

Passionate Politics: Emotion and Identity Formation Among the *Menu Peuple* in Early Fifteenth Century France

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The civil war between the Burgundians and the Armagnacs (1411–1435) began during the turbulent reign of the French king, Charles VI (r. 1380–1422).¹ Its root cause was a quarrel between two princes and their supporters, the king's brother, Louis Duke of Orleans (d. 1407), and their first cousin, John Duke of Burgundy (d. 1419). On November 21, 1407, Burgundy had Orleans assassinated, and by the summer of 1410 Orleans' family and their allies, later called Armagnacs, militarized their party in the name of justice. In early October of 1411, the civil war began when the feud drew citizens of all socio-economic statuses in Paris and throughout the realm into the conflict.² However, even prior to the autumn of 1411, the king's urban subjects were implicated in the affairs of the ruling elite and invited to engage in the emerging conflict between

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Burgundy and Orleans.³ Interestingly, as they archived the *menu peuple's* ongoing involvement, the letters patent, royal ordinances, and chronicles of the period also took the time to track and express anxiety over incidents of significant collective emotional expression throughout the evolution of the conflict. They were right to be apprehensive: the affect that various groups generated and the emotional responses that consequently emerged alongside it created the necessary space for voice and action, which enabled citizens to form strong groups and shared identities. Affect produced opportunities for social bonding, even for individuals and small groups normally separated by class. Certainly, the Duke of Burgundy nurtured a strong affective connection between himself and a significant number of Parisians by promoting himself as the people's champion and reformer.⁴

It is clear that the ruling elites recognized that urban affect and its accompanying emotions simultaneously posed a threat to political stability, and offered some clear benefits if it could be used effectively.⁵ Regarding the former, we note that a great number of documents of the early fifteenth century mainly disparage collective emotionality. By framing urban emotion of the *menu peuple* as frenzied, monstrous, and irrational, authors used it as a tool for delegitimizing the political actions of the *menu peuple* when they directly challenged the status quo. However, when we examine royal policy more closely and scrutinize the strategies of political leaders like the Duke of Burgundy, it is equally evident that the ruling elites recognized that collective, urban affect was a concrete political force that had to be taken seriously. At times, they tried to anticipate and subsequently prevent an emotional reaction of diverse urban bodies, but they also tried to stabilize conventional power formations by working with it whenever possible. In Paris, the two strategies frequently overlapped and are most visible in the anxieties surrounding the public readings of letters and information sharing, spontaneous or organized assemblies of the people, and the rights the citizens claimed for self-protection (namely, their city chains). These phenomena and the spaces in which they occurred produced the right conditions for subversion; therefore, they had to be carefully managed. The *menu peuple's* affect could, therefore, be a potent counterweight to the power of the ruling elites, and this last group knew it well.

By the first decade of the fifteenth century, the king's subjects were kept well informed about politics: they were informed regularly of new laws, reasons for taxation, the relationship between the crown and the

papacy, and the latest developments in various wars.⁶ Towns also communicated with each other. For example, a letter from Paris to the other towns in which the city set the record straight about what had been going on in the aftermath of the violent Cabochien Uprising (April–July 1413) ended by asking them to send on news of what was happening in their own towns.⁷ We learn from the royal ordinances that there were “customary places” carved out specifically for publishing information in every town of late medieval France.⁸ As in Paris, these typically included the dominant crossroads of the city, important church forecourts, and the primary markets (such as Place de Grève and the Halles in Paris).⁹ To publish a document, one generally read it out loud, presumably in front of a crowd, and typically posted it for future reference there, on church doors, or on town gates.¹⁰ Furthermore, there were official town criers whose profession was to cry out news.¹¹ In Paris, one of the primary responsibilities of the elected leaders of the sixteen *quartiers* (sectors), the *quarteniers*, was to dispatch formal information.¹² The *quartiers* were very well organized, and even informal news spread rapidly in the streets; it could therefore travel tremendously fast throughout the whole of the city, given its great size.¹³ For very important information issued by the king’s Parlement of Paris, instructions would be included that the crier pronounce the news “to the sound of the trumpet,” so that “none can feign ignorance.”¹⁴ These “ceremonies of information,” as Michèle Fogel called them, were designed to inform a large breadth of people, and the assumption hereafter was indeed that all would be made aware of the content.¹⁵ In this sense, knowledge was every citizen’s own responsibility.¹⁶ This might explain why town deliberation records suggest that when the official communication towns received required debate or discussion, they were read in formal political assembly places.¹⁷ Based on the infrastructure in place to disseminate news as rapidly as possible, information sharing was evidently a critical component of the political landscape of late medieval France. However, the reading of letters and the assemblies they relied on were also dangerous threats to the ruling elites because of the effect the content could have on the *menu peuple*. Hence, there was a constant attempt to neutralize the potential for disruption that might follow in the wake of news.

For example, on February 18, 1408, the king and the *Parlement de Paris* published an ordinance that strictly forbade all assemblies whose purpose was information sharing.¹⁸ The reason for alarm was that the Duke of Burgundy would soon arrive in the capital to justify why he ordered the

assassination of the Duke of Orleans (November 21, 1407). The king and his royal council were nervous that the well-loved duke would use his popularity to destabilize the Parisian community.¹⁹ The ordinance singled out the University of Paris for posting inflammatory letters on churches and elsewhere, which it claimed it did “to induce, incite and move the People to assemble in a certain place and at a certain time...”²⁰ Apparently, the men leading the assemblies intended to “say and propose among other things to the said People, many prejudicial and damaging words against Us, our aforesaid realm, our subjects and the public good, which [sets] a very bad example, and from which very great damages and inconveniences could ensue, if a hasty remedy is not put in place by Us [soon].” The document explained that it was the king’s duty to ensure that no “form of discord” emerged, as it was his responsibility to “govern and maintain our aforesaid subjects of our aforesaid Realm in good peace and tranquility.”²¹

The king’s mandate suggests that either the university scholars were actively provoking the populace, or that the royal council was at least worried they soon would. They feared that any spark among the people—anything that could incite them—would lead to disharmonious agitation, which would threaten the common good. The document exposes an implicit prejudice against the *menu peuple* for being so easily provoked and a judgment against the academic community for preying on the former’s alleged irrationality and predisposition for violent anger. However, despite these disparaging assumptions the letter also acknowledged the material power of affect once it is generated among a crowd. In an already tense political climate, the royal council was trying to maintain peace and harmony by removing all the tinder that might ignite the *menu peuple*. In other words, this was about the king’s duty to protect his capital city by removing any potential for disturbance; prohibiting assemblies and the reading and posting of letters were the best strategies the royal council could come up with for preventing the *menu peuple* from coming together and self-detonating.

During a similarly difficult time politically, at the end of January 1414, the king sent a letter forbidding his royal towns from publishing any letters the Duke of Burgundy might send them.²² At that time, Burgundy was organizing a military campaign against the then-Armagnac-controlled government. Importantly, ahead of his campaign, Burgundy had disseminated letters to numerous towns across the realm to explain his pending military campaign against Paris. He claimed it was a rescue

mission to set the Dauphin (Louis of Guyenne) free from his supposed captors, the Armagnac princes.²³ This was dangerous messaging indeed. The Armagnac princes accused Burgundy of trying to provoke the people, to elicit some “commotion” among them (*pour faire commocion*).²⁴

Thus, in the royal letter the king sent at the end of January, he first explained that he had to deploy his royal army against Burgundy in self-defense. The letter concluded by forbidding the towns from offering entry to Burgundy or his people, and from giving him “counsel, comfort, nor aid, in any form that it might be (*conseil, confort, ny aide, en quelque maniere que ce soit*).” Crucially, it also insisted that if Burgundy sent any of his “seditious and contrived [letters]” (*seditionneusement faites et controuvées*), they disregard them entirely. The king’s letter explained that since “our people have in times past been maliciously seduced as it is well known to everyone,” they were to refuse the communiqués outright. If they did not obey his order he assured them that the punishment would be severe enough to serve as an example to all (*sera exemple à tous autres*).²⁵

Evidently, what concerned the king and his council the most was the intrinsic power of the letters to incite people to act in ways the royal government could not control. According to the document, the citizens had already proven themselves vulnerable to seduction. While the king’s letter was referring specifically to the violent 1413 Cabochien Uprising from a few months before, he had even more experience with the Parisians’ susceptibility to their political passions. In the first years of his reign, the king and his council suppressed the 1382 Maillotins revolt; this was undoubtedly influencing the author(s) of the royal letter.²⁶ The unpredictability of collective anger, which the king and his council knew could be stimulated by letters, was precisely why they insisted in 1414 that the towns refuse to publish anything Burgundy sent. Interestingly, six days before the king published his own royal letter patent, the urban government of Paris wrote to the mayor, the aldermen, the bourgeois, residents, and inhabitants (*mayeur, eschevins, bourgeois, manans et habitants*) of various unnamed towns in which they made many of the same points. They, too, identified how dangerous reading subversive letters could be, and they likewise insisted that their addressees reject Burgundy’s attempts to communicate with them. Just as the royal letter referred to previous moments of seduction, the Parisians prefaced their plea by describing the ruinous consequences of collective emotionality during the Cabochien Uprising in the spring of 1413. They claimed:

Several seditious [men] and destroyers of the peace, obstinate in their malice, and who cannot abstain from conspiring...tried to move a great tumult of people in the city of Paris, and to create divisions and discord...and to do other things and novelties equally perilous and damaging to this kingdom; for which there is little doubt that very great evils and irreparable inconveniences against the king our aforesaid lord, his lordship, and the whole public thing (good) emerged.²⁷

Here we are witness to the belief that the *menu peuple* could be “moved” by a small number of evildoers and allow themselves to be overwrought by anger until they themselves produced “divisions and discord.” The assumption was clear that they were far too easily swayed. However, as with the royal letter, the negative portrayal of the people’s weakness does not negate the acknowledgment of the power of the *menu peuple*’s collective emotional reaction. Indeed, it is identified plainly as the primary cause for “great evils and irreparable inconveniences”: when it is out of control, collective emotion destroys the common good. Hence, the Parisians urged all townspeople to have their “hearts and affections rightly [directed] toward the king, his lordship, and to the conservation of the said peace, just as you always have, and to resist with all your powers all those who want to ruin the said peace in any way.”²⁸ What would best illustrate loyalty and their commitment to peace and harmony was to reject the Duke of Burgundy’s letters and to prevent him from entering their town.

Perhaps all these warnings in January 1414 paid off, for when Burgundy showed up at the gate of St. Honoré on February 8 “thinking that the people would be moved to help him enter into [the city],” the citizens did just the opposite: they denied him entry.²⁹ In so doing, the chronicler Jean Juvénal des Ursins claimed they showed “diligence in resisting him in every way.”³⁰ It is important, however, that the chronicler pointed to Burgundy’s expectation that he could indeed *move* the people to support his cause upon his arrival. It is difficult to know the truth of this rather partisan anecdote, but it nonetheless suggests that influential political leaders like Burgundy looked for help from the townspeople, aspiring, it seems, to draw directly from their shared affect. He assumed it would work to his advantage, but, as the chronicler makes clear, this time the people were unaffected by him. They chose instead to support the king. For this reason the chronicler’s appraisal of the citizens is more positive than the depraved or capricious emotions typically assigned to the *menu peuple*.³¹

Together, these first three documents give us some crucial clues regarding how the ruling elites perceived the volatility of the *menu peuple* and its importance in politics. In the first royal ordinance (1408), there was a particular unease that members of the University of Paris would deliberately seek to “move” the *menu peuple*. According to the king’s letter patent, the *menu peuple* proved they were susceptible to malicious seduction. The emotion that could emerge from these shared experiences was simultaneously considered a threat and a potential tool of exploitation. Regarding the threat, the fear of any agitation resulting from the assemblies or the reading of letters challenged the king, his sovereign authority, and his lordship; it produced discord; and it destroyed peace. Most importantly of all, these outcomes damaged the “public thing” (*chose publique*)—that is, the common good. Obviously, in characterizing the *menu peuple*’s emotionality in such ways, or worse, as “tumult,” “riot,” “noise,” “divisions,” or “debates,” the ruling elites denied collective emotional responses any legitimacy.³² However, in so doing they nonetheless acknowledge its political weight. Regarding the exploitability of emotion, enterprising leaders seemed to think they could further their own ambitions by relying on and managing crowd affect.

Hence, the evidence suggests that the French royal council of the early fifteenth century was cognizant that words and spirited actions could affect other bodies in the spaces of assembly. This perspective is congruent with the understanding of modern affect that theorists have developed. Affect is defined as the “visceral forces, beneath, alongside, or generally *other than* conscious knowing, vital forces insisting beyond emotion—that can serve to drive us toward movement, toward thought and extension...”³³ As the forces individuals experience through encounters with other bodies (human and non-human), affect explains the “motivational propensity” driving the actions of individuals and collectives.³⁴ In late medieval France, the verb *-émouvoir* fits well within this frame. It had a nuanced meaning in late medieval France; it referred to both putting something into movement, and to eliciting an emotional response.³⁵ To be *ému* was to have intrinsic and extrinsic forces inducing one’s body to react to some thing(s) or to other bodies also in motion. In line with how current theorists understand the impact of shared affect, the greatest concern for the royal government in 1408 and 1414, and for the urban government of Paris in 1414, was how the energy emerging from a gathering where words would affect bodies convened

together could fuel anti-government passions. This explains why professional criers were trained to anticipate the reactions of their audience and to make modifications to their publication plans as needed.³⁶

The above letters stand as examples of the attempts by ruling elites to prevent affect from growing among an urban community because of the disruptive threat it posed. However, there are numerous examples of attempts by ruling elites to deliberately engender an affective response among the citizenry to advance their own agendas, or alternatively, to work with the flow of the affect townspeople had already generated among themselves. Letters were an efficient way to engage with townspeople in the late medieval French realm. As we have observed, distributing letters to the king's subjects was the primary way through which the citizens were informed of important political happenings. However, it was not only the royal council that relied on this emerging practice to connect with the people. Dukes, counts, university scholars, the clergy, and even autonomous town governments engaged in letter writing to keep citizens spread across the realm abreast of news. Indeed, senders used letter writing to win over the *menu peuple* by inflaming the people using fearmongering, or the opposite—earning their affection or loyalty by allaying their fears about a political issue. As far back as August 1405, years before the assassination of Louis of Orleans (November 21, 1407) and before the war broke out in October 1411, letters were critical weapons in Burgundy's arsenal against the House of Orleans.³⁷ His purpose was to create a strong bond with Parisians and other townspeople in the north and northeast of Languedoil by casting himself as their tireless champion.³⁸ The letters thus remained the cornerstone mechanism of his propaganda until his assassination in 1419.³⁹ The leaders of the Orleanist/Armagnac party, the king, his heir, and sometimes the city of Paris did the same throughout the period (1405–1422), though arguably to a less successful extent.⁴⁰

The letters that were designed to inflame passions were rather formulaic in composition, conforming to a particular structure and drawing from the same pool of rhetorical tropes relating to the most dominant contemporary themes in political discourse. In particular, binaries between good government and tyranny, loyal subject and disobedient rebel, and good and evil helped the originators create a case for their own personal devotion to the common good. Ultimately, the intentions of the senders were to obtain material support for their ambitions (typically financial or military reinforcement).⁴¹ To achieve this end, however,

the originators wanted to influence precisely how the townspeople emoted so that their reactions would be of use, or at least mutually beneficial for both parties.

It is clear that the many intensive letter campaigns had some concrete impact. This is evident in the events leading up to a conviction and later, a pardon, for a baker from Carcassonne in 1416. This example provides insight into how powerful urban affect could be for generating spaces for dissenting voices and for producing political identities.⁴² According to the royal pardon, the townspeople of Carcassonne had assembled at their *hotel de ville*, which was where they typically assembled for things “touching the common interest.” There they were read a letter from the Duke of Burgundy suggesting they reject a tax raised by the king and his Armagnac council. According to the document, the citizens of Carcassonne were immediately affected by the letter’s content and began “murmuring” among themselves. Inspired by the letter, about forty men including the supplicant assembled in arms and decided to refuse to pay any tax. For this act of treason the royal pardon stipulates that the supplicant and his friends were “foolish, simple, and miss-advised (*folie, simplese et mal advis*).” Whenever a royal representative arrived, they aggressively attacked him and called him an “Armagnac traitor!” (*traître Armignac!*) Ultimately the city of Carcassonne had enough and suppressed the small-scale rebellion. They eventually captured and imprisoned the rebels.

Even though they were ultimately silenced, it is significant that it was Burgundy’s letter that first caused so much discussion between the citizens (here dismissively labeled as “murmurings”).⁴³ Furthermore, it was that initial discussion in that important civic space belonging to the city, a space signifying urban identity and autonomy, that approximately forty men became impassioned enough to put their freedom and their lives at risk. Clearly, they were feeding off each other in a space designated for discussing all that pertained to the common good of the town. Affect tends to grow in such meaningful spaces because they are “soaked with one or [a] combination of affects, to the point where space and affect are often coincident.”⁴⁴ It was precisely this consequence of collective affect that threatened the royal government and that they tried to contain; yet it was also precisely what the Duke of Burgundy tried to exploit. Both sides speak to an understanding of how explosive political affect could be as soon as there was a significant spark.

The paradox of needing to both contain and go with the flow of affect is likewise observed in a sequence of events in the town of Troyes in 1417.⁴⁵ Apparently, a Burgundian partisan named Jean de Fraignant, Lord of Toulonjeon, brought a letter from the Duke of Burgundy to publish in the town of Troyes and he was asked to acquire a response from them. However, the *baillis* of Troyes (an Armagnac) refused to grant the ambassadors leave to enter the town and read the letter publicly. Rumors quickly spread, and within a short time, 6000–7000 armed men compelled the *baillis* to permit Toulonjeon to read the document. Consequently, he read it “in the greatest and highest place in Troyes, named the Wheat Market, after which reading the aforesaid people were very joyous and happy, crying aloud *Noël!* Long live the king and our lord of Burgundy!”⁴⁶

Considering Toulonjeon was writing this report to the Duchess of Burgundy to keep her updated on her husband’s campaign to retake the capital, it is likely that he exaggerated the details to enhance his narrative and give the impression of widespread support among the northern towns. Nonetheless, this incident is revealing of the potential disruption the publication of letters (or the refusal to publish them) could generate, and the collective emotional responses that might accompany these events. As Ben Anderson argued, it is clear that “the transmission of affect, its movements, disruptions, and resonances are things that power can harness.”⁴⁷ In this case, Toulonjeon and his supporters attempted to do just that: they agitated the people by spreading rumors, which in turn created some disruptive movements within the town. This force was most certainly harnessed by the Burgundian faction, but for the *baillis* to maintain any hold on his position of authority, he attempted to stabilize the affect growing in the streets by choosing to cooperate with it. Cooperation with the force of affect is a typical dimension of politics and it can be of mutual benefit to all parties.

Moreover, Toulonjeon was quite clear as to the importance of the shared emotional experience of the townspeople upon the letter’s reading. He claimed that they were very happy and in unison cried “*Noël!*” As a word celebrating the birth of Jesus, to cry *Noël* was a ritualized expression of collective joy typically reserved for the most important events—the birth of a royal child, a royal entry or the parade of a sovereign, or a significant military victory.⁴⁸ With it, subjects expressed their loyalty and devotion to something (usually the king), and celebrated the

social harmony the event ostensibly produced. These were, after all, the emotions one was expected to have when thinking about the birth of Jesus.

Even if only a handful of individuals reacted as joyfully as Toulonjeon reported, the response he recorded nonetheless tells us something concrete about the political importance of collective emotional expression and its relationship to identity construction. Emotions are our understandings of the forces of encounter, of affect.⁴⁹ They are the cultural interpretations of those forces, and the labels one assigns to them (such as sadness, anger, and joy). These are drawn from a series of normative scripts that individuals reinforce through continuous citation.⁵⁰ Therefore, emotions are “social through and through.”⁵¹ Because they are embodied acts akin to speech acts, that is, acts that *do something* concrete and that contribute to hailing a subject into being, they are performatives.⁵² It is the “emotional community” that determines whether individuals express their emotions appropriately within the given circumstances.⁵³ The reliance on social exchange is precisely what makes emotion discourse so fundamentally important to power discourse and power structures. The labeling that necessarily accompanies it is an important political tool for reaffirming the power of certain groups or systems (patriarchy as an example), and for the vilification or “othering” of subaltern groups. It is for this reason that the royal pardon claimed the rebels in Carcassonne were foolish, simple, and poorly advised. This denigration served to belittle them and to justify their arrest and conviction (even if the suppliant was now pardoned).

The labeling that was associated with emotional expression was also what made the event described at Troyes one of great significance. Indeed, the large group of Trojans who sided with the suppliant expressed anger first, and then joy, when they achieved their intended goal (to have a letter read out). These collective emotional expressions gave them voice and enabled their group’s identity to coalesce. Indeed, the atmosphere of the town of Troyes had shifted; Burgundian supporters—a group who had, prior to this moment, been marginalized—regained their status as the dominant group within the town. Those who did not share in the joy of this moment would hereafter been identified as “the other,” in this case, Armagnac supporters. The factional labels of identity (Armagnac and Burgundian) were of critical importance in the civil war: assuming the wrong label could have devastating effects.⁵⁴

Although the labels first emerged in the spring of 1410, it was in October 1411 that the line between the factions had been very clearly drawn, and the period in which all the king's subjects, regardless of their status, had to choose their party.⁵⁵ The consequences were severe; by royal decree, many thousands of Armagnac supporters were either killed, had their property confiscated, or were exiled from their towns in 1411–1412.⁵⁶ Even uttering words against the Duke of Burgundy could lead to imprisonment, as could wearing the white band of the Armagnac party.⁵⁷ This was the beginning of the full-scale civil war. However, identifying as a Burgundian partisan was not always the most advantageous label to bear, particularly from 1414–1417 when the Duke of Burgundy was exiled from Paris.⁵⁸ Because of the volatility of the political climate, it is of even greater significance that the previously marginalized Burgundian supporters in the town of Troyes were able to take advantage of the affect their rumors generated in the streets to reassert themselves as the dominant group. It reminds us of the importance of letters and of assemblies as sites of disruption. Whereas Troyes had at least superficially remained loyal to the king and the Armagnac-led government up to this point, the townspeople pledged their full support to the Duke of Burgundy from this time until he regained control of the capital, and eventually the king and his council in May 1418. So powerful an ally was this town hereafter that the infamous treaty of Troyes was signed there in 1420. This treaty disinherited the king's son, the future Charles VII, on the grounds of his unlawful involvement in John of Burgundy's assassination (1419).

It was because letter reading could cause such momentous disruptions that there were attempts to either control the publication of information, or at least to control how that information should be interpreted. We have already seen that in 1414, the king not only prohibited the towns from publishing the Duke of Burgundy's letters, but he also insisted that if they did hear anything, they should not believe it. Only six days before, the urban government of Paris sent a letter to other towns iterating much of the same information, and they too insisted that the towns not believe anything in Burgundy's letters because they were lies.⁵⁹ At other points between 1405 and 1418, when letter campaigns were so intensive, the senders of letters had concerns about the "truth" and how adversaries might attempt to spin it in ways that adversely affected the receivers (the townspeople). For example, on August 19, 1405, during the first significant altercation with his first cousin, the Duke of Orleans

(who he would later assassinate), the Duke of Burgundy wrote a letter to the town of Mâcon to set the record straight. He explained, “we inform you freely that these things have occurred so that you will know the truth, and that by [other] sinister reports you are not informed against the truth...”⁶⁰ Likewise, the Orleanists also attempted to write letters to clarify truths. In November 1410, they wrote a letter from Tours to the *bonnes villes*, “so that you understand clearly our true intentions and good words that are only directed toward the good and honour of the King and all of his Realm, as it was said.”⁶¹ What they hoped to avoid were “inconveniences” that could and did arise from such readings.

Although the term “inconveniences” was used rather vaguely, the letters and ordinances tended to identify a causal relationship between the “murmurings” of the citizens of the realm and the “inconveniences” that they could produce.⁶² These had to be curtailed. Moreover, in royal ordinances the “inconveniences” were frequently linked to terrible devastation, associated with “evils and damages” (*maulx et dommages*) or “perils and damages” (*perilz et dommaiges*).⁶³ One example is found in a royal ordinance dated September 1, 1408 that outlined in detail the rules for the tranquility and surety of Paris.⁶⁴ The context is worth noting, for this was the time at which the widow of the Duke of Orleans had arrived in Paris to formally ask the king to intervene and give her family justice for the assassination of her husband.⁶⁵ That such a document had to be issued precisely at this time suggests there was some concern as to how the citizens of Paris might react to these political events. The mandate explained,

We having always been and are still desirous of protecting and holding in good security, peace & tranquility in the cities and countryside of our realm, and also in our good city of Paris, in which many men from diverse nations come and flow through; having similarly a great desire and affection to hold and keep in good security the burgesses and other residents and inhabitants of this city, wanting to impede by all means and manners the inconveniences, perils and damages that could arise, which by default good provisions could overcome, may all know that we have ordered through great and wise deliberation, and by these present [letters] order that which follows...⁶⁶

To ensure the city remained harmonious and tranquil, one of the stipulations in the list was that no foreigners were granted leave to enter. A second item stated that no one was permitted to violently attack another

regardless of the cause, whether it was the result of a feud (*guerre d'amis*), hatred, or malice. Importantly, this particular provision stated also that no one could attack the nobility or their men either with arms, or "by words and defamatory libel (*par paroles et libelles diffamatoires*).” These provisions in Article Five were given to specifically prevent the “great inconveniences that could and might follow (*grans inconveniens qui pevent ou pourroient ensuir*)” from taking root.

While there is nothing directly addressing the potential disruptions that collective emotional expressions of crowds or individuals might generate, it is implicit throughout the document. We have already observed that words were considered by the ruling elites to be triggers for the *menu peuple*. By limiting what people said and equating words to physical attacks, the connection is made plain. Moreover, the tone of the document is revealing. Throughout there is a discernable anxiety about what will happen when people arrive in Paris, or how they will respond to the political events taking place.

Assemblies and the spaces they inhabited were very clearly problematic for ruling elites; they were perceived as threats and with good reason. Affect has been likened to a contagion, sometimes spreading like “wildfire.”⁶⁷ It is through a process of mimesis, one that is partially conscious and partially unconscious that affect spreads and regenerates, gaining momentum as it moves through a crowd. It is not the product of irrational, uncontrolled emulation, however.⁶⁸ This process of mimesis requires some cognitive processing and filtering; it depends on inhibition, and scientific studies have proven there are some biological influences.⁶⁹ Moreover, the spaces in which these contagions take root are equally important to the process as the people involved. Spaces are steeped in the affect of those using them; as non-human bodies, these spaces radiate the affect they help to produce.⁷⁰ Because spaces are imbued with the meanings assigned to them by the bodies using them, they are also important material actors in all events, such as political assembly, religious ritual, or civic festivals. It is for this reason that Jane Bennett argued that the momentum of a social movement, which is drawn directly from the emergent affect of a crowd and its surrounding material environment, including the noises and the smells, is a source of agency; it is a crucial *material* element in the phenomenon to which it contributes.⁷¹

As theorists of affect argue, power does not only seek to prevent or prescribe affect; power structures must also seek to stabilize and cooperate with the force of affect to self-sustain.⁷² In this way, collective affect

can act as a counterweight to power.⁷³ Therefore, there is a highly complex dialogue between the pressures that emerge from the affect and demands generated in the streets on the one hand, and the power discourses and systems that are implemented from those governing on the other. A perfect example of this theory in action is the complex dialogue between the citizens and the ruling elites after Burgundy returned to Paris in March 1408. On March 1, he made his entry into Paris with a very large retinue of armed men. It is important to note that John had been expressly forbidden from entering the city in this way.⁷⁴ Apparently a large crowd of Parisians met Burgundy at the city gate St. Denis.⁷⁵ According to Monstrelet, "At the entry from which arose great joy from the Parisians, and even the little children, who in several crossroads, all aloud cried, *Noël!* This greatly displeased the queen of France and several other princes who were in the said location of Paris."⁷⁶ As noted above, joy was an emotion associated with peace, order, and tranquility: it represented harmony between the members of the body politic. That the Duke of Burgundy was both the cause and the object of the joyous affections of the Parisians speaks to his ability to simultaneously benefit from and influence the collective emotions during this highly affective ritual. It reflects the success with which he had manufactured an affective bond with the citizens of the capital by appealing mainly to populist thinking and policy.⁷⁷

In early 1409, the Duke of Bourbon expressed profound anger with the Parisians for greeting Burgundy and shouting "*Noël!*" He claimed that this honor ought to have been reserved only for the king. The Duke of Bourbon nurtured this anger for almost one year in silence, only finally speaking up during the negotiations for peace between Burgundy and the House of Orleans in February 1409. It was at this point that he chastised a great many of the Parisians for supporting the Duke of Burgundy's entry as they had.⁷⁸ He scolded them publicly, and insisted that those who had met him at the gates be paraded through the city with nooses around their neck and submit themselves to a mock execution for high treason (*lèse-majesté*). The problem for Bourbon was that railing against the Parisians, especially a year after the event in question, had absolutely no effect; nothing came of his demands. If the king and his royal government could not really control the emotions or the behaviors of the people, why would an uncle of the king have this power? These types of incidents suggest that the king's subjects recognized their political importance; this is what reinforced their emerging identity as political agents.

There are numerous examples from the early decades of the fifteenth century that illustrate that the king's citizens could use collective action as leverage because the threat of their supposedly capricious emotion lingered like the elephant in the room; it created space for political engagement and challenges to exclusionary practices in politics. For example, on September 10, 1411, the king registered a letter addressed to his Parlement, the Provost of Paris, and all his other officers of justice or their lieutenants responding to a "humble supplication of the provost of merchants and the bourgeois and inhabitants of Paris."⁷⁹ The letter justified why he was hereafter giving them permission to assemble. He claimed that because there were many "great and large needs that greatly touched the good honour and profit of Us, our aforesaid realm, and our said city," the Parisians had found it necessary to assemble several times to decide how to proceed in the best interest of all three (the king, his realm, and the city).⁸⁰ For this reason, he granted them permission for the next two months "to assemble as many times as it would please them, or seems necessary to them."⁸¹ Interestingly, the letter also retroactively gave them permission for having met throughout the month leading up to the publication of the document, even though these assemblies had taken place illegally.⁸² This provision is indicative of how little real power the king and his council had when confronted by an organized group.

The context is critical to understanding specifically why this document is important. In the aftermath of the violent uprisings in both Rouen and Paris in 1382, on January 27, 1383 the king had dissolved the urban government entirely and instituted a new role called the *guard of the provost of merchants*, dismissed all the *quarteniers*, *cinquanteniers*, and *dixainiers*, and forbade all corporations and assemblies except for Church services.⁸³ The urban government was not restored until January 20, 1412.⁸⁴ Therefore, the September 10, 1411 document here cited indicates that even though assemblies had been outlawed since 1383 and there was no formal, legal urban government in place for another three months, the citizens were nonetheless assembling and engaging in political debate. There is little doubt that these assemblies were sites of intense passion, for only two months earlier the Orleanist princes had sent their letter of defiance to the Duke of Burgundy and letters of justification to the king, which they copied and distributed to the *bonnes villes* throughout the realm (July 11 and 14, 1411).⁸⁵ Burgundy replied in kind, and also had his letters copied and distributed.⁸⁶ The Parisians, therefore, had much to discuss that summer. Furthermore, less than one month after

the September 10 document, the Armagnac princes and all their followers, from the highest nobleman to the lowest laborer, were labeled traitors to the crown, and their bodies and properties were confiscated.⁸⁷ Apparently it sufficed to call someone an Armagnac to kill and take his property. As Nicolas de Baye, a clerk in the Parlement who kept a journal of almost daily events explains, many Armagnacs fled the capital to try to save their lives from the Burgundian partisans, the main leaders of whom were butchers and tanners.⁸⁸ There is little doubt that emotions were running high in the streets throughout the summer, intensifying week by week. By September 10, factional fault lines were certainly perceptible among the Parisian populace even if they are only implicitly visible in the extant records from the period.

It should be noted that the Duke of Burgundy had a hand in organizing these ordinances, and thus in reforming the urban government that he populated with his sympathizers. After all, he was in firm command of the royal government by this time.⁸⁹ The Duke of Burgundy's maneuverings illustrate how ruling powers can seek to work in conjunction with the force of affect. First, as John the Fearless did, those in positions of influence can and do seek to amplify affect spreading in the streets to reaffirm their position of growing power. To accomplish this, John deployed affective techniques to appeal to the broader citizenry's "emotional imaginations" primarily to their fears and anger, and to "hypnotize" or "entrance" them with his fictionalized heroism.⁹⁰ All of this served to reaffirm the Parisians' own sense of solidarity, fomenting distinct groups with well-defined identities. For the Burgundians, their leader was paraded as a champion of the common good. In this way, the pressure from below certainly influenced the duke's attempts to engineer the affect of many Parisians and their accompanying emotional performances. Burgundy earned their support by appearing to advance their interests. He gave the citizens more autonomy to retain their long-term loyalty, and in so doing gave them what they wanted: self-governance. It was a mutually beneficial arrangement. Indeed, as a large collective, the Parisians were able to reinforce their autonomy through formal, legal, political means, which only strengthened their identity as important political agents. Moreover, the factional labels further reinforced sub-identities, which likewise contributed to the dynamic political landscape of 1411. There is little doubt that collective affect also played a crucial role in these developments. Even if it is not identified directly as a cause, the heightened, tense atmosphere of the summer and autumn months is nonetheless discernable in the above royal record(s).

One last example of where we can observe the force of affect and emotion materializing as constitutive elements in politics is found in the intense anxiety that Parisians shared over their right to self-defense, and specifically to the material forms of this right: their chains (used by them to control their streets and boulevards when under threat) and the town arms. As noted above, after the 1382 *Maillotins* rebellion, the king destroyed the city's chains and confiscated the urban militia's arms.⁹¹ These two acts left the city completely vulnerable, and thus entirely reliant upon the king. The town was not given back its chains and arms until 1405, and its government was not reformed officially until 1412.⁹² The circumstances in which these rights and freedoms were restored, and their consequences, are of interest here.

Apparently, in the summer of 1405, it was the growing public enmity between the Dukes of Burgundy and Orleans that produced anxiety and fear in the city of Paris.⁹³ It was within this context that the city officially asked both the Duke of Berry (the king's uncle), who was the captain of Paris at that time, and the Duke of Burgundy to restore their right to produce and control chains.⁹⁴ Rumors abounded in the capital that the Duke of Orleans and the queen were conspiring against the citizens. To both appease the Parisians and to advance their own political agendas, the two dukes responded favorably to the request. Six hundred chains were produced and distributed. Hereafter, the chains of Paris played an important role in politics.

This is an important point because chains and the city's arms were symbols of urban autonomy and identity that represented their right to challenge any power (even royal power) that threatened their stability and well-being.⁹⁵ Therefore, it was the very issue of self-protection that was the originating force of affective momentum; it was the catalyst for the generation of anger and anxiety, and most importantly a source for urban solidarity in the face of oppressive authoritarianism. Indeed, the affect generated and reproduced in the streets and marketplaces was palpable enough to be detected and feared by the royal council. The citizenry's collective emotion was well directed and strategic to such an extent that it was leveraged to regain a critical symbol of urban autonomy and identity. If the ruling elites had nothing to fear, they would not have felt compelled here or later to acquiesce and restore the objects that the city required to defend itself so well—and, notably, against royal authority if required. Here, then, we see the Dukes of Berry and Burgundy strategically recognizing the merit in drawing

from and stabilizing the affect of the people. Rather than responding in a top-down authoritarian fashion by resisting them, the dukes were able to acquire the agreement of the royal council to implement a policy that would, seemingly, undermine the government's own power. This example affirms the complicated role that affect plays in structuring the relationships between the governed and those who govern them. In this example, one can affirm Ben Anderson's theory regarding affect as the one "guarantee of the aleatory," the power of affect in producing a sphere of contestability and dissensus.⁹⁶ The ruling power—in this case, the royal council led by the Dukes of Berry and Burgundy—was forced to bow to the unpredictable and potentially disruptive force of the affect that was generated in the streets, and that gained momentum there as a political force.

Writing on protest, Michel Foucault said, "No one is obliged to support them. No one is obliged to find that these confused voices sing better than the others and speak the truth itself. It is enough that they exist and that they have against them everything that is dead set on shutting them up for there to be a sense in listening to them and in seeing what they mean to say."⁹⁷ Foucault's point is relevant because in early fifteenth century Paris, the *menu peuple* did sing, and they did so loudly, violently, and symbolically. Their voices were the result of collective affect and they manifested in group emotion—especially anger, anxiety, or joy. It is now clear that the ruling elite heard them, they feared them, and they effectuated policy accordingly. Though the narratives they produced were hostile and denigrated the populace for emotional vulnerability, the textual responses reflect the authors' apprehension of its power. Nonetheless, their texts also indicate that ruling elites recognized the power of collective emotions. It is evident that they took these voices and the political identities the emotives (emotions-as-performative) produced for the *menu peuple* very seriously. This is most obvious in how they attempted to control how information was published, the formation of assemblies, and how they dealt with security to prevent affect from growing. Although they did attempt to prevent affect, they were equally forced to find ways to cooperate with it to stabilize the *menu peuple*. The reality was that cooperation was critical to achieving their own agendas. It was certainly not out of compassion that they listened to the songs of the *menu peuple*. Finally, the documents here examined indicate that collective emotional expression was a critical material constituent in the formation of political identities. It gave the king's low-ranking subjects

an opportunity to carve out a space for their voices to be heard in politics; it enabled social bonding between different groups, cutting across socio-economic status; and the collective emotions of the *menu peuple* functioned as a significant counterweight to arbitrary political power of the ruling elites. Therefore, affect was a crucial element in the political landscape of late medieval France and one that we cannot ignore. It was a concrete force that compelled all political actors to confront it and reckon with it.

NOTES

1. For lengthy analyses of the developments of the civil war, see: Bernard Guenée, *Un meurtre, une société. L'assassinat du duc d'Orléans 23 novembre 1407* (Paris: Gallimard, 1992); Bertrand Schnerb, *Les Armagnacs et les bourguignons: la maudite guerre* (Paris: Librairie Académique Perrin, 1988); Françoise Autrand, *Charles VI: la folie du roi* (Paris Fayard, 1986); Jean-Michel Dequeker-Fergon, "L'histoire au service des pouvoirs. L'assassinat du duc d'Orléans," *Médiévales*, 5, no. 10 (1986): 51–68; Richard C. Famiglietti, *Royal Intrigue: crisis at the court of Charles VI, 1392–1420* (New York: AMS Press, 1982); Richard Vaughan, *John the Fearless: The Growth of Burgundian Power* (Woodbridge: Boydell Press, 1966, reprinted in 2002); Michael Nordberg, *Les ducs et la royauté. Études sur la rivalité des ducs d'Orléans et de Bourgogne 1392–1407* (Uppsala: Studia Historica Upsaliensia XII, 1964).
2. Archives Nationales de France (Paris), K 57, nos. 13 and 13bis (hereafter AN). Also, *Ordonnances des rois de France de la troisième race recueillies par ordre chronologique*, eds. M. Secousse and M. de Vilevaut (Paris: Imprimerie Royale, 1755) 9: 643–642. For the forfeiture of their "bodies and goods" (*corps et biens*) see AN, X^{1a} 8602, fos. 245–245v, 249–249v, 253v–254, 254–255, 259–260v, 260v–261v, and also K 57, no. 14.
3. For the involvement of the broader citizenry leading up to the outbreak of civil war, consult Emily J. Hutchison, "Winning Hearts and Minds in Early Fifteenth-Century France: Burgundian Propaganda in Perspective," *French Historical Studies* 35, n. 1 (2012): 1–30 and "Partisan Identity in the French Civil War, 1405–1418: Reconsidering the Evidence on Livery Badges," *Journal of Medieval History* 33 (2007): 250–274.
4. Hutchison, "Winning Hearts and Minds," 1–30, and "Partisan Identity," 250–274.
5. In this essay, I use "ruling elites" as a broad label referring to those occupying the highest secular political positions of the late medieval French realm, which includes the king and his royal council, the Parlement de

- Paris, and the leading noblemen, such as the Dukes of Burgundy, Berry, Orleans, and Bourbon.
6. Bernard Chevalier, *Les bonnes villes de France du XIVe au XVIe siècle* (Paris: Éditions Aubier, 1982), 46–47 and 95–96.
 7. “Et au surplus, nous mandiez [sic] de vos nouvelles, comme nous ferons à vous semblablement, si aucunes en surviennent par deçà.” Jean Juvénal des Ursins, *Histoire de Charles VI, roy de France et de son règne, depuis 1380–1422: Nouvelle collection des mémoires pour servir à l’histoire de France depuis le XIIIe siècle jusqu’à la fin du XVIIIe*, ed. Joseph François Michaud and Jean-Joseph-François Poujoulat, 32 vols. (Paris, 1851), 2: 489–491.
 8. Regarding the “customary places” for publication, an ordinance stipulating that all the property confiscated from the rebels of the crown (the Armagnacs and their partisans) would remain in the hands of those who seized them was published on November 13, 1412, explaining that the royal officers around the realm “facent crier et publier chascun en droit soy, ès mettes de son dit Office ès lieux accoustumer à faire criz et publications de par Nous...” *Ordonnances des rois de la troisième race recueillies par ordre chronologique... données depuis le commencement de l’année 1411, jusqu’à la fin de l’année 1418*, ed. M. de Vilevaut and M. de Bréquigny (Paris, 1763), 10: 34–38, for this quote, 37.
 9. Regarding the main crossroads, see Jean Favier, *Nouvelle histoire de Paris au XV^e siècle, 1380–1500*, (Paris: Association pour la publication d’une histoire de Paris, 1974), 51. Favier included a map of the main crossroads on p. 49.
 10. For example, in a royal letter restituting the honour and good standing of the Armagnac princes in September 1413, a royal ordinance stipulated that, “plusieurs libelles diffamatoires ont este faiz et bailliez a plusieurs personnes, fidez es portes des eglises et publiez en plusieurs lieux” throughout the realm. AN, X^{1a} 8602, fol. 285r.
 11. They could be professional criers in service of the king, of a seigneurial lord, or of a town. See Jean Verdon, *Information et désinformation au moyen âge* (Paris: Perrin, 2010), 33–52.
 12. F. Rittiez, *L’Hôtel de ville et la bourgeoisie de Paris: origine, mœurs, coutumes et institutions municipales, depuis le temps les plus reculés jusqu’à 1789* (Paris: Durand 1862), 226–240. Simone Roux, *Paris in the Middle Ages*, trans. Jo Ann McNamara, (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2009), 22–23.
 13. The population was sitting around 200,000 people at the turn of the fifteenth century. For more information on news traveling, see Hutchison, “Knowing One’s Place: Space, Voice, and Legitimacy in Early Fifteenth-Century Paris,” *The Medieval History Journal* 20, no. 1 (April 2017):

- 38–88. I reference Michael Sizer's example of the outbreak of the Maillotins revolt in 1382 (p. 51). Apparently, when a royal tax collector mistreated a female watercress seller, a crowd defended her by killing the royal representative. Sizer's point by using this example is that the "commotion" quickly spread to other areas of the city and the revolt began within the day. Michael Sizer, "Murmur, Clamor, and Tumult. The Soundscape of Revolt and Oral Culture in the Middle Ages," *Radical History Review*, n. 121, (2015): 17.
14. Regarding the sound of the trumpet, on September 1, 1408, the king published an ordinance detailing five prohibitive rules designed to protect the "bonne suerté, paix & tranquillité" of the city. At the end of the document, he stipulated that he was giving it to the provost of Paris "que nostre presente Ordonnance il face crier & publier à cry solennel et son de trompet, parmi les carrefours de nostredicte Ville de Paris, et partout ailleurs qu'il verra ester expedient et necessaire, incontinen et sanz aucun delaye, et par tele maniere que aucun n'y puisse pretendre ignorance..." *Ordonnances des rois de France*, 9: 369–371.
 15. Michèle Fogel, *Les cérémonies de l'information dans la France du XVIe au XVIIe siècle* (Paris: Fayard, 1989), 23–59. For the importance of the trumpet as a sound of authority, see Martine Clouzot, "Le son et le pouvoir en Bourgogne aux XVe siècle," *Revue historique* 302 (2000): 625.
 16. A good example of the onus on the citizens was the criminal record of Jehanette la Grosse, who was found guilty of selling contraband in the Marès of Paris. According to the record, it was due to her low standing and because of "l'eure & le lieu où elle fu prinse, ce qu'il est deffendu que esdiz marez nulle personne ne aille, sur peine d'amende & jugement volontaire...le crys & defens fait en la ville de Paris & pays d'environ, que nul et nulle ne preigne ou cueille verjus ou roisins quelconques..." that she could not be saved. Here, emphasis is placed on the fact that the grape vines she was selling at that time and place were firmly prohibited. *Régistre criminel du Châtelet de Paris: Du 6 septembre 1389 au 18 mai 1392*, ed. Société des Bibliophiles François (Paris: C. Lahure, 1864) 2: 254. Similarly, in Simonnete La Fourniere's case (August 8, 1391), this point was given as reason to find her guilty. The document declared that this punishment was determined "vue ce que il est publiquement & notoirement crié, sur la peine du pillory, que nul ne aporte verjus ventre à paris sans avoir cedule & enseignement des jsutices des lieux où eulx auroient prins iceulx", *Régistre criminel du Châtelet de Paris*, 2: 251.
 17. Town deliberation records provide extensive information on assemblies and debates. For example, on January 25, the town of Amiens held an assembly to read over letters sent by the king on January 14 relating to the problems he was having with the Duke of Burgundy. Likewise, on

- February 16 they assembled to read letters from the king, deliberated on what to do, and recorded their decision (in this case, to forward the letters the Duke of Burgundy had sent them, as the king demanded). Archives communales d'Amiens (Amiens), BB2. For the first record, 32v–33v; for the second record, 36v. For the importance of space and dissent, see Marc Boone, "Urban Space and Political Conflict in Late Medieval Flanders," *The Journal of Interdisciplinary History*, 32/4 (2002): 621–640.
18. The actual letter published was from April 7, 1407(8). The editors of volume 9 explained that a similar letter was published on February 18, but to avoid duplication, they selected to print only the second (from April). *Ordonnance des rois de France*, 9: 293. See also 311.
 19. Enguerran de Monstrelet, *La chronique d'Enguerran de Monstrelet en deux livres avec pièces justificatives 1400–1444*, 6 vols. (Paris, 1857)1:177. For Parisian support in the weeks leading up to, and immediately after, the justification speech in March 1408, see Hutchison, "Winning Hearts and Minds," 18–19; Alfred Coville, *Jean Petit et la question du tyrannicide au commencement du XV^e siècle* (Paris: Picard, 1932), 105, 113.
 20. For this and what follows, *Ordonnance des rois de France*, 9: 293. See also 311. The full excerpt of interest is: "...pour obvier aux inconveniens qui de ce pourroient ensuir, avons pieça faire crier, proclamer & faire deffendre publiquement en ceste nostre Ville de Paris...aucune convocacions [et] assemblées du Peuple sans noz licence et commandement dessudiz, si comme ce est assez notoire à tous...aucuns Suppos de nostre amée Fille l'Université de l'Estude de Paris...soubz umbre de certaines couleurs, ont mis et atachié ou fait mettre et atachier en pluseurs Eglises de nostredit Ville de Paris, et ailleurs, certaines Cedulaes pour induire, inciter et esmouvoir le Peuple d'icelle de se assembler en certain lieu et à certain brief jour, en entencion...de dire et proposer entre autres choses audit Peuple, pluseurs paroles grandement prejudiciables et dommaigables à Nous, à nostredit Royaume et à noz Subgez et bien publique d'icellui, qui est chose de très-mauvais exemple, et s'en pourroit ensuir de très-grans dommaiges et inconveniens, se à ce n'estoit par Nous pourveu de hastif remede. Nous qui toute nostre entente et consideracion mettons, comme raison est et faire le devons, à gouverner et maintenir nozdiz Subgiez de nostredit Royaume en bonne paix et tranquillité, voulans et desirans prevenir et obvier aux choses dessudictes, afin que aucune matiere de discorde ne sourde entre eulx..."
 21. The only exception for the men of the University of Paris was for assemblies *in churches* where they could preach the word of God. Thus, their political engagement was outlawed, but their spiritual engagement was still permissible (in this particular time). Finally, the ordinance stipulated precisely where it would be published so that the copies would receive

the greatest visibility (*église St. Geneviève, Place Maubert, Carrefour St. Séverin, devant le Palais, devant le Chatellet, à les Halles, à Porte Baudoier, à la Croix du Tirouer*). As Jean Favier has shown, these were all crucial sites of social exchange, and in particular, the most important sites for the sharing of information in the city (*Paris au XVe siècle*, 49 and 51).

22. For this and what follows, see Juvénal, *Histoire de Charles VI*, 491–493. According to the document, those who were present during the drafting and sealing of the letter patent were: the Duke of Guyenne, the King of Sicily, the Dukes of Berry, Orléans, and Bavaria, the Counts of Vertus, d’Eu, Richmond, Vendôme, and “plusieurs du grand conseil et de parlement, le recteur et plusieurs de l’université, les prevosts de Paris et des marchands, les echevins et plusieurs des bourgeois.” After the fall of the Cabochiens, in September 1413 the urban government underwent major changes. Tanneguy de Chastel was named the king’s royal representative, the Provost of Paris; André d’Espèrnon was appointed the Provost of Merchants.
23. Elsewhere I have analyzed this situation in depth and have labeled this as “subversive disinformation.” See Hutchison, “*Pour le bien du roy et son royaume*”: Burgundian Propaganda under John the Fearless, Duke of Burgundy, 1405–1418” (Ph.D. diss., University of York, UK, 2006), 17, 55–56. For John the Fearless’ letters regarding the Dauphin’s alleged captivity, see Archives Départementale du Nord (Lille), B 65, n. 15.253; Urbain Plancher, *Histoire générale et particulière de Bourgogne et Preuves*, (Dijon: Editions du Palais Royal, 1748), 3: 294, n. 289. See also Monstrelet, *La chronique d’Enguerran*, 2: 434–436.
24. Juvénal, *Histoire de Charles VI*, 491.
25. “...nostre peuple a esté au temps passé mauvairement seduited comme ce est à chacun notoire,” Juvénal, 491.
26. In January 1383, when Charles VI repealed the rights and freedoms of the city for their insolent rebellion, the royal ordinance stipulated it was the “commotion of the people, done in Paris by many disorderly people of evil intention,” that had caused the rebellion to catch on. As I have argued elsewhere, even if the king was calling this type of “noise” evil to diffuse its power, this statement is nonetheless a tacit acknowledgement that the voices of the dissenting population could be an uncontrollable force, and the catalyst for political action. In a rebellion, voice and collective affect are intrinsically connected. See Hutchison, “Knowing One’s Place,” 38–88.
27. “Aucuns seditieux, et perturbateurs de paix, obstinez en leurs malices, et qui ne se peuvent abstenir de machiner...en s’efforçant de faire esmouvoir grand tumulte de peuple de la ville de Paris, et de mettre divisions et discords...et de faire plusieurs autres nouvelletez moult perilleuse, et dommageables à ce royaume; dont sans doute se fussent ensuivis

- tres-grands maux, et inconveniens irreparables contre le Roy nostredit seigneur, sa seigneurie, et toute la chose publique.” Juvénal, *Histoire de Charles VI*, 489–491.
28. “coeurs et affections droitement au Roy, à sa seigneurie, et à la conservation de ladite paix, ainsi que tousjours avez eu, et resister de tous vos pouvoirs à tous ceux qui voudroient aucunement enfreindre icelle paix.” Juvénal, 489–491.
 29. “cuidant que le peuple se deust esmouvoir, à luy aidant à entrer dedans... mais ils ont montré diligence de luy resister en toutes manieres”, Juvénal, 488.
 30. Juvénal, *Histoire de Charles VI*, 488.
 31. See for example Christine de Pizan’s description of the 1413 uprising: “O! mais quell orreur esce à veoir au partir de la celle diabolique assemblée de innombrable menue gent suivant l’un l’autre comme brebis, prests et appareilléz de tous maux faire mais que l’un encomence, certes oncques fureur ne cruaulté de senglier ne s’y accompara sans savoir qu’ilz se demandent et quant ilz s’encharnent sur quelque soit, ou sur aucunes gens, là n’a resne tenue ne honneur gardé à prince n’a princesse, à seigneur ne à maistre, n’à voisin ne voisne.” Christine de Pizan, *The “Livre de la Paix” of Christine de Pizan: A Critical Edition with Introduction and Notes by Charity Cannon Willard*, ed. Charity Cannon Willard (Gravenhage: Mouton & Co, 1958), 131.
 32. All of these terms describing the emotionality of the Parisians in the 1413 uprising were drawn from a letter cited below, written by the urban government of Paris to other unnamed towns on January 24, 1414. It is transcribed in full in Juvénal, *Histoire de Charles VI*, 489–491.
 33. Gregory Seigworth, Melissa Gregg, “An Invention of Shimmers,” *The Affect Theory Reader*, ed. Melissa Gregg and Gregory J. Seigworth, (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2010), 1.
 34. Seigworth and Gregg, 220.
 35. *Dictionnaire du Moyen Français (1330–1500)*, in the *Analyse et traitement informatique de la langue française*, ed. CNRS and Université de Lorraine, Centre Nationale de Ressources Textuelles et Lexicales (2012), <http://www.atilf.fr/dmf/definition/émouvoir> (accessed February 3, 2016).
 36. Verdon, *Information et désinformation*, 34–39.
 37. For a concise overview of how important all these phases were in the evolution of the civil war, see Hutchison “Winning Hearts and Minds.”
 38. Hutchison, “Winning Hearts and Minds.”
 39. Hutchison, “*Pour le bien du roy et son royaume*,” 121–152 (especially 121–131).
 40. This is the position I took in “Winning Hearts and Minds.”

41. For a deeper analysis of the issue of town support, see “*Pour le bien du roy et son royaume*,” 141–150 and 210–211.
42. AN, JJ 169 and 167 cited in Léon Douët d’Arcq, *Choix de pieces inédites relatives au règne de Charles VI* (Paris, 1863) 1: 378–381.
43. For the importance of murmurings as a form of political dialogue, see Michael Sizer, “Murmur, Clamor, and Tumult,” 9–27. See also, Verdon, *Information et désinformation au moyen âge*, 53–76.
44. Nigel Thrift, *Non-Representational Theory. Space, Politics, Affect* (London: Routledge, 2008), 222.
45. For this and what follows, see Bibliothèque Nationale de France, *Collection Bourgogne*, vol. 55, fol. 248r.
46. “[E]n la plus grand et haulte place de Troyes, appelé le marché de Blé, aprez laquelle lecture ledit peuple fut tres joyeux et content crians à haulte voix: Noël! Vive le roy et monseigneur de Bourgogne!” Bibliothèque Nationale de France, *Collection Bourgogne*, vol. 55, fol. 248r.
47. Ben Anderson, “Modulating the Excess of Affect. Morale in a State of ‘Total War,’” in *The Affect Theory Reader*, 162.
48. *Dictionnaire du Moyen Français (1330–1500)*, <http://www.atilf.fr/dmf/definition/noël> (accessed February 3, 2016).
49. Thrift, *Non-Representational Theory*, 221.
50. As with gender performativity, an emotional *style* or *disposition* materializes over time and forms a “pattern of affective dispositions” that needs constant reinforcement. The performative process “entails citing the relevant normative scripts pertaining to emotions, and is fraught with possibilities for these scripts to be cited in ways that sabotage or resignify them, thus potentially transforming them.” Thus, the *experience* of emotion emerges through normative scripts and determines emotional display. Caroline Braunmühl, “Theorizing Emotions with Judith Butler: Within and Beyond the Courtroom,” *Rethinking History* 16, n. 2 (June 2011), 224–225.
51. Braunmühl, 224–225.
52. J. L. Austin first used this term when he argued that utterances can and do perform an action. *How to Do Things with Words. Second Edition*, eds. J. O. Urmson and Marina Sbisa (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 1975).
53. This was Barbara H. Rosenwein’s term. See “Emotional Communities and the Body,” *Médiévales* 61 (Autumn, 2011): 55–75; “Problems and Methods in the History of Emotions,” *Passions in Context. International Journal for the History and Theory of Emotions* 1 (2010): <http://www.passionsincontext.de/index.php?id=557>; *Emotional Communities in the Early Middle Ages* (Ithaca, 2006); “Pouvoir et passion. Communautés émotionnelles en Francie au VIIe siècle,” *Annales: Histoire, Sciences*

- Sociales* 58, n. 6 (2003): 1271–1292. For some of the most recent historical works on medieval and early modern history of emotions: Laurent Smagghe, *Les émotions du prince. Émotion et discours politique dans l'espace bourguignon* (Paris: Classiques Garnier, 2012); Nicole Eustace, Eugenia Lean, Julie Livingston, Jan Plamper, William M. Reddy, and Barbara H. Rosenwein, “AHR Conversation: The Historical Study of Emotions,” *American Historical Review* 117, n. 5 (December 2012): 1486–1531; In 2011, Damien Bouquet, Piroska Nagy, and Laurence Moulinier-Brogi edited a special issue for *Médiévales* called *La chair des émotions. Pratiques et représentations corporelles de l'affectivité au Moyen Âge* in *Médiévales* 61 (Autumn 2011); see also Damien Bouquet and Piroska Nagy, “Pour une histoire des émotions. L'historien face aux questions contemporaines,” *Le sujet des émotions au moyen âge*, ed. Piroska Nagy & Damien Boquet (Paris, 2009), 15–51; Élodie Lecuppre-Desjardins and Anne-Laure Van Bruaene (eds.), *Emotions in the Heart of the City (14th–16th Century)* (Turnhout: Brepols, 2005); William M. Reddy, *Navigation of Feeling. A Framework for the History of Emotions* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001).
54. For example, Nicolas de Baye describes the mass killings, arrests, and exiles of Armagnac partisans in 1411–1412. Baye, *Journal de Nicolas de Baye, greffier du parlement de Paris, 1400–1417*, ed. Alexandre Tuetey (Paris: Société de l'histoire de France, 1885–1888), 2: 83–85.
 55. For the labels of the two parties (in use by the outbreak of war in October 1411), see Religieux de Saint-Denis, *Chroniques du Religieux de Saint-Denis contenant le règne de Charles VI de 1380–1422*, trans. M. Bellaguet, 6 vols. (Paris: Imprimerie de Crapelet, 1852), 4: 446 (hereafter RSD), and Juvénal, *Histoire de Charles VI*, 2: 467. The Bourgeois de Paris chronicler's version of events held that the Armagnacs received their name in 1410. *Journal d'un bourgeois de Paris, 1405–1449*, ed. A. Tuetey (Paris, 1881), 10.
 56. *Ordonnances des rois de France*, 9: 635–637.
 57. This was the case for the “pouvre home aagie de cinquante ans ou environs,” who was imprisoned in Sens for having uttered “certain injurious and wicked words.” He was eventually released and has his reputation and property formally restored in March 1412. The Parlement had found that he was the victim of malicious gossip from “hateful and villainous enemies.” AN, X^{1a} 59, fols. 12v–13r. Likewise, a man accused by his town of Caen for being an Armagnac had his property confiscated. The town demolished the house, and built a fountain. He disputed the label they attached, but in January 1412 the city was officially pardoned for this misunderstanding and Bernard Campion was left with nothing. AN, JJ 165, fols 65–65v. Regarding the bands, see the criminal registers for

- the Châtelet (1412) see case number 31, (p. 599) and 45 (p. 602), in Alfred Soman, Claude Gauvard, Mary Rouse, and Richard Rouse, "Le Châtelet de Paris au début du XVe siècle d'après les fragments d'un registre d'écrous de 1412," *Bibliothèque de l'école des chartes*, 157, n. 2 (1999): 565–606.
58. For example, in 1417, a small garrison of six Burgundian men-at-arms had a violent altercation with the neighboring village, Sommereux. Apparently, the men-at-arms had tried to seize some cattle. Consequently, sixty men and approximately twenty women from the village threw sticks and rocks at them, calling them "false traitor Burgundians." After the Burgundians killed one of the villagers, one of their own was captured and taken to Sommereux to stand trial for murder. Douët d'Arcq, *Choix de pièces inédites*, 2: 103–105.
 59. Juvénal, *Histoire de Charles VI*, 489–491.
 60. "...ces choses vous signiffions voulontiers ainsi estre avenues, afin que vous en sachiez la vérité, et que par sinistres rapports vous ne peussiez estre informéz contre la vérité..." Archives communales de Mâcon, EE 41, n. 1 cited in Léon Mirot, "L'enlèvement du dauphin et le premier conflit entre Jean sans Peur et Louis d'Orléans (juillet–octobre 1405)," *Revue des questions historiques* 45 (1914), 397.
 61. "...afin que vous congnoissiez clerem[ent] nos vraies entencions et bons propos qui sont seule[ment] au bien et honneur du Roy et de tout son Royaume comme dit est." AN, K 56, no. 20bis.
 62. See for example a letter drafted by Burgundy on August 26, 1405: "il est moult à doubter qu'il n'en aviegne grans inconveniens, attend le murmure qui de ce est entre gens d'église, nobles, et autres de vostre royaume, et s'en pourroit ensuire de tres grant commocion, qui seroit moult perilleuse." The mandate forbidding assemblies and convocations in February 1408 cited at the outset of this essay seemed to echo this well, claiming that if such things were not prohibited, the writings would induce, incite, and move the people, and that their words specifically would lead to "très grans dommaiges et inconveniens." *Ordonnance des rois de France*, 9: 293.
 63. Another good example is an ordinance from June 31, 1388 in which the king described the violence his royal officers had to endure, and which hereafter clarified that all acts of violence against his representatives would be punished severely. He claims that his intervention was to "obvier aux périlz, dommages et inconvénients qui pour occasion de ce se sont ensues et pourroient encore plus faire ou temps avenir, se remede n'y estoit mis..." François André Isambert, Mr. Decrusy and Mr. Jourdan, *Recueil général des anciennes lois françaises, depuis l'an 420 jusqu'à la Révolution de 1789...* (Paris: Berlin-Leprieur & Verdrière, 1824) 6: 632.

64. *Ordonnances des rois de France*, 9: 370.
65. See Emily J. Hutchison, "The Politics of Grief in the Outbreak of Civil War," *Speculum* 91, n. 2 (April 2006): 437–441.
66. Nous aions toujours esté & encores soyons desirans de garder & tenir en bonne seurté, paix & tranquillité les Villes et Païs de nostre Royaume, & mesmement nostre bonne Ville de Paris, en laquelle vienne et affluent gens de divers Nations; ayans semblablement grant désir et affection de tenir et garder en bonne seurté les Bourgeois et autres manans & habitans en ycelle, voulans estre obvié par toutes les meilleures voyes et manieres que faire ce peut aux inconveniens, perilz & dommaiges qui par default de bonne provision pourroient sourvenir à ycelux, savoir faisons que Nous avons ordonné par grant & meure deliberacion, & par ces presentes ordonnons ce qui s'ensuit... *Ordonnance des rois de France*, 9: 370.
67. Thrift, *Non-Representational Theory*, 235.
68. Thrift, 229–231, 237–241.
69. Thrift, 221–222, 236.
70. Thrift, 229, 236.
71. Jane Bennett, "The Agency of Assemblages and the North American Blackout," *Public Culture* 17, n. 3 (2005), 447.
72. Anderson, "Modulating the Excess of Affect," 162, 167.
73. Anderson, 167.
74. Monstrelet, *La chronique d'Enguerran*, 1: 173–174.
75. RSD, 3: 754; Monstrelet, *La chronique d'Enguerran*, 1:1: 111; Juvénal, *Histoire de Charles VI*, 438.
76. "A l'entrée duquel, fut demenee très grant joye par les Parisiens, et mesmement les petis enfans, en plusieurs quarrefours, à haulte voix crioient: Noël! Ce qui grandement desplaisoit à la royne de France et à plusieurs autres princes estans oudit lieu de Paris." Monstrelet, *La chronique d'Enguerran*, 1: 176.
77. See Hutchison, "Winning Hearts and Minds," 3–30.
78. RSD, 4: 188–190.
79. AN, KK 1008, fol. 7.
80. "...grans et grosses besognes qui grandement touchent le bien honneur et prouffit de nous de nostre royaume et de nostre dicte ville" AN, KK 1008, fol. 7.
81. "...de eulz assembler par tant de foiz quil leur plaira et que bon leur semblera" AN, KK 1008, fol. 7.
82. "Et aussi les tenons et tenont quitez et deschargiez de toutes les assemblees qui ont faictes depuis un moys enca." AN, KK 1008, fol. 7.
83. *Ordonnances des rois de France de la troisième race race recueillies par ordre chronologique*, ed. M. Secousse (Paris: Imprimerie Royale, 1741), 6: 685–688.

84. The document was dated January 20, 1412. AN, K 950, 10. On the same day, Pierre Gencien was named Provost of Merchants (by election). AN, KK 1008 10r-v. See below, note 78.
85. See "The Politics of Grief," 448–449.
86. "The Politics of Grief," 448–449.
87. See above, note 3.
88. Baye, *Journal de Nicolas de Baye*, 83–85.
89. See for example Archives Départementales de la Côte d'Or (Dijon), B 11893, no. 13. This document was also dated September 10, 1411, and the men in council named were on his payroll. See "*Pour le bien du roy*," 136.
90. Thrift, *Non-representational Theory*, 241–243.
91. The document specifically mentioned "Masters of the Community of Butchers, the Masters of Change, of Goldsmiths, Drapers, of Mercers, of Furs, of the craft of Cloth Pressing, and of Textile Workers, nor any other craft of any kind no matter what it might be." The king mandated that the Provost of Paris would appoint one man from each "que bon lui semblera" to represent the trade, to oversee with the Provost that no frauds or other problems occurred therein. If these men were handpicked by the Provost of Paris, this new model left open a lot of room for nepotism and bribery. *Ordonnances des rois de France*, 6: 685–688.
92. In AN K 1008, 10r–10v, Pierre Gencien was first given the position of *garde de la prevoste des marchans* from Charles Culdoe. However, the document ends, "Et il soit ainsi que au jour dit par noz autres lectres Nous avons rendu et restitue ausdiz bourgeois et habitans de la dicte bonne ville de Paris prevoste des marchans et eschevinage et parloir aux bourgeois ainsi comme ils les souloient avoir du temps du Roy Jehan a qui Dieux pardoint." This, the document stipulated, was the result of "ladicte election faite par les diz bourgeois et habitans de la personne dudit Pierre Gencien." In a second document, (11r–11v), the king explained that he was restoring the rights of the provost, échevins, and their parloir des bourgeois so that they could deal with the "grans peines perilz travaux et dommaiges," all of which was directed toward the "bien prouffit et seurte de nostredicte ville." Likewise, in a third document publishing the Royal council's decision to restore the rights and liberties of the city of Paris, it was explained, "Nous les choses dessusdictes considérées pour le bien prouffit seurte de nostre dicte ville et par autre causes et considerations a ce nous mouvans et sur ce grant et meure deliberacion es conseil avecques plusieurs de nostre sang et lignage et autres de nostre grant conseil l'empeschement et main mise ainsi que di test par nous es dictes prevoste des marchans eschevinage, clergier, maison de la ville de

parloir aux bourgeois, juridicion cohercion privileges rentes le revenues et droiz appartenant dancienneté...” This document was dated January 20, 1411 (1412). AN, K 950, n. 10. See also Alfred Coville, *Les Cabochiens et l'ordonnance de 1413* (Paris: Hachette, 1888), 111–113.

93. RSD, 3: 308.

94. RSD, 3: 308. See also Coville, *Les cabochiens*, 109–110.

95. Chevalier, *Les bonnes villes*, 52.

96. Anderson, “Modulating the Excess of Affect,” 167.

97. Michel Foucault, “Useless to Revolt?” in *Power*, ed. James D. Faubion, trans. Robert Hurley, (New York: The New Press, 1994), 452.

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