

# Collaboration on City Planning: A Lesson from Mayor Joko Widodo (2005–2011)

*Anwar Sanusi*

## INTRODUCTION

If a survey were conducted today to name the most outstanding figure in Indonesia, the majority of people would probably choose one particular person: Joko Widodo (known as Jokowi). Jokowi won the presidential elections in 2014, thereby becoming the first Indonesian president not to have come from the political elite or be an army general. This case study, however, primarily considers his achievements before becoming president, when he was the mayor of Solo City.

Jokowi is a former businessman from the furniture trade who later became mayor of Solo City, serving from 2005 to 2010 and part of a second term from 2010 to 2015. In 2012, he was selected by his political party, the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDIP), to run for governor of the Special Capital Region of Jakarta (DKI Jakarta). Despite strong support for the incumbent Governor, Dr. Ir. Fauzi Bowo,

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A. Sanusi (✉)

Ministry of Villages, Development of Disadvantaged Regions, and  
Transmigration Republic Indonesia, Jakarta, Republic of Indonesia  
e-mail: anwaru@rocketmail.com

by the majority of political parties that dominated the provincial legislative council, Joko Widodo was elected Governor of DKI Jakarta for the period 2012–2017. Joko Widodo was subsequently selected by five political parties as their candidate for president for the period 2014–2019 and was declared the victor on July 22, 2014, by the Indonesian General Election Commission (KPU) Indonesia for the period 2014–2019 with 53.15% of votes.

Jokowi first came to prominence as a public official as a result of his transformative approach toward street vendors in Solo City and through his development of various pro-people policies. His approach was apparent not only in the way he dealt with the issue of the street vendors (*pedagang kaki lima*, or PKL) but also in his efforts to simplify and shorten delays for those requiring public services. He also worked to promote the “Esemka” cars produced by students from Vocational Senior Secondary Education (SMK, pronounced es-em-ka) in Solo, with the goal of establishing a national automotive industry.

He projected the image of a public servant rather than a bureaucratic figure, adopting a style of leadership that was considered by many to be genuine, rather than about building an image. His leadership style also promoted participation. For example, in the debate between the presidential and vice presidential candidates on June 8, 2014, Jokowi stated his view that democracy entails listening to people’s aspirations:

This Republic belongs to all of us. What people want is to have a better standard of living, and to be more prosperous. Democracy, in my opinion, is to listen to people’s aspirations and listen well. Why do we pay visits every day from one village to another or from one market to another (a practice known as *blusukan*)? This is because we want to listen to what they have to say. Mr. JK and I have proven it. Mr. JK resolved conflicts in Poso and Aceh through dialogue, and I resolved the issues of Tanah Abang (market relocation) and Waduk Pluit (dam normalization) through dialogue with society (Jokowi, on his Presidential campaign, June 8, 2014).

He also argued that, as leaders, the president and vice president have an obligation to implement the aspirations of the people. This approach compared favorably to the old image of the bureaucratic figure, perceived as rigid, impersonal, and dedicated to red tape.

This attitude of listening to the voice of the public as a way of understanding public issues became the trademark of Jokowi and came to

be known by the Javanese word *blusukan*. This term has since become widely used, with *blusukan* recently entering the Indonesian dictionary to describe a leader's ability to grasp public aspirations directly through visiting the sites of contention. His approach since he was mayor of Solo City has thus been associated with a style of leadership that promotes participation, something he continued when he became the Governor of DKI Jakarta.

### SURAKARTA: A CITY OF DIVERSE COLORS

Surakarta, or Solo as it is known locally, is located in the southern part of the Central Java provinces and is about 110 km east of Yogyakarta. The population in December 2012 was 545,653, and by December 2013, the population had increased by 18,006–563,659 people (Population and Civil Registration Service Office of Surakarta City 2013). The growth rate of Solo's population between 2000 and 2010 was 0.25%, far below the growth of the population of Central Java, at 0.46%. Yet, compared with other cities in Indonesia, the population density is relatively high, at 12,799 people/km<sup>2</sup>. This makes Surakarta city the most densely populated in Central Java and the eighth most densely populated in the country, with the 13th smallest area. The most populated district in Solo is Pasar Kliwon market, with an area only a tenth of the whole of Solo. Without control over the growth of the population, increases in density in Surakarta city are likely to continue.

Solo retains its position as the last remaining aristocratic symbol of Muslim Java and therefore is considered to be a place that preserves the "spirit of Java." According to a local newspaper, *Joglo Semar* (2012), Solo has a reputation for preserving traditional Javanese culture—both tangible in the form of a variety of arts and pottery, and intangible in the form of gentle, polite attitudes, and good manners. Historically, Solo City also made great contributions to the development of Islam in Indonesia and is considered a center of Islamic teaching. Many Indonesian Islamic organizations, such as the Islamic Chamber of Commerce (SDI), were started here.

The ethnic and social diversity of Solo, along with these highly cultured attitudes, has given it a sometimes-contradictory reputation. On the one hand, people respect harmony; on the other hand, things can easily turn toward chaos. People there are well known for being polite and tolerant, but they can also be radically intolerant. Thus, while relationships between the various ethnicities, cultures, and religions in

Solo are generally harmonious, there have been occasional conflicts and riots triggered by racial issues. In fact, the biggest riots since Indonesian independence in 1945 occurred in Solo in 1980 and 1998, triggered by ethnic clashes between the Javanese and ethnic Chinese communities. The first mass riots started on November 20, 1980, during the “New Order Era” following a fight in a sports school between Pipit Supriyadi, a young Javanese man, and Kicak, a young Chinese man. The fighting destroyed stores belonging to Chinese people and then spread to other cities in Central Java. At the end of the New Order regime in 1998, Solo was on fire again, but this time, the riots were caused by an economic crisis that led to public demands for President Suharto, who had ruled for 32 years, to step down (Siegel 1986, 1998). While ethnic conflicts occurred in three cities—Bandung, Solo, and Jakarta—the riots in Solo were on a much greater scale compared with the other cities.

The diversity of its socio-cultural elements mixed with the dynamics of its politics makes Solo a city that is always a barometer for the socio-political situation in Indonesia. To be mayor in such situation requires leadership that is flexible but firm.

### A GLIMPSE OF JOKOWI’S LIFE

The story of Jokowi’s life mirrors the experience of many Indonesians. He was born, like many other people, low down on the social and economic spectrum, on June 21, 1961, in the cheapest room of Brayat Minulyo hospital. Jokowi’s family was poor and lived a nomadic life, moving from one small rented house to others by the banks of rivers. The situation at that time was not very different from today, and many people were being bulldozed off their land. Nevertheless, he was very proud of what his parents accomplished. “My parents, Notomiharjo and Sujiatmi, are great figures who know how to manage a happy family in spite of the meagerness of their lives,” said Joko Widodo (Detiknews 2014).

As a child, Joko’s family was forced to move because of continuous rent increases. They moved to a home on the bank of the Dawung Kidul River. Conditions were similar, but the house was smaller. Next, they moved again to the Munggur area by the Pepe River, where his parents added three more daughters to the family. The meager income that he earned from working as a village carpenter forced Notomiharjo to juggle the family finances to make ends meet, but he was able to send little Joko and his three daughters to school. After moving to the Kali

Anyar riverbank, where a large timber market was thriving, the life of the Notomiharjo family gradually began to improve. Thus, Jokowi spent his childhood and adolescence in Solo, moving from a quiet village life to a life to the bustling Gilingan market in Surakarta.

Little Joko first studied in State Elementary School 111 in Tirtoyoso, Solo, between 1968 and 1974. He continued his schooling in Solo City. For him, going to school was a luxury that had to be cherished. He saw school as “a liberating channel” from poverty. He could not afford a bike, so he walked to school instead. Step by step, little Joko (until the age of 12) observed how to cut wood and chop bamboo, and spent time gathering duck eggs that others had missed in the rice fields (Detiknews 2014).

He did not want to be dependent on his father, so he started to think about how to become a merchant. His interest in the world of business was obvious as he called out to vendors that passed by. “One day, I overexcitedly called a vendor over, not knowing what he was selling. It turned out that it was firewood. Feeling guilty, my mother had to pay for the firewood although she did not need it,” said Jokowi. Those vendors inspired him to be persistent in earning a living. Since then, he became close to the world of “poor people” (*wong cilik*). “My childhood was my first lesson in understanding how people live. What I am doing now is the result of how I grew up. Riverbank slum areas in Surakarta taught me a lot of things: human life and hopes,” said Joko Widodo (Yudha 2014; Detiknews 2014).

After completing his senior high school education in SMA Negeri 6 Solo, Jokowi furthered his studies at the University of Gadjah Mada (UGM) Yogyakarta, a university that has been very critical of government policies. Jokowi studied in the Faculty of Forestry. The reason was simple. Since he was a kid, he had been drawn to timber and bamboo, starting from small businesses with his father and relatives, as well as his community, made up of mostly carpenters and wood sellers. It seemed that wood had become a “symbol” for his life. It means that anything to do with wood seemed to be attached to his way of life (Endah 2012a, b).

After graduating, Jokowi worked for PT Kertas Kraft Aceh, a state-owned enterprise (BUMN) based in Aceh. At that time, the situation there was dangerous and growing worse due to the Aceh separatist movement (GAM). Armed conflicts frequently broke out in Aceh as GAM grew steadily stronger, often provoking and intimidating non-native people. In 1988, after 2 years working in that company, Jokowi

returned to Solo to start a business as a furniture entrepreneur. Initially, Jokowi worked in a furniture company owned by his uncle, Pakde Miyono. Later, Jokowi started his own furniture company. After experiencing various ups and downs in the business, Jokowi was finally chosen as the chairman of the Indonesia Furniture Industry and Handicraft Association (Asmindo), Surakarta local commissary (Komda). This was Jokowi's entry point into the world of politics.

Jokowi actually had no ambitions of entering the political world. Calls for Jokowi to enter the political world were fostered by a paradoxical situation: Following the economic crisis that hit Indonesia in 1998, there was an increase in the dollar exchange rate against the Indonesian rupiah, which resulted in huge profits for exporters, including Jokowi. However, this situation also left many people in difficulty. Moreover, while people from outside Solo acknowledged Solo as a city of culture, many villagers who made traditional arts found it difficult to live. Jokowi said, "That was what encouraged me to initiate the establishment of an organization to protect the craftsmen and furniture entrepreneurs of Solo. The world of money took me to politics ... a world that was initially far from my preference" (Endah 2012).

Jokowi oversaw the opening of the Indonesia Furniture and Handicraft Industry Association (Asmindo) branch, an organization for furniture entrepreneurs, which included furniture entrepreneurs from all over Indonesia and more than 140 craft and furniture business people in Solo. It was initiated by Jokowi in Solo on July 11, 2002, and he was elected chairman. Jokowi's activities in the organization drew the attention of politicians. In 2004, there were many rumors emanating from the board and members of the Asmindo regional commissary of Surakarta. "I heard the news that Mr. Jokowi was running for city mayor," said Jokowi, quoting an Asmindo colleague. Jokowi just laughed and confessed that he had no intention whatsoever of being mayor of Surakarta city. The income from the furniture business was a blessing for him. He claimed that he had no political ambitions. "What was more hilarious for me was that I never dealt with politics. I was never interested in joining any political party and never involved in any arena that was associated with politics and government," he said (Detiknews 2014).

One factor that did encourage Jokowi to enter politics was the falling reputation of Solo City. Although it was one of the most popular tourist destinations in Indonesia and a center of Javanese culture, it was improperly managed. There was a gloomy outlook for the city—many city areas

were not well maintained, hotels had no business, and tourism potential was stagnant—and the majesty of Solo City seemed to be dying. Jokowi then thought about what development was possible and for whom (Endah 2012a, b). Entering 2005, pressure from Jokowi's business associates for him to enter politics became very strong. Officially, the Asmindo committee gave its full support for Jokowi to join the contest for mayor of Solo City. This time, he no longer laughed, but he still said no.

That remained the case until one day when Jokowi got “a spiritual call” after he prayed to God to ask for direction. Subsequently, he talked to his wife and called his children, who were studying in Singapore. His family generally opposed his decision, as stated by his oldest son, Gibran: “Why do you want to join the contest for mayor? I disagree. I would prefer you as you are now, not a public official and not involved in politics” (Detiknews 2014). Nevertheless, Jokowi had made up his mind, and his family respected his decision. The next day, he went to the Asmindo office and asked: “Who will be my running mate in the contest?” All the committee members of Asmindo responded positively.

The process gathered speed. The Asmindo team moved aggressively, as they had made thorough preparations. Jokowi chose to make his campaign as honest and as humble as possible; he did not want anything to do with money politics. “I also firmly informed my colleagues not to waste money on the campaign,” said Jokowi. He decisively paired with Rudy to enter the Solo City mayoral election in 2005. Jokowi was promoted by the PDIP and the PKB. The other candidates were Ahmad Purnomo-Istar Yuliadi, promoted by the PAN, Hardono-Dipokusumo, promoted by Golkar-PD-PKS, and Slamet-Hengky, promoted by small political parties. On June 27, 2005, Jokowi-Rudy won the election with more than 37% of the votes.

That was the beginning of Jokowi's life in politics, which for him was something new and completely different from his previous activities. However, he committed himself to entering the political world by listening and seeing what the people said and did. His character as a leader was emphasized as he listened to the general public. For him, democracy meant seeing and listening to what people were directly feeling.

On taking office in his first term of office as mayor of Solo City, Jokowi inherited a very difficult situation: suboptimal government performance, high poverty and unemployment rates, and bureaucratic practices based more on rules than on a desire to deliver good public service. The bureaucracy was seen as being slow, red-tape-bound, and

distant from the public. The mental shift that was needed was to change the bureaucratic culture and the mindset of the bureaucrats into a more humanistic approach. Apart from that, Jokowi also introduced a new tradition in planning the government's programs and activities by talking directly to citizens. This later became known as *blusukan*—looking at and listening directly to the facts and to public aspirations.

A number of Jokowi's legacies in Solo City (Surakarta) can be used as models for managing the best public policies, including the relocation of street vendors from Banjarsari, revitalization of traditional markets, and shortening the process of issuing ID cards.

## JOKOWI'S SUCCESS STORIES

### *Handling Street Vendors*

In 2005, when Jokowi was elected mayor of Solo City, polls showed that many people were unhappy with the number of street vendors. The number of street vendors had grown uncontrollably, with more than a thousand vendors spread across the city, leading to many social problems, including crime. The issue that drew most attention was the presence of street vendors in Banjarsari at the 45 Struggle Monument (Monumen Juang 45). They made a living from selling second-hand goods, and therefore, they named the market Klithikan (pasar Klithikan). Public officials initially ignored the vendors' practice of operating in Banjarsari without permission. This proliferation of street vendors in Solo turned the green open space at Banjarsari into a messy, dirty, and disgusting area to be avoided. At night, the location became a zone of prostitution, making local residents uneasy.

Due to this situation, there was no other alternative but to relocate the vendors. In the past, as in other Indonesian cities, the government used a repressive approach to solving this kind of problem by calling in the police and bulldozing vendors' pitches, which often led to conflict and even loss of life. While this coercive approach might initially seem efficient, it merely provided temporary relief and did not account for the problem of new unemployment, which could lead to increased social vulnerability. The question was how. It was out of the question to bulldoze them. The city hall of Surakarta had been burned down twice (1998 and 1999) due to communication breakdowns between the leaders and the people.



Jokowi tried to see the street vendors positively and felt that they needed to be empowered (Yudha 2014, 334–337). From this perspective, the street vendors were not pests to be wiped out but rather partners to work with. He believed that they were in fact the strength of the real economy and should be considered potential assets in boosting local economic development. Their persistence and their spirit in making ends meet for their families were something that the government ought to facilitate. They were also people with hearts and feelings. Therefore, a heart-to-heart approach was the one that Jokowi used to persuade them. In Javanese philosophy, it was known as “treating them as humans,” or putting ourselves in their shoes. Jokowi wanted to listen to their hearts, avoid violence, and offer solutions with love.

Then, the idea emerged of organizing an open buffet for the street vendors. This idea came from Jokowi’s experience in the furniture business: A good buffet usually ended up with a good business deal. The open buffet was then held, and all the street vendor associations in Banjarsari were invited to come to the event. Knowing that they were going to be relocated, the street vendors prepared themselves. They talked with the non-governmental organization that oversaw them. Banners were brought to the venue in Loji Gandrung, the mayor’s official residence. But they were surprised because in fact there was no discussion whatsoever about relocating them. It was only about eating and making small talk. As Jokowi used to say, AEGH stands for “After Eating–Go Home.”

A second open buffet was organized with the same agenda: to eat and make small talk. The street vendors were confused; if there were nothing important to say, why had the mayor invited them? But the open buffets were held again and again—in fact, a total of 54 banquets were held. At the 54th buffet (seven months later), Jokowi then conveyed his intention to the street vendors. Luckily, the situation was conducive to communication, and they openly aired their problems, specifically that they were afraid to lose their customers. For a solution to the relocation issue, Jokowi offered to publicize their relocation through printed mass media and local television. Jokowi also promised to put posters in strategic locations in the heart of Solo City and ordered the transportation service office to add a new bus route to the new site.

The vendors finally agreed to the program of the Surakarta city government. However, they also asked for other concessions, such as free kiosks. This request was the hardest one to meet. Fortunately, Jokowi

succeeded in convincing the regional legislative council to approve the deal on one condition: The vendors must pay a daily fee of 2600 IDR/hari. Within an 8-year period, the eight-billion IDR investment made by the city government would be returned. The street vendors were then relocated with a festival-like ceremony called *boyongan*, making them the center of public attention. All the vendors wore traditional clothes, and those that accompanied them wore traditional military uniforms. The festival was just like a 1-day royal ceremony. There were 989 vendors involved in that *boyongan* ceremony. The Monumen Juang in Banjarsari was restored to being a green open space, thus helping to improve the city's oxygen supply, and the area once again became a clean and convenient location for leisure activities.

Jokowi's success in relocating the street vendors was mostly determined by a very effective communication strategy, that is, listening to feedback from stakeholders directly related to the street vendors. Indeed, what Jokowi did seems less efficient because it took a long time—54 meetings—and required significant resources. However, the true value was in the legacy: The methods utilized by Jokowi were shown to be effective, especially in obtaining the support of street vendors and other stakeholders. Evidence for this can be seen in the sincere compliance of the street vendors in moving to a new place, and the street carnival, which received widespread media coverage. The approach catapulted Jokowi's name to the fore as an innovative mayor.

### *Revitalization of the Traditional Market*

The other lesson that we can learn from Solo City concerns the revitalization of the traditional market. Trade and services have long been the largest sectors in Solo City, and together, they generate almost 30% of all revenues. However, prior to Jokowi's mayorship, there had been little clear management and for 40 years, and no new markets opened in the city. People were more and more reluctant to go to traditional markets, because they were muddy, slum-like, and uncomfortable, so people went to the mall instead. The negative stigma against these traditional markets can be hard to remove. However, traditional markets can play a very large role in expanding the domestic economy. Sociologically, markets are also considered an effective arena for the exchange of information between people in order to strengthen social ties. In the opinion of Jokowi, small popular economic environments with economic potential

should be encouraged (Jokowi, interview by the author in Mata Najwa 2012). Jokowi described his approach as not anti-mall or supermarket, “but we as a city government should control them, limit them. Budgets should be used as much as possible to the community, especially the underprivileged” (BBC News Interview 2012).

For these reasons, traditional markets needed to be revitalized. Physically, the buildings were renovated and polished up, and by 2011, 19 of the 42 traditional Solo markets had been revitalized. In addition, traders were provided with training sessions relevant to the development of business, such as financial management, business administration, entrepreneurship, human resources, the arrangement of goods, and customer service. Traders responded well to the opportunity, including one who says his turnover increased by 41% after he attended training (*Kompas Newspaper* 2011). Prizes such as cars were given to attract the public to shop in the traditional markets. Within 3 years, revenue increased considerably—from 7 billion IDR in 2007 to 12 billion in 2008 and 19 billion in 2010. From this case, we can learn that it is possible to reorganize city management systems if there is a serious desire to do so. The most important thing is that there is political will, effective communication, and field supervision. However, there are still some problems connected with this revitalization, with some markets located quite far away from the community, reducing the number of visitors. As a result, some stalls have not been filled (“Jokowi Revitalisation for City Prostitution or Market for Prostitution” 2014).

### *Building Trust in Government*

One of the issues perceived to be the cause of the failure of the previous relocation process was the absence of trust from the street vendors toward the city government. They lost trust following the government’s frequent failure to keep their promises while never appropriately accommodating people’s aspirations. In the case of the relocation of street vendors’ in Banjarsari, the majority was against it due to the fact that the move would have adversely affected them. For them, the city government was not able to find a solution or appropriate alternative choices for relocation. The relocation of the Klithikan market to Semanggi was previously considered inappropriate, because it was merely a kiosk with no roof, walls, and lacked other supporting facilities and infrastructure. Moreover, the location was relatively far from downtown, and as it was

also a red-light district, it was the last place that many people would want to visit.

Both the city government and the street vendors aimed to build empathy by trying to put themselves in each other's shoes. The city government built a mindset that "the street vendors are the partners of the city government"—not an enemy that must be eliminated, a sign that the city government was trying to build empathy and to respect the existence of the vendors. This was proven during the early encounter in Loji Gandrung. There was no statement from the government about the relocation plan, because they were aware that the street vendors were against it. The city government told them only after they had gotten to know one another after numerous encounters.

There was mutual respect and no prejudice during the process. The building of respect, for example, took place during the registration of the street vendors. During this process, the city government, through the staff of the Street Vendor Association Office (PPKL) and with support from the public order police squad (Satpol Pamong Praja), treated them kindly. The socialization of the street vendors was conducted directly, as the city government raised awareness of the importance of organizing them through direct communication and by treating them as partners. Furthermore, the stakeholders mutually supported one another, rather than doing the opposite. As stated by one of the radical leaders of the street vendors, who were initially strongly against the relocation plan: "... I will always understand what the city government wants, and I cherish it ...". The city government also understood the street vendors by listening and welcoming their propositions on the relocation.

There was a shared effort to exchange concerns and experiences. Various organizations provided technical assistance to them. In the initial process, SOMPIS, Solidaritas Masyarakat Pinggiran Surakarta (Solidarity for Peripheral Surakarta Society), went along with them to voice their objections to the relocation and to prepare a strategy if they failed. A series of six meetings was conducted to consolidate the rejection plan while shoring up eight related associations (Handayani 2006). When the street vendors came to an agreement on the relocation, university representatives were employed to be the facilitators in announcing their designated kiosks, as they were considered neutral. After that, the universities organized training for the vendors through a business management course.

In building trust, the government did so through an informal approach by municipal officials (the mayor, vice mayor, and head office PPKL) to vendors. The city government officials went to the street vendors' booths with no regard for their own working hours. They engaged the vendors regardless of the time of day and even came in casual clothes. As one of the society leaders stated, "... perhaps you will find it hard to believe that Mr. Rudy (the vice mayor) will come to that market early in the morning and nobody knows when he will come, and he asked 'What do you need?' I saw it myself." Whereas another vendor said, "there we met Mr. Jokowi, socializing, telling jokes, we hardly felt that we were in a face-to-face meeting with the mayor, and he was often accompanied by Mr. Bambang. At that time it was like a garden party ..." and "Mr. Jokowi often came here like a friend with no bodyguards" (Sufianty 2014). The meetings were held in an informal atmosphere, and serious issues were discussed in a relaxed manner.

All stakeholders mapped out their roles and contributions. Contributions made by the stakeholders varied depending on their resources. The city government sought to facilitate the process, the street vendors and community leaders shared opinions on the proposals during discussions, NGOs accompanied the street vendors, and universities assisted vendors during the process, and by providing technical help with building design. The budget for this activity came from the city government and the street vendors. The UNS University, Surakarta, and local officials provided technical expertise. In addition, some local officials, such as the Office of Management Vendors, Bappeda (regional development agency), and the Department of Market Management, were deeply involved in the planning, design, financing, and coordination of this initiative. The local parliament was also involved when this initiative was applied as a social strategy and a two-way consultation approach that minimizes social conflict and accommodates the voices of all stakeholders (Sufianty 2014).

The next stage was to build a shared problem solution. In accordance with the SECI model approach, this phase is understood as a phase to communicate tacit knowledge possessed by every stakeholder, especially the street vendors. With a common understanding, it will create a collective agreement. In this context, the government and vendors agreed on the crucial issues and the constraints faced by the street vendors in moving to a new location. The PKL originally filed numerous claims to overcome the obstacles posed by the new location. Among the demands

that were satisfactorily resolved were: an intercity minibus route, a wider road, promotion (advertising the relocated, newly built Klitikan market for four months on local television and in print media), cooperative capital (5 million dollars per PKL), guarantees of no street vendors there, free stalls, free licenses, and a six-month payment holiday (Sufianty 2014).

The final stage requires building a shared commitment. After the learning process, the city government tried to do this through efforts to internalize the agreed-on solutions in order to maintain consistency. In the process of planning the relocation of street vendors in Banjarsari, there was a change in the attitudes of the vendors. At first, there had been a refusal to understand; then they showed a willingness to move, and even gave ideas for the move. This occurred as a result of the authentic dialogue based on trust that had been built between all parties. Reciprocal relationships are mutually adapted toward learning. Collaborative processes that occurred in planning the relocation of street vendors in Banjarsari built trust through relationships and mutual understanding. This led to joint problem-solving efforts through learning, and strengthening of commitment through adaptation. All stages occurred through face-to-face dialogue.

## ANALYSIS: JOKOWI'S INNOVATION IN CITY PLANNING

### *Blusukan (Indonesia SECI Model)*

Based on the above case study, we can see that Jokowi's leadership style in building Solo City (2005–2012) was instrumental in handling communication breakdowns within society through an alternative leadership approach that changed the style and strategy of communication. The participatory approach is in line with the phronetic leadership concept—namely a contextual leadership that exploits precision in making a decision in line with the right time and space in the framework of achieving goals (Nonaka and Takeuchi 1995). Moreover, in the framework of knowledge-based management, Jokowi's leadership can be examined through the SECI Model approach, which explores tacit as well as explicit knowledge. The main question that needs to be answered is how Jokowi's leadership can respond to various public issues to promote successful social development. The next involves considering how these

various successes can be institutionalized within a more permanent policy system.

One of the authentic approaches Jokowi's utilizes in accommodating the aspirations of society is using face-to-face greetings and meeting common people, an approach known by the popular term described above: *blusukan*. This term reflects inclusive and down-to-earth political practices that break away from the formalities and rigidity of a leader who must respond to the democratic demands of society (Yudha 2014). This approach is a strategy to free that leader from a bureaucratic culture that tends to be rigid and that tends to involve only one-way communication. This bureaucratic culture thrives within a paternalistic system that always emphasizes subordinates' submission to their superiors in order to earn rewards. This constant effort to please superiors is known as the "yes-boss" culture (or known in Indonesia as ABS). Clearly, this leads to a very big gap between what the public demands and bureaucratic responses. Rather than feeling a sense of certainty that the government will act based on their real needs, people can only hope that their wishes and demands will be included in a bureaucratic agenda. Because of that, what Jokowi has done is a creative breakthrough in listening to the objective voice of society. *Blusukan* is a contrary of leadership behavior or, as Max Weber dubbed it, a characteristic of a legal, rational leader that prioritizes society as the holder of the mandate. Many leaders tend to forget their virtues and become trapped in a corrupt culture.

Jokowi's justification for *blusukan* is that it helps him discover the true condition of society, which is often obscured by a bureaucratic culture that is overly formal and opaque. By deconstructing a whole bureaucratic system that is formalistic, procedural, and confining, a more aspirational public policy can be achieved. What Jokowi has done, in Rhodes's terms, is known as governing without government (Yudha 2014). Thus, the process of building trust was achieved through the following process: building a common understanding, attaining solutions to problems, and building commitment. In terms of the SECI Model (Nonaka and Takeuchi 1995), what is being done by Jokowi can be understood as a knowledge creation process that begins with building a common understanding with key stakeholders, vendors, and NGOs.

In the context of knowledge management, what Jokowi has done is to strive to create as many arenas as possible for people to channel their aspirations through creating *ba*. In this case, *ba* was achieved by

frequently inviting street vendors as key stakeholders to convey their ideas and propositions surrounding public issues. Many people considered them as the source of the city's problems. Although Jokowi could have used the power at his disposal, he did not do so. Instead, he preferred to use the approach of an adaptive leader, using tacit knowledge much more than explicit knowledge. This was shown by not giving directives to the street vendors or the flea market, but by listening to their creative ideas and propositions.

### *Jokowi's Leadership Styles*

Jokowi's leadership style in addressing public issues in Surakarta provides an example of how leadership does not just rely on the authority or power to execute decisions. The coercive approach, widely used by leaders, decrees that people who break a rule should be punished. For Indonesian local government, what Jokowi does can be seen as a creative breakthrough in public policy implementation that considers the essential aspects of humanity, i.e., the need to have one's existence respected. The action of respecting others is considered an important part of Javanese values and is known as *diuwongke*, or treating people as human beings. Jokowi puts this concept into practice through recognition that other people's opinions, ideas, and experiences are likely to be different from each other. Jokowi realized that everyone has experience and if they are given an opportunity to share or communicate them, this will produce better ideas that will be more useful in solving problems, while at the same time avoiding actions that could hurt people.

When Jokowi was a mayor at Solo City, he adopted what could be seen as a phronetic leadership style. According to Nonaka and Takeuchi (1995), a phronetic leader practices moral discernment about what is good and acts on it in every situation. Judgments must be guided by the individual's values and ethics. Without a foundation of values, executives cannot decide what is good or bad. Jokowi's ability to judge goodness can be seen when he rejected a proposal from the head of local civil service police to sweep away the PKL using a coercive approach. Furthermore, he replaced the male head of the local civil service policy unit with a woman. To get closer to citizens, Jokowi changed the uniform of local civil service police from a military-style uniform to a traditional uniform, which comes across as more people-oriented and friendly.



The other character of phronetic leaders is their ability to grasp the essence of the actual situation. For Jokowi, this capacity can be seen when he saw PKL as an important sector to drive economic growth. To empower PKL in terms of economic activity, Jokowi provided them with some financial support, such as offering soft loans from local banks and reducing taxes. He also provided PKL with a proper place to run their businesses that was close to the community and comfortable. His willingness to listen to other people's opinions also contributed to the agreement between the local government officials and street vendors. Jokowi was very patient in listening to many proposals from street vendors.

To be a phronetic leader, leaders should create shared context. To establish a shared context, the leader and all the members should create a place that is convenient for sharing ideas. In Japan, a *ba* (place, space, or field) refers to the context in which relationships are forged and interactions occur. Those participating in a *ba* share information, build short-term relationships, and try to create new meaning (Nonaka and Takeuchi 1995). *Ba* in the Jokowi context is in the Loji Gandrung, the mayor's office, which in a Javanese context is usually a sacred place that not everyone can access easily. But during the Jokowi era, the office was used for public meetings involving street vendors and local officials. Street vendors could easily come to this government office and talk freely to articulate their points of view.

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## AUTHOR BIOGRAPHY

**Anwar Sanusi** is the Secretary General Ministry of Villages, Development of Disadvantages Regions, and Transmigration Republic Indonesia. Under the Jokowi and Jusuf Kalla Administration, this ministry plays very important role to develop Indonesia from peripheral through villages. Prior hold this position, he held several positions such a Director of Center for Development of Policy Analyst, Director of the Center for Innovation of Institutional and Human Resources Studies, and other positions related to research and development and training and education for civil servants at the National Institute of Public Administration (NIPA), Republic Indonesia. He is also a country expert for some Asian Productivity Organization Project for the some projects including *Measuring Public Sector Productivity in Selected Asian Countries*.

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