

Institutional and Structural Foundations of Discourse

Abstract This chapter consists mainly of a dialogue between theoretical arguments and first cursory empirical results. It establishes the historical foundations of public discourse and reviews the extant literature. Hence, this chapter will focus on the development of the economic situation in Western Europe over the last four decades and its interplay with the role of the state in economic policy-making. It will show that public discourse on economic liberalization has taken place in a context of increasing internationalization and post-industrialization and against the background of the emergence of the regulatory state. These transformations are linked to changes in the substance of economic liberalization discourse. On the one hand, it becomes evident that mainstream party convergence and the internationalization of conflicts have led to a dominance of pro-market mainstream ideas. On the other hand, this chapter elaborates on the interplay between the institutional context of countries and arenas as well as public discourse. To be precise, it is argued that the openness and coordinative function of public discourse increase its conflict intensity.

Keywords Historical foundation · Internationalization
Post-industrialization · Regulatory state · Pro-market mainstream

To have an understanding of today's public discourse on economic liberalization reforms, it is necessary to explore the economic and political transformations that Western Europe has undergone over the last decades

(see Hay 2001). This is important because the political actors' ideas on economic liberalization policies have constantly influenced and adapted to the fundamental political and economic changes. This chapter therefore is concerned with the long-term transformation of the general economic and institutional context as well as the overall developments in public discourse. More precisely, the chapter starts out by discussing the trends which are key to understand the convergence of the substance of public discourse: economic globalization, post-industrialization, and the changing role of the state in economic policy-making. These processes reconfiguring public discourses started with the breakdown of the Bretton Woods system in the 1970 and affected all Western European countries in a similar way (Iversen and Cusack 2000; Boix 2000; Berger 2000).

Subsequently, this chapter shows that profound changes in public discourse have unfolded in lockstep with these structural transformations. The main findings refer to shifts in the dimensionality as well as a convergence in the overall political climate. As for the changes in the conflict dimensions, new dimensions have replaced the traditional, all-encompassing left-right divide. To be precise, the internationalization of the economies and the shifting involvement of the state in the remaining domestic affairs are the main drivers behind the new divides in economic liberalization discourse. It is shown that the convergence of mainstream party positions on economic liberalization lead to a pro-market mainstream that dominates contemporary discourses on economic liberalization reforms. Yet, the discussion provided in this chapter also reveals that two main groups of challengers, the traditional left and protectionist right, are at times able to shuffle up the mainstream dominance in public discourse. On the one hand, the labor movement still is the most important left challenger to the pro-market mainstream in the public arena. On the other hand, many observers point to right-wing populists as increasingly strong opponents of economic liberalization. General political and economic developments and public discourse therefore imply a convergence toward a more internationalized and pro-market-oriented discourse.

However, national peculiarities in the structure of public discourses are persisting even under the influence of strong convergence pressures like globalization and post-industrialization (Crouch and Streeck 1997; North 1990; Thelen and Steinmo 1992; Pontusson 2005; Adam and Kriesi 2007). As will be shown, institutional complementarity is responsible for the differences in both the accessibility and functionality public discourse. Accordingly, the remainder of this chapter will examine how institutions are inter-

twined with public discourses. In the research perspective applied here, the relationship between institutions and public discourses is perceived as mutually reinforcing. Primarily, it is ideas that give rise to political actors' engagement in public discourse (Béland 2005; Lieberman 2002). As those ideas become routines, however, they become enshrined in corresponding institutions. These institutions, in turn, constrain subsequent discursive actions. This means that the actors' ideas are contingent on their interpretations of previously institutionalized ideas, leading to different trajectories of discourse across countries and arenas (Thelen and Steinmo 1992; Herigel and Wittke 2005).

In sum, this chapter will show that only the consideration of economic developments and institutional contexts allows a detailed evaluation of the structure and substance of public discourse in the six countries under concern.

2.1 GLOBALIZATION, POST-INDUSTRIALIZATION AND STATE TRANSFORMATION AND THE SUBSTANCE OF PUBLIC DISCOURSE

A concise way of describing the relevant economic transformations for public discourse on economic liberalization is by distinguishing processes of globalization from post-industrialization. On the one hand, economic globalization is driven by the internationalization of industry, trade and services, as well as the deregulation economic policy frameworks (Held and McGrew 2000; Simmons et al. 2006). Since the 1970s, tariffs among advanced economies have been reduced to negligible levels most national markets for manufactured goods and financial transactions have been integrated into global ones (Brühlhart 2009; Brady et al. 2007.) Similarly, the advanced economies have seen an upsurge in the extent of international lending and the displacement of conventional loan businesses by security markets (Hirst and Thompson 1999). The reduction of transport and communication costs has further enabled large corporations to integrate their value chain on a worldwide level and to split their production according to comparative advantage (Berger 2005). On the other hand, tertiarization, i.e., the increasing importance of the service sectors for the economy, and the feminization of the workforce, i.e., the massive entry of women into the working population, are driving post-industrialization (Iversen and Cusack 2000). Both processes have profoundly reshaped Western European economies (Pierson 2001, p. 420).




Fig. 2.1 Structural economic developments and the transformation of the role of the state in the economy in Western Europe. *Notes* All indices were standardized to a scale ranging from 0 to 100 across the six Western European countries of the study. *Sources* KOF (Dreher et al. 2008) and OECD (2010)

Figure 2.1 presents empirical evidence for economic globalization and tertiarization along with two indicators on the general economic development in the six Western European countries in question. First, the index on international economic flows includes data on trade, foreign direct investment flows and stocks, portfolio investment, and income payments to foreign nationals (Dreher et al. 2008).¹ Second, service sector production as a percentage of the gross domestic product and the share of service sector employment in total employment, as reported by the OECD² were used to calculate the index of tertiarization. Third, the economic hardship index combines unemployment as well as inflation into a composite measure of the economic difficulties affecting the six countries (See Note 3). All indices are standardized to a scale ranging from 0 to 100 to ensure comparability at this aggregate level. The intensity of international economic flows affecting Western European countries have more than tripled since the 1970s. The growth of the tertiary sector, indicating progressing post-industrialization, was similarly steady and even slightly stronger than the increase in economic internationalization. Thus, while increases in economic productivity have not taken place for decades, the six Western European countries have become much more open and also substantially tertiarized.

An important part of international economic flows takes effect in the financial markets. Accordingly, capital flows have enormously increased in both amount and speed on a worldwide scale, and multinational banks play

an ever more critical role as managers of financial flows and as credit lenders (Kalinkowski and Cho 2009). The downside of positive effects such as the more efficient allocation of financial resources is increasing financial market volatility, since the financial system is more concentrated and less regulated than ever. In consequence, financial crises have become more frequent and more severe, which is not only visible in the recent global financial crisis, but also in the European currency crises of the early 1990s and in the Asian financial crisis of 1997–1998 (Stiglitz 2003; Bhagwati 2004; Quaglia et al. 2009). Moreover, rapidly industrializing countries, most notably China, Brazil, and India, but also Eastern European states, which have radically opened their markets since the collapse of the Comecon system, have introduced major competitive pressure into the world economy. Indeed, the share of these emerging markets in world trade has tripled since the 1970s (Perraton et al. 1997). In sum, what Katzenstein (1985) once wrote with respect to small Western European countries has therefore become significant for all the countries being studied here: vulnerability in relation to the world economy is an inescapable fact of today's economic policy-making. Of course, this can also be seen in the most recent protectionist tendencies, which are vehemently debated in several European countries under the pressure of right- and left-wing populists.

In addition to globalization, domestic changes related to post-industrialization have transformed Western European economies as well. Both demographic aging and the massive entry of women into the labor markets are major process in this regard (Häusermann 2010b). A second aspect of post-industrialization is tertiarization, that is the movement of labor and production from the agricultural and manufacturing sectors to the service industries (Iversen and Cusack 2000, p. 313f). While the tertiary sector, especially the financial and communication services, has experienced high productivity growth in the last decades, most basic labor-intensive industries such as textile manufacturing have declined in relative terms. The composition of the workforce has accordingly changed with the entry of the majority of the young people into the service industries, while early retirement continues to be a feature prevailingly of the traditional sectors.

One important implication of the macroeconomic developments outlined so far is their interaction with a fundamental transformation of the role of the state in the economy. In lockstep with globalization and post-industrialization, states have increasingly drifted toward more workfare (Jessop 2002), competition (Cerny 2000), and regulation (Glaeser and Shleifer 2003). First, globalization and post-industrialization have led to

a significant erosion of the effectiveness of decommodification measures, i.e., policies to disconnect income streams from market outcomes, such as employment protection or minimum wages (Scharpf and Schmidt 2000; Grande and Kriesi 2012; Häusermann 2010b). Welfare states are increasingly being rebuilt from providing free-standing social services to incorporating policies that conform to the markets, e.g., employment subsidies, training schemes, and conditional entitlement programs (Clayton and Pontusson 1998; Vail 2008). On the industrial relations side, this has also led to increasingly flexible social pacts containing more and more market-conforming policies (Rhodes 2001). Since the beginning of the 1990s especially, labor market liberalization has thus shaped labor relationships in Western European economies. As a consequence, however, economic inequality and job insecurity have increased (Rueda 2005; Anderson and Pontusson 2007).

Second, governments are increasingly absorbed with ensuring the competitive advantage of their economies. In order to maintain success in a globally integrated economy, a reorientation from public production to the provision of support for particular industrial and service sectors has taken place (Sapir 2006; Vogel 1996; Rhodes 2001). Moreover, the last decades have seen a high number of privatizations as well as the relative decline of public investment (Heinemann 2006; Zohlnhoefer et al. 2008). Western European states therefore have partly retreated from lucrative businesses like telecommunications or the energy industry (Schneider et al. 2005). Finally, public authorities have extensively established independent regulatory agencies in a bid to maintain the state's credibility regarding the provision of public goods (Gilardi 2005; Majone 1996; Vogel 1996). The cooperation between administrations and the economic sphere has become more intense, most of all in the form of public private partnerships. Most notably with the extension of the EU's regulatory scope, previously nationally oriented actors have increasingly become involved in transnational decision-making and are now constitutive parts of a multi-level governance process (Kohler-Koch 2003; Scharpf and Schmidt 2000, p. 1f). National governments have thus significantly transferred authority on liberalization policies to supra- and international bodies (Simmons et al. 2006). Crucial steps of this process were the Treaty of Maastricht, which created the Single European Market in 1992, and the WTO Uruguay round in 1994. Furthermore, the competition for capital has led to a proliferation of bilateral investment treaties which secure the rights of foreign investors (Elkins et al. 2006). And even in policy domains that have remained predominantly national,

such as labor market regulations, welfare regimes or collective bargaining systems, international and European regulatory networks are now strongly influential (Schmidt 2009, p. 518).

Complementing the arguments on the changing role of the state in the economy, Fig. 2.1 provides an empirical overview of three indices corresponding to processes related to this changing role of the state.³ First, the graph indicates the index for the lowering of national boundaries, which covers the dissolution of various policy instruments designed to shelter the national economy, i.e., measures imposing formal and hidden import barriers, tariff rates, taxes on international trade, and capital account restrictions (Dreher et al. 2008).⁴ Second, the degree of labor market deregulation is shown; this subsumes several variables reflecting employment security. The data, which come from the OECD structural analysis database,⁵ indicate the share of active labor market programs in public expenditures, the strictness of regulation on dismissals, and the use of temporary contracts. Finally, an index of state retrenchment—measured by the number of privatizations and the share of governmental investment in total public expenditures⁶—is presented.

While the lowering of national barriers to economic activity shows an upward trend in all decades, public sector retrenchment begins to stabilize in the early 1990s. The flexibility of labor markets is mostly constant, except for a substantial rise in the mid-1990s. These trends corroborate the findings from the literature and point to growing liberalization, particularly in terms of internationalization, across the whole time period.

The emergence of the pro-market mainstream

Globalization, post-industrialization, and state transformation can be assumed to create major pressures on public discourses on economic liberalization. One important questions for this study is how this turns out in terms of the conflict constellations in public discourses. From the 1970s on, the embedded liberalism of the post-war decades⁷ was incrementally removed in favor of a multi-level governance system and a network of bilateral treaties leading to more complex interdependence among advanced economies (Scharpf and Schmidt 2000; Hooghe and Marks 2001; Elkins et al. 2006). The increasing political-economic interdependence then provided the basis for the global diffusion of economic liberalism, which found new areas for expansion after the collapse of state socialism at the end of the Cold War. The spread of pro-market ideas was therefore decisively driven by

the support given by the United States and the Bretton Woods institutions to the international monetary system (Simmons et al. 2006).

One of the main consequences of this spread of economic liberalism has been mainstream party convergence. Center-right and center-left parties, which usually dominate government coalitions in Western Europe, have converged on economic issues (Kitschelt 1999; Mair 2001; Kriesi et al. 2008). Over the last decades, the historically very contentious division between labor and capital has lost much of its importance in structuring of political conflicts in advanced economies (Dalton et al. 1984; Hardin 2000). While the ideational change in favor of a more radical economic liberalism in advanced economies first captured parties on the right, such as the Conservatives under Margaret Thatcher in the UK, both the left in advanced economies and the political elites in many developing countries followed suit after the end of the Cold War (Vandenbroucke 1998). In lockstep with the parties, the majority of public authorities, such as ministries of finance and central banks, shifted to monetarist and supply-side economic management.

Such changes in the policy mainstream are obviously related to a fundamental reshaping of economic liberalization discourses. More specifically, the structural transformation eroded the plausibility of the left's traditional economic policies. By the end of the stagflation crises of the 1970s and early 1980s, Keynesian economic policies had lost much of their viability (Hall 1993). Therefore, established left parties needed to turn from sharp criticism of capitalism to a more pragmatic approach on economic liberalism if they were to continue to aspire to office (Giddens 2000; Müller-Rommel and Poguntke 2002). Table 2.1 shows the decade averages of policy positions and going public by mainstream and challenger parties in electoral campaigns from the 1970s to the 2000s.⁸ Policy positions show the average direction of the statements on economic liberalization made by four party groups: the left challenger, mainstream left, mainstream right, and right challenger parties. Going public indicates the relative frequency of statements made by each of the four groups.⁹ Radical left parties, such as communists and left-wing populists, are coded as left challengers.¹⁰ Mainstream left parties include mainly green parties and social democrats, while the right mainstream consists of liberals, Christian democrats, and conservatives. Right challenging parties contain right-wing populists and other radical parties.

The comparison of policy positions over time shows three key developments. First, the party systems as a whole have shifted toward pro-market

Table 2.1 Policy positions and going public in the electoral arena

	Left challenger parties	Mainstream left parties	Mainstream right parties	Right challenger parties
<i>Policy position</i>				
1970	-0.57	-0.32	0.12	-0.09
1990	-0.58	-0.23	0.58	0.42
2000	-0.66	0.25	0.36	0.34
Δ 1970/2000	-0.09	+0.57	+0.24	+0.42
<i>Going public</i>				
1970	5.3	32.4	58.7	3.6
1990	5.2	37.3	51.8	5.8
2000	8.5	44.6	39.1	7.9
Δ 1970/2000	+3.2	+12.1	-19.6	+4.3

Notes All numbers are decade averages. Positions range from -1 = full opposition to +1 = full support of economic liberalization. Source Own data established in collaboration with Kriesi et al. (2012)

positions, since three party camps moved to the right and only the left challengers slightly strengthened their opposition to economic liberalization. Second, the electoral politics of economic liberalization has become more polarized, since positive and negative positions have become further away from each other. Third, and most importantly in the context of this study, the mainstream left and right converged on a moderately pro-market position (0.25 for the mainstream left and 0.36 for the mainstream right parties). Since these two party camps are still important in terms of going public than the other two camps, this adds to the dominance of the pro-market mainstream in public discourses on economic liberalization. While the emphasis on free markets already is the historical position of the political right, the mainstream left therefore underwent a major transformation in the last decades. Social democrats and greens have largely incorporated into their political programs (Kriesi et al. 2008). Examples of this programmatic adaptation are the restructuring of public services by the Blair government in the UK in the late 1990s, and Schröder's labor market reforms (the Agenda 2010) in Germany at the beginning of the 2000s (Ross 2000).

Besides the shifts of parties toward a pro-market mainstream, the pro-liberalization side is reinforced by other actors as well. On the one hand, vertical mechanisms of transnationalization are responsible for the increasing involvement of supra- and international actors in national discourses (Held et al. 1999, p. 80f; Hooghe and Marks 2001). And these actors like

the WTO or the European Commission mostly try to push for the opening up of markets. A telling example is the EU, which, at least until the recent financial crisis, continuously pressured its member states to deepen the Single European Market (Howarth 2006, p. 85f; Thatcher 2007). On the other hand, internationalization furthers the increasing influence of actors such as foreign governments or multinational corporations in the countries' discourse on economic liberalization (Koopmans and Erbe 2004). Starting at least in the 1980s, the biggest financial institutes and other multinational corporations grew out of the national political networks that they had relied upon for decades and began to press for liberalization reforms (Braithwaite and Drahos 2000, p. 476f).

The main implication is that mainstream party convergence and internationalization have led to a pro-market mainstream in the public discourse on economic liberalization (Grande and Pauly 2005). More precisely, measures such as trade liberalization, floating exchange rates, the integration of financial markets, and the expansion of transnational production, have been continuously emphasized by international and European organizations—e.g., the OECD and the European Commission—and a large number of Western European governments (Wade and Veneroso 1998; Alesina and Giavazzi 2006; Baccaro and Simoni 2008).

Challenging the pro-market mainstream

Globalization and post-industrialization have reinforced different forms of opposition. Hence, there are traditional and new challengers to the pro-market mainstream in the public discourse on economic liberalization over the last decades. The traditional challengers on the left are radical left parties and trade unions, which firmly opposed too extensive liberalization reforms for much of the twentieth century (Bartolini and Mair 1990; Hironaka 2005). The shift of the mainstream left parties toward pro-market policies has opened up a niche for interventionist and protectionist policy positions. This offers an opportunity for several actors to mobilize the political potential of those who have lost out economically (De Vries and Edwards 2009). According to (Häusermann and Schwander 2011), these economically disadvantaged are best conceptualized as having insufficient marketable skills. Most notably, a low educational attainment impedes mobility in today's flexible and internationalized labor markets (Oesch 2006; Häusermann and Schwander 2011). Accordingly, we can expect challengers to mobilize on claims for social and national protective policy solutions to shelter the less well-off.

Radical left parties are historically well suited to articulate the grievances of the economically disadvantaged in Western Europe. Yet, their only moderate success in the 2000s shows that this has happened only to a marginal degree. As the results from their election campaigning show (see Table 2.1), they mobilized slightly more radically against economic liberalization and also had a stronger going public in the 2000s than in the decades before. But these shifts are rather weak. In general, radical socialist, communist, Maoist, and Trotskyist parties face serious obstacles to a successful revival. Most notably, the collapse of the Soviet Union was detrimental to the electoral prospects of the classical radical left parties, because it undermined their ideological coherence and the credibility of their societal project. As a result, most radical left parties lost much of their importance in the decade after the fall of the Iron Curtain (March and Mudde 2005). Only very recently, radical left parties have gained ground mainly in Southern Europe, with Syriza even able to win the last Greek election.

Trade unions seem to be in a difficult situation too. From the post-war period until the late 1970s, the labor movement became increasingly organized in advanced economies (Wallerstein and Western 2000). Since the 1980s, however, trade union density and absolute membership numbers have tended to fall in most countries, and many centralized systems of wage-setting have been partly breaking down—except in countries with a Ghent system (Regini 2003; Häusermann 2010a).¹¹ Accordingly, strike activity has cooled down markedly since the peak times in the late 1970s and early 1980s (see Armingeon et al. 2010). Unions therefore have faced difficulties in maintaining social protection at what they see as a fair level and face continuous pressure to make concessions in light of high unemployment numbers and increasing welfare costs (Baccaro and Simoni 2008). Moreover, the relationship between social democratic parties and unions in Western Europe, until the 1970s a solid political coalition, has significantly weakened in the last decades (Upchurch et al. 2009). The shift of social democrats toward economic liberalism and their experience that strong ties to unions are an electoral liability have made them reluctant to strongly ally with the trade unions. An example is the early 2000s, when German and French unions protested against the sweeping labor market reforms of their governments.

Against this background of a weakening labor movement, other movement actors often are denoted in the literature as taking over the mobilization of discontent with globalization and post-industrialization. Indeed, a variety of movements, commonly labeled as global justice movements,

appeared as countermovement against the deepening of global markets (Ruggie 2007, p. 27). Yet there are two reasons why their influence on public discourses is rather limited. First, since the 1960s, social movements in general have focussed on multi-cultural, pacifist, emancipatory, and cosmopolitan demands, leaving economic issues aside. Hence, most social movements did not join the global justice movements (Hutter 2012). Second, the turn of the new millennium can be considered the peak period of the global justice movement. After the ‘Battle of Seattle’ of 1999, global justice activists were repeatedly able to organize protests against the global political elites.¹² These protests led to an upswing of research by scholars into social movements that gives the impression that social movements are decisively on the march (e.g., Boli and Thomas 1999; O’Brien et al. 2000; della Porta 2007). However, although there has been some other significant mobilization—for example, the ‘indignados’ (outraged) and occupy movements in the USA and most of Europe in 2011—such perceptions are misleading. Organizational coherence and substantial consistency are missing for these movements, so is their influence on economic liberalization discourse (Wueest 2011; Tarrow 2001).

A third group of challengers has emerged out of the conservative right to mainly oppose economic internationalization. Most notably, populist right-wing parties have been successful in exploiting the existing potentials of economic grievances (De Vries and Edwards 2009). They did so by shifting from support of economic liberalization during the early 1990s to protectionist ideas later on (Zaslove 2004; Kitschelt 2007). Hence, although right-wing populists still mainly mobilize on cultural issues like immigration and European integration, they also increasingly campaign against international economic competition (Oesch 2006). The central political program of the new populist right can be understood as ethno-pluralism: specific ethnicities are not necessarily superior or inferior to others, but simply different and thus incompatible with the own ethnicity. In line with this ideology, many right-wing populists see economic globalization and its agents as threats to the national identity (Andersen and Bjorklund 1990; Betz and Johnson 2004; Rydgren 2007).¹³ The rationale is that economic globalization and the creation of supranational legal institutions jeopardize the national economy, which is seen as one of the pillars of collective identification and well-being (Mudde 2007; Kriesi et al. 2008; Berezin 2009). One of the most visible moments of this kind of opposition was the 2005 defeat of the French referendum on the constitution of the European Union. Although radical left forces also rallied for a rejection of the consti-

tution, the mobilization of the Front National was largely seen as decisive for the result.

By pursuing this protectionism, right-wing populists likely side with protectionist business and employer associations. Domestically oriented small- and medium-sized industries as well as low-productive businesses such as agriculture traditionally demand state intervention to protect their privileges (Katzenstein 1985; David and Mach 2006). Tellingly, in conflicts at the European level, there is a significant protectionist wing among business actors which generally opts for a protected European single market (Schneider and Grote 2006; van Apeldoorn 2002). This protectionist faction among business actors is likely to raise its voice ever more given the ongoing economic integration during the last decades.

Conflict dimensions on economic liberalization

It is clear that the just described conflict constellation between a pro-market mainstream and left or right challengers has been accompanied by changes in the underlying divides in the public discourses on economic liberalization. As will be shown, the once overwhelming left-right divide has been eroded (Dalton et al. 1984; Inglehart and Welzel 2005), and a two-dimensional configuration has emerged: a first dimension can be traced back to globalization, while a second dimension relates to post-industrialization.

Previously distant national markets have become more and more intertwined (Tarrow and Caporaso 2009, p. 594). In the case of Western Europe, of course, there is the additional toward the integration of the European markets (Lehmkuhl 2006). As a consequence, international and European actors increasingly intervene in arenas once perceived as strongholds of domestic politics. As Zürn and Walter (2005, p. 273f) highlight, its consequence is a growing political divide between those who profit from internationalized markets and those who profit from the sheltering of national industries (Frieden 1991; Hays 2009). However, even if internationalization has become a central aspect of economic policy-making in Western Europe, many important liberalizing steps, such as privatizations and labor market reforms, are still decided and carried out at the domestic level (Häusermann 2010a; Schwartz 2001, p. 31). Hence, it is evident that the classical ideological antagonism between left and right still influences today's discourses to some extent (Kriesi et al. 2012; Pontusson and Rueda 2010). Apart from the opposition between state intervention and market mechanisms, this divide concerns social policies as well. It divides

the political left, which favors protective and redistributive policies, and the political right, which prefer means-tested benefit structures (Esping-Andersen 1999; Häusermann and Schwander 2011).

To conclude, conflicts on economic liberalization either take place with regard to *domestic* aspects or can be concerned with the *internationalization* of markets (Hellwig 2008; Hall and Gingerich 2009, p. 37). Or, as Kitschelt (2007, p. 1183) puts it concisely, ‘trade always cut across, or was antithetical to distributive class politics.’

2.2 WHY INSTITUTIONS MATTER

The last sections presented the general political and economic trends linked to the transformation of public discourse in Western Europe. The following sections discuss how these general trends are mediated by national and arena-specific institutions. Since, as will be shown, these economic developments are rather similar in all six countries, they cannot explain the large variation in the accessibility and functionality of public discourses. Institutions are understood as sets of formal rules and more informal practices with rule-like qualities (North 1990). Public discourse thereby is succumbed to path dependency with respect to historically developed institutional arrangements (Risse et al. 2001; Brinegar et al. 2004; Medrano 2003, p. 63f). As actors continuously interact with institutions, the ideas underlying them are perpetuated in public discourse (Blyth 2002). The evolution of policy processes on economic liberalization is therefore a dynamic process involving the mutual interdependence of public discourse and institutions (Jackson 2010, p. 65).

Before the theoretical underpinnings of the links between institutions and public discourse are elaborated more in detail, a country-wise overview of key economic developments since the 1970s and electoral discourse in the 2000s is presented. In a first step, economic flows across borders, tertiarization, and the economic hardship index are analyzed to assess how differently the countries have been affected by globalization, post-industrialization, and general economic difficulties, respectively. In accordance with the analyses so far, Table 2.2 shows economic performance in the last four decades with respect to the same indices, but this time for the single countries. The index of cross-border economic flows consists of indicators measuring trade and international financial activities. Tertiarization is a composite number indicating service sector growth in terms of economic output and employment. The economic hardship index, finally,

Table 2.2 Globalization, tertiarization, and economic hardship by the country

	A	FR	DE	NL	CH	UK
<i>Cross-border economic flows</i>						
1970	16.1	2.2	2.1	63.8	47.9	38.4
1980	31.7	19.7	11.8	78.7	63.7	51.7
1990	50.6	38.0	29.2	88.4	77.6	57.6
2000	81.3	54.9	54.5	97.0	91.2	64.7
Δ 1970/2000	+65.2	+52.7	+52.4	+33.2	+43.3	+26.3
<i>Tertiarization</i>						
1970	29.9	39.2	21.8	68.5	n.a.	n.a.
1980	45.5	64.8	49.9	89.2	n.a.	84.6
1990	59.6	80.0	65.0	92.5	72.9	88.0
2000	74.4	86.6	83.0	95.7	79.0	88.5
Δ 1970/2000	+44.5	+47.4	+61.2	+27.2	n.a.	n.a.
<i>Economic hardship</i>						
1970	24.1	42.0	22.8	35.9	14.7	56.9
1980	22.1	54.9	29.5	43.9	9.7	59.3
1990	18.7	40.5	34.6	27.8	15.3	38.4
2000	19.2	33.9	36.5	16.4	11.9	20.1
Δ 1970/2000	-4.9	-8.1	+13.7	-19.5	-2.8	-36.8

Notes All numbers are decade averages of indices which range from 0 to 100 (for the 2000s, however, only the years up to 2007 were considered); *Sources* KOF (Dreher et al. 2008) and OECD (2010)

shows how the countries have been affected by unemployment rates and inflation. All figures in the table represent the decade averages of the standardized indices, which take values from 0 to 100. This makes it possible to compare the six countries directly.

The overall trend with respect to cross-border economic flows is very clear. A strong and continuous increase in transnational trade and financial activity in every country can be observed. The growth is strongest in Austria, which had a low level of integration into the global markets in the 1970s (16.1 index points). In fact, after regaining access to the Eastern European markets in the early 1990s, Austria has rapidly caught up with Switzerland's and the Netherlands' level of trade, although these other two small, continental countries remain by far the most open economies with an average of over 90 index points in the 2000s. Switzerland does not only have an exceptionally high and long-standing export dependency of 80% or more with regard to its most important industrial sectors, above all the chemical and pharmaceutical industries, mechanical engineering, and horology, but it also has a financial sector which is significantly outreach-

ing its own economy. In the Netherlands, the chemical and pharmaceutical industries, as well as the financial sector with its center in Amsterdam, are important drivers of economic openness; in addition, the country, with its large overseas ports, is the key transport hub to continental Europe. The UK shows the weakest increase in international economic flows over time (26.3 index points), which means that France and Germany have been able to reach similar degrees of economic openness. However, the UK is still the most open country of the three biggest Western European economies in the 2000s. Its margin, however, has been reduced to about ten index points, while it was clearly ahead with approximately 38 points in the 1970s, compared to the 2 points in France and Germany. The UK thus still profits from its reputation as an exceptionally strong hub for the financial markets. Interestingly, Germany and France have developed almost in lockstep, which hints at their dense economic interdependence, which has emerged out of their common role as core economies of the European single market (Trouille 2007).

To conclude, integration into the European and global markets remains more important for small Western European countries, although its impact nowadays is also substantive for big economies. Note that the timing and speed of economic cross-border flows are highly correlated. The countries which opened early, i.e., the Netherlands, Switzerland, and the UK, experience a subsequent period of slower internationalization compared to Germany, Austria, and France.

The development of tertiarization shows a similarly uniform trend. The steepest growth in tertiarization, however, took place between the 1970s and the 1980s (not in the 1990s as for economic cross-border activity). All six countries belong to the group of early deindustrializing countries (Iversen and Cusack 2000). The picture for the single countries therefore differs only slightly. As with economic openness, the Netherlands is the most tertiarized country (95.7 index points), followed by the UK, France, and Germany. Moreover, Germany exhibits the most impressive growth in the tertiary sector (+61.2), followed by France (+47.4) and Austria (+44.5). In the UK, as far as there are data available, the level of tertiarization remains fairly constant compared to the other countries: it has grown only by 3.9 index points from an already high level in the 1980s. The Netherlands and the UK have a slightly bigger share of the tertiary sector than the other countries in the 2000s, yet the differences are not as substantial as with international economic flows. Further, in contrast to their

high economic openness, Austria and Switzerland are the least tertiarized countries.

With respect to economic hardship, i.e., to the basic economic difficulties in the six countries, the trends are less uniform. The index that combines inflation with unemployment rates shows neither a constant development over time nor a simultaneous course among countries. Switzerland has performed best over the four decades, displaying the lowest degree of economic hardship throughout the period studied and ending up with 11.9 index points.¹⁴ Similarly constant is Austria, which was stable at a level of about 20 index points. In these two countries, the general economic environment has not changed substantially in comparison with the other four countries. Here, the economic context thus seems to exert not much pressure for liberalization reforms across all decades. The pressure for reform in Germany, by contrast, rose considerably over time, as the sharp increase in economic hardship by 13.7 index points indicates. This development, of course, was heavily influenced by the economic burden of reunification (Vail 2008). In the 2000s, the hardship index for Germany was highest among the countries being studied here. In the Netherlands, the *Dutch miracle*, a series of incremental social policy reforms which led to the virtuous co-occurrence of strong growth and low unemployment from the mid-1990s onwards, resulted in the almost halving of the economic hardship index between the 1990s and the 2000s (Visser and Hemerjick 1997). In a similar vein, the UK displays a continuous and drastic improvement in its general economic situation after being far behind the five other countries in the 1970s (−36.8 index points). John Major's Conservative government and the third way Labor governments that followed were able to considerably lower the economic hardship from the 1990s onwards. In France, finally, the level of economic hardship could be reduced as well, but not as substantially as in the UK. The general situation in France has remained almost as dire as in Germany (Vail 2008).

In sum, however, except for the difference between smaller and larger Western European economies in terms of their economic openness and the comparatively high level of economic hardship in France and Germany, there are no substantial variations among the six countries. Long-term economic transformations have thus affected all six countries to a similar extent.

How did this affect electoral politics? Table 2.3 shows the average policy positions and going public shares by the four already defined party groups in the two first elections of the 2000s.¹⁵ The picture looks similar across

Table 2.3 Policy positions and going public during elections in the 2000s

	Left challenger parties	Mainstream left parties	Mainstream right parties	Right challenger parties
<i>Policy position</i>				
Austria	−1.00	−0.15	0.30	0.18
France	−0.44	−0.20	0.39	0.40
Germany	−0.94	0.48	0.44	n.a.
Netherlands	−0.67	−0.11	0.23	0.45
Switzerland	−1.00	−0.20	0.47	0.34
UK	n.a.	0.50	0.30	n.a.
Overall	−0.66	0.25	0.36	0.34
<i>Going public (in %)</i>				
Austria	3.2	29.1	46.7	21.0
France	18.9	33.4	36.0	11.8
Germany	10.6	51.7	37.7	n.a.
Netherlands	7.0	20.1	68.1	4.8
Switzerland	5.5	26.0	48.1	20.4
UK	n.a.	83.0	17.0	n.a.
Overall	8.5	44.6	39.1	7.9

Notes Positions range from −1 = full opposition to +1 = full support. *Source* Own data established in collaboration with Kriesi et al. (2012)

countries as far as policy positions are concerned. All left challenger parties, mainstream right parties, and right challenger parties position themselves quite close to the average position over all countries. The significant outliers are the mainstream left parties, since the social democrats in Germany (0.48) and the UK (0.50) are clearly set apart from the other mainstream left parties, which all moderately or strongly oppose economic liberalization. Nevertheless, this is the only substantial variation, and it can easily be explained by the fact that the mainstream left in Germany and the UK had governmental responsibility in much of the research period. In sum, the evidence on the policy positioning in the electoral arena shows substantial convergence, and thus not much variation in terms of the substance of public discourse.

The going public of the different party families in the 2000s, however, contrasts this finding. The presence of the party families in the electoral arena varies considerably. The extend of this variation goes beyond the easily explained differences due to the different electoral systems—most notably the absence of challenger parties in the UK. The lowest accessibility

is found for the left challenger parties in Austria (3.2%). In France, by contrast, the communists and other radical left parties achieve a share of 18.9%. As for the mainstream left parties, the variation among the countries is even larger. The share in all statements on economic liberalization ranges from 20.1% in the Netherlands to dominant 83% in the UK. In a similar vein, the going public of the mainstream right parties differs heavily across the six countries (51.1% in the UK and 68.1% in the Netherlands). The right challenger parties, finally, are very successful in Austria (21%). In the Netherlands, in contrast, they are almost incapable to enter the public arena (4.8%).

Why is the structure of discourse on economic liberalization running differently across national contexts? It has been shown that the economic developments have created similar conditions for public discourse in all six countries? The answer is that there are distinct forms of capitalist regimes with correspondingly distinct accessibility and functionalities of public discourses (Pontusson 2005, p. 163). Building on the work of Shonfield (1965) and Zysman (1983), such accounts of different institutional trajectories in political-economic development have sprung up in the last two decades (e.g., Albert 1993; Bonoli 2003; Hall and Soskice 2001; McCartney 2009; Schmidt 2009). The basic assumption of this literature is that capitalist economies do systematically differ in terms of how interests are intermediated, although each economy is efficiently organized.

The recently most influential attempt to conceptualize capitalist economies is probably the Varieties of Capitalism (VoC) approach (Hall and Soskice 2001). The VoC approach is organized around the employers' coordination capacities—however defined—as the key distinguishing feature (Hall and Gingerich 2009). More precisely, it identifies two diverging patterns of adaptation to economic changes (Hancké et al. 2007). Liberal Market Economies (LME), on the one hand, are characterized by non-cooperative relations between unions and employers, a market-driven financial system, and arm's length relations among firms. In the country sample in this study, the UK most closely matches the premises of this LME category. In Coordinated Market Economies (CME), on the other hand, union–employer relationships are generally perceived as cooperative, industries traditionally have close ties to banks, and employers are usually tightly organized in associations. This means that business in CME is more intensely involved in processes of interest intermediation between trade unions, public authorities, professional organizations, and employer associations. In LME, in contrast, less formal interactions are usually assumed to

take place among the different economic interest groups, leading to more confrontational employment relations. From the six countries under study, Austria, Germany, the Netherlands, and Switzerland can be classified as CMEs. The different institutional arrangements have straightforward consequences on how countries react to abrupt economic upheavals. As Hall and Soskice (2001) argue, firms in LMEs are quicker to hire and fire in response to a changing economic environment. In CME, labor relations are designed to at least partly withstand the volatility of markets (Hays 2009, p. 13). The main strategy involves cooperative agreements between employers, trade unions, and the public authorities.

The VoC dichotomy comes with several disadvantages. First, it is necessary to define at least one residual category (the Mixed-Market Economies) for countries that do not consistently fit into one of the ideal-typical categories. Unfortunately, very important countries for political economy research, such as Japan or France, fall in this category. In relying on Shonfield's (1965) differentiation between arm's length, interventionist and organized capitalist systems, Schmidt (2009) convincingly argues that this misconceptualization is due to the neglect of the state as the central mediating and intervening actor in the economic sphere and extends the two VoC to three—Liberal, Coordinated, and State-influenced (SME) Market Economies. While in LMEs the influence of the state is limited to rule setting and conflict settlement, it actively tries to facilitate economic activity in CMEs and SMEs. However, in a CME the state acts as a co-equal with employers and unions to negotiate employment protection, to participate in wage bargaining, or to set other economic regulations (Schmidt 2009, p. 521). In an SME, by contrast, the state often acts as an entrepreneur and actively decides on business activity (Thibergien 2007). Such countries traditionally rely on a large public sector and long-term state-led development strategies. In the context of this study, France can clearly be defined as a SME.

A second necessary extension of the classical VoC typology is that the Netherlands and Switzerland need to be separated from Austria and Germany (Visser and Afonso 2010). The Netherlands and Switzerland but they rely on a comparatively flexible labor market, i.e., the extension of part-time and temporary employment, to compensate for economic difficulties due to high wages and fixed labor costs (Visser and Hemerjick 1997; Bonoli and Mach 2000; Iversen and Cusack 2000). Moreover, in contrast to other CMEs like Austria, labor movements traditionally play a subordinate role and business interests are dominated by the large export-oriented

companies (Katzenstein 1985). A last important extension is the neocorporatist distinction of different types of labor and employment relations (Schmitter and Lehmbruch 1979). In contrast to the employer-centered view of the VoC tradition, neocorporatists usually focus on trade unions. They distinguish corporatist regimes, which rely on stable bargaining mechanisms among quite centralized interest groups, from pluralist regimes, which denote highly fragmented economic interest group systems. In fact, the VoC typology and neocorporatist classification coincide to some extent. There is congruence between corporatist regimes and CMEs, whereas SMEs and LMEs are characterized by pluralist interest intermediation, leaving trade unions in a comparatively weak position (Sapir 2006).

These more or less coherent types of capitalism have ‘filter’ effects on the accessibility and functionality of public discourse. First, the different types of political-economic arrangements create different opportunities for actors to participate in public discourses (Hancké et al. 2007; Ferree et al. 2002). The strength of the labor movement as one of the most important challengers is a good indicator for the openness of different public discourses. In the LME UK, the labor movement is in an especially weak position, which means that public discourse is particularly closed in this country. In the SME France, in contrast, the history of sharp ideological conflict has led to a more confrontational political style, not only with respect to electoral campaigns, political protests, and labor market disputes, but also in the mass-mediated public arena (Hallin and Mancini 2004; Kriesi et al. 2012). The labor movement is thus able to regularly access public discourse. Public discourse in the coordinated market economies is generally more accessible than discourse in the UK. In Germany, the Netherlands, Austria and Switzerland, proportional electoral systems foster the position of opposition parties and corporatist institutions strengthen economic interest groups (Lange 1984; Korpi 2006). Switzerland and the Netherlands, however, have a less open discourse relative to Austria and Germany because of the labor movements’ comparatively weak position.

A second important consequence of institutional divergence is the varying functionality of public discourse in the different countries. In coordinated market economies like Germany, Switzerland and Austria, discourses are more inclusive. Since reforms need broad support from the majority of relevant actors in order to be sustainable, coordination plays a bigger role in these countries (Schmidt 2002, Chap. 5). Negotiations and efforts at persuasion in the run-up to policy decisions are more important aspects of public discourse. In the UK with its distinctly majoritarian representative

institutions and in France with its pronouncedly statist economic policy-making, discourse is more communicative. Governments must apply comparatively sophisticated efforts to communicate the feasibility and necessity of their policy decisions. Thus, the top-down dissemination of information from governments to the public after policies are implementation is more important (Müller 2015).

Arenas: Institutional venues of policy-making

Not only institutions provide relevant opportunities and constraints public discourse, they are also provided by the specific arenas of the policy process in which public discourse takes place (Helbling et al. 2012; Varone et al. 2006). Arenas can be defined as sites of political contention separated by specific rules and norms of an either formal or informal nature (see Ferree et al. 2002; Bartolini 2005, p. 27f; Kriesi et al. 2012; Schneider and Grote 2006, p. 2). Naturally, the analysis of public discourse is centered on the public arena through which all political communication is channeled (Ferree et al. 2002). However, this study pays attention to the arenas from where the ideas are conveyed into public discourses.

The different arenas can be organized according to their function in the political process (Howlett et al. 2009; Aberbach et al. 1981; Poggi 1990, p. 1). On a very general level, the arenas are separated into input (governing by the people) and output (governing for the people) arenas (Scharpf 1999, p. 7f). The input side is the forum where political potentials are mobilized, innovative ideas are suggested and policy options are debated. This refers to the parliamentary, electoral, protest, and direct-democratic arenas. The parliamentary arena is characterized by the strict rules on debating and decision-making. Further, the electoral arena is constituted by the rules of party competition and the casting of votes. Protest politics, on the contrary, is not characterized by such formal rules, though today's protests in Western Europe are professionalized, ritualized performances to attract public attention (Tarrow 1994, 94). The output arenas are the sites where policies are implemented and evaluated. This includes the arena of interest intermediation, the political advisory arena and the business arena.

Between input and output arenas are governmental and judicial arenas, which have a *janus-faced* position (Kriesi 2007, p. 263). On the one hand, public authorities interact significantly with the input arenas: they intervene into the decision-making processes in the parliamentary arena by providing expertise for new regulations and influence discourse in the electoral and direct-democratic arenas by political campaigning. On the other hand, they

head the administration and moderate negotiations between social partners in interest intermediation processes. They are thus involved on both sides of the policy process.

Due to their inherent rules and norms, arenas have an impact on the structure of public discourse. First, discourse in the input arenas is *accessible* to the largest number of actors. This is due to the multiplicity of channels for participation that the input arenas provide, most notably in the protest and direct-democratic arenas. Since janus-faced arenas are the sites of decision-making, public authorities crowd out most other actors. Access to these arenas is thus anticipated to be restricted. The output arenas, finally, are hypothesized to be less inclusive than the input arenas, but not as exclusive than janus-faced arenas. Moreover, it is also assumed that arenas differ substantially with respect to their discursive *functionality*, i.e., whether discourse in the different arenas is shaped by coordination or communication among the actors engaged. In general, the input arenas are characterized by a higher degree of coordination, and, correspondingly, more conflict than the other arenas, since opposition to the pro-market mainstream is largest here. Actors such as niche parties and protest movements are expected to be able to mobilize their political potential mainly in the input arenas. In contrast, since government actors dominate in the janus-faced arenas, these arenas should be tightly connected with the communicative function of discourse. More precisely, most actors in the janus-faced arenas care about the reformulation and implementation of policies, which is why the need to communicate clarifications and justifications on these policies should be highest. The output arenas, finally, are expected to occupy a middle ground.

2.3 THE INSTITUTIONAL AND STRUCTURAL LEGACIES OF PUBLIC DISCOURSE

This chapter has outlined the historical developments that end in contemporary discourses on economic liberalization. While the general economic performance in terms of economic hardship has been rather constant, Western Europe is far more exposed to the global economy and also more post-industrialized than it was four decades ago. This has not only changed the nature of government activity, but is also tightly connected to changes in public discourse on economic liberalization. Accordingly, the internationalization of important aspects of economic policy-making and the mainstream party convergence have led to a pro-market mainstream, which in

general incorporates established parties, governments, public administrations, the EU, International Organizations, as well as multinational corporations and peak employer associations. With regards to the challengers of this pro-market mainstream, trade unions still are important in mobilizing grievances against the consequences of free markets, although the intensity of their opposition has decreased over the decades. The parties of the radical left and social movements can be expected to be only marginally relevant. The populist radical right, finally, which opposes economic liberalization for identitarian reasons, is a newly important challenger. As challengers of the right, they are expected to side with traditionally protectionist businesses. The second major shift in public discourse is the fundamental change toward a new two-dimensional structure: instead of a single left-right bifurcation, public discourse is nowadays characterized by an international and a domestic divide. These two divides are related to conflicts on increasing globalization and post-industrialization, respectively.

The second part of this chapter established that there is also diversity in discourses dependent on the different institutional frameworks. One of the main messages is thus that the study of economic developments is not sufficient to grasp all contextual influences on the structure and substance of public discourse. On the one hand, institutional country differences are key to understanding the variations in the functionality and accessibility of discourse. On the other hand, arenas—institutional venues which further structure the policy process—are influential as well.

The first implication of the country-specific institutional contexts for the discourses on economic liberalization is their accessibility. In comparison with the UK, more actors are able to engage in the public discourse on economic liberalization in France. The history of militant conflicts draws more actors into the public arena than in the liberal market economy UK. In Austria and Germany, the public arena is most accessible because of their balanced neocorporatist institutional setting and the consensus-oriented character of their overall political system. In comparison with these two countries, the labor movement has a comparatively weak position in the Netherlands and Switzerland, which is why public discourse is relatively closed in these countries. In the two majoritarian and pluralist countries, France and UK, public authorities are expected to crowd out discursive actions by other actors more effectively than in the four CME, leading to communicative discourses. In Germany, Switzerland, Austria and the Netherlands, in contrast, a broader variety of ideas is conveyed into public discourses, increasing the share of coordinative discourses.

With regard to the sub-national level, the analysis differentiates three types of arenas: the input arenas, where political interests are mobilized; the output arenas, which are mainly the forums of policy implementation; and the janus-faced arenas, which are crucial for both the formulation and implementation of policy change. As a first insight derived from this conceptualization, a high share of coordinative discourses is expected in the input arenas. This separates them from the more communication-oriented janus-faced arenas, with the output arenas taking a middle ground. In addition, input arenas are the most accessible sites of the policy process, since they receive the whole spectrum of political mobilization for and against economic liberalization. The janus-faced arenas, in which most policy decision-making takes place, are closed, since they are almost exclusively the sites of government actors. Output arenas again take the middle ground with regard to the accessibility of public discourses.

So far, the discussion has developed from the relationship of economic developments, institutions, and changes in public discourse over the last decades. The next chapter will outline the design of the content analysis applied to assess the structure and substance of contemporary discourses on economic liberalization in much more detail.

NOTES

1. Data retrieved from <http://globalization.kof.ethz.ch> [08/03/2011].
2. Data retrieved from <http://stats.oecd.org> [08/03/2011].
3. All indices are arranged so that they show increasing liberalization trends on a scale from 0 to 100. They are standardized by setting the highest value to 100 and the lowest to 0. The remaining values are then recalculated correspondingly to fit into the range from 0 to 100.
4. Data retrieved from <http://globalization.kof.ethz.ch> [08/03/2011].
5. Retrieved from <http://stats.oecd.org> [08/03/2011].
6. Taken from the privatization barometer (retrieved from <http://www.privatizationbarometer.net> [08/03/2011]) as well as the OECD structural analysis database.
7. This regime featured only lightly interdependent national economies organized around Keynesian macroeconomic policies (Ruggie 2008).
8. The following national elections are covered by the data: Austria = 1975, 1994, 1999, 2002, 2006; France = 1978, 1988, 1995, 2002, 2007; Germany = 1976, 1994, 1998, 2002, 2005; the Netherlands = 1973, 1994, 1998, 2002, 2003, 2006; the UK = 1974, 1992, 1997, 2001, 2005; Switzerland = 1975, 1991, 1995, 1999, 2003, 2007.

9. The data stem from a content analysis of newspapers in a two-month selection period up to each election day (see Dolezal et al. 2012).
10. See Table A.2 in the Appendix for the details on the aggregation of parties to party families.
11. A Ghent system is one where the main administrative responsibility for welfare payments, particularly in the field of unemployment benefits, is held by the trade unions, not by public authorities. Belgium and the Scandinavian countries feature such a system.
12. In the same year, activists protested at the IMF and World Bank talks in Washington. Later on, in 2001, massive protests surrounded the third Summit of the Americas in Quebec (talks among leaders from both South and North America held by the Organization of American States), the EU summit in Gothenburg, and the G8 summit in Genoa.
13. At first glance, the results in Table 2.1 conflict with this conclusion. Right-wing challenger parties have actually become more pro-market over the last four decades. From the 1990s to the 2000s, there has only been a slight decrease in their pro-liberalization stance. However, the numbers show the aggregate positions on all economic liberalization policies. In Chap. 4, results will show that most right-wing populists are only pro-market on domestic aspects, while opposing international liberalization.
14. In contrast to the other indices, a negative direction of the trend of economic hardship of course indicates a positive development of the state of the economy.
15. Austria = 2002, 2006; France = 2002, 2007; Germany = 2002, 2005; the Netherlands = 2002/2003, 2006; the UK = 2001, 2005; Switzerland = 2003, 2007.

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