

## The State of *Ikhwan*

### INTRODUCTION

This chapter explores the fifth reverse wave of democratization in Egypt which extended from June 30, 2012, when Morsi received power, to November 2012 when Morsi and the MB aborted democratization in Egypt by issuing the November 2012 Constitutional Declaration. This chapter explores how Morsi's exclusionist policies and governance triggered the anger of the different sectors of Egyptian society and deepened the isolation of the MB from other political groups. Instead of utilizing inclusive policies to combine different political forces, he believed that the MB alone had a free reign to rule Egypt. Furthermore, instead of reforming the state's official institution, Morsi initiated a plan for *Ikhwanisation* (Brotherhoodization) of the state.

Additionally, this chapter explores how Morsi economic policies were even worse than those of the SCAF. During 1 year of Morsi's rule, the economy nearly collapsed and many Egyptians felt that their standard of living had declined since President Morsi came to office. The MB had no plan to treat Egypt's economic problems, and as a result, issues such as unemployment, poverty, inflation, and foreign debts worsened.

Morsi's de-liberalization policies and his attempts to dominate Egypt's public space and reduce public liberties are also analyzed here. Morsi attempted to curb the unceasing protests through undemocratic legislation such as his amendments to the protest law. However, he failed. The rate of monthly protests rose from 176 in 2010 to 211 per month in

2012 and then dramatically increased to 927 in 2013. According to the Democracy Indicator, Egypt had the highest rate of protest worldwide, having witnessed 1354 protests in March and 1462 in April 2013.<sup>1</sup> He did not stop there, and shortly before Morsi was ousted in mid-2013, his government proposed an NGO law restricting the activities and funding of human rights NGOs. Morsi also attempted to pass laws aimed at dominating the judiciary. One of the new articles proposed lowering the retirement age for judges from 70 to 60 years, which would have resulted in the forced retirement of 3500 out of the country's 13,000 judges.<sup>2</sup> Morsi additionally tried to force through new election laws which were debated until right up to his removal. In trying to change election laws to further its own interests, the MB lost its last remaining major ally, the Salafist Call, who joined forces with the NSF and other political forces against Morsi. In brief, his attempts at passing these laws failed, but they added further fuel to the opposition's fire.

This chapter's main argument is that the exclusionary leanings of the MB's Qutbist faction, which dominated the MB leadership, were the major reason for the downfall of the MB from power. It was the main reason behind the Brotherhoodization plan and, importantly, it was the major factor behind the use of violence against opposition forces, whom the Qutbists considered infidels. It was also the major reason for Morsi's de-liberalization policies, regulations, and laws that aimed to restrict Egypt's public space and shrink public liberties.

### AN EXCLUSIVE BEGINNING: *HISHAM QANDIL*

Morsi's rule did not get off to a good start. He did not want to take his oath of office before the Supreme Constitutional Court on June 30, 2012, so he took an oath of office a day earlier than the planned ceremony in front of thousands of supporters in Tahrir Square.<sup>3</sup> However, the SCAF left no doubt as to where the real power lay in Egyptian politics and forced him to take his oath of office before the Supreme Constitutional Court the following day.<sup>4</sup> Morsi's speech in Tahrir Square angered many Egyptians as he promised to release Egyptian several prisoners, including *Sheikh Omar Abdel Rahman*, the Egyptian-born militant Islamist, and *al-Gama'a al-Islamiyya* theorist who Issued a fatwa resulting in assassinating president Sadat and was convicted of bombings in the US.<sup>5</sup> He was the first Egyptian president who dared to publicly demonstrate his respect for terrorists.

Furthermore, he broke every single promise he made about power sharing during his presidential campaign.<sup>6</sup> On June 22, 2012, Morsi had vowed that if he won, he would form a national unity government headed by an independent figure drawn from outside the MB and its FJP.<sup>7</sup> Not only did he not do this, but he also broke his promise to appoint two vice presidents, a woman and a Copt. Morsi actually went to great lengths to monopolize power and place Islamists in state institutions. He selected a Salafist brother<sup>8</sup> and novice politician, *Hisham Qandil*, as his first Prime Minister (July 24, 2012–July 8, 2013), a decision which divided Egypt's political elite,<sup>9</sup> many of whom thought the selection was very poor considering the state of Egypt's economy.<sup>10</sup> *Qandil's* religious appearance as the first bearded Premier also raised the suspicion of Egypt's political elite. Although he had previously told the media that he was not affiliated to the MB<sup>11</sup> or any other political or religious parties,<sup>12</sup> he was known to have strong pro-Muslim Brotherhood sympathies,<sup>13</sup> and was chosen because he was not likely to challenge any of Morsi's or the MB's political agendas.<sup>14</sup>

The *Qandil* cabinet was the fifth since the January Revolution,<sup>15</sup> and assurances were made that his government will include representatives from all political factions.<sup>16</sup> However, eight of *Qandil's* ministers served under Mubarak.<sup>17</sup> And five ministries—Information, Higher Education, Youth, Labor, and Housing—were given to FJP members,<sup>18</sup> suggesting that the Brotherhood was trying to exercise power over universities, schools, youth centers, and trade unions.<sup>19</sup> The appointment *Salah 'Abdel-Maqsooud's* as Minister of Information meant that the state-owned television and radio union was now under the control of the Brotherhood, raising concerns among many journalists who feared an Islamification of the press.<sup>20</sup> The new Youth Minister, *Osama Yassin*, acted as MB security chief in Tahrir Square during the 18 days of protesting that ended with Mubarak stepping down. He belonged to the 'Brotherhood 95 Division,' one of the MB's militia, headed by *Khairat Al-Shater*, the MB's first Deputy Supreme Guide.<sup>21</sup>

Additionally, the Ministry of Justice post went to an MB sympathizer, Judge *Ahmed Mekki*, the former deputy head of the Court of Cassation.<sup>22</sup> The FJP effectively secured the portfolios that offer direct leverage over the hearts and minds of the people, which is to say the key portfolios for running the country's society and economy.<sup>23</sup> Five additional posts were reserved for other Islamist party members, whether from the *Wasat* (Centre) Party or MB's sympathizers.<sup>24</sup>

Importantly, none of the ‘sovereign’ portfolios—Defence, Interior, Foreign Affairs and Finance—went to MB members. The head of the SCAF, Field Marshal Tantawi retained his role as Defence Minister<sup>25</sup> and was highly influential in the appointments of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Interior.<sup>26</sup> General *Ahmed Gamal Al-Din*<sup>27</sup> was appointed head of the Interior Ministry, the agency whose brutal behavior sparked the 2011 uprising.<sup>28</sup> Some accused *Gamal Al-Din* of being anti-reformist, and he was dubbed one of ‘*al-Adli*’s men’ (after former Interior Minister *Habib al-Adli*).<sup>29</sup> Actually, because the MB’s short-term objective was to maintain stability and the status quo, his being a member of a powerful anti-reform faction in the ministry was the main reason for the MB assigning *Gamal Al-Din* the interior portfolio. This was also the reason behind appointing *Khaled Tharwat* as the new chief of the Homeland Security Sector (HSS).<sup>30</sup> According to former MB member *Mohamed Al-Kassas*, the MB wanted people in key posts that they were on good terms with from the time of Mubarak.<sup>31</sup> The appointment of a new chief for the HSS came amid controversy, as it was claimed Morsi wanted to transfer the jurisdiction of the HSS from the Ministry of Interior to the presidency. However, the presidency hurried to deny such a move.<sup>32</sup> *Tharwat* had worked for 30 years at the dissolved State Security Investigation Bureau (SSI), which is now called the HSS,<sup>33</sup> and during this time, *Tharwat* worked on issues related to opposition political parties, labor unions, and university student union affairs. Hence, the MB endorsed him because he had never been involved in interrogating or torturing members of Islamists groups such as *Al-Gamaa Al-Islamiya* or Jihad,<sup>34</sup> nor had he worked against armed Islamist groups in Sinai.<sup>35</sup> Because most Islamist groups in Sinai had developed alliances with the MB since Morsi ascended to power, *Tharwat* was the ideal choice for the MB.

For the most part, the Salafist Al-Nour Party refused to participate in *Qandil*’s cabinet as it was predominantly a mix of the MB and the remnants of the NDP with a few technocrats making up the numbers. *Qandil* did not bring any women or Copts into government. His cabinet did have two female ministers, but both were former ministers from the *Kamal Al-Ganzouri* government (December 7, 2011–July 24, 2012). *Nadia Zakhari* was the new government’s only Christian member.<sup>36</sup>

According to *Qandil*, his government was committed to implementing Morsi’s ‘renaissance project’ alongside his 100-day program aimed at ending traffic problems, lack of security, fuel shortages, and the non-collection of garbage.<sup>37</sup> However, neither of these goals came to fruition.

Because of these failures, the government was criticized right from the beginning, even by MB allies. For instance, the National Front for the Protection of the Revolution, which supported Islamist President Mohamed Morsi during the presidential elections, said the *Qandil* government did not keep its promises.<sup>38</sup> The Al-Nour Party (NP) and the Salafist Call fiercely criticized the cabinet, and interestingly, the MB allowed criticism from within its ranks. For instance, the MB Finance Minister, *Momtaz Al-Said*, was criticized for being too close to Youssef *Boutros Ghali*, the former Finance Minister, who fled Egypt during the January 25 Revolution.

To counter this early criticism, Morsi announced on December 26 that he would carry out a limited cabinet reshuffle. The MB decision not to remove *Qandil* was met with severe criticism. For instance, *Mohamed Mahsoub*, from the *Al-Wasat* Party, resigned from the cabinet.<sup>39</sup> *Al-Wasat* Secretary General *Hussein Zayed* was quoted as saying ‘He is the last man ... [who should] lead a government facing political unrest and a severe economic crisis.’<sup>40</sup>

In fact, the main reason for the Islamists’ criticism of the MB decision was to force the group to include a greater number of Islamist ministers in the composition of the next reshuffle. They wanted more inclusion but inclusion just for Islamists. The MB held a meeting in the Guidance Bureau in order to improve the image of the Prime Minister and assigned Dr. *Mohamed Ali Basher* the task of selecting the new ministers.<sup>41</sup> The MB’s role in these meetings demonstrated that the MB, and not Morsi, was, in fact, ruling Egypt. At the beginning of January 2013, *Qandil* made his first limited cabinet reshuffle, announcing ten new ministers, of which the MB selected 8. The other two were selected by *Qandil* himself. Among these ten, five were affiliated with the MB which increased the number of MB ministers to ten ministers, or about 40%.<sup>42</sup> The cabinet reshuffle added five new portfolios to the five portfolios the MB had previously,<sup>43</sup> about 20%. *Ahmed Gamal Al-Din* was replaced by General *Mohamed Ibrahim* due to his refusal to act on Morsi’s order to forcibly remove protesters outside Morsi’s *Al-Etehadia* Palace on December 6, 2012,<sup>44</sup> a claim denied by MB. *Qandil*’s limited cabinet reshuffle has met with the same criticism as its previous cabinet, both from Islamist and secular camps. Tellingly, non-Brotherhood Islamist forces focused their criticism on the Interior Minister Mohamed Ibrahim accusing him of using the same repressive tactics of the Mubarak regime.<sup>45</sup>

As a result of the vehement criticism, Morsi asked *Qandil* to make another limited reshuffle in May 2013. *Quandil* then appointed nine new Ministers in his cabinet; four of whom belonged to the MB.<sup>46</sup> The new cabinet reshuffle represented further brotherhoodization of the Egyptian cabinet Minister as it included 14 ministers affiliated to the MB (about 45%).

Despite Morsi's promises to be the president for all Egyptians, Egyptians were slowly coming to the realization that he was a president with only the Brotherhood's interests in mind.<sup>47</sup>

### *IKHWANISATION (BROTHERHOODIZATION) OF THE STATE*

The Brotherhood's long-term objective had remained unchanged since its inception in 1928: the transformation of Egyptian society in accordance with their strict ideological framework. The 2011 revolution was an opportunity for the group to initiate its long-awaited project by beginning a systematic 'Brotherhoodization' of the state.<sup>48</sup> The plan was to gain control of the state's institutions, i.e., the military, parliament, the media, and even the constitution drafted by a committee selected by the Islamist majority in parliament.<sup>49</sup> In a way, the MB's 'brotherhoodization of the state' project replaced the Mubarak hereditary succession project.

In trying to control state institutions, the MB was following the NDP playbook. However, a key difference was that the NDP appointees were mostly experienced and talented people. Without a great pool of talent to choose from, the MB resorted to other criterion in selecting its replacements for Mubarak's ruling elite. Personal relationships, commercial ties, and mutual interests became the qualifications required for one to be appointed at the MB 'deep state.' A prime example of this was the appointment of Morsi's daughter's father-in-law, Dr. *Ahmed Fahmi* as the Speaker of the Shoura Council (the Upper House of Parliament). The Presidential establishment includes three MB lobbies and interest groups. The first is the *Al-qazaz* family. The secretary of the president, Egyptian-Canadian citizen, *Khaled Al-qazaz* is *Kharait Al-Shater's* business partner. *Al-qazaz* is the mastermind of the MB's and FJP's Foreign Affairs. His son *Adli Al-qazaz*, who owns the MB *Al-Moqatem* Language School, was appointed the Minister of Education's advisor for education reform. The third person in the *Al-qazaz* lobby in the presidential establishment is *Hussein Al-qazaz*, who was appointed a

member of Morsi's Advisory Council and is also FJP's advisor for economic affairs. He is one of the authors of the economic section of the MB's *El-Nahda* (renaissance) project and is responsible for the MB's International branch in the US (one branch of the MB International Organization). In addition, he was the MB liaison with the US. The second influential lobby group in the Presidential Establishment is the *Al-Hadad* family which was represented by two members. The first is *Essam Al-Hadad* a British-Egyptian citizen, who was appointed as the President's Assistant for Foreign Affairs. *Al-Hadad* is one of *Al-Shater's* business partners and his close associate and confidant. He was a member of the MB's International Organization in the UK. *Al-Hadad* is also *Hassen Malek's* business partner and *Al-Shater* nominated *Al-Hadad* as a member in the Guidance Bureau on February 4, 2012, although members of the Bureau should be elected not nominated. He is the second advisor for MB's *El-Nahda* project and the MB Spokesperson. The third member of *Al-Hadad* family is ' *Essam Al-Hadad's* brother, businessman *Madhat Al-Hadad*, who is one of the most important businessmen in the MB after *Al-Shater* and *Hassen Malek*. The third lobby group within the Presidential Establishment is made up of members of the MB's International Organization.<sup>50</sup> The Ministry of Interior also becomes a target of Brotherhoodization. In fact, there had already been indications of a plan by the MB and other Islamists to create pockets of supporters in that institution. Evidence of infiltration into this ministry came from reports that some security officers insisted on growing their beards despite regulations specifically prohibiting beards in that agency.<sup>51</sup> The MB achieved very limited success in infiltrating the armed forces, enrolling only a small number of its members into the Military Academy.

Local governance was another area where dominance was seen as ensuring the MB's future hegemony in parliamentary elections. In September 2012, President Morsi appointed 19 new governors out of 27. The reshuffle saw the MB receiving 40% of the seats by appointing four governors. Three seats (30%) went to former military and police major generals.<sup>52</sup> The remaining three new governors included a judge and two university professors.<sup>53</sup> Morsi's appointments did not depend on competence, but rather on political affiliation or ideological background. The new governors mostly did not have backgrounds related to local development. The selection of the governors followed the steps of Mubarak regime precisely.<sup>54</sup> The main criterion of selecting those new four MB governors was a recommendation sent by the MB to Morsi to

nominate three of its leading members for appointment in an anticipated governor reshuffle.<sup>55</sup> The MB also appointed its members as heads of districts, cities, and village councils. Because these positions in the past were dominated by families and tribes mostly affiliated to the NDP, the MB faced strong opposition. For instance, people of *Bab Al-Sharia* district, Cairo, protested in front of the Cairo governorate after an MB schoolteacher was nominated as the head of their district.<sup>56</sup>

Brotherhoodizing the education system was also one of the MB's strategies to implant its ideology into the next generation. However, it should be noted that the MB had dominated the educational system in Egypt through public and private schools and public universities since the 1970s. MB university professors have long dominated colleges of education; science; medicine; engineering; and departments of Arabic and Islamic studies at most Egyptian Colleges of arts, and they also have a long history of penetrating foreign universities such as the American University in Cairo (AUC) with the aim of influencing the sons of Egypt's higher class. The reaction of non-MB members against the MB's new education policies was not surprising. The Independent Teachers Syndicate has accused the Education Ministry of 'Brotherhoodizing' education decision-making by promoting 22 Brothers to senior ministerial positions.<sup>57</sup> The syndicate alleged that the next step after gaining control of the administration would be to 'Brotherhoodize' curricula.<sup>58</sup> The then MB Minister of Education, Dr. *Ibrahim Ghoniem* denied that *ikhwanisation* of the ministry of education was occurring and alleged that only three out of 140 prominent leaders of the ministry of education were affiliated to the MB.<sup>59</sup>

Another ministry that began a process of brotherhoodization was the Endowments Ministry. It should be noted that some in the Endowments Ministry were Brothers and Salafists even before the 2011 uprising. The MB just attempted to complete what it had stated before. For the MB, brotherhoodization of the Endowments Ministry would enable them to dominate mosques, influence Muslim preachers, and supplant its ideology without having to spend any of its huge budget. The reaction of preachers was swift; hundreds of Endowment Ministry Imams staged protests on January 13, 2013, against they believed to be the 'brotherhoodization' of the Ministry. *Mohamed Al-Bastawisy*, the chairman of the Independent Preachers Union, complained that the Imams were being systematically replaced with ones from the MB,<sup>60</sup> a claim the MB vigorously denied.<sup>61</sup> Overall, the MB achieved noticeable success in the



brotherhoodization of Ministry of Endowments, even appointing one Salafist Call member as the Minister of Endowment in 2013.

For the MB, Brotherhoodization of Al-Azher (the Sunni world's religious authority based in Cairo) was hugely significant, as it would enable them to dominate religious education in Egypt and impose their ideology on one of the most prestigious and influential Sunni institutions in the world. The ultimate goal was still of course the creation of a new Caliphate and controlling Al-Azher would give them the legitimacy needed to make it happen.<sup>62</sup> Ever since its inception, the MB had been recruiting Al-Azhar sheikhs to the group, and as a result, both the MB and the Salafists have had a strong presence in Al-Azhar institutions; specifically its higher schools, since the 1970s. Their dominant presence extended from students right up to administrators, professors, and deans. Of course, most of Al-Azhar's students came from Egypt's rural areas and graduated from Al-Azhar's high schools, and many of these schools were dominated by and even established by the MB as a part of its social services and missionary work. The MB did transfer control of these schools to Al-Azhar, but only after the MB appointed their own teachers and staff. Under Morsi, the MB domination over Al-Azhar increased substantially. The MB developed a sophisticated plan led by *Khariyat Al-Shater* to Brotherhoodize Al-Azhar. The plan was to join forces with the Salafist Call and its political arm, the Al-Nour party to replace Al-Azhar's grand Imam, Al-Azhar faculty deans, the rector of Al-Azhar university, even schoolteachers with MB sympathizers.<sup>63</sup> *Yasser Borhami*, Salafist Call leading member, made it no secret that they wanted to remove the Grand Imam, *Al-Tayeb*.<sup>64</sup> The ultra-conservative Salafists were similarly unhappy with *Al-Tayeb* due to his support for his predecessor's ban on the *niqab*, or full-face veil, among female Al-Azhar students on the grounds that this was not a religious obligation in Islam.<sup>65</sup> Similarly, the MB demonstrates its will to remove *Al-Tayeb* due to his hard-line stance against the Brotherhood when it was an outlawed opposition group.<sup>66</sup> Several attempts were made by the MB to remove *Al-Tayeb* from his position. For instance, the Brotherhood staged student protests in an attempt to discredit the grand Imam and perhaps replace him with a Brotherhood sympathizer.<sup>67</sup> Nevertheless, the MB's plot to remove the Grand Imam failed.

The MB really only achieved partial success in further Brotherhoodization of Al-Azher, due in no small part to the fierce opposition by *Al-Tayeb*. They failed to add new members to the Council of

Senior Scholars, although the MB had already had one member of the council, Sheikh *Hassan Al-Shafa'ai*. However, they were able to nominate Dr. *Mohamed 'Amerh*, as the editor in Chief of *Al-Azhar* Magazine, a post he exploited to propagate MB ideology.<sup>68</sup> Furthermore, with the support of Salafists, they were able to dominate the Higher Council of the Islamic Affairs.<sup>69</sup> These members were mostly Salafists, but they were affiliated with the Legal Authority for Right and Reform, which was established and founded by *Al-Shater* and controlled by the MB.

The policy of Brotherhoodization faced criticism from a wide range of different political forces and sparked public outrage. Surprisingly, it was not secular politicians but Salafists who published a list detailing how Egypt's Brothers had infiltrated vital government posts,<sup>70</sup> revealing that for many Salafists, Islamisation is not synonymous with ikhwanisation.<sup>71</sup> For instance, the Al-Nour Party criticized MB policies as thinly veiled means of Brotherhoodizing state institutions in a manner reminiscent of the Mubarak regime.<sup>72</sup> The MB's reaction to the Al-Nour Party was to fire Dr. *Khaled 'Alem Al-Din*, one of Morsi's Advisors and leading member of the Al-Nour Party. In response, Salafist Call's members of the Legal Authority for Reform and Rights resigned from the authority, including the prominent Salafist, Shiekh *Mohamed Hassan*.<sup>73</sup> The conflict between the MB and Al-Nour Party was not because of democracy, participation or the public interest. Rather it was over shares in Egypt's political spoils.<sup>74</sup> The friction between the MB and the Salafist Call began before the 2012 presidential election and reached its apex with the formation of the *Qandil* cabinet in July 2012. Salafists felt they had been betrayed and misled by the MB, and that their ideas regarding a national coalition government were not taken seriously.<sup>75</sup>

The denial by the MB and their supporters regarding Brotherhoodization widened the gulf between them and other political forces. *Fahmi Howeidy*, even went so far as to say Brothers remained a persecuted group who were excluded from many domains under the former regime, including diplomacy, the military, the intelligence agencies and the Interior Ministry.<sup>76</sup> Brotherhood member *Ahmed Abu Baraka* even attacked the term akhwana (*ikhwan* means brotherhood in Arabic) calling it a 'devilish term created by the secularist and leftist opposition' to try and cultivate fear in the general public.<sup>77</sup> *Fawaz Gerges*, a professor of Middle Eastern Politics and International Relations at the London School of Economics, wrote in *Foreign Policy* that Egyptians from all tiers of society held the view that Morsi was trying to bring the whole country under the MB umbrella.<sup>78</sup>

This was not the democracy Egyptians protested for in Tahrir Square, and it was obvious to the majority that the ‘Second Republic’ was yet to be born.<sup>79</sup>

### MORSI’S ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL POLICIES

The way in which Morsi went about curing Egypt’s economic crisis affected his credibility almost more than anything else. To be fair, ever since 2011 neither the SCAF nor any of the short-lived governments were capable of outlining a viable economic plan.<sup>80</sup> Nevertheless, Morsi’s management of the transition was even worse than that of the SCAF. During 1 year of Morsi’s rule, the economy nearly collapsed.<sup>81</sup> Rather than coming up with a new financial model, Morsi simply rehashed Mubarak’s economic policies of relying on handouts from the US and institutions such as the IMF.<sup>82</sup> He tried with varying success to woo back businessmen who had fled, offering fast-track legislation to aid in settling financial disputes and sending trade missions overseas to attract investors.<sup>83</sup>

The country’s foreign reserves were almost completely depleted by December 2012, meaning the central bank could not even pay for essential food and fuel imports.<sup>84</sup> This crisis needed a sophisticated economic plan. However, the only MB economic plan for post-Mubarak Egypt was the FJP’s ‘*El-Nahda* Project,’ which was outlined as a part of Morsi’s electoral campaign. This project aimed to bring \$200 billion Dollars worth of direct foreign investment into the country,<sup>85</sup> but it was described by *Al-Shater* as just a set of ideas designed to get Morsi elected.<sup>86</sup> The Morsi government struck an initial agreement with the IMF in November 2012.<sup>87</sup> However, these talks stalled when Morsi rescinded proposed tax increases for fear of public outcry.<sup>88</sup> In January 2013, a senior International Monetary Fund official met Egypt’s government to discuss a vital US\$4.8 billion loan<sup>89</sup>; however, a lack of a realistic economic reform program led the IMF to break off negotiations.<sup>90</sup> Egypt also rejected a \$750 million rescue loan from the IMF, believing at the time that they were not at the emergency stage just yet.<sup>91</sup> The last attempt was on April 2, 2013, 3 months before ousting Morsi. Finally the \$4.8 billion IMF loan was suspended pending Morsi’s stabilization of the political situation.<sup>92</sup> The loan required reforms such as slashing subsidies for staples<sup>93</sup> and many feared it would plunge a country reeling from post-revolution inflation, poverty, and unemployment further into chaos.<sup>94</sup>

Interestingly, when Sadat and Mubarak sought help from the IMF, the MB deemed it haram, or sinful. But under Morsi, a \$4.8 billion loan from the IMF suddenly became halal, or religiously blameless. Brotherhood theologians simply rebranded the interest (forbidden under Islam) as ‘administrative fees.’<sup>95</sup> A similar IMF loan had been rejected by *Kamal Al-Ganzouri*’s interim government arguing that the economic reforms linked to the loan did not do enough to address public security, poverty or, perplexingly, provide the revenue to raise wages.<sup>96</sup>

Morsi and the MB did try to find another solution for the financial crisis—‘Islamic *Sukuk*’ (Islamic bonds). The Morsi government sent his proposed ‘*Sukuk*’ law to the necessary institutions, including the Finance Ministry, the Investment Ministry and Al-Azhar to get their approval.<sup>97</sup> However, the law was rejected by the Islamic Research Academy of Al-Azhar because it was considered against Shari’a, Islamic law.<sup>98</sup> Nevertheless, the *Sukuk* Law won the affirmative vote of the Shura Council on March 19, 2013.<sup>99</sup> However, the project gained no traction among the people, nor support from political forces other than Salafists.<sup>100</sup>

Failing to attract international funds or gain popular approval for the *Sukuk* project, Morsi resorted to using MB business community members to try and encourage Mubarak-affiliated businessmen to revive their investments in Egypt. To accomplish this goal, in March 2011, *Hassan Malek*, founder of the *Malek* Group of textiles and furniture factories, established a new business association, the Egyptian Business Development Association (EBDA).<sup>101</sup> Modeled on the Turkish MÜSIAD, EBDA officially began work in March 2012 under the leadership of *Hassan Malek*, who was crucially responsible for the Brotherhood’s relations with the private business sector.<sup>102</sup> By February 2013, it had 600 members, including some Christians. The objective was not only to help Brotherhood businessmen entering the formal economy, but also to create a business organization friendly to the Brotherhood.<sup>103</sup> It also acted as a link between the president and the business community, including Mubarak’s cronies who had fled the country.<sup>104</sup> *Hassan Malek* explicitly praised the efforts of former Industry Minister *Rachid Mohamed Rachid*, especially with respect to generating foreign direct investment.<sup>105</sup> However, neither the EBDA nor *Malek*’s statements encouraged Mubarak businesspersons to resolve Egypt’s finance crisis.

To further encourage Mubarak businesspersons, the *Shura*’s Legislative and Constitutional Affairs approved a draft law submitted by the *Al-Wasat*

Party aimed at reaching financial settlements with a number of Mubarak-era businessmen and at recovering funds smuggled outside Egypt under the Mubarak regime.<sup>106</sup> However, the law itself provoked heated disputes,<sup>107</sup> and corrupt former officials rejected the deal as a result of their mistrust of the MB.

Looking back, it seems all economic policies implemented by the MB were doomed to failure. Many reasons contributed to this failure. The most important one is the MB's lack of credibility and trustworthiness. Mistrust between the MB and Egypt business communities had been an issue since the 2011 revolution, and once Egyptians realized that the *El-Nahda* project was nothing more than an electoral trick to vote for Morsi; the general population had cause for mistrust also.

### EGYPTIAN ECONOMIC CRISIS UNDER MORSI

Morsi's economic policy led to a total collapse of the economy. For instance, while the Egyptian economy was already struggling with slow economic growth and a budget deficit of 8.1% prior to the 2011 revolution, the fall of Mubarak led to further stagnation in its Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth rate: dropping from 5.1% in 2010, to an estimated 1.8% in 2013.<sup>108</sup> The unemployment rate went up by 4%, from 9% in 2010 to 13% in 2012<sup>109</sup> and up another 1% during the third quarter of 2013.<sup>110</sup> About 95% of the unemployed were youth with at least a secondary education. Nearly three-fourths of those who were lucky enough to find jobs end up working in the informal sector where wages range between \$2.60 and \$3.70 per day.<sup>111</sup> The Egyptian economy suffered from a foreign currency deficit as tourism revenues, one of Egypt's main sources of foreign currency, dried up. 2013 marked the country's worst year for tourism in 4 years, reaching just \$6.6 billion by November, down from \$12.5 billion in 2010.<sup>112</sup> Additionally, the Egyptian pound continued its nosedive against the US dollar.<sup>113</sup> The rapidly devaluing Egyptian pound eroded the purchasing power of Egyptian savings, leading, as a result, to a 5% decline in national savings between 2010 and 2013.<sup>114</sup> Obviously, the country's international credit standing also declined and continued mounting domestic public debt and a huge budget deficit made for grim forecasts.<sup>115</sup> According to experts, Egypt under Morsi was in need of more progressive tax initiatives, subsidy reform, a minimum wage, and increased investment in education and healthcare on<sup>116</sup>; however, the problem of *mistrust*—of government,

of business, and of new and untested political forces—scuttled any possible way of maneuvering out of the economic strife Egypt found itself in.<sup>117</sup> Polls show that 65% of Egyptians felt that their standard of living had declined since President Morsi came to office, and more than 70% of Egyptians were unhappy with the way the economy was moving.<sup>118</sup> Many of those who joined the *Tamarod* (Arabic for rebellion) demonstrations on June 30, 2013 were there due to unemployment, inflation, and scarcity of the basics.<sup>119</sup>

## MORSI AND DOMINATING THE POLITICAL PUBLIC SPACE

### *Morsi's Protest Draft Law*

According to the Democracy Indicator, Egypt in 2013 had more protests than any other country on the planet, with 1354 protests in March and 1462 in April.<sup>120</sup> Hence the MB's new protest law was described as anti-democratic and more draconian than something Mubarak would agree to. MB's desire to 'regulate' the right to protest and freedom of assembly led to five attempts to pass their new law.<sup>121</sup> The law was finally moved to the *Shura* Council for consideration on March 26, 2013.<sup>122</sup> The draft bill stipulated that the Interior Ministry must be notified of the time and venue of any protest at least 5 days in advance.<sup>123</sup> It also prohibited demonstrations in the vicinity of the presidential palaces, police stations, ministries and military institutions,<sup>124</sup> and meant that the ministry could stop any protest gatherings it deemed a threat to public order.<sup>125</sup> The government's bill was a blatant attempt at giving police the right to object to and intervene in organizing protests, especially with the inclusion of stipulations such as the requirement for pre demonstration meetings where 'agreement' from uncooperative security forces had to be reached on how and where the protest would occur.<sup>126</sup>

In the initial debate of the draft law, non-Islamist MPs launched a scathing attack on the proposed legislation which, it said, sought to muzzle freedoms and clamp down on anti-government protests.<sup>127</sup> The Salafist's position on protests was actually in line with the MB. One Salafist MP from the NP called for Egyptian citizens to be stripped of their right to protest, while Salafist MP 'Adel 'Afifi of *Al-Asala* (authenticity) Party argued 'the police must be armed with live ammunition to practice its right to self-defense.'<sup>128</sup> On the other hand, almost all other groups rejected the law as a return to a police state.<sup>129</sup>

### *The Opposition's Draft Law*

On March 27, 2013, the Egyptian Social Democratic Party presented an alternative draft of the protest law. While the Ministry of Justice bill was clearly restrictive of Egyptian's rights to protest, the opposition's draft asserted this right. The draft presented by the opposition proposed the establishment of a new unit within the Ministry of Interior to hold training courses for riot police forces on the non-violent dispersal of protest and suggested that such riot police replace the Central Security Forces (CSF, *quwat al-amn al-markazi*), the special police force which has long been in charge of dispersing 'illegal' gatherings.<sup>130</sup> However, Morsi was ousted before either the MB draft law or the opposition's could be passed.

Generally speaking, personal freedoms under Morsi were the worst since the Nasser regime. However, according to a 2014 Freedom House report, Egypt's political rights rating declined from 5 to 6 and its status declined from Partly Free to Not Free after the overthrow of Morsi in July when violent crackdowns on Islamist political groups and civil society were conducted, and the military increased its role in the political process.<sup>131</sup>

### NGOs DRAFT LAW

A Mubarak-era non-government organizations (NGOs) law, known as law 84/2002, had governed the running of NGOs in Egypt since the downfall of the Mubarak regime. The law essentially allowed the government to close down these entities with impunity by freezing assets, confiscating property, rejecting nominees to an organization's governing board, blocking funding, or denying requests to establish relationships with international groups.<sup>132</sup> Thus, it is not surprisingly that NGOs have suffered under the SCAF-led transition and under the Morsi regime. For instance, a few days after the removal of the Mubarak regime, the government carried out a crackdown on NGOs. The crackdown continued and, in some cases, worsened under MB rule, from late June 2012.<sup>133</sup>

Shortly before President Morsi was ousted from power in mid-2013, his government proposed a draft NGO law to further empower the authorities' ability to restrict the activities and funding of human rights NGOs.<sup>134</sup> The law was even worse than that of Mubarak's law 84/2002. The bill was a violation of Article 51 of the 2012 Egyptian constitution, which stipulates a notification system for establishing associations and

provides for their ability to work freely.<sup>135</sup> The bill made official registration of associations dependent on the passage of 30 days without objection from the administrative body (Article 6),<sup>136</sup> and it viewed foreign funding (Articles 13, 63) and domestic fundraising through donations (Article 14) as a crime which could result in a fine or dissolution.<sup>137</sup> The bill also introduced strict monitoring of foreign funding of Egyptian NGOs and licensing of international organisations wanting to operate in Egypt.<sup>138</sup> The bill allowed any person or entity (including the security apparatus) to review absolutely anything related to an organizations activities (Article 16), which was in blatant violation of an associations' right to privacy under the constitution and international law.<sup>139</sup>

Paradoxically, despite the fact that Minister of Social Insurance *Nagwa Khalil* confirmed that the MB will have to meet the conditions included in any new NGO legislation,<sup>140</sup> *Mahmoud Hussein*, the MB Secretary General, states that the MB would not subject to the bill because it is not an NGO. Rather it is a proselyting; economic; political; religious; and divine society, as defined by its founder *Hassen Al-Banna*.<sup>141</sup>

Under examination, the new law is actually more draconian than Mubarak's equivalent and is inappropriate for a country undergoing a democratic transition. In fact, the undemocratic provisions of such bill have provoked concern among human rights activists.<sup>142</sup> However, as with the protest law, Morsi was ousted without having issued the new NGO law.

Generally speaking, human rights in Egypt saw no progress while Morsi was in power. If anything, there was a backward slide. Violations abounded, including torture in police stations, sexual assaults on female protesters, and military trials of civilians, now sanctioned under the constitution.<sup>143</sup> The list of abuses, according to Human Rights Watch (HRW), includes excessive police violence and harsh limitations on freedom of expression, women's rights, labor rights, freedom of belief, and freedom of organization.<sup>144</sup> Freedom of religion also suffered under the Islamist president, and Sectarian violence worsened in this time as demonstrated by the June 23 [2013] lynching of four Shia.<sup>145</sup> Tellingly, although Egypt's more than 30-year state of emergency was ended by the SCAF in May 2012, Emergency State Security Courts (ESSC) continued to operate under Article 19 of the emergency law. Morsi kept the ESSC courts in operation and appointed 3649 judges to preside using emergency laws.<sup>146</sup>



## ELECTION DRAFT LAW

For Egypt's transition to succeed, presidential power must be checked by a strong, independent legislature. However, as long as Egypt's electoral laws and procedures do not encourage inclusivity and equity, this is unlikely to happen.<sup>147</sup> On February 21, the Islamist-dominated *Shura* Council approved amendments to Law 38/1972 on the PA and Law 73/1956 on the exercise of political rights. The Shura Council rushed through the controversial legislation in order to comply with Article 229 of the equally controversial constitution which states that parliamentary elections must occur within 60 days of the ratification of the new national charter which Morsi ratified on 25 December.<sup>148</sup> Consequently, Morsi called for the electorate to cast their vote on April 22, 2013.<sup>149</sup> Morsi's declaration sparked widespread anger from political groups. Their opposition was focused mainly on the arbitrary redrawing of district boundaries and violations of the new constitution. *Mohamed Mohieddin*, an appointed MP representing the liberal *Ghad Al-Thawra* ('The Revolution's Tomorrow') Party, stated that the law was a violation of the constitution because the Supreme Constitutional Court (SCC) was not consulted for a final approval.<sup>150</sup> Even the Salafist Al-Nour party demonstrated its opposition to the law. *Abdallah Badran*, spokesman for the Salafist Nour Party, charged that redrawing boundaries was in violation of Article 133 of the 2012 constitution.<sup>151</sup> However, on March 6 the Administrative Court ruled that the SCC must first assess the constitutionality of Shura Council amendments to the election law. The SEC convened the following day and canceled the four-round ballot that was scheduled to end in June.<sup>152</sup> The SCC rejected the initial electoral law drafted by the *Shura* Council and ordered changes to the law including the redrawing of electoral districts, hardening the eligibility conditions for candidates to effectively exclude Islamist political detainees, and relaxing the exclusion of former NDP members of parliament.<sup>153</sup> The Islamist-dominated *Shura* Council, however, refused to make all the mandated changes or to return the amended law to the court to ensure compliance.<sup>154</sup> The debate regarding the electoral law lasted until Morsi's last day in power, and it was never passed. By issuing this law the MB lost one of its major allies—the Salafists—who joined forces with the NSF and other political groups against Morsi.

## CONCLUSION

The election of the MB candidate, Mohamed Morsi, did not bring Egypt's democratization to an end. But rather it paved the way for a short-lived reverse wave of democratization. Morsi's behavior—governance—and his refusal to cooperate with other political forces deepened the isolation of the MB and doomed the new bearded authoritarian regime to failure. He began his rule by clashing with nearly every group imaginable. Instead of promoting the inclusive policies he promised while campaigning, he took his election win as a license to govern Egypt as only he saw fit. Furthermore, instead of reforming the state's establishments or what he called the 'deep state,' Morsi carried out a hugely unpopular plan for *Ikhwanisation* (*Brotherhoodization*) of the State. Morsi's brotherhoodization plan widened the gap between the group and Salafist Call. It also helped bridging the gap between the opposition forces and the Salafist Call. After 6 months of his rule and inauguration of his brotherhoodization plan, Egyptians were convinced that Morsi was not the president of all Egyptians as he promised, but rather he simply served the MB's interests through his position as a president. The MB's 'brotherhoodization of the state' project reminded many of Mubarak's aborted hereditary succession plan.

Further parallels can be drawn with the Mubarak regime in terms of economic policy, Morsi's economic policies did not really differ from those of Mubarak's neoliberal policies and had the effect of increasing the rate of unemployment, poverty, inflation, and foreign debt. Thus, many Egyptians felt that their standard of living had declined since President Morsi came to office. And many of those who joined the demonstrations on June 30, 2013, did so because they were jobless and suffering from rising prices and short-ages of key necessities. There was also mistrust between the MB and the Egyptian business community since the 2011 revolution. Instead of holding talks with other political forces to find applicable economic alternatives, Morsi followed the Mubarak regime's stopgap solution of seeking loans from the IMF.

Additionally, his attempts to enact undemocratic laws such as the protest law, election law, and NGOs law, were doomed to failure as it inflamed opposition forces against his rule. The protests calling for his removal increased day by day to the extent that Egypt had more protest than any other country on the planet. However, the MB attempts to dominate the political public space, public liberties and their deliberalization policies

deepened the gap between the group and other political forces and paved the way for these political forces to join together to remove Morsi from power. Thus, even those who voted for him moved into the opposition camp. Even the Salafist Call, for instance, turned against the MB and joined the secular opposition. After just 6 months of his rule, Morsi became isolated at the presidential palace as most of Egypt's political forces, except Jihadist forces and parties, turned against him and the MB.

## NOTES

1. Abdel Ghany, Sayed, The Brothers, the Revolution, and the Right to Protest, Jadaliyya, May 14, 2013, available at: <http://www.jadaliyya.com/pages/index/11707/the-brothers-the-revolution-and-the-right-to-prote>.
2. El-Sherif, Ashraf, Egypt's Post-Mubarak Predicament, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Rule of Law Program, January 14–15, 2014.
3. Kirkpatrick, David, Egypt's New Leader Takes Oath, Promising to Work for Release of Jailed Terrorist, the New York Times, June 29, 2012.
4. Howeid, Amira, One hundred days with Morsi, Al-Ahram Weekly, October 11–17, 2012.
5. Kirkpatrick, David, Egypt's New Leader, op. cit.
6. Nassar, Galal, Enough with tyranny, Al-Ahram Weekly, January 4, 2013.
7. Ragab, Eman, The Brotherhood's "deep state", Al-Ahram Weekly, August 9–15, 2012.
8. Salafist brother is one of the MB faction. Members of the faction wear the western dress, while their appearance and rhetoric expressed clear Salafist ideology. Notable members of this faction are the preacher and former presidential candidate *Salah Abou Ismael* and the preacher *Safwat Hegazi*.
9. El-Din Essam, Gamal, A nearly-new face, Al-Ahram Weekly, July 25–31, 2012.
10. Eric, Leckie, the Muslim Brotherhood and the Perception of Democracy, Master Thesis in Security Studies, the Naval Postgraduate School, December 2012, pp. 53–54.
11. *Al-Fager* (Arabic independent newspaper based in Cairo) July 26, 2012.
12. Egypt Today, July 26, 2012.
13. Ragab, Eman, The Brotherhood's "deep state", op. cit.
14. Eric, Leckie, the Muslim Brotherhood, op. cit., pp. 51–54.
15. Said, Abdel-Moneim, The new cabinet, Al-Ahram Weekly, August 9–15, 2012.

16. El-Din Essam, Gamal, A nearly-new face, op. cit.
17. Essam El-Din, Gamal, New cabinet, new woes, Al-Ahram Weekly, August 9–15, 2012.
18. Chams El-Dine, Chérine, The Military and Egypt's Transformation Process: Preservation of the Military's Reserve Domains, Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik German Institute for International and Security Affairs, SWP Comments, No. 6, February 2013, p. 1.
19. Essam El-Din, Gamal, New cabinet, new woes, op. cit.
20. Ibid.
21. See for more details Al-Dostour (Arabic independent newspaper based in Cairo), January 4, 2013 and *Al-Watan* (Arab independent newspaper based in Cairo), January 4, 2013.
22. Ashour, Omar, Egypt's New Old Government, Cabinet, August 7, 2012.
23. Said, Abdel-Moneim, The new cabinet, Al-Ahram Weekly, August 9–15, 2012.
24. Ibid.
25. Ibid.
26. Ibid.
27. Gamal Al-Din is '*Abd al-Ahad Gamal Al-Din*'s nephew, the ruling National Democratic Party's parliamentary majority leader during the 2000s. See for more Details Ashour, Omar, Egypt's New Old Government, op. cit.
28. Ibid.
29. Ibid.
30. Ibid.
31. Ibid.
32. Ibid.
33. Ibid.
34. Ibid.
35. Ibid.
36. Essam El-Din, Gamal, New cabinet, new woes, Al-Ahram Weekly, August 9–15, 2012.
37. El-Din Essam, Gamal, A nearly-new face, op. cit.
38. Essam El-Din, Gamal, New cabinet, op. cit.
39. Ibid.
40. Ibid.
41. *Al-Yaum Al-Saba'a* (Arabic independent newspaper based in Cairo), July 26, 2012.
42. *Al-Masery Al-Yaum* (Arabic independent newspaper based in Cairo), January 7, 2013.
43. Ibid.
44. Ibid.

45. Essam El-Din, Gamal, Salafis open fire on Morsi, *Al-Ahram Weekly*, February 14, 2013.
46. *Al-Masrey Al-Youm*, May 7, 2013.
47. Ghanem, Hafez, Egypt's Difficult Transition, op. cit., p. 21.
48. 'Brotherhoodization of the state' is 'a process by which movement members enter and perhaps even dominate official institutions that had previously been closed to Islamists.' See for more details, Brown, Nathan J., *Islam and Politics in the New Egypt*, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Middle Papers, April 2013, p. 4.
49. Fotopoulos, Takis, The Muslim Brotherhood and Islamic "democracy" in Egypt as Part of the New World Order? (*The International Journal of Inclusive Democracy*, Vol. 8, Nos. 1/2, Winter/Summer 2012, 13–47), pp. 28–29.
50. Personal observations of the author and gathering information of his fieldwork. See also *Al-Tahrir*, October 30, 2012.
51. Ragab, Eman, The Brotherhood's "deep state", op. cit.
52. Abdel-Baky, Mohamed, Meet the new governors, *Al-Ahram Weekly*, September 6–12, 2012.
53. Ibid.
54. Studies show that over the last two decades, 50–80% of all governors appointed under Mubarak had military backgrounds. Some came from the police or other internal security bodies, such as the now-dissolved State Security Apparatus. It is the same way the old regime reshuffled the governors ... nothing new, neither people with a military background nor official from the ruling party. See for more details *Egypt Independent*, Sunday, January 13, 2013.
55. Ibid.
56. *Al-Masrey Al-Youm*, November 30, 2012.
57. *Egypt Independent*, January 7, 2013.
58. Ibid.
59. Interview with Minister of Education, Dr. Ibrahim Ghoniem, *Al-Ahram* (in Arabic) January 30, 2013.
60. *Egypt Independent*, Sunday, January 13, 2013.
61. Ibid.
62. Shahine, Gihan, Risks to Al-Azhar? *Al-Ahram Weekly*, July 25, 2013.
63. *Al-Fager*, July 26, 2013.
64. Essam El-Din, Gamal, The Brothers' next stop, *Al-Ahram Weekly*, January 4, 2013. See also *Al-Fager*, July 26, 2013.
65. Ibid.
66. In 2006, Al-Tayeb condemned a military-style parade by Brotherhood students on the Al-Azhar University campus in his capacity as the then president of the University, charging that they had worn black facemasks

- 'like Hamas, Hizbullah and the Republican Guard in Iran'; see for more details Shahine, Gihan, *Risks to Al-Azhar?* Op. cit.
67. Ibid.
  68. Roshedy, Rami, the battle of *Al-Tayeb* and *Al-Shater*, *Rose El-Yousseff*, April 13, 2013.
  69. Roshedy, Rami, The full Story of the Salafist Faction of the MB, *Rose El-Yousseff* (Arabic state-owned magazine based in Cairo), March 2, 2013.
  70. The Economist, March 9, 2013.
  71. El-Tonsi, Ahmed, One hundred days of alienation, *Al-Ahram Weekly*, October 18–24, 2012.
  72. Al-Masery Al-Youm, February 15, 2013.
  73. *Al-Akbbar* (Arabic state-owned newspaper based in Cairo), February 25, 2013 and *Al-Masery Al-Youm*, February 25, 2013.
  74. *Al-Masery Al-Youm*, March 3, 2013.
  75. Abdel-Latif, Omayma, Unholy alliance, *Al-Ahram Weekly*, January 4, 2013.
  76. Shahine, Gihan, Akhwana': myth or reality? *Al-Ahram Weekly*, September 13–19, 2012.
  77. Ibid.
  78. Pollard, Ruth, After Mursi, political Islam losing ground in Egypt, August 2, 2013, available at: <http://www.smh.com.au/world/after-mursi-political-islam-losing-ground-in-egypt-20130802-2r3kz.html>.
  79. Ashour, Omar, Egypt's New Old Government, op. cit.
  80. Mabrouk, Mirette F. and Hausheer, Stefanie A., The State of the Arab Transitions: Hope Resilient Despite Many Unmet Demands, Atlantic Council, Rafik Hariri Center for the Middle East, Policy Issue, February 2014, pp. 10–12.
  81. Ghanem, Hafez, Egypt's Difficult Transition, op. cit., p. 14.
  82. Gregorian, Harch, The Salafist Winter: Aiding Post-Conflict Statebuilding in Egypt, Tunisia and Libya, the Canadian Defence & Foreign Affairs Institute, Policy Paper, July 2013, p. 3.
  83. Ibid.
  84. Adli, Amr, My Conversation with the Devil (Part One), *Jadaliyya*, July 6 2013, available at: [http://www.jadaliyya.com/pages/index/12473/my-conversation-with-the-devil\\_30-june-and-beyond](http://www.jadaliyya.com/pages/index/12473/my-conversation-with-the-devil_30-june-and-beyond).
  85. Gad, Emad, The awareness factor, *Al-Ahram Weekly*, September 27–October 3, 2012.
  86. Ibid.
  87. Egypt Independent, January 7, 2013.
  88. The Washington Post, March 14, 2013.
  89. Egypt Independent, Monday, January 7, 2013.

90. The Washington Post, March 14, 2013.
91. Ibid.
92. Smith, Lee, Egypt Against Itself, A society on the edge of chaos. The Weekly Standard, February 18, 2013.
93. Ibid.
94. Samhouri, Mohammed, Egypt and the IMF, Time for a Different Approach, Sada Journal, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, April 9, 2013.
95. Nassar, Galal, Enough with tyranny, Al-Ahram Weekly, January 4, 2013.
96. Fotopoulos, Takis, The Muslim Brotherhood, op. cit., p. 41.
97. Egypt Independent, January 14, 2013.
98. *Al-Masrey Al-Youm*, January 11, 2013.
99. Abdel Ghany, Sayed, The Brothers, op. cit.
100. Ashraf El-Sherif, "What Path Will Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood Choose?" Op. cit.
101. Kinnimont, Jane, New Socio-Political Actors: The Brotherhood and Business in Egypt, The German Marshall Fund of the United States, opinions on the Mediterranean, July 2012, p. 3.
102. Roll, Stephan, Egypt's Business Elite after Mubarak, SWP Research Paper, Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, German Institute for International and Security Affairs, pp. 15–16.
103. Roll, Stephan, Egypt's Business Elite, op. cit., pp. 15–16.
104. El-Houdaiby, Ibrahim, From Prison to Palace: the Muslim Brotherhood's challenges and responses in post-revolution Egypt, Working Paper, FRIDE and Hivos, No. 117, February, 2013, pp. 3–4.
105. Roll, Stephan, Egypt's Business, op. cit., pp. 14–15.
106. Essam El-Din, Gamal, Wiping clean the rubber stamp, Al-Ahram Weekly, February 20, 2013.
107. For instance, FJP's *Essam Al-Erian*, however, argued that "it is useless to keep corrupt former officials in prison when they could be set free in exchange for the return of the billions they embezzled. See for more details: Essam El-Din, Gamal, Wiping clean, op. cit.
108. Dyer, Emily, Egypt's Permanent Revolution, in Guitta, Olivier, Dyer, Emily, Simcox, Robin, Stuart, Hannah and Sutton Pupert, the Arab Spring An Assessment Three Years on (the Henry Jackson Society, 2014: 31–41), pp. 35–36.
109. Paciello, Maria Cristina, Economic and Social Policies in Post-Mubarak Egypt, Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI), insight Egypt, No. 3, November 2013, pp. 1–3.
110. Mabrouk, Mirette F. and Hausheer, Stefanie A., The State of the Arab Transitions, op. cit., pp. 10–12.
111. Ghanem, Hafez, Egypt's Difficult Transition, op. cit., p. 25.

112. Dyer, Emily, *Egypt's Permanent Revolution*, op. cit., p. 36.
113. Samhour, Mohammed, *Egypt and the IMF*, op. cit.
114. Dyer, Emily, *Egypt's Permanent Revolution*, op. cit., pp. 35–36.
115. Samhour, Mohammed, *Egypt and the IMF*, op. cit.
116. Kinnimont, Jane, “Bread, Dignity and Social Justice”, op. cit., p. 18.
117. Ibid.
118. Ghanem, Hafez, *Egypt's Difficult Transition*, pp. 24–25.
119. Ibid.
120. Abdel Ghany, Sayed, Abdel Ghany, Sayed, *the Brothers, the Revolution, and the Right to Protest*.
121. Ibid.
122. Ibid.
123. *Al-Masaa* (Arabic independent newspaper based in Cairo), January 30, 2013.
124. *Egypt Daily News*, February 15, 2013.
125. *Al-Masry Al-Youm* (Arabic independent newspaper based in Cairo), January 4, 2013.
126. Abdel Ghany, Sayed, *The Brothers*, op. cit.
127. Essam El-Din, Gamal, *Wiping clean*, op. cit.
128. Abdel Ghany, Sayed, *The Brothers*, op. cit.
129. Essam El-Din, Gamal, *Wiping clean*, op. cit.
130. Abdel Ghany, Sayed, *The Brothers*, op. cit.
131. Freedom House, *Freedom in the World 2014: Egypt*, available at: <http://FREEDOMHOUSE.ORG/REPORT/FREEDOM-WORLD/2014/EGYPT-0#U6AHGVMSYSO>.
132. Brown, Nathan J., and Bentivoglio, Katie, *Egypt's Resurgent Authoritarianism, It is a Way of Life*, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, October 9, 2012, available at: <http://carnegieendowment.org/2014/10/09/egypt-s-resurgent-authoritarianism-it-s-way-of-life/hrez>.
133. Dyer, Emily, *Egypt's Permanent Revolution*, op. cit., pp. 37–38.
134. Ibid.
135. For a full official English version of the 2012 Egypt's Constitution, State Information Service, *The Constitution of the Arab Republic of Egypt*, available at: <http://www.sis.gov.eg/newvr/theconstitution.pdf>.
136. Zaree, Mohamed, *Administrative repression*, *Al-Ahram weekly*, June 25, 2013.
137. Ibid.
138. Ibid.
139. Ibid.
140. Essam El-Din, Gamal, *Wiping clean*, op. cit.
141. *Al-Watan Newspaper* (Cairo-based Arabic newspaper), January 4, 2013.



142. Essam El-Din, Gamal, Wiping clean, op. cit.
143. Zaree, Mohamed, Administrative repression, op. cit.
144. Egypt Independent, January 31, 2013.
145. Human Rights Watch (HRW), Egypt: Judge Government on Respect for People's Rights: Protect Political Rights of Muslim Brotherhood, HRW, July 3, 2013, available at: <https://www.hrw.org/news/2013/07/03/egypt-judge-government-respect-peoples-rights>.
146. HRW, Egypt: Judge Government, op. cit.
147. Tavana, Daniel, The Future of Egypt's Electoral Law, Sada Journal, September 11, 2012, available at: <http://carnegieendowment.org/2012/09/11/future-of-egypt-s-electoral-law/dt37>.
148. Essam El-Din, Gamal, Less haste, more speed, Al-Ahram Weekly, March 1, 2013.
149. Egypt Independent, January 10, 2013.
150. Essam El-Din, Gamal, Less haste, op. cit.
151. Ibid
152. Leila, Reem, Time to ponder, Al-Ahram Weekly, March 14, 2013.
153. Hamad, Mahmoud, Egypt's Litigious Transition: Judicial Intervention and the Muddled Road to Democracy, Atlantic Council, Rafik Hariri Center for the Middle East, Policy Issue, May, 2013, p. 3.
154. Ibid.

Egypt in Crisis

The Fall of Islamism and Prospects of Democratization

Arafat, A.A.-D.

2018, XV, 295 p., Hardcover

ISBN: 978-3-319-56019-9