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The Macroeconomics of Corruption

Governance and Growth

Ivanyna, M.; Mourmouras, A.; Rangazas, P.

2018, XII, 304 p. 13 illus., 9 illus. in color., Hardcover

ISBN: 978-3-319-68665-3