2012 'The "Good Hegemon"'.
242. *Bild* 21/07/2011 'Federal Eagle Defiled With Swastika', see also, e.g. 10/10/2012 'Chancellor in Greece—Germany Does Not Deserve This!' or 22/06/2011 'With Swastika! Greeks Scorn Europe ... and Get New Billions Anyway!'.
243. *Zeit* 27/10/2011 'Reluctant Hegemon'.
244. *Zeit* 27/10/2011 'Reluctant Hegemon'.
245. *Zeit* 03/11/2011 'Oops, the people! Papandreou's plebiscite' (Jan Ross).
246. *Spiegel* 48/2012.
247. *Spiegel* 21/2012 'Euro: Ultimatum to Greece'.

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