

The Rise of Mozambican Nationalism

HISTORY, THE MUEDA MYTH AND THE FORMATION OF MANU

Portuguese penetration into sub-Saharan Africa dated back five centuries. After taking the coastal trading post of Sofala in 1505 and then pushing up the Zambezi Valley, where they made profitable contact with the gold-producing Monomatapa kingdom and its tributaries, the Portuguese began trafficking in East African slaves for sale in India and elsewhere. The number of Mozambicans enslaved never reached the proportions of those of Angola, but as many as 25,000 per year were taken in the years immediately before the end of the slave trade in 1850.

The first three centuries of Portuguese rule were “almost wholly injurious to the African societies with which they [came] into direct contact.”¹ In Angola, for example, “the criminal classes of Portugal were employed in inciting the native peoples to make war on each other in the interests of slave labour for Brazil.”² In Mozambique, despite the destruction they caused, as of the 1870s the Portuguese did not control much beyond a few towns along the country’s 1500-mile coast. “As late as 1890 most of Mocambique was almost completely innocent of Portuguese authority, and in 1894 Lourenco Marques suffered serious assault by African warriors from the outlying area.”³ The vast northern districts bordering on Tanzania were progressively occupied for the first time between 1906 and 1912. Portugal was still engaged in campaigns of conquest and pacification up through the First World War. In the

Barue region of the Zambezi Valley the revolt against the Portuguese did not end until 1920.⁴

One development of enduring significance was the failure of the Portuguese to build a north–south transit system, road or rail, bridging large rivers such as the Zambezi and Save. These rivers flowed from the interior to the Indian Ocean, dividing the country into separate geographic and ethnic layers. Without a strong, unifying educational and political system the country was left physically, culturally, and socially divided.

When slavery was finally abolished in 1850, it was replaced by a system of conscript labor for European farms and mines that persisted into the 1960s. It was embellished with an official policy of assimilation in the 1930s. But “the grinding abuse of African labor, the poverty of Portugal itself, the economic backwardness of the colonies, the lack of minimal educational or medical facilities, and the absence of technical personnel all made the goal of assimilation in the 1930s and 1940s a legislative dream.”⁵ The 1950 Mozambique census listed just 4300 out of approximately 5.7 million Africans as having qualified as *assimilados*.⁶ It would require the seepage of incendiary nationalist ideas through sealed colonial boundaries, airborne news via Radio Brazzaville, and “bush telegraph” accounts of social and political achievements elsewhere in Africa to give rise to explosive demands for African self-determination and independence.

In 1957, after years of legal political protest by Africans, colonial reforms including moves toward self-government, Ghana became the first colonized territory in sub-Saharan Africa to gain its independence. The stirrings of contemporary African nationalism began to register on Mozambique’s political seismograph. In southern coastal centers of maximal Portuguese impact, most notably Lourenço Marques, grievances festered and surfaced within the ranks of port workers, students, local administrators, and others with connections to the outside world. But over time their efforts to organize were snuffed out or taken over by colonial authorities. Portugal’s divide-and-rule strategy was reflected in a 1950s policy that deliberately kept social and racial groups apart. Accordingly, there was an official *Associação Africana* with its iconoclastic journal, *O Brado Africano*, designated mainly for *mestiços* and a *Centro Associativo dos Negros de Moçambique* for blacks, in particular for African *assimilados*.

Exceptional was the case of one 1950s urban reformist organization in Lourenco Marques, a multiracial *Associacao dos Naturais de Mocambique*. An essentially white social organization that evolved into a movement favoring racial integration, it organized a scholarship program to aid young Africans seeking secondary, technical, and commercial education. As the *Associacao's* tendency to favor political autonomy progressed toward "a more genuine nationalism," however, the government became alarmed, reversed its earlier support, arrested the top leadership, and replaced it with pro-Salazarists. In Mondlane's view, Mozambique's Portuguese population of some 120,000 would come to "regret the emasculation of this organization, for with its demise as a multi-racial nucleus may have gone all the hopes for a racially tolerant Mozambique."⁷

According to one African activist who fled to Rhodesia, by late 1957 most nationalist oriented Africans in Mozambique's largest cities—Lourenco Marques and Beira—were either in prison or out of the country. Whether members of soccer clubs, carpenters' associations, burial societies, or the numerous other social and cultural organizations "where plans were made and hopes entertained," a "clandestine outflow" of Mozambican nationalists swelled, sometimes with "disastrous results" at the hands of border police.⁸

However, it was not in the southern part of the colony, where most of the schools and the white minority of 1 in 70 lived, that African nationalism first emerged in Mozambique. Instead, it was among the more than half a million Mozambicans laboring in the mines and fields of neighboring South Africa and the British colonies of Northern and Southern Rhodesia, Nyasaland, and Tanganyika. There were an estimated 65,000–80,000 Mozambican men working in the gold and other mines of South Africa under contracts entailing per capita payments to the Portuguese government. Hundreds of Mozambicans who migrated to the relatively better economic conditions and educational opportunities of neighboring countries were exposed to and caught up in the ideas and activities of local African nationalist movements.

Perhaps the most celebrated, iconic, and ironic case of influence from outside took place in the town of Mueda, in Mozambique's northernmost province, Cabo Delgado. The people of Mueda were Maconde (or Makonde). The rural Maconde straddled the Ruvuma River border with Tanganyika, which merged with Zanzibar in April 1964 to

become Tanzania. In June 1960, two pro-Portuguese Macondes living in Tanganyika got an idea for an entrepreneurial venture. They decided to persuade fellow Mozambican émigrés to leave British East Africa, which was in an economic downturn at the time, and return back across the border and resettle in what seemed to them at that time economically more promising opportunities in northern Mozambique. Their plans ran counter to a long history of Maconde migration to British East Africa⁹ and, therefore, to normal political expectations—and they may have aroused Portuguese suspicion of outside influence.

What happened next, according to Michael Cahen, a prominent French research scholar, demonstrates how impervious Portuguese authority was to changing African realities and how political myths are created. Interviewing extensively in Africa and Portugal, Cahen separated what he concluded to be fact from fiction within what became known as the Mueda Massacre.¹⁰ A nervous local colonial administrator misconstrued the actions of the two Tanzania-based Maconde organizers of the project, who had been ensnarled in the dilatory red tape of Portugal's visa services and out of frustration traveled to Mueda without proper papers. Viewing them as hostile, he ordered their arrest. The hapless organizers had meant to break through bureaucratic barriers and facilitate the relocation of émigré Macondes in the province of Cabo Delgado. On June 16, 1960, the same panicked official overreacted to a spontaneous gathering of several thousand protesting against the organizers' arrest, confronted the crowd, and compounded his problem. A fracas ensued. The official called in eight nearby soldiers driving two jeeps equipped with a single functioning machine gun. Between 9 and 36 people were reportedly killed, many more wounded, there was a general panic, and a thousand bicycles were abandoned.¹¹ This event convinced the Maconde people that "war against Portugal" was the only answer. In this way, "Portugal's obsolescent dictatorship transformed an ethnic movement which could still have been treated as a social problem into a political" one.¹²

The June 16, 1960, incident was subsequently portrayed by a Frelimo military leader and purported witness of the event, Alberto Joaquim Chipande, as a "massacre" in which demonstrators who had denounced forced labor and demanded independence were attacked by a well-armed platoon of soldiers and more than 500 Mozambicans were killed. In fact there were almost no Portuguese military forces in Cabo Delgado at the time. And the Maconde had not yet developed an independence

agenda. Thus, Chipande's report lacked credence. However, the event did prompt Macondes to coalesce into a new nationalist movement, the Mozambique African National Union (MANU).¹³ Later Mondlane, as well as outside observers and academics, would routinely cite the Mueda debacle as a massacre of over 500 and a critical precursor to the Mozambique Revolution.¹⁴

On February 19, 1961, some fifty delegates from Dar es Salaam, Tanga, Pemba, and other Maconde émigré communities in British East Africa met in Mombasa, Kenya, and formed MANU. MANU's cautious platform sought to "rais[e] the political consciousness" of Mozambicans living and working in the sisal fields and ports of East Africa. The conference was organized by a Kenyan MP, C. Chokwe, and received a promise of support from Tom Mboya, a prominent leader of Kenya's governing Kenya African National Union (KANU).¹⁵

In early 1961 reports surfaced of a MANU underground operating within northern Mozambique and there were rumors that it was receiving Ghanaian assistance.¹⁶ MANU became a member of a new regional grouping of nationalist organizations, the Pan-African Freedom Movement of East, Central and Southern Africa (PAFMECSA), and its leaders were invited to participate at an April 1961 meeting in Casablanca, Morocco, to create an alliance of Portuguese African nationalist movements, a Conferencia das Organizacoes Nacionalistas das Colonias Portuguesas (CONCP). MANU's leader, Matthew (Mateos) Mmole, was a second-generation English-speaker from Dar es Salaam. Given his linguistic limitation, he suggested that Adelino Gwambe, a Portuguese-speaking émigré recently arrived in Dar es Salaam, accept the invitation and represent both MANU and Gwambe's own exile organization, the Uniao Democratico Nacional de Mocambique (UDENAMO), at the Casablanca meeting. Gwambe accepted. In Casablanca, however, Gwambe obtained exclusive Mozambican membership for UDENAMO. Thus, Mozambican nationalism was recognized as an institutionalized reality, but at the cost of divisive personal enmity resulting from Gwambe's double-cross of Mmole.

ADELINO GWAMBE

In January 1961, shortly before the Casablanca conference, three Mozambican political activists in the Southern Rhodesian town of Bulawayo—Aurelio Bucuane, David Chambale, and Adelino Gwambe—traveled

to Salisbury, the capital of the British white settler colony, to consult with Joshua Nkomo, the leader of the Southern Rhodesia National Democratic Party (NDP), the colony's leading African nationalist party, about how to further their political objectives in Mozambique. They told the local press that they were on their way to Lisbon, Portugal, where they intended to meet with Antonio Salazar and "unveil the evils of their Portuguese brothers in Mozambique."¹⁷ They said they would tell Salazar they were seeking independence through peaceful negotiations, interim representation in the Portuguese National Assembly or the Mozambique Legislative Council, and an end to all forms of discrimination. According to Bucuane, a 23-year-old former schoolteacher who was the group's spokesman, in September 1960, with the permission of a local official, he and friends had formed a short-lived Partido da Unidade (PUN) in a rural area some 200 miles north of Lourenco Marques. Two months later, however, the government declared a "State of Emergency," and arrested and imprisoned him and other PUN members without trial. He escaped prison in Lourenco Marques and made his way to Southern Rhodesia. Now he, Chambale and Gwambe, like Dorothy and her companions making their way along the Yellow Brick Road to quiz the Wizard of Oz, were on their way via African countries to quiz the Wizard of Lisbon.

Hlomulo Jani Chitofo (Adelino) Gwambe, a garrulous 22-year-old Mozambican nationalist, was introduced to the public in an interview with Lusaka's *African Mail*.¹⁸ He had begun working as a émigré in Bulawayo in 1954 at age 15. In November 1960 he decided to return to his "home country, Mozambique, and fight for the liberation of my people," but, he told the paper, "[i]t is still an offense in our country to speak of freedom or say anything contrary to the Salazar Regime." And he was arrested.

Gwambe described his experiences in jail. He shared "a cell with two African political prisoners who complained of stomach trouble." A "friendly African prison official or 'spy' in plain clothes" advised Gwambe not to eat prison food because it was being poisoned. Thirty minutes after the other two prisoners were removed from his cell, Gwambe said they were reported dead. By the time a Portuguese prison official brought Gwambe some food, he had become so hungry he was tempted to eat a "spoonful," but he "felt" the food had "a suspicious taste" and gave it up. After he told the "spy" that he had taken some of

the food and his stomach had begun aching, the “spy” gave Gwambe some tablets. Later, Gwambe offered the friendly spy a bribe. The spy accepted and Gwambe escaped back into Rhodesia. Now, he told a journalist, “my friends and I must go to Portugal where we intend to present our case.” With this tale, Gwambe introduced himself and his gift for storytelling to the world.¹⁹

Instead of going to Lisbon, Nkomo recommended that the three Mozambicans go to Dar es Salaam. The independence of Tanganyika, which was slated for December 1961, promised a new opportunity for Mozambicans to organize in a bordering country. Gwambe followed Nkomo’s advice.

In many ways Gwambe was the polar opposite of Eduardo Mondlane. The product of a third-grade Catholic primary schooling, he was untouched by Protestant teaching and ethics and was left to live by his wits, raw ambition, and gift for imaginative narrative. His political career combined a frenetic mixture of ambition and guile. He defied critics who denounced him as an opportunist who had worked with PIDE in Rhodesia before shifting his to the nationalist cause.²⁰

In 1966 Gwambe offered his version of the formation of UDENAMO in what he called “My Concise Autobiography.”²¹ It describes Gwambe’s rise from rural obscurity to political prominence. His prose reveals a penchant for mixing fact and fiction and portrays a life of frenetic behavior. He began by explaining the correct spelling and meaning of his name, “HLUMULU JANI CHITOFU GWAMBI.” He wrote, “*Hlumulu* means (depression)” and was given to him by his mother because “I was born when my father was at South Africa on forced labour and my mother had no means to support the children including the new comer (myself).” The name Jani was “requested” by his grandfather, who, “although [...] dead by that time [...] could still communicate with my parents and relatives for this purpose.” It was the name his grandfather had used “during the time he was on forced labour at South Africa and its origin is French JEAN.” Chitofu was his father’s name, “which has also some influence of South Africa *stove* and this name [was used] while in the mines.” Gwambi “is used by all Gwambi family for hundreds of years and is never changed.”

Gwambe was born in the village of Chimbutsa in the rural district of Vilanculos or Bilankulu, Inhambane district, Sul do Save Province, on

April 4, 1939. He “was born from proletarian class” and his “parents lived only on petty agriculture.” His father was Lakeni Chitofu Gwambi. His mother was Petani Wanisawu Ngilazi Sumbi. They were from the same district and were married traditionally. Gwambe’s father and grandfather were often arrested and sentenced to forced labor in South African mines. His mother manufactured and sold a local African gin known as “nipa” to support the family. Gwambe was the “third born” of five children, three male and two female, from the same father and mother. Of the five, he was the only one who was “reasonably educated” and “directly engaged in politics.”

Gwambe was educated at the Missao de Sao Jose de Vilanculos em Maphinhane from 1947 to 1951 and left after obtaining a third class diploma in Primary Education. He continued educating himself in Portuguese and English and in 1966 was “still continuing educating [him]self in many languages and many subjects including military theory and application specially guerrilla warfare for application in Mozambique.”

From 1952 to 1953 Gwambe worked in Beira as a forced laborer at Mocambique Industrial, Ltda., Manga. During this period, he “organized secret night school for other youths at the compound of this company.” When the company authorities discovered his night school, he was detained and tortured for a month, then released. He also worked at the Emporium (Grandes Armazens da Beira). According to Gwambe, after a popular uprising in the Sofala rural district in 1953, he wrote a petition to the United Nations, which was discovered by the PIDE. He was arrested, tortured, and sentenced to five years’ imprisonment. He was sent to work at the Urban Administrative Council of Beira as “a clerk and interpreter reserved for special assignments.” Gwambe wrote that it sounded like a “good job,” but he was not paid. In the first four months of 1954 Gwambe described being detained four times on suspicion he was “continuing with anti-Government activities” and “warned that the fifth time meant” he would be deported to work at the cocoa plantations on Sao Tome e Principe, Portugal’s island colony off the West Coast of Africa.

In May 1954, after analyzing “the threats by the Portuguese authorities” and because he “could have failed to serve the interests of my country and people from the islands on the Atlantic ocean,” Gwambe forged a travel document and fled to Southern Rhodesia, where there

were many Mozambicans. There Gwambe worked at the Pioneer Steam Laundry & Ninety Minutes Dry Cleaning in Salisbury from June to September 1954. In October, he left for Bulawayo and worked as a domestic servant. In 1955 he worked at the Rhodesian Timber Ltd and Laing & Roberts construction company.

In October 1955 Gwambe "went back to Mozambique at CHIKWALAKWALA to start an underground movement against Portuguese foreign domination," but "stayed only one month and [...] was instructed by other comrades to go and organize other Mozambicans in Shabani and on Saturdays and Sundays [...] oftenly went to Shabani Mines to organize other Mozambicans." At this time, he was working for Rhodesia Railways, but he resigned in December 1955 and "went to organize fully at Shabani Asbestos mines and then to Rutenga, Fort Victoria and Rhodesia/Mozambique border Malvernia." He described his activities as being "done underground and amongst few dedicated patriots."

Between 1956 and 1960, Gwambe wrote that he organized "other Mozambicans" at Gwelo and Que Que," went back to Bulawayo and worked at the Consolidated Textiles Ltd, "joined the Rhodesia Railways-Bulawayo as office Messenger [with] the Chief Accountant and Finance Officer," resigned in 1959, and worked as a cashier/store-keeper at Madeira Fish & Chips "for a while," and then went back to Chikwalakwala to report the work he had done to his comrades. In 1960 he returned to Southern Rhodesia, worked at the Portuguese Association-Bulawayo and Madeira Fish & Chips again, but resigned after a while to establish his own business as a professional photographer at Luveve. He "used this business to organise many Mozambicans in Bulawayo under the cover of door-to-door photographer."

In Rhodesia, Gwambe joined the Southern Rhodesia African National Congress and then the NDP. While working on the Rhodesian Railways, he joined the Railways African Workers' Union. During this period Gwambe wrote that he "organize[d] other youths during the 1956 railway strike in order to blockade the roads leading to all railways departments so that all the workers should be forced back home in order to ensure the success of the strike," and "led squads of youth during the September 1960 Uprising in Bulawayo and took a very active part in many actions throughout the city and suburbs." After what he called "the September People's Uprising," Gwambe "decided to convene a

secret conference of all Mozambican patriots.” The “secret conference” took place on October 2, 1960, at Luveve village, about 10 miles out of Bulawayo. According to Gwambe, activists from all over Mozambique attended and elected him to be National President of the new party—the Uniao Democratica Nacional. Mozambique was added to the party’s name in March 1961, and it became UDENAMO. Gwambe identified this as point at which he and other Mozambican activists “started to work fully for the liberation of Mozambique and made many contacts by correspondence to governments and organizations and of all peace loving nations and peoples of entire world.” As a result of those communications, the PIDE tried to arrest all of those who attended the October 1960 conference. In January 1961, Gwambe went underground and, as described above, visited Salisbury to consult with Joshua Nkomo and the leaders of the NDP, who advised Gwambe, Bucame and Chambale to go to Northern Rhodesia and Tanganyika.

In Lusaka, the capital of Northern Rhodesia, Gwambe tried but failed to gain support from Kenneth Kaunda, the country’s leading African nationalist. In his autobiography, Gwambe described in detail how he got from Lusaka to Dar es Salaam in Tanganyika:

I was given a lift by a Portuguese Roman Catholic Priest who was going to Angola and I sold him a Parker 51 pen at 10/- (ten shillings) and I used this amount to pay a lorry which took me to Kanona [...] From Kanona I walked to Mpika where I was assisted by the Welfare Department after I claimed to be an orphan from Tanganyikan parents and I was given a warrant to travel free on the account of the Welfare Department to Mbeya in Tanzania. From Mbeya I went to Dar es Salaam and my fare was paid by the Provincial Headquarters of the *Tanganyika African National Union* [TANU] and at Dar es Salaam I was accommodated at a private residence of TANU which was allocated for Freedom Fighters from Southern Africa.

Shortly after arriving in Dar es Salaam, Gwambe met with MANU’s Matthew Mmole, who, as described above, offered him an invitation to attend the founding conference of CONCP.

In June 1961, at the “invitation of the OSAGEYFO the President Dr. Kwame Nkrumah,” Gwambe and UDENAMO vice-president Fanuel Guideon Mahluza went to Ghana. On their way there from Dar es Salaam, they were arrested at the Usumburu (Burundi) airport, held for 24 hours and sent back to Nairobi. But, drawing on his formidable

powers of persuasion, Gwambe was able to convince Ethiopian Airlines to carry the two to Ghana without travel documents. In Ghana, Gwambe found the lasting financial and ideological sustenance he needed to fuel his ambitions. He developed solid support within the orbit of Nkrumah's Bureau of African Affairs and its director, A.K. Barden. This included military training for twenty to thirty young UDENAMO militants. By this time, mention of dialogue with Salazar was long gone.

Gwambe adopted a tough anti-colonial posture compatible with the Africanist militancy of *The Voice of Africa*, published by Nkrumah's African Affairs bureau. Lashing out with a harsh racial and class critique of the situation in Mozambique, Gwambe charged that a small group of privileged mulattos and *assimilados* were operating at the bidding of Portuguese "slave" owners. "From my own experience," he declared, "I have realized that what the oppressed people of Mozambique want is not a highly educated leader but just a determined and dedicated leader armed with the principles of Pan African Nationalism, because the political leadership of the mulatto-assimilado groups will never be accepted." (In other words, the people want a Gwambe, not a Mondlane.) "Nothing can shake us from the conviction that the policy of multi-racialism would lead Mozambique to a new form of colonialism, i.e. neo-colonialism." We want straightforward majority rule and "will deal with [those] who oppose it."²²

After returning to Dar es Salaam on July 12, 1961, with his Ghanaian boost, Gwambe went for broke. He called for a mass rally and declared that UDENAMO had decided to fight for the independence of Mozambique through a people's armed struggle. Gwambe dismissed the idea of non-violence and "so-called peaceful co-existence." Without alerting, let alone consulting, Julius Nyerere and his Tanganyikan hosts, Gwambe boasted that, with the help of Ghana and a military force of 70,000, UDENAMO was preparing to launch an armed struggle from Tanganyika for Mozambican independence.²³

Militarily vulnerable, Nyerere's nascent government feared Portuguese retaliation. Nyerere also resented Nkrumah's transcontinental ambitions. Accordingly, Tanganyika quickly declared Gwambe a Prohibited Immigrant and sent him packing. The Ghanaian High Commissioner to Tanganyika in turn denied Gwambe's claims and declared that Ghana had obtained its independence without bloodshed and expected other countries to follow its example.²⁴

DAVID MABUNDA

David Joseph Maurice Mabunda, born of Mozambican parents in Witbank, South Africa, on August 24, 1934, was educated and acculturated in the country's rigorously segregated school system. He earned a 15-year matriculation certificate at the Pax Training College in Petersburg, Transvaal, in 1954, in a region where white supremacy was especially rigid. Mabunda then moved to Lourenco Marques, where he worked as a tally clerk until 1957, when the exposure of his political activities obliged him to flee to Rhodesia.

Writing as a participant in one of the small, ephemeral nationalist groups that emerged inside Mozambique in the late 1950s, Mabunda attributed "the relatively late emergence of widespread and organized opposition" to Portuguese rule to the absence of educational opportunity for the vast majority of the Africans, which "minimized the amount of contacts the African community could have with the ideas of freedom and independence taking hold in the rest of Africa." Mabunda also credited the "highly efficient Portuguese security police—PIDE," which "operated concertedly to put down the least semblance of nationalist sentiment among the Africans."²⁵ In 1959, two anti-Salazarist Portuguese expelled from Mozambique, Dr. Alvaro Fernando Peres do Carmo Vaz and Antonio Jose Simoes de Figueiredo, reported that there were only "isolated instances" of African protest in Mozambique.²⁶ They confirmed the existence of a police state in the colony and attributed "the non-existence of an African nationalist movement" to "the changeless rigors of a colonial system that has persisted for 450 years."

According to Mabunda, the early stages of nationalism in Mozambique took "the form of social and cultural clubs and associations" in which "young men of all walks of life gathered for social activities and in the process were able to exchange free words on national as well as international affairs."²⁷ "Indeed," he asserted, "the famous conspiracy of 1958 in which eminent African employees of the government-owned and operated Mozambique Railways and Harbors at Lourenco Marques and several Portuguese and African officers were involved, was the direct result of the work and influence of these social and cultural organizations."²⁸

Mabunda described the events of 1958 as an "attempt to overthrow" the colonial government "through a series of mutinies." The mutinies were supposed to begin at the Namaaona barracks outside Lourenco

Marques and to be followed by another at the Malhangalene barracks inside Lourenco Marques and consequently others. Many of the young men involved were members of cultural clubs and, if not directly involved personally, managed to persuade their fathers “to engage in clandestine political activities.” Clubs such as the *Associacao dos Carpenteirias Indigenas* and *Centro Associativo dos Negros de Mocambique* enjoyed legal status and “had access to information which was useful to the young militants.” However, army informers infiltrated the operation and leaked news of it to government authorities. Its leaders were arrested, and the plan was crushed.²⁹

In a handwritten letter, Mabunda described the *modus operandi* of the dissident social groups centered in Lourenco Marques and Beira. They took different forms, from soccer clubs to burial societies.

The *Associacao dos Carpenteirias Indigenas* organized weekly dances with admission open to all (members and non-members) and [this provided] an opportunity for political discussions for the politically involved. An underground wing of the [*Associacao*], the *JOVENS MILITANTES*, sprang out of these meetings and later became strong enough to attack police patrols at night.³⁰

The Portuguese called these groups “Bandidos.” The *Jovens Militantes* held picnics in order to organize meetings on the side. Mabunda wrote:

[T]he most popular meeting method was that of organizing a dance. I was one of the seven founders of the *Jovens Militantes*. The interests behind the founding of this group was to seek means to advocate the uprisings [by] the forced laborers among whom we worked at the port of Lourenco Marques. In time our field of interest widened as many others joined. Our meetings were conducted in small groups during the dance and word would be passed from group to group or table to table by member waiters. Usually unanimity was reached on important issues. No written records were kept. In 1954 we drafted a petition to the UN reporting on the condition of the forced labourers among other issues. Mistakenly, the petition was mailed in Lourenco Marques and because of our signatures, I was arrested together with other members.³¹

In 1957, fearing arrest, Mabunda fled to Southern Rhodesia, where he worked as a supervisor/storeman and a wages clerk in Salisbury from

1957 to 1961 and remained politically active. In Rhodesia, Mozambican nationalists organized surreptitiously under the cover of the Portuguese East African Association. Social clubs and burial societies mobilized émigré opinion.

Mabunda also described the formation of UDENAMO beginning with the October 2, 1960, meeting in Bulawayo as the genesis of Mozambique's liberation movement. Other UDENAMO founders present at the October 1960 meeting in Bulawayo were Fanuel Mahluza and Calvin Mahlayeye. But Mabunda's chronology differed slightly from Gwambe's chronology. According to Mabunda, the Uniao Democratica Nacional was founded on February 11, 1961, after a preparation period during which Gwambe, Bucane and Chabane traveled to Salisbury to meet Nkomo with a plan to go on to Lisbon to meet Salazar. He described his early involvement in UDENAMO as follows:

I worked in Salisbury and about the time that preparations for the formation of UDENAMO [were] going on in Bulawayo, I was together with Poles Ndelane, Alifa Speke, Joaquim Vilanculos and others working out plans for the formation of a liberation movement. When [we got] the news of the establishment of a UDENAMO office in Dar es Salaam, [some of us] decided to go and join the others. [In Dar es Salaam] the workday started at sunrise and ended late at night. Organizing Mozambicans working in Tanzania, receiving refugees from home, establishing foreign contacts, growing contacts with the interior. Work was hard but rewarding. Sometimes we spent days without food or baths for lack of funds.³²

Mabunda rose in the movement ranks to become Deputy Secretary General and head of UDENAMO's Accra office, where he linked up with Nkrumah's Bureau of African Affairs. He traveled to Moscow in quest of Soviet assistance and described UDENAMO as "a movement with a Pan-Africanist orientation, a democratic-socialistic basis and an Africanist outlook" with an outreach to Mozambicans working in South Africa.

By early 1962, UDENAMO was led by what Mabunda described as two groups: "organizers"—Gwambe, Mahlayeye, Mahluza and Paulo Gumane—and "political orienteers"—Marcelino dos Santos, Jaime Sigauke, Joao Mungwambe, and Mabunda. Mondlane viewed Sigauke, who was arrested in early 1962 inside southern Rhodesia and imprisoned in Mozambique, as the most formidable of UDENAMO's leaders.

Mabunda wrote that UDENAMO “bore the brunt of political battle throughout its short period of life 1960–62.” During those two years, it spearheaded African nationalism until it began peeping through the curtain of darkness long hung around Mozambique by the Portuguese. It was the first to establish effective underground cells and maintain contact with the interior, the first to begin military preparation for its militants, the first in grouping Mozambicans of all tribal groupings under one leadership, and it was instrumental in mobilizing public opinion against Portuguese colonialism.³³ Mabunda acknowledged that the organization “had weaknesses,” but its successor, Frelimo, “was built on a foundation long laid by UDENAMO.”³⁴

“While the UDENAMO appeared to flourish in its external policies,” Mabunda later wrote, “internally it was plagued by conflict arising mainly from the carelessness of its president, Adelino Gwambe.” Gwambe’s “dramatic announcement to the press in 1961 that arrangements had been made for UDENAMO to start the liberation of Mozambique with the aid of several African states and some 70,000 soldiers, prompted his expulsion from Tanganyika.” Gwambe’s “arbitrary expulsion” of Marcelino dos Santos (“a dedicated nationalist”) from UDENAMO and his apparent “desire to turn the party into his household tool, turned many members of the party against him.” The party began to lose the support of the “somewhat educated Africans who had come from Mozambique” to work with it. Gwambe also gained the description of “anti-intellectual” by attempting to stop a group of students who had been offered scholarships for study in the USA from going there.³⁵ In contrast with Mondlane, who had helped to arrange the scholarships, Gwambe denounced the USA as evil and Christian missionaries as “propagandists for the United States spreading neo-colonialist mentality” and attempted to steer the students to Eastern Europe.³⁶

Internal feuding in UDENAMO came to a head as a result of external pressure on it to merge with MANU. In early June 1962, representatives of the two movements sketched out a preliminary agreement at Nkrumah’s Ideological Institute in Winneba, Ghana. But, before it could be implemented, Mondlane arrived in Dar es Salaam. Gwambe was admitted back in Tanzania for unity talks and the two began a no-holds-barred duel for leadership of the Mozambican independence movement.

NOTES

1. Roland Oliver and J.D. Page, *A Short History of Africa*. Baltimore: Penguin, 1962, 128. For an analysis of Portuguese rule, its rationale, and its consequences in Angola, see Gerald L. Bender, *Angola Under the Portuguese: The Myth and the Reality*. Berkeley: UC Press, 1978.
2. Ibid.
3. James Duffy, *Portugal in Africa*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1952, p. 119; see also Allen F. Isaacman, "The Tradition of Resistance in Mozambique," *Africa Today*, July–September 1975, pp. 37–50; and A.J. Williams-Myers, "Regional Aspects of a Historical Legacy of Resistance," *Journal of Southern African Affairs*, University of Maryland, January 1977, pp. 43–60.
4. Malyn Newt, *A History of Mozambique*. London: Hurst & Col, 1995, pp. 415–419.
5. Duffy, *Portugal in Africa*, p. 164.
6. Ibid.
7. Eduardo Mondlane, "The Struggle for Independence in Mozambique," *Presence Africaine*, Paris, vol. 20, no. 48, 1963, p. 35.
8. David J.M. Mabunda, "The UDENAMO and Nationalism in Mozambique," typescript, San Diego, May 16, 1966, Marcum Papers, Box 36/3. Mabunda detailed the fates of three would-be escapees shot to death at the Rhodesian border by Portuguese soldiers.
9. Edward A. Alpers, "To Seek a Better Life: The Implications of Migration from Northern Mozambique to Colonial and Independent Tanzania for Class Formation and Political Behavior in the Struggle to Liberate Mozambique," University of Minnesota, Conference on Class Basis of Nationalist Movements in Angola, Guinea-Bissau and Mozambique, May 25–27, 1983.
10. Michel Cahen, "The Mueda Case and Maconde Political Ethnicity," *Africana Studia* (Porto, Portugal), no. 2, November 1999, pp. 29–46.
11. Ibid.
12. Ibid.
13. Chipande presented himself as a survivor, the link between the event and Frelimo. But according to Cahen's research, it is unlikely that Chipande was personally present at the time in Mueda-sede (chief town), because he was a member of Linguilanilo, a cooperative movement organized by a local Maconde leader, Lazaro N'Kavandame, which had nothing to do with the arrested organizers of the ill-fated Tanganyika delegation, Faustino Vanomba and Kibirite Diwane. (For a disparaging description of N'Kavandame's Linguilanilo movement see *Centro de Estudos*, "Africanos, Nao Vamos Esquecer!" Universidade Eduardo Mondlane, Maputo, February, 1983.)

14. Eduardo Mondlane, *The Struggle for Mozambique*. Baltimore: Penguin Books, pp. 117–118; Munslow, *Mozambique*, p. 11; and George Houser and Herb Shore, *Mozambique: Dream the Size of Freedom*. The Africa Fund, 1975, pp. 22–23.
15. *East African Standard* (Nairobi), February 20, 1961; Anders E. Per Westberg, *Angola and Mozambique: The Case Against Portugal*, New York: Roy Publishers, 1963.
16. Edwin C. Munger, “Mozambique: Uneasy Today, Uncertain Tomorrow,” *African Field Reports*, Cape Town, South Africa, C. Struik, 1961, p. 392.
17. *African Mail*, Lusaka, January 31, 1961.
18. Ibid.
19. Ibid.
20. Mondlane portrayed Gwambe as a duplicitous former PIDE agent. See Mondlane, “The Mozambique Liberation Front,” mimeo, 1962; Marcum Papers, Box 36/7. Gwambe may have worked for PIDE, but it seems likely that he slipped into Rhodesia with a mission to report back to PIDE on the activities of Mozambican émigrés then cut short his collaboration when he saw the opportunity for a leadership role within burgeoning African nationalism.
21. “Hlomulo Jani Chitofo Gwambe: My Concise Autobiography,” typescript, Lusaka, June 13, 1966. Marcum Papers, 36/1. Written during a period when he and Paulo Gumane were collaborating, the script was sent to the author by Gumane. Gwambe signed each page. The autobiography ends with the statement: “This was typed by me personally and any alteration or addition is false. All the contents are type written by one make of typewriter and anything by hand or otherwise is not mine and correction or omission is forgery. Documents, pictures and additions to this Concise Autobiography to support the substance can be applied directly to me with specific purpose and consideration shall be made to release them or not.”
22. *The Voice of Africa*, Accra, November 1961. On March 30, 1962, UDENAMO distributed leaflets to a group of Goan refugees aboard an ocean liner that had arrived in Dar es Salaam harbor from India, warning that there would be no place for them as “stooges” of the Portuguese in the future of Mozambique. “African people would not tolerate such people when independence was won.” Dar es Salaam Radio, domestic, 1600 GMT, March 30, 1962.
23. *Daily Nation*, Nairobi, July 18, 1961.
24. *The Times*, London, July 22, 1962.
25. Ibid.
26. *New York Times*, April 11, 1959.
27. Mabunda, “The UDENAMO and Nationalism...”.

28. Ibid.
29. Prominent among the many involved and arrested in the 1958 affair were Narciso Mbule (later UDENAMO foreign secretary), Mohamed Hussein, Tomas de Almeida, and Joao Baptista.
30. Mabunda, "The UDENAMO and Nationalism...".
31. Letter to author dated, June 12, 1966, Marcum Papers, Box 36/3.
32. Ibid.
33. Mabunda, "The UDENAMO and Nationalism...".
34. Ibid.
35. Ibid.
36. Gwambe's anti-American view were reflected in an UDENAMO statement "America the Country Responsible for the Colonial Wars in Africa," mimeo, Dar es Salaam, October 8, 1962, Marcum Papers, Box 36/1.

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