

Catholic and Christian Democratic Views on Europe Before and After World War II: Continuities and Discontinuities

Patrick Pasture

There is little doubt about the decisive impact of Christian Democracy on the formation of the European Communities and the European Union (EU)—suffice to recall the “founding fathers” like Konrad Adenauer, Alcide De Gasperi, Jean Monnet and Robert Schuman, and more recently Jacques Delors, as well as the present and previous heads of the European Council, Poland’s Donald Tusk and Belgium’s Herman Van Rompuy. Indeed, Christianity’s impact upon Europe as a cultural and political space has been decisive. Some even view the EU, or at least its forerunners, as an essentially Catholic project. At the same time, European history in general, and European integration history in particular, is also perceived in almost exclusively secular terms—witness the proposal not to include a reference to Christianity in the preamble of the draft European constitution in 2003, while maintaining a reference to Humanism and Enlightenment.

P. Pasture (✉)
KU Leuven, University of Leuven, Leuven, Belgium
e-mail: patrick.pasture@kuleuven.be

I will not explore this dichotomy, but rather investigate the Catholic and Christian Democratic impact on European integration before and after World War II. As the Protestant impact on European integration is less determining, or at least less visible, I will concentrate on Catholics and Christian Democrats. With the latter term, I refer to a distinct political movement, whose boundaries however remain vague, especially before World War II. Hence I include mainly Catholic politicians and thinkers speaking about European unity and its political organization.¹ The Catholic Church's hierarchy, incidentally, in this respect, is just one player among many, and not even the most important one. But in any case, such an assessment implies some reflection on democracy and human rights, which became key elements of European self-representation after World War II, but had important roots in prewar Christian thought. Investigating continuities and discontinuities reveals a far more complicated story than that of the gradual "enlightenment" of which we are accustomed to hear.

Just beyond the simple statement that Christian Democrats influenced the early European integration process, one immediately finds some key divergences. The dominant scholarly representation of Christian Democracy shares with the historiography of European integration the perception that World War II somehow constitutes a break—that everything actually "started" then. That representation is correct insofar as Europe underwent various major political changes in the war's course, although much of what is perceived as novel after 1945 was already imagined, if not always realized, in the 1930s or earlier, and many of the changes that we associate with the postwar period were only implemented in the late 1950s, if not later still.

The histories of Christian Democracy and European integration both offer plenty of examples of such continuities and discontinuities. The clearest break was the division of Europe, which—pardon my cynicism—"integrated" one part of the continent into the Eurasian Soviet empire, which extended far further to the west than any previous Russian empire had done before, while letting Europe's western part engage in a contentious path of regional integration and association with the United States. The western part was in some ways less unified than the eastern part, but it surely was more effective in leaving behind the causes of the war (in particular the French–German antagonism) and in achieving economic recovery. While Western Europe entered onto a path of economic growth, the eastern part of the continent soon fell behind. The division

also split Christian Democracy as a continental political movement: while blossoming in the west, where Christian Democrats quickly (albeit unexpectedly) became the dominant political force, this political family's members were virtually outlawed in the east, barely surviving with their lives. The division, although real enough, did not preclude parallels and interactions, among others through exiles acting as go-betweens, but one must assess their impact according to proper proportions.² Unlike in the remainder of this volume, the East-Central European Christian Democrats will hardly play any role in this chapter.

Traditional narratives of both European integration and Christian Democracy incidentally ignore what was actually, seen from a global perspective, the most important change: decolonization. The real importance of this mid-twentieth-century development is only coming to the fore now, in the twenty-first century, when the demise of the "old world" and the emergence particularly of East Asia as the economic and cultural center of the world are becoming apparent.³

The emphasis on a break across the caesura of the Second World War, however, obscures some important fundamental continuities with earlier times. That there were European predecessors of course has been recognized, in particular Count Richard von Coudenhove-Kalergi's Pan-Europa Movement. Recent research, however, focuses on prewar anti-liberal views of Europe, as the Euroskeptic John Laughland already suggested in 1997. (Referring to Laughland in the context of European integration history may be blasphemous, but this does not change the fact that he had a point.)⁴

In fact, the traditional representation has cast European integration as a path to "enlightenment," with great visionaries imagining a Europe that overcame its demons, mostly associated with nationalism, ultimately resulting in an European Union that has brought peace while acting as a moral beacon of the world. Although this image is not totally devoid of truth (Laughland is not the best possible introduction to European integration history), I think that it is wrong for many reasons. First and foremost among these is that it ignores the variety of motives to plead for unity, instead producing a distorted view of contemporary Europe that ignores important parts of the continent's history—perhaps even at the risk of repeating it.

In this chapter, I would like to reassess these continuities and discontinuities with regard to Christian Democratic views on European unity, emphasizing the complex ways in which Catholics and Christian

Democrats contributed to European unity and showing that they were actually quite well integrated in broader political movements, from socialist radicals to fascists. This reassessment points toward new spatial and temporal understandings of a Christian Democratic Europe.

PRE-WORLD WAR II VARIETIES

The first task is to recall modern (i.e. “post-French Revolution”) Europe’s continuous nostalgia for a lost Christendom, which has inspired cross-confessional Christian romantics as well as Catholic ultramontanes.⁵ After the First World War, widespread pessimism over Europe’s fate generated an intense reflection on the proper organization of the continent, resulting in various calls for a pan-European “palingenetic” rebirth that was often, though not always, imagined as profoundly Christian. This reflection often incorporated profound fears about a looming “awakening” of Islamic and East Asian empires.

In these pessimists’ eyes, Europe needed to pull itself together against external threats, rejuvenate and constitute itself as a “Third Way” (or “third force”). Such ideas, for example, underpinned the explicitly Catholic *Abendland* movement concentrated around the famous monastery of Maria Laach in Germany; Catholic avant-garde intellectuals such as Giovanni Papini and Curzio Malaparte in Italy; and conservative noblemen such as Hugo von Hofmannstahl, Count Hermann Keyserling and Otto von Habsburg. Many of them dreamed of a contemporary restoration of Catholic Europe after the old Carolingian empire or the Habsburg Empire of Charles V. They opposed Communism, but also the “Anglo-Saxon” internationalism represented by the League of Nations.⁶ Some argued already from the early 1920s not only for a “conservative revolution,” but also for Europe’s cleansing of “democratic corruption.” Perhaps the most influential among them was prince Karl Anton Rohan, the founder of one of the main cultural circles in interwar Europe, the Europäische Kulturbund (European Cultural Association; Vienna 1922, Paris 1923), which published the illustrious *Europäische Revue / Revue européenne*.

Clearly, such ideas drew them to Italian fascism. Prince Rohan indeed explicitly described himself as a fascist, expressing sympathy for Mussolini in the 1920s. The fascist affinity is less clear for Malaparte and especially Papini, though both did ultimately embrace fascism in the 1930s.⁷ However, the Europäische Kulturbund refrained from

overtly engaging in party politics, appealing instead to much wider circles, including liberals such as José Ortega y Gasset and Alfred Weber, socialists such as France's Marcel Déat, as well as proto-fascists such as the Italian esoteric philosopher Julius Evola and Mussolini's right-hand ideologue Giovanni Gentile. The network also interfaced with the influential Katholische Akademikerverband (Catholic Academic Association), created in Cologne in 1913, which included as a member also Cologne mayor—and future great post-World War II German chancellor—Konrad Adenauer.

Catholics could also be found in the vanguard of those who pleaded for a Franco-German reconciliation and understanding, which in turn would imply wider European collaboration. Many of Western Europe's Catholics, for example, followed closely the ideas regarding French-German rapprochement advanced by the weekly *L'Europe Nouvelle* and its inspiring founder Louise Weiss, who had a mixed Jewish-Protestant background. *L'Europe Nouvelle* published articles by leaders of different political colors and confessional backgrounds, including Catholics as varied as Weimar Foreign Minister Gustav Stresemann, French diplomat Wladimir d'Ormesson and the French extreme right writer Pierre Drieu La Rochelle.⁸ Unsurprisingly, such ideas were particularly prevalent in the 1920s in the Rhineland among conservatives and business leaders, but also in left Catholic circles, with Joseph Joos as a central figure seeking reconciliation with France and defending, like Adenauer, a vision of a European federation.⁹ The Catholic newspaper *Kölnische Volkszeitung* in 1924 adopted the French Prime Minister Édouard Herriot's plea for a united Europe, understood mainly in economic terms. In France, journals identified with conservative Catholic essayist Wladimir d'Ormesson, including *Revue de Paris* and *Le Temps*, supported similar views. In the international field, the International Confederation of Christian Trade Unions (Confédération internationale des Syndicats chrétiens, CISC), constructed on a Franco-German base, supported European federalism quite explicitly.¹⁰ The same was true of the Catholic pacifist Democratic International led by Marc Sangnier, founder of the republican movement *Le Sillon*. At its 1930 congress, Sangnier's Democratic International for Peace explicitly endorsed the concept of the United States of Europe.¹¹

The idea of a Christian Europe was very prominent in the most famous interwar movement, Count Coudenhove-Kalergi's Pan-European Union. Yet this was no Christian association, nor did it strive for a restoration of Christendom. Emphasizing economic and political

collaboration, Pan-Europa was also less palingenetic than the *Abendland* movement and its various appendages. From its very origins, Pan-Europa was conceived as a neutral movement, though it did obtain support from Catholic circles as well. The Austrian Chancellor Msgr Ignaz Seipel was the Austrian branch's first president, and the Social Democrat Karl Renner its vice-president—a pairing that, given the polarization of inter-war Austrian politics, represented a remarkable and significant demonstration of political collaboration. Catholics and Protestants strove also to bridge the Franco-German antagonism through economic partnerships, such as the movement for a European Customs Union, as well as the Circles of Colpach and liberal industrialist Émile Mayrish's Comité Franco-Allemand d'Information et de Documentation (Franco-German Committee of Information and Documentation). (Mayrish was not a Catholic, as far as I know.) Among the Catholics who interfaced with these groupings, we find not only the principled Adenauer but also the conservative Catholic Franz von Papen, who would become chancellor in the Hindenburg cabinet of 1932 and vice-chancellor under Adolf Hitler in 1933–1934.

Some Christian politicians in the 1920s and 1930s started organizing at the European level in the International Secretariat of Democratic Parties of Christian Inspiration (SIPDIC). That the name referred to neither “Christian Democratic” nor Catholic parties is significant: the SIPDIC was no real inter- or transnational movement, but rather a common office of different national Christian parties or movements. Its main objectives lay in the circulation of ideas, not in adopting transnational European policies. National preoccupations largely eclipsed international considerations. Hence the SIPDIC hardly expressed itself on the question of European unity. However, the lack of international ambitions was only one reason why it did not explicitly argue for European unity, in contrast to other associations. Another reason was that Christian—I hesitate to label them Christian Democratic—parties were deeply divided, above all on the issue of international politics on the European continent.¹²

Although the dominant narrative of European integration history considers the ambitious plan for a European Union in the League of Nations that French Foreign Minister Aristide Briand launched on 5 September 1929 as largely still-born due to the increased protectionist wave after the 1929 Crash and the ensuing economic depression, the plan did raise hope among Catholics. It was even discreetly supported by

the Holy See, which favored the rapprochement of France and Germany and opposed nationalism. (This may be surprising, as in French domestic politics Briand was considered an outspoken anti-clericalist, even if he had moderated and revised his ideas on the matter since serving as the rapporteur of the 1905 law on the separation of Church and State.)¹³ At its last congress in October 1932, under the leadership of Cologne mayor Konrad Adenauer, SIPDIC even passed a motion in favor of a European Common Market, as well as long-term planning for a political union.¹⁴ This, however, was little more than SIPDIC's swan song.

And yet, "third way" aspirations survived and flourished. In the early 1930s, a different, more philosophical "Europeanism" emerged within personalist milieus. This development is mostly associated with a number of young, often (but not exclusively) Catholic French intellectuals publishing in journals such as *Esprit* and *Ordre Nouveau*, but actually they fit into a much broader personalist movement, partly within the Catholic Church but as much outside it. In Central Europe, this movement built upon the thinking of, among others, Rudolf Hermann Lotze, Rudolf Eucken, Charles Renouvier and particularly, in the early twentieth century, Max Scheler, Nikolai Berdiaev and Heinrich Pesch.¹⁵

Emphasizing the concept of "community" as a bridge between the individual and society at large, rejecting nationalism as well as statism, the by and large Francophone personalists showed a particular interest in federalism, even in the federalist ideas of the nineteenth-century anarchist and mutualist Pierre-Joseph Proudhon, as well as Protestantism and ecumenism (particularly the work of Jewish philosopher Martin Buber). The Protestant philosopher Denis de Rougemont, in particular, connected personalism, Protestantism and federalism as he knew it from his homeland, Switzerland.¹⁶

These men and women had a major impact on European thinking. Federalism was seen as a process that engendered both decentralization (up to the level of the region and the community) and a "bottom up" approach in which "lower" instances delegated competences to a higher level; this was, in fact, the very definition of subsidiarity. Furthermore, it included a European dimension, conceiving of Europe as a profoundly Christian project, in which confessional ideals would serve as the basis for establishing a lasting peace.¹⁷ In one of the earliest texts of this emergent federalist thinking, René Dupuis and Alexandre Marc argued for a European federalism breaking with the existing order, charting a middle course between "nationalist imperialism" (or imperial nationalism)

and some sort of “abstract internationalism.” This new “young Europe,” described as vibrant, solid, sustainable and united, was to constitute a new “European community [which is] not cosmopolitan and international.” This, in the personalists’ view, had been the weakness of Coudenhove-Kalergi’s Pan-Europa, while their alternative was to be “supranational and decentralised.”¹⁸

Many of those new personalists and proponents of a “new order,” in particular the Austrian corporatists, Germans after the mold of Carl Schmitt and France’s non-conformists, by rejecting the individual as sole constituent of the political order, however, logically also opposed parliamentary democracy. As an alternative, they imagined a “new” or “true” democracy respecting the spirituality and the connectivity of the person, over and against the “terrorism” of the masses.¹⁹ However, pleading for “true democracy” and an “integral Christianity” risked amalgamation with fascism, to the extent that France’s *Ordre Nouveau* ultimately materialized as a school for fascist ideas, rather than a seedbed for democracy. The French thinkers led by Alexandre Marc proposed a corporatist model in which different “communities,” lacking in democratic representation, would determine politics, paradoxically according the state a central role, and thereby paving the way for authoritarianism and totalitarianism.

In fact, however, all over Europe Christians were strongly tempted by corporatism’s authoritarian, totalitarian and anti-Semitic politics in the 1930s. In largely Catholic countries such as Austria, Hungary, Portugal and Spain, Catholics joined fascistic parties. Even Nazism attracted major Catholic support as a function of its “totalitarian”—not so different perhaps from, for example, Action Française’s “integral”—ambition.²⁰ Lutherans, incidentally, either remained aloof from politics or supported extreme right parties as well, including National Socialism in Germany. Those transnational European movements that argued most explicitly in favor of a European “rebirth” and unification from a Christian perspective, if they had not already done so in the 1920s, also drifted toward fascism.

At the same time, a minority of Christian intellectuals and politicians reacted against the obviously abusive politics that emerged in Europe, including—though rarely emphasized—the persecution of Jews. They let their consciences speak.²¹ A case in point is the British Catholic Christopher Dawson, often represented as a reactionary figure, who nonetheless emphasized the Christian underpinnings of Europe, its

pluralism and its interactions with other political concepts to oppose fascism and Nazism.²²

It is in this context that Jacques Maritain published his famous *Humanisme intégral* (1936), imagining a “New Christendom” that would reconcile the fundamental neo-Thomist rejection of liberal modernity with a respect for republican values, and hence be both secular and confessional. The two pillars of such a “secular Christian society” were the common good, in particular “justice,” and the defense of the spiritual value of the human person, which required fundamental liberties of the protection of private life, the family and culture. However, *Humanisme intégral* explicitly rejects liberal democracy. As John Hellman has compellingly argued, Maritain actually came to embrace democratic values during the war as a result of his understanding of the practical realities, certainly helped by the political theorist Yves Simon’s astute comments.²³ In the United States, human rights were perhaps seen as universal already in the late 1930s, in part because democracy and religion in the USA were not seen as opposite, but as complementary. It was indeed the ethical awareness in the confrontation with the realities of the rejection of individualism and democracy, thus “practical reasoning,” that made certain Catholics, though by no means all, oppose totalitarianism in the 1920s and 1930s.²⁴ The influential margins here belonged to the Thomists, who almost inevitably lured their adepts into fascist collaboration.

World War II strengthened the federalist and democratic views of those who resisted fascism and collaboration, even if the Nazis’ rhetoric about a new European order during the war, particularly as promoted by Vichy France, discredited the idea of an integrated Europe altogether. The discrediting of a European project extended particularly to the Resistance: even Coudenhove-Kalergi, pleading his cause in American exile, was seen as a traitor.

In this context, Swiss, British and American federalisms appeared to offer alternative models for a future Europe. Through the Federalist Union, to which both Catholics and Anglicans contributed, British ideas about federalism had a wide impact in the Anglo-Saxon world, including the USA.²⁵ The Swiss thinker Denis de Rougemont only developed a more systematic vision of federalism while in exile in the USA, where, according to his biographer, he first became conscious of his Europeanness—a feeling that many exiles shared.²⁶ Similarly, Maritain and the Italian Christian Democrat Don Luigi Sturzo began to conceive

of a European union only after 1940, in American exile, where the federalist movement bloomed, particularly in the circles in which they moved. Exiled *Abendlanders* such as Otto von Habsburg experienced a similar awareness, cherishing the idea of an association modeled on the old Habsburg “dual monarchy” ideal, even if adapted—though how remains questionable to this day—to democracy.²⁷ Nevertheless, as Wolfram Kaiser has pointed out, these various political thinkers’ experiences in the USA also drove them into a more Atlanticist position, as well as favoring regional alliances without Germany after 1941.²⁸ Most favored a (sub-) regional unity only—such as between France and Belgium, the Danube or Balkan countries—concluding that a wider union was unrealistic. At a minimum, they felt that the war had reinforced their abhorrence of nationalism, and as a result they shared the curious assessment that blamed nationalism for the war.

AMBIGUITIES OF THE CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATIC BREAKTHROUGH AFTER WORLD WAR II

To the surprise of almost everyone—not least themselves—Christian Democrats emerged as the dominant political force on the European continent after World War II. The reasons why fall beyond the scope of this chapter, but a few observations are necessary. Christian Democracy remained largely a Catholic and, to a lesser extent, Reformed affair. Meanwhile, Lutherans entered onto a different path of reflection and engagement with the world that kept them largely aloof from party politics, though interesting parallels with Catholics can be discerned as well, beginning mainly in the 1960s. In the meantime, the new world that Catholic activists conceived no longer appeared as a restored Christendom, perhaps not even, as Étienne Fouilloux argued with regard to France, a “new” kind of Christendom.

Instead, this new world was to be fundamentally pluralistic, even secular. Christians were to collaborate with non-Christians in order to bring about a society commensurable with their ideals.²⁹ Perhaps their contacts with the USA, which steadfastly supported European Christian Democracy after the war, also played a role in this process. It also implied a healthy dose of anti-clericalism—a deliberative, though cautious, distance with regard to the clerical authorities that, in the eyes of many lay leaders, particularly in France and Belgium, had often fallen short of

bravery and moral leadership during the war. And yet this was not necessarily the view of the majority of the faithful, who continued to look to the churches for hope and stability, particularly in Germany. Hence the Christian Democratic leaders considered the churches, and in particular the Catholic Church, to be still useful; they did not grant them leadership though. The churches, too, incidentally, preferred to retreat from political interference, at least in theory. Certainly, in Catholic lands, the impact of the Church hierarchy on society steadily increased once again, as the hierarchy saw pervasive dangers to the basic interests of the Church, which contributed to the restoration of “pillarised Catholicism.”³⁰

Nevertheless, there was more continuity across the caesura of 1945 than may appear at first sight, and also more ambiguity. Namely, it took time before new principles became generally accepted. The Holy See, while nevertheless engaged in emphasizing the principle of “human dignity” as the core of its new vision and opposition to totalitarianism, actually stopped short of embracing democracy and pluralism until the Second Vatican Council in the 1960s. In his famous Christmas speech of 1944, for example, Pope Pius XII expressed only a very conditional support for the “democratic ideal of liberty and equality,” still warning against “the whims of the masses.”³¹

There were also still many leading Catholic thinkers who did not embrace democracy at all. This was, for example, the case of the post-war *Neue Abendland* in Germany, which somewhat remarkably emerged from the war as opponents of Nazism because of the Nazi persecution of Catholics and the exile of a few well-known leaders such as Otto von Habsburg.³² Prince Rohan, too, returned to propagating extreme right ideas. However, these currents remained marginal, and the mainstream Christian Democrats as well as, it should be noted, most of the ecclesiastical hierarchy remained aloof from them. Rohan, for example, ended his days as a pariah.

But the ambiguities of postwar Catholic politics in Europe began with Christian Democracy itself. While it referred to democracy, its ideal remained “Christian,” or, as the International Union of Young Christian Democrats (Union internationale des jeunes démocrates-chrétiens, IUYCD) advocated at their 1948 congress, “a truly democratic Europe of Christian inspiration.”³³ While referring to “Christian” as well as “humanistic” values, postwar Christian Democrats aimed at offering an alternative to the materialistic world and its individualism, as well as to

the nation-state, understood to be obsolete, at least by most radicals: the new slogan was that now the “time is for federations.” In the economic field, the essence of the Christian Democratic project remained corporatist, or at least communitarian—always rejecting capitalist liberalism as well as Communism, and arguing for some sort of “third way.” Its European program in particular followed the logic of the personalist multi-layered organization that transcended the nation-state. Clearly, elements of *Ordre Nouveau* thinking found their way into Christian Democratic thinking, among others through the pages of the French journal *La Fédération*, which earned some notoriety exactly because both former Vichyites and Christian Democrats, including from the Resistance, found there a forum for exchanging ideas, in particular on the organization of the economy.³⁴

Christian Democracy’s postwar ambiguity comes to the fore particularly in a domain that may appear highly surprising: human rights. In his paradigm-changing monograph *The Last Utopia*, as well as its sequel *Christian Human Rights*, Samuel Moyn argued that Catholic thinking had a formative impact on the formulation of human rights after World War II—and that Christian Democrats, in particular, had a major hand in the drafting of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR, 1948), as well as the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR, 1950).³⁵ However, as Piotr H. Kosicki and Paul Hanebrink have argued in reference to Poland and Hungary in the 1920s and 1930s—whose cases were not isolated—for Christian Democrats it was the rights of the Catholics, not human beings, that needed defending—precluding, for example, a presumptive defense of the rights of Jews.³⁶

That idea certainly continued after World War II, in particular with regard to education. Without endorsing Marco Duranti’s inordinate claim that human rights were at least partly some kind of extreme right Catholic conspiracy to offer a refuge for collaborators,³⁷ it can hardly be denied that they were imagined as a means to offer protection from the totalitarianism of not only fascism, Nazism and Communism, but also from the republic, and from the secular state. Recent research has also suggested that, in contrast to popular writings on the subject, the Holocaust, and Jews and Judaism more generally, did not factor prominently in the drafting of either the UDHR or the ECHR, particularly not among Catholics. In other words, anti-Semitism had not disappeared overnight in 1945.³⁸ This restrictive interpretation of human rights incidentally had another consequence—that human rights were not

supposed to be universally applicable in Europe's colonies—although that was foreseen for some.³⁹ Furthermore, Catholics continued to argue for collective rights, an issue on which, however, they ultimately found themselves to be on the losing side.

The Christian human rights concept was deeply rooted in the personalistic concept of human dignity, which was certainly imagined in the 1930s to strengthen the rejection of totalitarianism, Communist as well as Nazi. Remarkably, the larger category of fascism seems hardly to have been criticized for not respecting human rights, and Catholic dignitaries known for fascistic sympathies such as Austrian bishop Alois Hudal felt perfectly comfortable adopting the language of human dignity. In Austria, in fact, Catholic conservatives once supportive of the Dollfuss regime actually drew on the new theory of totalitarianism to protect the Austrofascist state from Communism as well as Nazism. "Totalitarianism," in the view of its main Catholic architects Waldemar Gurian, Dietrich von Hildebrand and Jacques Maritain, was imagined as the culmination or apogee of a secular, republican modernity. In other words, it was the other side of the coin of liberal democracy, which stripped individuals of their connections, their character and their values. Hence it was liberalism itself that inevitably paved the way for totalitarianism, the all-encompassing power of the state. The alternative that Catholic personalists of the 1930s proposed was a society based on Christian principles and centered around the person (not the individual) as a social being, hence based upon "communities." It could be democratic, but in the interwar period few thought that it would necessarily be so.⁴⁰

Former proponents of a "new order" were not always excluded from postwar Christian Democratic circles. Christian Democrats, in the struggle for votes in the new Europe, strove for reconciliation, especially with the enemy within. The French *La Fédération* offers a case in point as this journal offered a meeting place for former proponents of the *Ordre Nouveau*, including outright collaborators in the Vichy regime, with Christian figures from the Resistance. These former antagonists united in promoting a European federalist ideal that continued many of the themes that had emerged in prewar personalist circles.

The core of the Christian Democratic ideal continued to reject the predominance of the nation-state as an all-determining political structure, promoting a multi-layered (neo-)corporatist society that would respect different communities built around the individual (or the

person). More than before the war, this implied action at the international and European levels. In other words, World War II, as generally understood across the continent, had once again—a recurrent theme in Catholic thought since the French Revolution—shown the pernicious power of the absolutist nation-state.⁴¹ Obviously, then, Catholics in general and Christian Democrats in particular opposed the sanctification of the republic that some, including contemporary historians as Antonin Cohin and Marco Duranti, associate with liberal democracy, implying, correctly, that Christian Democrats therefore rejected this system as well. Their alternative, I believe, should not, however, be so easily cast aside as implying a turn to some reactionary totalitarian machinery.

While recent scholarship thus emphasizes a “transwar” continuity, one should not overlook the discontinuities either. A major difference with the previous war was that in 1945 no similar need for a European palingenetic rebirth emerged. To be sure, there existed a sense of destruction and economic and moral bankruptcy, resulting in a widespread movement for moral regeneration. Perhaps the *reality* of doom was even greater after World War II.

But, unlike in 1918, three decades later there was an acute sense of a new start. That was perhaps most outspoken with regard to domestic politics, which would lead to the development of a more inclusive society (albeit in more homogenous nation-states) and the welfare state (on both sides of the emerging Iron Curtain, despite the differences in ideology and political economy). And yet on this point, too, continuities bear emphasis: most ideas were not new, and a more inclusive society materialized only from the 1960s onwards. The international political situation clearly showed the greatest discontinuities, with the geopolitical map of Europe being completely redrawn, the global power balance definitively altered, and decolonization begun in the Global South. In contrast to 1918, nobody actually believed that Europe would be able to regain its former position, even if the continent also witnessed what Martin Shipway has called a “late-colonial shift,” which came to the fore in the Eurafrica project that would endow even the European Economic Community with a colonial dimension.⁴² This idea of a new start, perhaps somewhat paradoxically, implied much continuity in the concrete proposals and plans.

However, in contrast with the general feeling after World War I, after the subsequent war the idea of a moral victory of Good over Evil prevailed, which perhaps stimulated the sense that indeed a new start had

been initiated. With regard to Christian Democracy, the Nazi persecution of Catholics somehow dissociated the Church from its general collaboration with fascism, especially as some of those who had fascist sympathies had distanced themselves from Nazism. Hence Redemption had in some way already been achieved.

The rejection of nationalism to some extent offered a common ground to Christian Democrats and other European federalists, though one should not exaggerate the impact of either party. At the end of World War II, it appeared that European political leaders had learned little from the past and were firmly on their way to repeating the errors of Versailles, even with a vengeance.⁴³ What changed was less a gradual European *prise de conscience* than the emerging Cold War, which produced the conditions to pacify Western Europe. It is this geopolitical context that allowed European federalists to reconnect with interwar conceptions of a European federation as a way to overcome the divisions that had once again ruined the continent and jeopardized its position in the world. Their ideas found an attentive ear in the Vatican. For various reasons, the latter's space for intervention remained limited, however, not least because the Holy See and much of the Church hierarchy throughout Europe had largely failed the test of moral leadership during the war. This, incidentally, was also the case with Protestant churches.

A RESTART FOR A CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATIC EUROPE

In the postwar European project, several dynamics converged, and their confrontation and interaction led to a new path for the continent—or, at least, for its western half. The most obvious, and immediate, was the Cold War. It was the Cold War that rendered obsolete the postwar Allied plans with regard to the destruction and division of Germany—although, ironically, the French obsession with dividing Germany would materialize, if not as imagined.

Less generally acknowledged, but just as important, was decolonization. Maintaining Europe's dominant status in the world had been a major motivation to envisage forms of European collaboration already from the nineteenth century, a practice that was not particular to Catholics.⁴⁴ With decolonization imminent, European federalism could be a way to compensate for the continent's loss of global influence, a factor that certainly played a major (though largely unacknowledged) role in the European orientation of France, the Netherlands and, with much

delay, also Belgium, as well as, initially, the United Kingdom (UK)—at least in the eyes of Ernest Bevin and the Foreign Office. It also aggravated the need to reinforce national economies, which, as Alan Milward has demonstrated, was one of the main motives behind European economic integration. Still, attempts to preserve their status as colonial powers could prevent European countries from fully engaging in European integration, as was eventually the case for the UK, but initially at least also for France and, for even longer, for Belgium. Moreover, it hindered the development of a strong alternative European identity through an emphasis on human rights as European values.

Apart from some former *Ordre Nouveau* activists such as Denis de Rougemont and especially Alexandre Marc, Christian Democrats did not appear at the forefront of European integration immediately, and its main proponents did not occupy major positions in political life. Moreover, an important part of the new generation of “left Catholics,” who emerged in Western Europe as a significant (though, in hindsight, perhaps overrated) social and political phenomenon, initially objected to the Euro-Atlantic perspective implied in the Marshall Plan.⁴⁵ The plan had called upon Europeans to associate under the leadership of the USA and to integrate under the auspices of a transatlantic economic and political alliance. By the end of the 1940s, however, fears of Communist and Soviet expansion were complemented by the attractions of American dollars—in the form of diverse support schemes for Christian Democratic parties and movements. The United States supported the European Christian Democrats, particularly in Italy, as the new Cold War foreign policy establishment saw in the Christian Democrats a political power that could contain Communist infiltration. At the same time, Americans also feared that Catholic politics could be too weak among working classes, the reason why they supported unified social-democratic and Christian labor unions.⁴⁶

Still, the Christian Democratic role in European cooperation initially remained restrained. Apart from Denis de Rougemont, Alexandre Marc and François de Menthon, Christian Democrats only belatedly associated themselves with the Congress of Europe at The Hague in May 1948, which created the European Federal Movement. To be sure, de Menthon made a proposal for a European “constitution”—indeed, for a United States of Europe—in his remarks at The Hague. Likewise, it was Georges Bidault—member of the Resistance, founder of the highly successful Christian Democratic Popular Republican Movement

(Mouvement Républicain Populaire, MRP) and French foreign minister in the government of the Christian Democratic eminence Robert Schuman—who outlined France’s new European policy, pursuing the creation of a European Assembly (later realized in the Council of Europe), as well as a customs and economic union.

The Council, however, was a far cry from what Aristide Briand had advocated in the interwar years. In the end, Christian Democrats remained divided with regard to the intensity of European collaboration. In June 1949, Bidault himself even opposed the creation of a Christian Democratic faction in the new European Assembly, while the *Nouvelles Équipes Internationales*, an association of pro-European Christian Democratic politicians newly formed in 1947, was hardly supported by the newly constituted Christian Democratic parties.⁴⁷

The tide shifted afterwards only slowly, for reasons well known. The search for an alternative European order initially included a European defense scheme as well as an economic union, a “third way” between Soviet Communism and American capitalism. Its only initial result was the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), the outcome of a French initiative put forward by Jean Monnet, a socialist civil servant (and horse-shed Catholic), and French Foreign Minister Robert Schuman, as the patience of the USA was running out with the quarreling Europeans and with France’s use of Marshall funds in its overseas colonies.

The 1950 Schuman Plan combined at least two perspectives. At its core was the design for economic integration of Europe based upon industrial cooperation, including a regional and industrial free market and a customs union on the one hand, enriched by Monnet’s new insights into the value of central economic planning, which made him an advocate of supranational authority. Already during the war, Monnet had imagined drafts to bring German industry under French control as part of the dismantling of the Third Reich, not unlike what France had previously envisioned after World War I. Beyond this not entirely reconciliatory objective of the Schuman Plan, however, was its horizon as the European answer to the Organization for European Economic Cooperation, at least partly aimed at re-establishing a strong European economy not completely dependent on American intervention. But re-establishing a European economy actually proved to be less a pan-European project than a series of national ones, particularly for France, where it had also a colonial dimension. But the multifaceted features of the European integration project also illustrate the Christian Democratic

sense of compromise, flexibility and will to transcend the level of the nation-state.⁴⁸

Nevertheless, institutions were created spanning most of Western Europe, with the ECSC as first in a series, and Christian Democrats did take the lead in this process. One simple reason for their leadership is that, in the early 1950s, Christian Democrats were in charge of the main departments in key European countries—with a consequence described aptly by Wolfram Kaiser as “hegemony by default.” This means that Christian Democrats were holding the steering wheel and disposed of reliable partners across the borders, who often knew each other personally already from the 1920s, or who had perhaps met during the war in various networks and meetings, among others in Geneva.

Adenauer is a particularly interesting case, as he had already argued for Franco-German reconciliation in the 1920s, recognizing as few German politicians had the French need for security.⁴⁹ Wary of Prussian imperialism, he had suggested breaking the Rhineland off from Germany into an independent state, in the interest of appeasing French fears and inspiring a more conciliatory French policy toward the German people. The personal relationship between Adenauer and Schuman—who was born in Luxemburg with the German nationality of his father—was certainly important in this respect. Philippe Chenaux and Wolfram Kaiser have admirably, from different perspectives, retraced the intensive yet largely secret personal contacts between European Christian Democrats, mainly in and around Geneva.⁵⁰

The story of these contacts also makes clear that one should not overestimate the European orientation of (Western) European Christian Democrats, even in the 1950s. Even the French architects of the ECSC had the interests of France in mind, although they admitted that a productive—in more senses than one—reconciliation with Germany came to seem inevitable. After the Marshall Plan expired, French Christian Democrats actually prioritized bilateral Franco-American relations in view of American support for Indochina.⁵¹

BY WAY OF A CONCLUSION

I am not going to venture into the question, still very much alive, about the originality of Christian Democracy, nor into the question of whether there is something distinctively Christian Democratic in European politics.⁵² Concrete proposals were strongly influenced by existing models

formulated before World War II by various Europeanist movements and circles. This was also true during the war, as in the case of outspoken socialist proposals such as the Ventotene Manifesto “For a Free and United Europe” (*Per un’ Europa libera e unita*), drafted by the Italian Communist Altiero Spinelli and the anti-fascist Ernesto Rossi, which even inspired the Catholic prime minister of the new Italian republic Alcide De Gasperi. I also think that the question of continuity or discontinuity across the classic caesura of World War II is often misguided, as one should distinguish more in terms of issues.

But there are some developments that I do want to emphasize:

1. Notwithstanding a still-dominant secular presentation of European integration history and some contemporary presentations of European integration as a secular project, Christians in general and Catholics in particular occupied a central stage in the debate on European unity all throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Their subsequent marginalization in the historiography has either been based upon a secularist bias or a misinterpretation of their various relationships with different worldviews and political currents, including socialists, liberals and fascists. In this context, however, one needs to acknowledge that boundaries between these movements and positions, particularly with fascism, were less clear than imagined in hindsight.
2. The recognition and desire to collaborate even within a unitary organization appeared to be novel after World War II, but, as I have indicated, was in fact not so much or far less so at the international level. Scholars of Christian Democracy have emphasized the importance of discussions with Resistance leaders, such as those on the initiative of the Italian Communist Altiero Spinelli at the house of the Dutch Reformed theologian Willem Visser ‘t Hooft in Geneva during the war. Meanwhile, other scholars, such as Philippe Chenaux, have downplayed the importance of these contacts, arguing that those experiences were shared only by a small minority, and were all but generally accepted.⁵³ Surely Chenaux is right with regard to these specific talks, but we saw Catholics and Christian Democrats already engaged in mixed associations and circles in the 1920s and 1930s as well. Here we find a surprising continuity. The discontinuity, meanwhile, lies in the rather (slow) development of a separate Christian Democratic international action.

3. Were Catholics and Christian Democrats “internationalists” par excellence, and particularly more in favor of European unity after World War II, as has often been argued?⁵⁴ To be perfectly honest, I have my doubts. Apart from a handful of individuals, Catholics were not particularly prominent in the federalist movement, while those who were did not achieve great influence—like the movement itself. Perhaps they were a bit more in favor of some sort of reconciliation, but I would not be too sure about that either. Obviously, what united Catholic politics at the time was a rejection of nationalism—which, after World War II, became a widely advertised key feature of Christian Democracy and Roman Catholicism alike. From this perspective, anti-nationalism perhaps motivated a turn to Europeanism, sometimes as a more realistic alternative to universalism.

If Christian Democrats played a major role in the construction of (Western) European institutions in the 1950s, it is because they were in power and they, among others, had become convinced that some sort of unity was needed to save their countries in the context of the emerging Cold War. Of course, being in power in a republic implies a certain moderation and pragmatism, but the case of Georges Bidault illustrates that it may have been more than just the pragmatism of power. This brings me to what Kees van Kersbergen identified as the most distinctive feature of Christian Democracy: its ability to compromise, to transcend political cleavages. The creation of the ECSC certainly offers a case in point.

4. The term “Christian Democracy,” especially in its presentation as a major political force after the war, suggests the acceptance of what today is viewed as the defining set of essentially European values: the acceptance of democracy, the rule of law, human rights, pluralism, the separation of Church and State. This chapter has confirmed the contributions of Christian Democrats to these values, but also considerably complicates the narrative. Even Christian acceptance of democracy was a far more ambiguous process than the militants of the movement like to believe,⁵⁵ while recent research by Samuel Moyn, Marco Duranti, Antonin Cohen and others has shown that, in addition, the values of

human dignity, human rights and the acceptance of pluralism must seriously be qualified. The ambiguities that I also emphasize apparently had a lasting impact even on the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights, up to today vis-à-vis the freedom of religion, which, according to Nehal Butha, appears to uphold a very “Christian Democratic” view on secularism, a view that appears quite inadequate today to the task of dealing with contemporary issues of religious freedom, in particular for Muslims.⁵⁶ At the very least, this question invites us to reconsider the history not only of European Christian Democracy, but of European values in general as well.

NOTES

1. Jan-Werner Müller, “Towards a new history of Christian Democracy,” *Journal of Political Ideologies* 18, no. 2 (2013): 243–255.
2. Gerd Rainer-Horn and Padraic Kenney, eds, *Transnational Moments of Change: Europe 1945, 1968, 1989* (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2004).
3. Peter Van Kemseke, *Towards an Era of Development: The Globalisation of Socialism and Christian Democracy, 1945–1965* (Leuven: Leuven University Press, 2006).
4. See esp. Dieter Gosewinkel, ed, *Anti-liberal Europe: A Neglected Story of Europeanisation* (Oxford: Berghahn, 2015); John Laughland, *The Tainted Source: The Undemocratic Origins of the European Idea* (London: Little, Brown & Co., 1997).
5. Patrick Pasture, “Between a Christian Fatherland and Euro-Christendom,” in *Christianity and National Identity in Twentieth-Century Europe*, ed. John Wood (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2016), 169–188.
6. Vanessa Conze, *Das Europa der Deutschen: Ideen von Europa in Deutschland Zwischen Reichstradition und Westorientierung (1920–1970)* (Munich: Oldenbourg, 2005), 33–110, esp. 33–56; Dagmar Pöpping, *Abendland: Christliche Akademiker und die Utopie der Antimoderne 1900–1945* (Berlin: Metropolis, 2002). On Rohan and the Europäische Kulturbund, see Anita Ziegerhofer-Prettenthaler, “Eurotopias: Coudenhove-Kalergi’s Pan-Europa and Rohan’s Europäischer Kulturbund,” in *The Space of Crisis: Shifting Spaces and Ideas of Europe, 1914–1945*, ed. Vittorio Dini and Matthew D’Auria (Bern: Peter Lang, 2013), 161–177; Christian Bailey, *Between Yesterday and Tomorrow: German Visions of Europe in Germany, 1926–1950* (Oxford: Berghahn, 2013), 3–42; Guido Müller, *Europäische Gesellschaftsbeziehungen nach dem Ersten Weltkrieg:*

- Das Deutsch-Französische Studienkomitee und der Europäische Kulturbund* (Munich: Oldenbourg, 2005), 309–456; Matthias Schulz, “Der Europäische Kulturbund,” *Europäische Geschichte Online* (EGO), <http://www.ieg-ego.eu/schulzm-2010c-de>; Dina Gusejnova, “Noble Continent? German-Speaking Nobles as Theorists of European Identity in the Interwar Period,” in Dini and D’Auria (eds), *The Space of Crisis*, 111–133.
7. Walter L. Adamson, “Giovanni Papini: Nietzsche, Secular Religion and Catholic Fascism,” *Politics, Religion & Ideology*, 14, no. 1 (2013): 1–20; Walter L. Adamson, “Modernism and Fascism: The Politics of Culture in Italy, 1903–1922,” *American Historical Review*, 95, no. 2 (1990): 359–390; Brett Colasacco, “From Men into Gods: American Pragmatism, Italian Proto-Fascism and Secular Religion,” *Politics, Religion & Ideology*, 15, no. 4 (2014): 541–564.
 8. Christine Manigand, “Projets genevois et projets d’unité européenne à travers l’Europe Nouvelle de Louise Weiss,” in *Histoire des groupes d’influence et des acteurs de l’idée européenne*, ed. Gérard Bossuat (Bern: Peter Lang, 2003), 125–138.
 9. See esp. Wolfram Kaiser, *Christian Democracy and the Origins of European Union* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 92–97.
 10. Patrick Pasture, “Realità e concezioni europee nel movimento sindacale cristiano tra le due guerre,” in *Il fattore religioso nell’integrazione europea*, ed. Alfredo Canavero and Jean-Dominique Durand (Milan: Edizioni Unicopli, 1999), 373–386; Patrick Pasture, *Histoire du syndicalisme chrétien international: La difficile recherche d’une troisième voie* (Paris: L’Harmattan, 1999).
 11. Gearóid Barry, *The Disarmament of Hatred: Marc Sangnier, French Catholicism and the Legacy of the First World War, 1914–45* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), 128–152, 164–166; Kaiser, *Christian Democracy*, 62–63.
 12. Andreas Khol, “Die internationale Parteienzusammenarbeit: Die Beziehungen der österreichischen Volkspartei zu ihren Schwesterparteien und ihre Mitarbeit in den transnationalen Parteienzusammenschlüssen,” in *Volkspartei—Anspruch und Realität. Die Geschichte der ÖVP 1945–1995*, ed. Robert Kriechbaumer and Franz Schausberger (Vienna: Böhlau, 1995), 359–369; Alwin Hanschmidt, “Eine christlich-demokratische ‘Internationale’ zwischen den Weltkriegen: Das ‘Secrétariat International des Partis Démocratiques d’Inspiration Chrétienne’ in Paris,” in *Christliche Demokratie in Europa: Grundlagen und Entwicklungen seit dem 19. Jahrhundert*, ed. Winfried Becker and Rudolf Morsey (Vienna: Böhlau, 1988), 152–188.

13. Philippe Chenaux, *De la chrétienté à l'Europe: Les catholiques et l'idée européenne au XXe siècle* (Tours: CLD, 2007), 35.
14. Thomas Jansen and Steven Van Hecke, *At Europe's Service: The Origins and Evolution of the European People's Party* (Berlin: Springer, 2011), 9–10.
15. Jan Olof Bengtsson, *The Worldview of Personalism: Origins and Early Development* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006); Johan De Tavernier, "The Historical Roots of Personalism," *Ethical Perspectives* 16, no. 3 (2009): 361–392. On the Non-Conformists and their views on personalism, see Jean-Louis Loubet del Bayle, *Les non-conformistes des années 30: Une tentative de renouvellement de la pensée politique française* (Paris: Seuil, 2001); Piotr H. Kosicki, *Catholics on the Barricades: Poland, France and "Revolution," 1891–1956* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2018), 21–61; James Chappel, *Spiritual Welfare: Catholic Political Economy in Twentieth-century Europe* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2018).
16. Bruno Ackermann, *Denis de Rougemont: Une biographie intellectuelle* (Geneva: Labor et Fides, 1996), 2 vols; Attilio Danace, "Un modèle théorique personnaliste pour le fédéralisme européen: unité—diversité," in *Du personnalisme au fédéralisme européen. En hommage à Denis de Rougemont, Colloque organisé par la Fondation Denis de Rougemont pour l'Europe et le Centre européen de la culture à Genève, 21–23 avril 1988* (Geneva: Centre européen de la culture, 1989), 85–102.
17. Undine Ruge, *Die Erfindung des "Europa der Regionen": Kritische Ideengeschichte eines konservativen Konzepts* (Frankfurt am Main: Campus, 2003), 90–94.
18. René Dupuis and Alex[ander] Marc, *Jeune Europe* (Paris: Plon, 1933), 150, 175; John Hellman, *The Communitarian Third Way: Alexandre Marc and Ordre Nouveau 1930–2000* (Montreal: McGill University Press, 2002); Bernhard Vuyenne, "Genèse du fédéralisme marcier," *L'Europe en formation*, nos. 319–320 (2000–2001): 13–29.
19. Patrick Troude-Chastenet, "La critique de la démocratie dans les écrits personnalistes des années 1930: Esprit et Ordre nouveau," *Cités* 4, no. 16 (2003): 161–176; Stefanos Geroulanos, *An Atheism That is Not Humanist Emerges in French Thought* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2010), 112.
20. See, e.g., Kosicki, *Catholics on the Barricades*, 1–20.
21. For the compelling (though not overall unambiguous) case of Christian labour see Pasture, *Histoire du syndicalisme chrétien international*; John Connelly, *From Enemy to Brother: The Revolution in Catholic Teaching on the Jews, 1933–1965* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2012).

22. On the attitude of Dawson toward fascism, see Bernhard Dietz, "Christliches Abendland gegen Pluralismus und Moderne: Die Europa-Konzeption von Christopher Dawson," *Zeithistorische Forschungen* no. 9 (2012): 491–497; Stephen G. Carter, "Historian of the Spirit: An Introduction to the Life and Ideas of Christopher H. Dawson, 1889–1970" (PhD diss, Durham University, 2006), 142–145; Luisa Passerini, *Europe in Love, Love in Europe: Imagination and Politics in Britain between the Wars* (London: I.B. Tauris, 1998), 64–80; Tom Villis, *British Catholics and Fascism: Religious Identity and Political Extremism between the Wars* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), 105–116.
23. John Hellman, "The Anti-Democratic Impulse in Catholicism: Jacques Maritain, Yves Simon and Charles de Gaulle During World War II," *Journal of Church and State* 33, no. 3 (1991): 453–471.
24. Kosicki, *Catholics on the Barricades*, 21–61; Samuel Moyn, *Christian Human Rights* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2015).
25. Philip M. Coupland, *Britannia, Europa and Christendom: British Christians and European Integration* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006).
26. Bruno Ackermann, "'Le cheminement des esprits'," *Revue Suisse d'Histoire* no. 47 (1997): 171–191.
27. Conze, *Europa*, 107ff.
28. Kaiser, *Christian Democracy and the Origins of European Union*, 119–162, esp. at 150–151, 155.
29. Étienne Fouilloux, "Feu la 'nouvelle Chrétienté'?" in *The Transformation of the Christian Churches in Western Europe 1945–2000*, ed. Leo Kenis, Jack Billiet and Patrick Pasture (Leuven: Leuven University Press, 2010), 39–54.
30. Patrick Pasture and Wilhelm Damberg, "Restoration and Erosion of Pillarised Catholicism in Western Europe," in *Transformation*, ed. Kenis, Billiet and Pasture, 55–76.
31. Étienne Fouilloux, "Intransigence catholique et monde moderne," *Revue d'Histoire Ecclésiastique* 96, no. 1–2 (2001): 71–87 (esp. 79) (English quotations from Pius XII's 1944 Christmas message from <http://www.catholicculture.org/docs/>); and a different view in Philippe Chenaux, *Pie XII: Diplomate et pasteur* (Paris: Cerf, 2013), 305–309; Moyn, *Christian Human Rights*, 87.
32. Conze, *Europa*, 111–206, on federalism 124–127, 140–142, 152, 197–206; Vanessa Conze, "Facing the Future Backwards: 'Abendland' as an Anti-liberal Idea of Europe in Germany between the First World War and the 1960s," in *Anti-liberal Europe*, ed. Gosewinkel, 78.
33. Quoted in Laurent Ducerf, "Les jeunes des Nouvelles Équipes Internationales, entre jeune Europe et nouvelle chrétienté," *Histoire@Politique* 10, no. 1 (2010): 33 (DOI:[10.3917/hp.010.00103](https://doi.org/10.3917/hp.010.00103)).

34. Antonin Cohen, *De Vichy à la Communauté européenne* (Paris: PUF, 2012), esp. 292–316 ff; Voyenne, “Genèse”; Bernhard Voyenne, *Histoire de l’idée fédéraliste* (Nice: Presses d’Europe, 1976).
35. Samuel Moyn, *The Last Utopia: Human Rights in History* (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2010); Moyn, *Christian Human Rights*; James Chappel, “‘All Churches Have Heretics’: Catholicism, Human Rights and the Uses of History for Life,” *The Immanent Frame* (2015): <http://blogs.ssrc.org/tif/2015/06/05/all-churches-have-heretics-on-catholicism-human-rights-and-the-advantages-of-history-for-life>.
36. Piotr H. Kosicki, “Masters in their own Home or Defenders of the Human Person? Wojciech Korfanty, Anti-Semitism and Polish Christian Democracy’s Illiberal Rights-Talk,” *Modern Intellectual History* 14, no. 1 (2017): 99–130; Paul Hanebrink, *In Defense of Christian Hungary: Religion, Nationalism and Antisemitism, 1890–1944* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2006), 170–192.
37. Marco Duranti, “The Holocaust, the legacy of 1789 and the birth of international human rights law: revisiting the foundation myth,” *Journal of Genocide Research* 14, no. 2 (2012): 159–186.
38. Connelly, *From Enemy to Brother*; Duranti, “Holocaust.”
39. Louise Moor and A.W. Brian Simpson, “Ghosts of colonialism in the European Convention on Human Rights,” *British Yearbook of International Law* no. 76 (2005): 121–193.
40. Essential to totalitarianism is, however, the equation of Nazism and Bolshevism. Arguably the first to make this equation methodologically was Waldemar Gurian in 1932: James Chappel, “The Catholic Origins of Totalitarianism Theory in Interwar Europe,” *Modern Intellectual History* 8, no. 3 (2011): 561–590.
41. See, e.g., Emiel Lamberts, *The Struggle with Leviathan: Social Responses to the Omnipotence of the State, 1815–1965*, trans. Maria Kelly (Leuven: Leuven University Press, 2016).
42. Martin Shipway, *Decolonisation and its Impact: A Comparative Approach to the End of the Colonial Empires* (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2007).
43. Patrick Pasture, *Imagining European Unity since 1000 AD* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015).
44. Peo Hansen and Stefan Jonsson, *Eurafrica: The Untold History of European Integration and Colonialism* (London: Bloomsbury, 2014); Pasture, *Imagining European Unity*.
45. Martin Conway, “Left Catholicism in Europe in the 1940s: Elements of an Explanation,” in *Catholics and Society in Western Europe at the Point of Liberation*, ed. Gerd-Rainer Horn and Emmanuel Gerard (Leuven: Leuven University Press, 2001), 237–247.

46. Pasture, *Histoire du syndicalisme chrétien international*, 209.
47. See Beata Kosowska-Gąstoł's chapter in this volume; Kaiser, *Christian Democracy and the Origins of European Union*, 163–190; Chenaux, *Une Europe vaticane*, 134–135.
48. Pasture, *Imagining European Unity*, 176–184, 185–195. On Christian Democracy's inclination toward compromise, see esp. Kees van Kersbergen, *Social Capitalism: A Study of Christian Democracy and the Welfare State* (London: Routledge, 1999).
49. See, e.g., Tiziana Di Maio's chapter in this volume.
50. Kaiser, *Christian Democracy and the Origins of European Union*, 191–252; Chenaux, *Une Europe vaticane*. See also Lucian N. Leustean, "The Ecumenical Movement and the Schuman Plan, 1950–54," *Journal of Church and State* 53, no. 3 (2011): 442–471.
51. Gérard Bossuat, *France, l'aide américaine et la construction européenne, 1944–1954* (Paris: Comité pour l'Histoire Économique et Financière de la France, 1992), I: 909.
52. Patrick Pasture, "Rethinking the roots of Christian Democracy: A European view," RSCAS Working Papers (accepted).
53. Chenaux, *De la chrétienté à l'Europe*, 90.
54. Pasture, "Christian Fatherland."
55. Jan-Werner Müller, *Contesting Democracy: Political Ideas in Twentieth-century Europe* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2011), 132–143.
56. Nehal Butha, "Two Concepts of Religious Freedom in the European Court of Human Rights," *South Atlantic Quarterly* 113, no. 1 (2014): 10–36.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Ackermann, Bruno. "Le cheminement des esprits." *Revue Suisse d'Histoire* no. 47 (1997): 171–191.
- Ackermann, Bruno. *Denis de Rougemont: Une biographie intellectuelle*. Geneva: Labor et Fides, 1996. 2 volumes.
- Adamson, Walter L. "Giovanni Papini: Nietzsche, Secular Religion and Catholic Fascism." *Politics, Religion & Ideology* 14, no. 1 (2013): 1–20.
- Adamson, Walter L. "Modernism and Fascism: The Politics of Culture in Italy, 1903–1922." *American Historical Review* 95, no. 2 (1990): 359–390.
- Bailey, Christian. *Between Yesterday and Tomorrow: German Visions of Europe in Germany, 1926–1950*. Oxford: Berghahn, 2013.
- Barry, Gearóid. *The Disarmament of Hatred: Marc Sangnier, French Catholicism and the Legacy of the First World War, 1914–45*. Basingstoke: Palgrave-Macmillan, 2012.
- Bengtsson, Jan Olof. *The Worldview of Personalism: Origins and Early Development*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006.

- Bossuat, Gérard. *France, l'aide américaine et la construction européenne, 1944–1954*. Paris: Comité pour l'Histoire Économique et Financière de la France, 1992. Volume 1.
- Butha, Nehal. "Two Concepts of Religious Freedom in the European Court of Human Rights." *The South Atlantic Quarterly* 113, no. 1 (2014): 10–36.
- Carter, Stephen G. "Historian of the Spirit: An Introduction to the Life and Ideas of Christopher H. Dawson, 1889–1970." PhD dissertation, Durham University, 2006.
- Chappel, James. "'All Churches Have Heretics': Catholicism, Human Rights and the Uses of History for Life." *The Immanent Frame* (2015). Online at <http://blogs.ssrc.org/tif/2015/06/05/all-churches-have-heretics-on-catholicism-human-rights-and-the-advantages-of-history-for-life>. Accessed 2 April 2017.
- Chappel, James. "The Catholic Origins of Totalitarianism Theory in Interwar Europe." *Modern Intellectual History* 8, no. 3 (2011): 561–590.
- Chappel, James. *Spiritual Welfare: Catholic Political Economy in Twentieth-Century Europe*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2018.
- Chenau, Philippe. *De la chrétienté à l'Europe: Les catholiques et l'idée européenne au XXe siècle*. Tours: CLD, 2007.
- Chenau, Philippe. *Pie XII: Diplomate et pasteur*. Paris: Cerf, 2013.
- Cohen, Antonin. *De Vichy à la Communauté européenne*. Paris: PUF, 2012.
- Colasacco, Brett. "From Men into Gods: American Pragmatism, Italian Proto-Fascism and Secular Religion." *Politics, Religion & Ideology* 15, no. 4 (2014): 541–564.
- Connelly, John. *From Enemy to Brother: The Revolution in Catholic Teaching on the Jews, 1933–1965*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2012.
- Conway, Martin. "Left Catholicism in Europe in the 1940s: Elements of an Explanation." In *Catholics and Society in Western Europe at the Point of Liberation*, edited by Gerd-Rainer Horn and Emmanuel Gerard. Leuven: Leuven University Press, 2001. 237–247.
- Conze, Vanessa. *Das Europa der Deutschen. Ideen von Europa in Deutschland Zwischen Reichstradition und Westorientierung (1920–1970)*. Munich: Oldenbourg, 2005.
- Conze, Vanessa. "Facing the Future Backwards: 'Abendland' as an Anti-liberal Idea of Europe in Germany between the First World War and the 1960s." In *Anti-liberal Europe: A Neglected Story of Europeanisation*, edited by Dieter Gosewinkel. Oxford: Berghahn, 2015. 72–89.
- Coupland, Philip M. *Britannia, Europa and Christendom: British Christians and European Integration*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006.
- Danace, Attilio. "Un modèle théorique personnaliste pour le fédéralisme européen: unité—diversité." In *Du personnalisme au fédéralisme européen: En hommage à Denis de Rougemont*, Colloque organisé par la Fondation Denis de

- Rougemont pour l'Europe et le Centre européen de la culture à Genève, 21–23 avril 1988. Geneva: Centre européen de la culture, 1989. 85–102.
- De Tavernier, Johan. "The Historical Roots of Personalism." *Ethical Perspectives* 16, no. 3 (2009): 361–392.
- Dietz, Bernhard. "Christliches Abendland gegen Pluralismus und Moderne: Die Europa-Konzeption von Christopher Dawson." *Zeithistorische Forschungen* no. 9 (2012): 491–497.
- Ducurf, Laurent. "Les jeunes des Nouvelles Équipes Internationales, entre jeune Europe et nouvelle chrétienté." *Histoire@Politique* 10, no. 1 (2010). DOI:10.3917/hp.010.00103.
- Dupuis, René and Alex[ander] Marc. *Jeune Europe*. Paris: Plon, 1933.
- Duranti, Marco. "The Holocaust, the legacy of 1789 and the birth of international human rights law: revisiting the foundation myth." *Journal of Genocide Research* 14, no. 2 (2012): 159–186.
- Fouilloux, Étienne. "Feu la 'nouvelle Chrétienté'?" In *The Transformation of the Christian Churches in Western Europe 1945–2000*, edited by Leo Kenis, Jaak Billiet and Patrick Pasture. Leuven: Leuven University Press, 2010. 39–54.
- Fouilloux, Étienne. "Intransigence catholique et monde moderne." *Revue d'Histoire Ecclésiastique* 96, no. 1–2 (2001): 71–87.
- Geroulanos, Stefanos. *An Atheism That is Not Humanist Emerges in French Thought*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2010.
- Gosewinkel, Dieter, editor. *Anti-liberal Europe: A Neglected Story of Europeanisation*. Oxford: Berghahn, 2015.
- Gusejnova, Dina. "Noble Continent? German-Speaking Nobles as Theorists of European Identity in the Interwar Period." In *The Space of Crisis: Shifting Spaces and Ideas of Europe, 1914–1945*, edited by Vittorio Dini and Matthew D'Auria. Bern: Peter Lang, 2013. 111–133.
- Hanebrink, Paul. *In Defense of Christian Hungary: Religion, Nationalism and Antisemitism, 1890–1944*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2006.
- Hanschmidt, Alwin. "Eine christlich-demokratische 'Internationale' zwischen den Weltkriegen: Das 'Secrétariat International des Partis Démocratiques d'Inspiration Chrétienne' in Paris." In *Christliche Demokratie in Europa: Grundlagen und Entwicklungen seit dem 19. Jahrhundert*, edited by Winfried Becker and Rudolf Morsey. Vienna: Böhlau, 1988. 152–188.
- Hansen, Peo and Stefan Jonsson. *Eurafrica: The Untold History of European Integration and Colonialism*. London: Bloomsbury, 2014.
- Hellman, John. "The Anti-Democratic Impulse in Catholicism: Jacques Maritain, Yves Simon and Charles de Gaulle During World War II." *Journal of Church and State* 33, no. 3 (1991): 453–471.
- Hellman, John. *The Communitarian Third Way: Alexandre Marc and Ordre Nouveau 1930–2000*. Montreal: McGill University Press, 2002.

- Horn, Gerd-Rainer and Padraic Kenney, editors. *Transnational Moments of Change: Europe 1945, 1968, 1989*. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2004.
- Jansen, Thomas and Steven Van Hecke. *At Europe's Service: The Origins and Evolution of the European People's Party*. Berlin: Springer, 2011.
- Kaiser, Wolfram. *Christian Democracy and the Origins of European Union*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007.
- Khol, Andreas. "Die internationale Parteienzusammenarbeit: Die Beziehungen der österreichischen Volkspartei zu ihren Schwesterparteien und ihre Mitarbeit in den transnationalen Parteienzusammenschlüssen." In *Volkspartei - Anspruch und Realität: Die Geschichte der ÖVP 1945–1995*, edited by Robert Kriechbaumer and Franz Schausberger. Vienna: Böhlau, 1995. 359–369.
- Kosicki, Piotr H. *Catholics on the Barricades: Poland, France and "Revolution," 1891–1956*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2018.
- Kosicki, Piotr H. "Masters in their own Home or Defenders of the Human Person? Wojciech Korfanty, Anti-Semitism and Polish Christian Democracy's Illiberal Rights-Talk." *Modern Intellectual History* 14, no. 1 (2017): 99–130.
- Lamberts, Emiel. *The Struggle with Leviathan: Social Responses to the Omnipotence of the State, 1815–1965*. Translated by Maria Kelly. Leuven: Leuven University Press, 2016.
- Laughland, John. *The Tainted Source: The Undemocratic Origins of the European Idea*. London: Little, Brown & Co, 1997.
- Leustean, Lucian N. "The Ecumenical Movement and the Schuman Plan, 1950–54." *Journal of Church and State* 53, no. 3 (2011): 442–471.
- Loubet del Bayle, Jean-Louis. *Les non-conformistes des années 30: Une tentative de renouvellement de la pensée politique française*. Paris: Seuil, 2001.
- Manigand, Christine. "Projets genevois et projets d'unité européenne à travers l'Europe Nouvelle de Louise Weiss." In *Histoire des groupes d'influence et des acteurs de l'idée européenne*, edited by Gérard Bossuat. Bern: Peter Lang, 2003. 125–138.
- Moor, Louise and A.W. Brian Simpson. "Ghosts of colonialism in the European Convention on Human Rights." *British Yearbook of International Law* no. 76 (2005): 121–193.
- Moyn, Samuel. *Christian Human Rights*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2015.
- Moyn, Samuel. *The Last Utopia: Human Rights in History*. Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2010.
- Müller, Guido. *Europäische Gesellschaftsbeziehungen nach dem Ersten Weltkrieg: Das Deutsch-Französische Studienkomitee und der Europäische Kulturbund*. Munich: Oldenbourg, 2005.

- Müller, Jan-Werner. *Contesting Democracy: Political Ideas in Twentieth Century Europe*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2011.
- Müller, Jan-Werner. "Towards a new history of Christian Democracy." *Journal of Political Ideologies* 18, no. 2 (2013): 243–255.
- Passerini, Luisa. *Europe in Love, Love in Europe: Imagination and Politics in Britain between the Wars*. London: I.B. Tauris, 1998.
- Pasture, Patrick. "Between a Christian Fatherland and Euro-Christendom." In *Christianity and National Identity in Twentieth-Century Europe*, edited by John Wood. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2016. 169–188.
- Pasture, Patrick. *Histoire du syndicalisme chrétien international: La difficile recherche d'une troisième voie*. Paris: L'Harmattan, 1999.
- Pasture, Patrick. *Imagining European Unity since 1000 AD*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015.
- Pasture, Patrick. "Realità e concezioni europee nel movimento sindacale cristiano tra le due guerre." In *Il fattore religioso nell'integrazione europea*, edited by Alfredo Canavero and Jean-Dominique Durand. Milan: Edizioni Unicopli, 1999. 373–386.
- Pasture, Patrick and Wilhelm Damberg. "Restoration and Erosion of Pillarised Catholicism in Western Europe." In *The Transformation of the Christian Churches in Western Europe 1945–2000*, edited by Leo Kenis, Jaak Billiet and Patrick Pasture. Leuven: Leuven University Press, 2010. 55–76.
- Pasture, Patrick. "Rethinking the roots of Christian Democracy: A European view." RSCAS Working Papers (accepted).
- Pöpping, Dagmar. *Abendland: Christliche Akademiker und die Utopie der Antimoderne 1900–1945*. Berlin: Metropol, 2002.
- Ruge, Undine. *Die Erfindung des "Europa der Regionen": Kritische Ideengeschichte eines konservativen Konzepts*. Frankfurt am Main: Campus, 2003.
- Schulz, Matthias. "Der Europäische Kulturbund." *Europäische Geschichte Online* (EGO). Online at <http://www.ieg-ego.eu/schulzm-2010c-de>.
- Shipway, Martin. *Decolonisation and its Impact: A Comparative Approach to the End of the Colonial Empires*. Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2007).
- Troude-Chastenot, Patrick. "La critique de la démocratie dans les écrits personalistes des années 1930: *Esprit* et *Ordre nouveau*." *Cités* 4, no. 16 (2003): 161–176.
- Van Kemseke, Peter. *Towards an Era of Development: The Globalisation of Socialism and Christian Democracy, 1945–1965*. Leuven: Leuven University Press, 2006.
- Van Kersbergen, Kees. *Social Capitalism: A Study of Christian Democracy and the Welfare State*. London: Routledge, 1999.
- Villis, Tom. *British Catholics and Fascism: Religious Identity and Political Extremism between the Wars*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013.

Voyenne, Bernhard. "Genèse du fédéralisme marcier." *L'Europe en formation*, nos. 319–320 (2000–2001): 13–29.

Voyenne, Bernhard. *Histoire de l'idée fédéraliste*. Nice: Presses d'Europe, 1976.

Ziegerhofer-Prettenthaler, Anita. "Eurotopias: Coudenhove-Kalergi's Pan-Europa and Rohan's Europäischer Kulturbund." In *The Space of Crisis: Shifting Spaces and Ideas of Europe, 1914–1945*, edited by Vittorio Dini and Matthew D'Auria. Bern: Peter Lang, 2013. 161–177.

Christian Democracy Across the Iron Curtain
Europe Redefined

Kosicki, P.H.; Lukasiewicz, S. (Eds.)

2018, XXXIII, 468 p., Hardcover

ISBN: 978-3-319-64086-0