

J.G.A. Pocock and the Politics of British History

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In *The Discovery of Islands* (2005), J.G.A. Pocock collected together the series of influential essays in which he made the case for a new kind of British history, one envisaged as archipelagic and later oceanic in character, and extending ultimately as far as his own native New Zealand. Most of the essays were written during the 1990s, but the original manifesto, ‘British History: A Plea for a New Subject’, was first published in 1975, and an important sequel appeared in the *American Historical Review* in 1982.¹ That so many years passed between the formulation of the new British history and its highpoint in the 1990s is one of the interesting things about it. *The Discovery of Islands* also included several new pieces, including a memoir entitled ‘The Antipodean Perception’, in which the author, by now a remarkably energetic octogenarian, contextualised the contents of the volume autobiographically. Hence Pocock’s unusual announcement in the book’s preface: ‘I am presenting myself as a piece of historical evidence’.²

This chapter will inspect this singular piece of evidence. My approach to the questions considered in this volume has always centred on

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J.G.A. Pocock because I am primarily a historian of eighteenth-century Ireland.³ Early modernists speak of ‘three kingdoms’ history rather than ‘four nations’. Pocock is the most influential and intriguing exponent of this approach—although Linda Colley, John Morrill and Conrad Russell have all contributed powerfully to transforming our understanding of Britishness and the British problem. It is largely thanks to these scholars that, in so many universities, courses on English history have given way to courses on *British* history, or the history of the British Isles. The ‘three kingdoms’ perspective of the early modernists, beginning with the union of crowns of 1603 and culminating in the parliamentary union in the period 1801–1921 is, incidentally, one reason for our persistent neglect of Wales. In contrast, medievalists such as Rees Davies, Robin Frame and John Gillingham have compared Wales and Ireland as zones of English cultural aggression and imperial ideology.⁴

In this chapter I explore the broader cultural politics animating Pocock’s *Discovery of Islands*. The underlying theme is the role of biography in shaping decisions about the spatial or territorial frame we adopt when we write about the past. It might be equally pertinent to the transatlantic careers of Linda Colley or David Armitage, or, for that matter, Edward Said. The relevant biographical factors include our point of origin (social, cultural, political), and our intellectual environment and professional training, but also the usual accidents of an academic career, and the audiences we find ourselves addressing as teachers as well as writers. Pocock’s personal ruminations, examined below, raise questions about what it means to make history, to write history, and to have history taken away from us. This existential dimension of the new British history has been a persistent element since Pocock first made his ‘Plea for a New Subject’. What was at stake, as he recalled in 1999, was ‘the need to affirm my own historical being’.⁵ The following chapter attempts to identify more exactly the peculiarities of this enterprise, and to explain why it suddenly flared into life at the end of the twentieth century, stimulating interest in various forms of three kingdoms and four nations history.

The impact made by J.G.A. Pocock on his field has been astonishing. His manifesto for the new British history was written as he was finishing the *Machiavellian Moment* (1975), one of the most influential history books of the post-war era. Pocock has significantly changed the way we think about Thomas Hobbes, James Harrington, Edward Gibbon and Edmund Burke, and about both the Scottish Enlightenment and

the American Revolution: a satisfactory historiographical study of any of these topics would have to accord him a prominent place. He invented the idea of an *English* enlightenment. He has written with characteristic breadth and insight about New Zealand, and in particular about the early encounters between the *pakeha* (the descendants of European, mostly British, settlers) and the Maori (the indigenous Polynesian inhabitants). He is famous as one of the two founders of the 'Cambridge School' of the history of political thought, having advocated the method of linguistic contextualism in a series of essays published between the 1960s and 1980s. His most important legacy as an intellectual historian has been to shift the attention of scholars away from the arguments of the canonical texts towards the broad vocabularies or 'paradigms' in which they were framed.⁶

Anyone who looks back over the six and a half decades between Pocock's first article and his valedictory lecture will be struck by the consistency of his central concerns and the connections between them. Most of them were already present in the Cambridge Ph.D. thesis he submitted in 1952 with what must now seem a rather modest title: 'The Controversy over the Origin of the Commons, 1675–88'. Regrettably, Pocock's prolific output has also been resented or simply ignored by many scholars, especially those who were hostile to intellectual history *tout court*, a depressingly large constituency in almost all history departments in the United Kingdom. Much of Pocock's work is quirky and idiosyncratic, as well as resolutely original. He specialises in panoramic macro-histories and meta-histories, identifying large-scale patterns in the history of ideas, often crossing centuries and continents, generating multiple dichotomies and typologies. His writing is playful and paradoxical, with gnomic tendencies. One unkind critic complained that '[t]he Pocockian prose style with its perplexing allusions, its involutions, convolutions and intricacies is the ultimate disincentive to skimming'.⁷ Embarking on one of Pocock's grand synoptic articles is a bit like watching an acrobat spinning several plates whilst crossing a tightrope.

The argument set out in Pocock's 'Plea for a New Subject' has been summarised many times. The article was intended as a protest against the conventional Anglocentric arrangement of British history, in which Scotland, Ireland and Wales were largely ignored. The target was the introversion and self-satisfaction of the English, nicely exemplified in the response made at the time by A.J.P. Taylor, who declared that the difference between England and Britain was 'a triviality interesting only to

nationalist cranks'.⁸ In contrast, Pocock sketched a scheme for British history that was centred on the interactions of a group of political cultures in these islands which moulded the United Kingdom as it took shape in 1603, 1707 and 1801. Inevitably the organising theme in this narrative was the increasing political and cultural domination of England. But English supremacy always co-existed with pluralism. The other partners in the United Kingdom, however disadvantaged, were never passive. The hybrid or hyphenated communities that resulted from English expansion held a particular fascination for Pocock. In early modern Ireland a number of 'intermediate and counter-reactive' societies were created along the frontiers of English expansion—what became known as the Old English and the New English. They also included the Scots-Irish (or Ulster Protestants), whom he neatly described as 'a settler nation which is at the same time an anti-nation'.⁹

The new subject advocated by Pocock in 1974 turned on the interlocking histories of the three kingdoms, and the relations between the various nations and sub-nations they contained. Beginning with his own period, Pocock noted that none of the great upheavals of the early modern era—the English Civil War, the revolution of 1688 and the American Revolution—had been confined to one or two of the kingdoms and colonies of the British Crown but were disruptions in the overall system that encompassed them. He anticipated the core components of Conrad Russell's billiard ball theory of the English Civil War—now generally conceptualised as a 'war of the three kingdoms'. His view of the American Revolution as a civil war in a shared British Atlantic world has also become commonplace.¹⁰ Pocock then moved back to the first patterns of human settlement in the 'Atlantic archipelago', noting the variety of geographical, political and economic divisions that preceded the three kingdoms. Turning to the medieval period, and the emergence of the centralised kingdoms of the English and the Scots, he focused on the creation of a variety of marcher lordships or debateable lands between these two polities and along the 'Anglo-Celtic' frontier that bisected both islands. His aim was to demonstrate that the expansion of England had never been a unilateral process but had involved processes of negotiation in which the various parties had 'interacted so as to modify the conditions of one another's existence'.¹¹

One aspect of the 'Plea for a New Subject' has generally been overlooked, although it was pivotal to Pocock's purpose. The article sketches out a typically elegant and ambitious typology of the dominant modes

of historical awareness within the three kingdoms. Historical subjectivity had been a preoccupation since his Ph.D. thesis, and he remained fascinated by the schemes employed by different cultures for ordering temporal experience, by the functions of what we now call social memory, and by the fact that written archives and therefore our histories are shaped by particular institutionalised settings. In 1962, for example, he published 'The Origins of the Study of the Past: A Comparative Approach', surveying the constitutional myths of England, Scotland, Ireland, Naples and France, with comments on classical Athens, pre-Qin China and Evans-Pritchards' study of the Nuer.¹² His attempt to show that the study of historiography should be approached 'as part of the history of social man's awareness of his past and his relations with it' provides a valuable context for his attempt to rethink Britishness a decade later.¹³ The 'Plea for a New Subject' was, as its concluding words remind us, 'an exercise in mapping the historical consciousness', something few readers appear to have noticed.

Pocock's fundamental point was that, throughout the British world, the historical values and paradigms established by the English were dominant, so that a historian in New Zealand would find it impossible to escape them. The English enjoyed a sense of identity so secure as to be almost subconscious. Rather like Americans today, they tended to conflate the condition of being English with that of being normal, so that the problem was to explain why so many neighbouring nations had diverged from their allegedly orderly processes of constitutional development. As Herbert Butterfield (Pocock's supervisor at Cambridge) put it in his wartime *The Englishman and his History* (1944):

We do not have to set about the deliberate manufacture of a national consciousness, or to strain ourselves, like the Irish, in order to create a 'nationalism' out of the broken fragments of tradition, out of the ruins of a tragic past.¹⁴

For the (Catholic) Irish, on the other hand, union with England had been experienced as a form of conquest. The Irish master-narrative was therefore a 'romantic' and revolutionary one—'how a collection of pre-modern cultures were violently transformed ... by an alien power acting on them from without, and how the emerging collectivity discovered the conceptual, political and social means to take charge of the process'.¹⁵ Pocock observed regretfully that the resulting mental conflict

was resolved only 'by the death of the divided self' and its rebirth through the revolutionary struggle that began in 1916. The language here surely echoes Franz Fanon's *Black Skin, White Masks* (1952), which had recently been translated. In 1998, Pocock similarly cited the Irish case as an example of a master-slave relationship: 'Patrick Pearse insists on taking by violence what might have been his by negotiation, because otherwise he cannot believe that it is truly his'.¹⁶ Happily, as Pocock had learned from reading Conor Cruise O'Brien, a revisionist movement was now underway. Irish historiography had reached 'a point of maturity where it has been emancipated from, by recognizing, its own compulsions'.¹⁷

It was to Scotland, instead, that Pocock looked for creative inspiration. The Anglo-Scottish Union of 1707 had not been imposed but negotiated, albeit it on drastically unequal terms, leaving room for a mode of historical consciousness that Pocock called 'tangential'. The point here was that since the sixteenth-century Reformation there were political writers north of the border who believed that their future lay in closer integration with England rather than independence. The Scots were free to move between different avenues of self-determination and, in doing so, to appropriate and reinterpret English institutions and norms for themselves. Enlightened Scotland consequently provided the template for the 'pluralist and multicultural' approach to British history that Pocock now urged his fellow New Zealanders to adopt.¹⁸

To understand better what Pocock meant by tangential history, we might turn to his 1979 article 'Hume and the American Revolution: The Dying Thoughts of a North Briton'. The central theme of the piece was David Hume's anxiety that the rebellious colonists and their radical supporters in London were destabilising the British constitution. But the article also presented an incisive analysis of what the enlightened Scots actually meant when they described themselves as 'North Britons'. (This was the century when Scots produced many icons, symbols, and other expressions of Britishness, including the words to 'Rule Britannia', the figure of John Bull, and the *Encyclopedia Britannica*.) Throughout his life Hume conversed in broad Scots, despite his well-known efforts to purge Scotticisms both from his own and from his friends' writings. His cultural context therefore involved a form of bilingualism. When Anglo-Scottish relations were reconfigured after 1707, so that Edinburgh became a provincial satellite of metropolitan London, Pocock explained

that the Scottish literati ‘had no alternative to outplaying the English at their own games’. This involved polishing their linguistic and literary style, hence Hume’s decision to bring Thomas Sheridan, the Irish elocutionist, to Edinburgh. But it also necessitated the reconstruction of both the English and the European past along ‘philosophical’ lines. Hume’s well-known boast that ‘This is the historical age and this [Scotland] the historical nation’ should be read alongside his conviction that ‘the English have not much excelled in that kind of literature’.¹⁹ In the second half of the eighteenth century it could be argued that anyone who sought a sophisticated analysis of English political culture would have to turn to Scotland. A North Briton, Pocock concluded, was ‘a Scotsman committed to a restatement of English culture in such terms that it would become British and that Scotsmen would make their own way in it’.²⁰

By the time he wrote this, Pocock had been consigned to ‘outer darkness’ by Britain’s turn towards Europe, and he consequently adopted his own analogous ‘strategy of rewriting British history’ in a form that would make sense of his own experience.²¹ Before scrutinising this strategy, however, we might note that Pocock’s tangential angle on Englishness was fundamentally different from Hume’s position. Hume’s response to the provincialism of his surroundings was to become as cosmopolitan as possible: when he contemplated leaving Edinburgh, it was Paris rather than London that attracted him.²² His novelty lay not in the spatial framing or ethnic definition of the subject but in the psychological and sociological insights of what he called the ‘science of man’. In historiography, as in moral philosophy, Hume was an ‘anatomist’ rather than a ‘painter’, whose ambition was to discover the ‘secret springs and principles’ of human behaviour.²³ There was nothing so iconoclastic about Pocock’s work, although the method of linguistic contextualism certainly challenged both liberal and Marxist narratives of seventeenth-century England. Just as Pocock admitted ‘a certain sympathy’ for the republican tradition examined in *The Machiavellian Moment*, he also treated the myth of the ancient constitution—which Butterfield had identified as central to the English political character—with respect.²⁴ Anyone interested in seventeenth-century political thought, the revolution of 1688 or the Enlightenment will discover that nobody has written more insightfully and sensitively about the Englishness of English politics than Pocock.

The ‘Plea for a New Subject’ was occasioned by the United Kingdom’s entry into the European Economic Community (EEC) in January 1973 and the consequent demise of the system of imperial trade preference that discriminated in favour of British producers—even if the British in question lived on the other side of the planet. The manifesto was originally delivered as a lecture at the University of Canterbury, Christchurch, just four months later, and the political context was made explicit:

The British cultural star cluster is at present in a highly dispersed condition, various parts of it feeling the attraction of adjacent galaxies; the central giant has cooled, shrunk, and moved away, and the inhabitants of its crust seem more than ever disposed to deny that the rest of us ever existed.²⁵

Feelings of disorientation, abandonment, and even disbelief were felt keenly throughout the white dominions. In Canada, Australia and New Zealand, the monuments and symbols of nationhood and the commemorative rituals that bound citizens together were all derivative. To the extent that they thought of themselves as a people with distinctive cultural attributes and a shared history, the inhabitants of New Zealand were Britons. Indeed, they were ‘better Britons’—the embodiment of essentially Anglo-Saxon virtues which had been heightened by the challenges of life on the frontier. A good example of this creed appears in *The English as a Colonizing Nation* (1903), a textbook by James Hight, lecturer in political economy and constitutional history at Christchurch, the same university where Pocock studied and later taught:

The successful colonist must be of sturdy character, persevering, unflinching in the face of difficulty, steady of nerve at those moments when he is exposed to terrible dangers, willing to endure hardship, and not too proud to labour with his own hands; he must love the land, as the old Teuton forefathers of the English love it; he must be active, enterprising, eager to take advantage of new opportunities for bettering his position in the world, moved by the trading as well as the farming spirit; he must delight in the sea, which is to bear him to his new home, and upon whose bosom he will entrust the fruits of his labour at home. All of these qualities are present in the national English character.²⁶

Australian attitudes were similar. C.E.W. Bean, the primary creator of the ANZAC legend, believed that ‘Australia is as purely British as the people of Great Britain—perhaps more so’. Only in Australia and

New Zealand, he reasoned, had the separate peoples of England, Scotland, Ireland and Wales been blended together by intermarriage.²⁷ But the complacent assumption that the inhabitants of the white dominions were—as the *Sydney Morning Herald* put it—‘simply the British overseas’ was shattered by the prolonged negotiations that took place between 1961 and 1963 following Harold Macmillan’s decision to apply for British membership of the EEC.²⁸ As the Canadian philosopher George Grant expressed it in his *Lament for a Nation* (1965), they were ‘like fish left on the shores of a drying lake’.²⁹

Even more than the Australians or the Canadians, the New Zealanders (the *pakeha*, at any rate) had invested heavily in Britishness. James Belich’s *Paradise Reforged* (2001), the second volume of his authoritative history of New Zealand, adopts the concept of ‘re-colonization’ to express the *intensification* of links between London and its antipodean outposts between the 1880s and 1960s. Emotional ties between New Zealand and Britain were strengthened by the islands’ unique reliance on the export trade with Britain. Hundreds of thousands of tons of refrigerated mutton and dairy products were sent to Britain annually by steamship. In return, ships from Britain carried books, newspapers and mail to the dominions. More than ever before, the dominions were cultural provinces of London, ‘co-owners—not mere subjects—of the world’s largest empire’.³⁰ This transoceanic economy was shattered by Britain’s entry into the EEC in 1973, which demanded the UK’s membership of the Common Agricultural Policy.

This crisis was rooted in structural changes rather than English mind-sets. It was anticipated by the fall of Singapore in February 1942 (when Pocock, it should be remembered, was already eighteen years old). The enthusiastic commitment of Australian and New Zealand troops to the imperial war effort had been based on the assumption that British sea-power would continue to protect their homelands. Now they glimpsed a new world order in which the British connection might have to be supplemented or subsumed.³¹ This was a key moment in the disintegration of the ‘British world system’, analysed by John Darwin, which underpinned the chaotic jigsaw of colonies and dependencies in Asia, Africa and the Pacific. The conditions which enabled the imperial system included wider geopolitical and economic forces—not simply the industrial and naval pre-eminence but also the huge military resources of India, the international financing and trading networks centred on London, and the loyalty of the white dominions. There were also vital

negative conditions—the factors that inhibited potential competitors in East Asia, the US and the European mainland. The collapse of this world system, like its rise, was ‘largely determined by geopolitical forces over which the British themselves had little control’.³² The wider manifestations of post-war contraction included the devaluation of the pound by the Wilson government in November 1967, which disrupted the sterling currency area, and, above all, the decision taken earlier that year to terminate the United Kingdom’s military presence ‘East of Suez’. The US was already replacing Britain as the military focal point in South-East Asia, just as American popular culture was beginning to reshape the way New Zealanders looked at the world.

The aim of Pocock’s new subject was not to perpetuate imperial sentiment and allegiance in the face of metropolitan indifference, and in the absence of the material interests and institutions that had created and sustained it.³³ It was not the reconstruction of some form of political association that Pocock proposed, although it sometimes sounded like that, but rather ‘ways of re-imagining [British history] and making it our own, so that we were equals in its practice’.³⁴ It must be stressed that this was a highly individual reaction. A variety of alternative responses were open to abandoned Britons in the South Pacific. At the University of Auckland, the Department of History was dominated by Keith Sinclair, whose writing focused on the cultivation a more distinctive sense of New Zealandness. In 1963, the year that began with Charles de Gaulle exercising his veto over British entry to the EEC, Sinclair urged that ‘for us to want to be British is a poor objective, like wanting to be an understudy or a caretaker—or an undertaker’.³⁵ The attempt to construct some kind of New Zealand exceptionalism was at least as likely as Pocock’s reassertion of his British birthright. In launching his assault on English introspection, Pocock was simultaneously fighting another, neglected battle *within* New Zealand, which he depicted as a struggle between Canterbury and Auckland. Two other Canterbury graduates included Namierite historians of eighteenth-century England, N.C. Phillips and J.B. Owen, both of whom studied at Oxford. Phillips returned to become Hight’s successor as Head of Department. He was still there when Pocock first taught history in the late 1940s, and again when he held the chair of political science in the 1960s.

As a critical admirer of J.R. Seeley’s *The Expansion of England* (1883), Pocock might have chosen instead to embark upon the historical reconstruction of ‘Greater Britain’. The belief that the United Kingdom and

its overseas settlements in Canada, South Africa, Australia and New Zealand formed a single global political community was particularly strong between the 1870s and 1890s. During those decades the perceived threat from the rising superpowers of Germany, Russia and the United States stimulated intense interest in schemes for imperial federation. The ideal was popularised in Charles Dilke's bestseller *Greater Britain* (1868). It appealed to the historians Seeley and J.A. Froude, but also to politicians as diverse as Lord Rosebery, Joseph Chamberlain, James Bryce and Cecil Rhodes, and to the New Liberal intellectuals L.T. Hobhouse and J.A. Hobson. What connected the settler colonies was the English language, representative political institutions, and the Anglo-Saxon 'race' (a term then carelessly conflated with nationality). Bryce believed that Irish Home Rule was a necessary concession in order 'to maintain our English citizenship and nationality over the whole world' by some kind of federation, which he hoped would involve 'some sort of permanent relationship' with the Americans.³⁶ But the association with Home Rule on the whole damaged the cause of imperial federation. As Duncan Bell observes, the imagined community of Greater Britain had no place for many of the British Empire's subjects. The scramble for Africa was largely ignored, and most advocates took the view that neither India nor Ireland constituted a 'nation'.³⁷

When historians of New Zealand eventually found a distinctive voice, it owed little to Seeley or even to Sinclair. If a single, compelling paradigm has replaced the development of British constitutional practices and social democracy in New Zealand's historiography, it is surely that of settler colonialism, discussed at the end of this chapter. This outcome could hardly have been foreseen when Pocock left for Cambridge. As Pocock observed half a century later, New Zealand's history was not yet 'central to our self-formation', its social and cultural forms were considered dull, and it seemed clear that 'history that excited the intellect and imagination had happened elsewhere'.³⁸ Even in the 1960s, 'race relations' remained a relatively recent and minor topic—although Pocock himself had sketched out a characteristically ambitious model of Western expansion and indigenous reaction as a framework for the New Zealand experience.³⁹ The voguish work on colonisation at that time was *The Founding of New Societies* (1964) by the American political scientist Louis Hartz. It was the target of an angry paragraph in Pocock's 'Plea for a New Subject' where it was presented as the antithesis of his vision of a British past characterised by reciprocity and interaction.⁴⁰ New

Zealand was a ‘fragment society’ according to Hartz—a settler community that had remained frozen in its cultural development since the time of its settlement. (This theory would later be applied to Ulster Unionists too.) It was concerned with the reproduction of European societies, however, and it had nothing to say about indigenous peoples.⁴¹

I have briefly rehearsed these alternatives and counterfactuals to demonstrate that there was no necessary connection between the realignment of the Commonwealth and the enlarged conception of British history in which ‘three kingdoms’ or ‘four nations’ was the defining feature. Indeed, Pocock seems to have been unique among antipodeans in promoting this extraordinary act of imaginative repossession. The ethnic composition of *pakeha* New Zealand, in which Scots and Ulster-Scots were more significant than Irish Catholics, is no doubt a background factor.⁴² More important, however, is the simple fact that Pocock’s own area of specialisation was seventeenth-century England, a field he transformed just as David Hume had done. Until the 1970s, the revolutions and civil wars of the Stuart era remained key battlefields for liberal and Marxist historians throughout the Anglophone world. Moreover, Pocock’s essays consistently reveal a synoptic, synthesising mind. As Jack Hexter once complained, for Pocock ‘the making of connections and the exploring of relations is a vocation verging on an addiction’.⁴³ We should bear in mind that there are usually several things going on simultaneously in Pocock’s major essays. Any satisfactory attempt to analyse Britishness would have to begin with the core foundation myth of England’s ancient constitution, and to demonstrate that a dialectic between metropolitan and provincial Britons, involving collaboration and competition, had existed almost from the start.

Generational factors also matter. When Pocock embarked on his Cambridge Ph.D. in 1948, he travelled to England as a ‘British Subject’. It was only in that year that legislation was passed creating a separate category of New Zealand citizenship.⁴⁴ Two short articles written for the *Cambridge Review*, following a period as research fellow at St John’s College, show that New Zealand’s relationship with Britain was already experienced by Pocock as a predicament. ‘On Living in a Mediocracy’ (1960) was a report on the New Zealand university system. Pocock explained that his native country had a small population—then just 2.5 million people—and an economy based on the export of

sheep and dairy cattle. Although they enjoyed a high standard of living, and a greater sense of egalitarianism than in England, the cultural life of New Zealanders was restricted and derivative. The administrative class was small and unsophisticated, hence his title. Life in Canterbury came as something of a shock after his doctoral and post-doctoral studies in England:

‘What we are doing in Cambridge’, said somebody to me once, ‘is training a ruling class’; and though the English have carefully arranged matters so that any statement you can make about them sounds unbearably naïve, one did have the sensation that one was helping to run an promotion machine of an enormously complex and peculiar type, and that the values and qualities one took seriously as an academic were, in no matter how extraordinary a way, related to the promotion machine and part of the qualifications for promotion.⁴⁵

England was a kind of meritocracy; New Zealand a rather dull mediocracy. (Pocock was presumably nodding towards *The Rise of the Meritocracy*, the satirical essay by the British politician and sociologist Michael Young published in 1958.) Even more intriguing is the earlier essay, ‘Antipodean Comment’. This was a meditation on the relations between Oxbridge and the new redbrick universities of Manchester, Reading, Southampton and elsewhere—a common theme in English literary and journalistic writing. Once again, the life of the New Zealand academic was presented as a dilemma, an extreme case of the provincial problem of participating in a ‘U-culture’ which had developed in a different physical and social environment from that in which Pocock found himself, ‘so that while [the antipodean] can never emancipate himself from a high degree of dependence on this culture, he can never altogether be a sharer in it’.⁴⁶

These essays take us back to the vanished New Zealand of the 1940s and 1950s, when poets, writers and painters still gravitated towards London, when the intellectuals who remained in New Zealand were divided between internal expatriates and rival hard-drinking ‘blokerati’ such as the historian (and poet) Keith Sinclair.⁴⁷ They demonstrate how instinctively Pocock psychologised his situation as a scholar, a situation already experienced as tangential. They also remind us that, for Pocock, the writing of history always entails a broader attempt to make sense of

one's place in the world, and that the exercise of self-determination is as much an existential effort as it is a political good.

In the 1970s Pocock had been 'a voice crying in the wilderness'—as he later acknowledged.⁴⁸ Judged on its own terms, as an exhortation to New Zealanders to reclaim their British past, the 'Plea for a New Subject' was largely a failure. Why was it, then, that twenty years after Pocock's original prospectus, the new British history suddenly blossomed—in Britain itself? During the 1990s, collections of essays on the three kingdoms poured from the university presses.⁴⁹ Textbooks appeared, making explicit their debts to Pocock. They included works by Scottish historians, such as Alex Murdoch's *British History 1660–1832: National Identity and Local Culture* (1998) and by Irish scholars, for example Jim Smyth's *The Making of the United Kingdom 1660–1800* (2001).⁵⁰ But neither this explosion of interest in Pocock's vision nor its subsequent dissipation owed much to his own antipodean priorities.

One explanation for this sudden efflorescence was the fact that during the 1990s the British problem began once again to disturb the English. Nationalism was apparently resurgent elsewhere too—in the former USSR, in Eastern Europe, in Yugoslavia, Spain and Canada. But historiographical trends have their own internal dynamics, which are at least as important as the external drivers. Some of these were anatomised in David Cannadine's seminal article, 'British History: Past, Present—And Future?', which appeared in *Past & Present* in 1987. The question mark in Cannadine's title signalled his fear that British history was in rapid decline, a victim of its own self-absorption as much as of the contraction of British influence in international affairs. The nub of the problem was revisionism—the startling proliferation of Ph.Ds, monographs and articles, all 'mainly concerned to show that less happened, less dramatically than was once thought'.⁵¹ This situation provided a sharp contrast with the halcyon days of 1945–1970, when it was still assumed that British experience was unique, full of drama, and at the same time capable of offering privileged access to world-historical developments. The representative books of the post-war era were Geoffrey Elton's *The Tudor Revolution in Government* (1953), Lawrence Stone's *The Cause of the English Revolution* (1972) and Phyllis Deane's *The First Industrial Revolution* (1965). Cannadine complained that researchers were no longer illuminating the central themes of British history, although he refrained from specifying what exactly these were. Seven years later,

however, he had found the answer, albeit an incomplete one. In an upbeat keynote to the annual Anglo-American Conference, with Pocock as a guest of honour, Cannadine related how the making and breaking of the United Kingdom had supplied a new agenda for British historians.⁵²

Not everyone was convinced. Forceful criticisms of Pocock were made by historians of early modern Ireland, and in particular by Nicholas Canny. One common objection was that the islands of Britain and Ireland never formed an integrated unit, a point also raised by English critics.⁵³ Tony Claydon, for example, protested that the British Isles do not constitute 'a natural or logical division of mankind'.⁵⁴ Canny denounced Conrad Russell and John Morrill for conferring upon 'these islands' an integrity they never really possessed. He preferred to pursue comparative history, by building up a detailed knowledge of 'one society' and relating it to others.⁵⁵ But these strictures could equally be applied to the historiography of Ireland itself. Are there *any* logical divisions of mankind? Did the inhabitants of Ireland *ever* comprise 'one society'? The new British history was also lambasted for not being inclusive or multicultural enough. It tended to obscure the presence of other ethnic groups—Germans in the American colonies, the French in Canada, the Boers in the Cape and, of course, Native Americans and Africans. The most decisive rejections of Pocock's proposals, however, stem from an opposition among social historians to *all* political boundaries—to the very notion of the state as an organising principle for the study of human experience in the past.⁵⁶

It was inevitable that some Irish historians should see the new British history as another manifestation of the colonial mind, or as a denial of Ireland's ownership of its national or proto-national past. But what about the other nation in the North of Ireland that is simultaneously an 'anti-nation'? The Ulster Protestant is surely a perfect specimen of *Homo Britannicus*. What other community has experienced so repeatedly the psychological consequences of British contraction and the consequent feelings of abandonment? It is interesting, then, that so many of the foundational figures of Irish historiography have come from northern Protestant backgrounds, including T.W. Moody, J.C. Beckett and R.B. McDowell; among the succeeding generation there are many prominent northerners such as George Boyce, Paul Bew and Henry Patterson. But none of these scholars has confined his research to the North or has aspired to write history from a specifically Unionist standpoint. If anything, they have drawn inspiration from nonconformist or socialist

counter-currents within Protestant culture, or, like Beckett, they have cultivated a patrician distaste for both Orange and Green. The literary prestige of the Anglo-Irish elite inhibited the development of a distinctive Ulster-British movement in historiography and helped to ensure that a sense of a common enterprise was maintained among Ireland's historians in spite of the partition of the island. Scholars educated in Protestant institutions would instead play a disproportionate role in professionalising and revising the *Irish* national narrative. One reason for this is surely the felt need to re-imagine the Irish past to allow room for those excluded from the dominant Gaelic-revivalist and Catholic ethos of the Irish state.

For the reasons outlined above, the flurry of books and essays in the 1990s on three kingdoms history did not reflect a new commitment to Britishness so much as the exhaustion of English political history, as traditionally conceived. This helps to explain the sudden loss of momentum in what promised to be a lively new sub-field. The New British History was just one of several movements during the 1980s and 1990s attempting to escape the confines of the nation-state by writing history around, over or across its borders. Perhaps the most obvious of these was the appearance of the 'British Atlantic World'. Among Irish historians this option was energetically promoted by Nicholas Canny. In a series of recent survey articles Canny continues to separate the Atlanticist sheep from the British goats in a peremptory fashion. Canny's harsh verdict is that three kingdoms history transpired to be 'no more than traditional English political history in mufti'.⁵⁷ Atlantic history is primarily concerned with the movement of people and things rather than political ideas or institutions—with wind currents and trade patterns. Canny stresses the limits of the nation-state as an actor; his Atlantic is rather a world created by mariners, traders and migrants. This approach certainly allows for greater inclusivity, accommodating the existence of black Atlantics and perhaps even green ones. Ironically, however, it sits uneasily with Canny's magnum opus, *Making Ireland British* (2001) which charts the brutal transformation of Irish society between the 1580s and the 1650s. The Atlantic is noticeably absent from *Making Ireland British*, which focuses instead on state formation and the impact of the Protestant reformation in the British Isles and their European context.⁵⁸ Perhaps political boundaries are not so easily transcended after all.

Simultaneously, the post-colonial turn prevalent in literary and culture studies began to attract the notice of historians. Whereas the Atlanticists dissolved political structures into the larger study of social and economic processes, the Foucauldian models of power and resistance adopted by post-colonial scholars redirected attention to subaltern groups who were excluded from formal politics altogether and whose histories, therefore, are concerned less with their own material and cultural resources than with the mechanisms of exclusion. Their impact on British scholarship intersected with the broader reaction against the privileged historiographical status of the West, perhaps the most fundamental historiographical shift of all—although Asian and African scholarship has generally been mediated through American universities, like almost everything else. The discovery that Britain does not mean the same thing as England still comes as a revelation to many undergraduates, but is unlikely to excite them as much as the realisation that the world is not the same thing as the West.

Finally, there have been ramifying varieties of global and transnational history flourishing everywhere, particularly visible since the beginning of this century. Some of these agendas were formulated in part against the excesses of post-colonialism, with its overwhelming concentration on questions of representation and otherness. An early example was Tony Hopkins' call for a transnational approach to the British Empire. Hopkins accepted that it was outmoded to view the experience of empire from the metropolitan centre, thus 'perpetuating a form of Eurocentrism and possibly covert racism that has no place in a post-colonial world'. He nevertheless favoured a return to the 'hard' political and economic questions that were the staples of imperial history.⁵⁹ One of the most remarkable, big-canvas books to take up this challenge is James Belich's *Replenishing the Earth: The Settler Revolution and the Rise of the Anglo-World* (2009). Belich combines technological and economic forces with cultural factors in order to explain the 'explosive' expansion of English-speakers during the nineteenth century, both in the American West and in the dominions of Greater Britain. Whereas Pocock proposed to rewrite British history from an antipodean angle, Belich produced a major work of global history structured around the four great cities of London, New York, Chicago and Melbourne, but driven by research questions formulated in Auckland and Wellington.

Replenishing the Earth reconstituted the territory of Greater Britain, including its ambivalent relationship with the United States. (One of

its provocative verdicts is that it was only in the 1890s that the United States began to decolonise, by outgrowing its 'junior partnership with British culture and economy'.⁶⁰) But Belich's most distinctive achievement was to isolate the phenomenon of 'settlerism' from the broader narratives of colonialism and imperialism, and to contrast processes of British settlement with the Spanish, Portuguese, Chinese and Russian cases. As with other historiographical trends, diverse scholars have arrived at the emerging sub-field of settler colonialism from quite independent starting points. In a recent survey of imperial historiography, Stephen Howe highlights the prevalence of the frontier massacre as a recurring focus of research. 'Before the 1940s,' he points out, 'most genocidal episodes in modern world history were in colonial settings, and a very high proportion of these were in areas of British settlement'.⁶¹ In an attempt to explain ethnic cleansing, the sociologist Michael Mann juxtaposes Australia and the United States with Spanish Mexico and German South West Africa as examples of 'genocidal democracies in the New World'.⁶² Australians have been particularly prominent in elaborating paradigms for settler colonialism, beginning with the anthropologist and ethnographer Patrick Wolfe. But early American historians also became fascinated by frontier massacres, the *locus classicus* being the revenge killings of Indians carried out by the Scots-Irish Paxton Boys in Pennsylvania in the 1760s.⁶³

The narratives of dispossession and atrocity central to the literature on settler colonialism take us a long way from the British world as Pocock envisaged it. In this chapter I have tried to place the new British history in a richer context than it is usually accorded and to delineate some of its more neglected features. Perhaps, in closing, the obvious point should be made that in the third quarter of the twentieth century Britishness really mattered. Even in 1973 it was possible to take for granted that British history was a scholarly field of global significance, widely studied throughout the English-speaking world. It was the core of the curriculum in New Zealand just as in Northern Ireland. At the University of Melbourne, right up to the 1960s, students who wanted to enrol for Australian history had to complete British history first. This arrangement was entirely logical, since it was assumed that Australian history was primarily about the relocation of English political institutions and notions of liberty; it was consequently a comparative subject already, with reference to New Zealand and other settler colonies.⁶⁴ When Pocock moved to the United States in 1966 it was not uncommon to find three or four

British specialists in the established universities. Much of the direction and continuity of Western history was supplied by narratives of modernisation and secularisation; the key themes of representative government, religious toleration, industrialisation and class struggle all prioritised Britain—or rather England. The Imperial School had always regarded the American Revolution as part of English political and social history as well as a rejection of it, a view shared by historians of ‘Colonial British America’, the term favoured by Jack P. Greene and J.R. Pole.⁶⁵

Since then British historians in the United States have been forced to reinvent themselves, and their colleagues on this side of the Atlantic have followed their example. While it is true to say that history in the United Kingdom has been globalised, it is also true that the British past has been Americanised.⁶⁶ It is no coincidence that many of the most influential exponents of global, Atlantic and imperial turns are English historians based in US universities—Linda Colley, David Cannadine, David Armitage and Tony Hopkins are among the most brilliant. The dramatic resurgence of empire as a topic was underway in the 1990s but it was the controversies over American hegemony after 9/11 that really energised scholarship.⁶⁷ In Canada, Australia and New Zealand, indigenous protest movements have transformed historical sensibilities, but once again American influences have been decisive in pushing multiculturalism and the analysis of cultural encounters to the centre of the academy.⁶⁸ In Pocock’s home territory, the history of political thought, John Locke’s *Two Treatises* are less likely to be encountered as an attack on absolute monarchy than as a justification of English colonialism and by extension American racism.⁶⁹

Is it possible to glimpse in these trends a victory of sorts for Pocock’s new subject? Although he always insisted that his reconfigured British history was designed to complement English history rather than replace it, a more subversive agenda—what might be described as ‘provincialising England’—was clearly implicit. Like many historiographical programmes, the new British history came in both soft and hard varieties. It could be read simply as an injunction to rethink the confines of our national and territorial boundaries, or as a more forceful argument that the British polity and the wider forms of allegiance it produced should be our ultimate unit of study. In the first sense, it could be said that many aspects of the new British history are now simply taken for granted. Both the Union of 1707 and the American Revolution are viewed as dramatic

reverberations in a wider British world: these are just two examples of the remarkably fruitful effects of Pocock's insights.⁷⁰

But the new British history was also designed to be *done to* somebody, and that somebody was the English. Pocock's manifesto was conceived to avenge an 'insult'. It was crystallised by England's willingness to dismiss New Zealanders as 'faithful servants no longer needed, who might now be pensioned off and forgotten'.⁷¹ Viewed on this level, the affronted loyalism of the dominions now seems a rather parochial issue among the immense readjustments that have taken place between 'the West' and 'the rest'. The English are a good deal less complacent than they were in the 1960s; the New Zealanders are less bothered about the remains of the Commonwealth or the broken covenant that once underpinned it. Anglocentricity has been discredited, among academics at any rate; but I have argued here that this victory belongs to the wider forces that have undermined the privileged historiographical status of Europe as a whole, and to the Americans who dominate the international academic market. One indication of recent trends is Tony Ballantyne's *Orientalism and Race* (2002), a book 'Conceived in New Zealand, based on British, Indian and Australasian archival material, drafted in Cambridge and Galway, and finally reworked in Illinois'. Ballantyne reconceptualises empire as 'a complex agglomeration of overlapping webs', drawing attention to horizontal connections between different colonials; the web is designed to replace the metaphor of the wheel, where ideas seem to radiate out from the metropolitan centre to each part of the periphery. Ballantyne's post-colonial politics have little in common with Pocock's liberal humanism. On Pocock's map of historical consciousness we might place him closer to Patrick Pearse than David Hume. But pondering his webs of empire, or indeed Belich's 'anglo-world', is it not tempting to suggest that there is a *new* new British history waiting to be born?⁷²

NOTES

1. J.G.A. Pocock (1975) 'British History: A Plea for a New Subject', *Journal of Modern History*, 47, 4, 601–21 (first published in the *New Zealand Journal of History* in April 1974); J.G.A. Pocock (1982) 'The Limits and Divisions of British History: In Search of the Unknown Subject', *American Historical Review* (AHR), 87, 2, 311–36.
2. J.G.A. Pocock (2005) *The Discovery of Islands: Essays in British History* (Cambridge), x.

3. I. McBride (1996) 'Ulster and the British Problem' in R. English and G. Walker (eds.) *Unionism in Modern Ireland* (Basingstoke), pp. 1–18.
4. R. Frame (1990), *The Political Development of the British Isles, 1100–1400* (Oxford); R.R. Davies (2002) *The First English Empire: Power and Identities in the British Isles 1093–1343* (Oxford); J. Gillingham (2000) *The English in the Twelfth Century: Imperialism, National Identity and Political Values* (Woodbridge). For a sixteenth-century comparison of Ireland and Wales, see B. Bradshaw (1996) 'The Tudor Reformation and Revolution in Wales and Ireland: The Origins of the British Problem' in B. Bradshaw and J. Morrill (eds.) *The British Problem, c. 1534–1707* (Basingstoke), pp. 39–65. D.G. Boyce (1987) makes interesting comparisons between South Wales and Northern Ireland in his 'Brahmins and Carnivores: The Irish Historian in Great Britain', *Irish Historical Studies*, 25, 99, 225–35.
5. J.G.A. Pocock (1999) 'The New British History in Atlantic Perspective: An Antipodean Commentary', *AHR*, 104, 2, 493.
6. The other founder, of course, was Quentin Skinner. Mark Bevir (1992) points to the divergences between the two in a series of critiques including 'The Errors of Linguistic Contextualism', *History and Theory*, 31, 3, 276–98 and (2011) 'The Contextual Approach' in G. Klosko (ed.) *The Oxford Handbook of the History of Political Philosophy* (Oxford), pp. 11–23.
7. J.H. Hexter (1979) 'Republic, Virtue, Liberty, and the Political Universe of J.G.A. Pocock', J.H. Hexter (ed.) *On Historians: Reappraisals of Some of the Makers of Modern History* (Cambridge, MA), p. 263.
8. A.J.P. Taylor (1975) 'British History: A Plea for a New Subject: Comments', *Journal of Modern History*, 47, 4, 622.
9. Pocock, 'A Plea', 33.
10. See C. Russell's (1991) *The Fall of the British Monarchies, 1637–1642* (Oxford) and more accessibly in (1987) 'The British Problem and the English Civil War', *History*, 72, 395–415; C. Russell (1990) *The Causes of the English Civil War* (Oxford), p. 26–57; Pocock's thoughts on the American Revolution were brilliantly elaborated in J.G.A. Pocock (1980) 'The Revolution against Parliament' in J.G.A. Pocock (ed.) *Three British Revolutions: 1641, 1688, 1776* (Princeton, NJ), pp. 265–88 and J.G.A. Pocock (1993) 'Political Thought in the English-Speaking Atlantic, 1760–1790' in J.G.A. Pocock (ed.) *The Varieties of British Political Thought, 1500–1800* (Cambridge), pp. 246–82.
11. Pocock, 'Limits and Divisions of British History', 311.
12. Reprinted in J.G.A. Pocock (2009) *Political Thought and History: Essays on Theory and Method* (Cambridge), pp. 145–86.
13. Pocock, *Political Thought*, p. 145.

14. H. Butterfield (1970) *The Englishman and his History* (North Haven, CT), p. 114.
15. Pocock, *Discovery of Islands*, p. 36.
16. J.G.A. Pocock (1998) 'The Politics of History: The Subaltern and the Subversive', *Political Thought and History*, 6, 3, 251.
17. Pocock, *Discovery of Islands*, p. 36.
18. Pocock, *Discovery of Islands*, p. 39.
19. E.C. Mossner (1941) 'An Apology for David Hume, Historian' in *Publications of the Modern Language Association of America* (Hull), p. 660.
20. J.G.A. Pocock (1985) 'Hume and the American Revolution: The Dying Thoughts of a North Briton' in J.G.A. Pocock (ed.) *Virtue, Commerce and History: Essays on Political Thought and History, Chiefly in the Eighteenth Century* (Cambridge), pp. 128, 130.
21. J.G.A. Pocock (1999) 'The Four Seas and the Four Oceans' in G. Lucy and E. McClure (eds.) *Cool Britannia: What Britishness Means to Me* (Lurgan, County Armagh), p. 183.
22. For Hume's acute awareness of English condescension and hostility towards Scots, see A. Broadie (2007) *The Scottish Enlightenment: The Historical Age of the Historical Nation* (Edinburgh), pp. 59–60.
23. As he told Francis Hutcheson in 1739: J.Y.T. Grieg (ed.) (1932) *The Letters of David Hume* (2 vols, Oxford), I, p. 32
24. J.G.A. Pocock (2004) 'Quentin Skinner: The History of Politics and the Politics of History', *Common Knowledge*, 10, 3, p. 542.
25. Pocock, *Discovery of Islands*, p. 42.
26. Quoted in D. Bell (2007) *The Idea of Greater Britain: Empire and the Future of World Order, 1860–1900* (Princeton, NJ), pp. 142–3.
27. J. Curran and S. Ward (2010) *The Unknown Nation: Australia after Empire* (Carlton), p. 12; for Bean see D.A. Kent (1985) 'The Anzac Book and the Anzac Legend: C.E.W. Bean as Editor and Image-Maker', *Historical Studies*, 21, 84, 376–90.
28. Curran and Ward, *Unknown Nation*, p. 41.
29. Curran and Ward, *Unknown Nation*, p. 21.
30. J. Belich (2009) *Replenishing the Earth: The Settler Revolution and the Rise of the Anglo-World* (Oxford), p. 462.
31. J. Darwin (2009) *The Empire Project: The Rise and Fall of the British World System, 1830–1970* (Cambridge), pp. 494–513.
32. Darwin, *The Empire Project*, p. 649.
33. For Pocock's insistence on this point see his 'The New British History in Atlantic Perspective', 491–2.
34. Pocock, *Discovery of Islands*, p. 13.
35. Curran and Ward, *Unknown Nation*, p. 20.

36. C. Harvie (1976) 'Ideology and Home Rule: James Bryce, A.V. Dicey and Ireland, 1880–1887', *English Historical Review*, 91, 359, 313.
37. Bell, *Greater Britain*, pp. 171, 174, 205.
38. Pocock, *Discovery of Islands*, p. 10.
39. J.G.A. Pocock (1965) 'Introduction' in J.G.A. Pocock (ed.) *The Maori and New Zealand Politics* (Hamilton), pp. 1–13.
40. Pocock, 'A Plea', 620; omitted from the version in *Discovery of Islands*.
41. L. Hartz (ed.) (1964) *The Founding of New Societies: Studies in the History of the United States, Latin America, South Africa, Canada and Australia* (San Diego, CA).
42. J.M. MacKenzie (2010) 'Irish, Scottish, Welsh and English Worlds? The Historiography of a Four-Nations Approach to the History of the British Empire' in C. Hall and K. McClelland (eds.) *Race, Nation and Empire: Making Histories, 1750 to the Present* (Manchester), pp. 1244–63.
43. Hexter, 'Political Universe of J.G.A. Pocock', p. 303.
44. As explained in J.G.A. Pocock, 'The Four Seas and the Four Oceans', pp. 181–2.
45. J.G.A. Pocock (1960) 'On Living in a Mediocracy', *Cambridge Review*, 425–8, quotation at 427.
46. J.G.A. Pocock (1958) 'Antipodean Comment', *Cambridge Review*, 504–5.
47. I am borrowing terms here from J. Belich's (2001) *Paradise Reforged: A History of the New Zealanders from the 1880s to the Year 2000* (Honolulu, HI), pp. 332, 337.
48. Pocock, 'New British History in Atlantic Perspective', p. 490.
49. Among many others, see A. Grant and K. Stringer (eds.) (1995) *Uniting the Kingdom? The Making of British History* (London); Bradshaw and Morrill (eds.) *The British Problem c. 1534–1707*; L. Brockliss and D. Eastwood (eds.) (1997) *A Union of Multiple Identities: The British Isles, c. 1750–1850* (Manchester).
50. Most important of all were two books by C. Kidd (1993), *Subverting Scotland's Past: Scottish Whig Historians and the Creation of an Anglo-British Identity, 1689–c. 1830* (Cambridge) and (1999) *British Identities before Nationalism: Ethnicity and Nationhood in the Atlantic World, 1600–1800* (Cambridge).
51. D. Cannadine (1987) 'British History: Past, Present—And Future?' *Past & Present* (P&P), 116, 183.
52. D. Cannadine (1995) 'British History as a "New Subject": Politics, Perspectives and Prospects' in Grant and Stringer (eds.) *Uniting the Kingdom*, p. 12–28.
53. N. Canny (2003) 'Writing Early Modern History: Ireland, Britain, and the Wider World', *The Historical Journal* (HJ), 46, 3, 738.

54. T. Claydon (1997) 'Problems with the British Problem', *Parliamentary History*, 16, 2, 222, 223; T. Claydon (1999) "'British" History in the Post-Revolutionary World' in G. Burgess (ed.) *The New British History: Founding a Modern State, 1603–1715* (London), pp. 115–37.
55. N. Canny (1995) 'Irish, Scottish and Welsh Responses to Centralization, c. 1530–c. 1640' in Grant and Stringer (eds.) *Uniting the Kingdom?*, pp. 147–8.
56. This is certainly the case with Nicholas Canny, whose somewhat oracular pronouncements on historiography take the superiority of social over political history to be self-evident. See, for example, N. Canny (2003), 'Writing Early Modern History: Ireland, Britain, and the Wider World', *HJ*, 46, 3, especially 739, 740, 746.
57. Canny, 'Writing Early Modern History', 273.
58. N. Canny (2001), *Making Ireland British, 1580–1650* (Oxford).
59. A.G. Hopkins (1999) 'Back to the Future: From National History to Imperial History', *P&P*, 164, 1, 198–9.
60. J. Belich (2009) *Replenishing the Earth: The Settler Revolution and the Rise of the Anglo-World* (Oxford), p. 495.
61. S. Howe (2012) 'British Worlds, Settler Worlds, World Systems, and Killing Fields', *Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History*, 40, 4, 704.
62. M. Mann (2005) *The Dark Side of Democracy: Explaining Ethnic Cleansing* (Cambridge), pp. 70–110.
63. L. Veracini (2010) *Settler Colonialism: A Theoretical Overview* (Basingstoke); L. Veracini (2013) "'Settler Colonialism": Career of a Concept', *Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History*, 41, 2, 313–33; K. Kenny (2006) *Peaceable Kingdom Lost: The Paxton Boys and the Destruction of William Penn's Holy Experiment* (Oxford); P. Griffin (2007) *American Leviathan: Empire, Nation, and Revolutionary Frontier* (New York, NY).
64. S. Macintyre and A. Clark (2003) *The History Wars* (Melbourne, VIC), p. 33.
65. D. Armitage (1999) 'Greater Britain: A Useful Category of Historical Analysis?' *AHR*, 104, 2, 437.
66. As always, the best guide is David Cannadine: see his (2005) "'Big Tent" Historiography: Transatlantic Obstacles and Opportunities in Writing the History of Empire', *Common Knowledge*, 11, 3, 375–92.
67. Most evident in books like C. Maier (2009) *Among Empires: American Ascendancy and its Predecessors* (Cambridge, MA).
68. J.G.A. Pocock (2000) 'Waitangi as Mystery of State: Consequences of the Ascription of Federative Capacity to the Maori' in D. Ivison et al. (eds.) *Political Theory and the Rights of Indigenous Peoples* (Cambridge), pp. 25–35.

69. D. Armitage (2004) 'John Locke, Carolina, and the Two Treatises of Government', *Political Theory*, 32, 5, 602–27; J. Tully (1993) 'Re-discovering America: The Two Treatises and Aboriginal Rights' in J. Tully (ed.) *An Approach to Political Philosophy: Locke in Contexts* (Cambridge), pp. 137–78.
70. G. Mailer explores connections between 1707 and 1776 in (2017) *John Witherspoon's American Revolution* (Chapel Hill, NC).
71. Pocock, *Discovery of Islands*, p. 20.
72. T. Ballantyne (2002) *Orientalism and Race: Aryanism in the British Empire* (Basingstoke), pp. ix, 15.

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