

2. Theorizing Legal and Symbolic Membership

There are two major research questions that this project aims to answer. The first one concerns naturalisation decisions of Turks in Germany. Here, the explanatory macro-variables include the legal framework and minority members' relation with the majority group. The legal framework is defined by rights granted to alien residents (*AufenthG, GG*), preconditions for naturalisation (*StAG, BMI 2009Anwendungshinweise*), and the citizenship constellation with the country of origin. I conceptualize these legal preconditions as legal boundaries. The relation with the majority group is theoretically defined by the symbolic boundaries that are negotiated between majority and minority. The next element of the explanation is to break down boundaries to individual perceptions. Here, the idea is to dissect how legal boundaries and symbolic boundaries are defining the situation of naturalisation choices and thus affect individual naturalisation intentions. The second research question refers to the negotiation of symbolic boundaries and the consequences of these boundaries for naturalisation decisions. Certain boundary definitions may be dominant in societal discourse, but individual perceptions do not necessarily conform to dominant definitions. Instead, they are expected to vary according to individual experiences and individual responses. Since boundary making is an exclusionary practice, I refer to the theoretical concept of 'responses to stigmatization' that I elaborate in Chapter 5. Next, I introduce the theoretical concept of symbolic boundaries starting broadly and moving to the case studied. Then, I elaborate on the implication of these macro-level variables for a micro-explanation based on the model of frame selection (MFS).

1.1 The Concept of Symbolic Boundaries

Positive vs. Negative Self-Definitions

According to Lamont and Molnár, "symbolic boundaries are conceptual distinctions made by social actors to categorize objects, people, practices, and even time and space" (2002, 168). Actors often make these boundaries implicitly by distinguishing themselves through taste, life-style, preferences, and values.

Bourdieu (1984) is the founding father of this literature interested in boundaries as self-oriented distinctions. However, that is not the only way to make boundaries. Sometimes actors draw boundaries in a way that is explicitly oriented towards the other and results in a negative self-definition. That kind of definition is negative in a dual sense: The other is defined by negative attributes and the self is defined by absence of those attributes. Scholarship on this aspect of boundary making stand in the tradition of research on stigmatization by Goffman (1963).¹¹ I would not claim that either of the two perspectives is superior. They simply draw attention to different aspects of symbolic boundaries and they are suited to study boundaries in different realms. Symbolic boundaries exist in far more constellations than in the one between natives and immigrants. Goffman (1963), for example, studied stigmatization of many groups such as handicapped people, felons, and homosexuals.

Figure 2.1 Heuristic Model of Boundary Making by Superior Group




Figure by author.

Figure 2.1 presents a heuristic model for determining the kind of boundary making by the higher status group that is likely to prevail in a particular case. The two dimensions are ‘relative power of the own group’ and the ‘threat by the lower status group’. If the threat is harmless, actors will tend to define bounda-

¹¹ “[...]; the stigmatization of those in certain racial, religious and ethnic groups has apparently functioned as a means of removing these minorities from various avenues of competition; [...]” (Goffman 1963, 165).

ries positively whereas more serious threats are likely to trigger negative definitions and stigmatization. However, the kind of boundary making is less predictable in mixed constellations of serious threats to a high status group, or weak threats to low status groups. Also, lower status-groups may represent various kinds of threats. Threats to socio-economic status and threats of interpretational sovereignty are most frequent. For example, homosexuals are not primarily a socio-economic menace to the Catholic Church, but their struggle for equal rights threatens the church's power to dominate the discourse on family and sexuality. Hence, in order to predict the kind of boundary making based on the heuristic model, further assumptions about the relative power of groups and the kind of threat posed by the lower status group are necessary. In the case of ethnic minorities, there are good reasons to assume lower relative power compared to the cultural mainstream.

Institutional Boundaries

I want to point out the relevance of institutions broadly defined, before I consider boundary definitions through social interactions. Institutions in this broad sense include structures and traditions that potentially support the regulation of boundaries. They are legitimate qua law or tradition. For example, the boundary between immigrants and natives is not merely defined socially. The ascription of different legal statuses to members of both groups supports the boundary institutionally because these statuses regulate access to resources. The gender boundary in an academic board of a liberal democratic country, however, is likely not to be polished through legal discrimination by gender but, if at all, by the historically established numerical male domination. Students of symbolic boundaries should therefore consider the interaction of social and institutional elements in boundary making and preservation. That is also, why I introduce institutional boundaries before symbolic ones. They often define power hierarchies between groups of actors Wimmer 2008b.

Kinds of Symbolic Boundaries

Scholars interested in symbolic boundaries between upper and middle class usually focus on different self-presentations and life-styles (e.g. Lamont 1992; Sachweh 2013; Weingartner 2013). Studies like this one, which are interested in symbolic boundaries between majorities and minorities, will often find that the cultivation of differences takes more explicit forms including stigmatization and

physical violence (e.g. Wimmer 2002).¹² Elias and Scotson's (1965) seminal study of established and newcomers in an English suburban community illustrates that applications are by no means restricted to ethnic groups.¹³ However, the stigma is visible and audible to different degrees depending on the kind of constellation. If stigmatization is the mode of boundary making, the dominating group defines itself negatively by pointing to absent characteristics. Visible features then increase the persistence of boundaries. In both boundary making modes, the more powerful group (normally the one with a higher social and/or economic status), is in a better position to define the nature of boundaries. That implies more permeability of symbolic boundaries towards the inferior group than the other way around. For example, the American Civil Rights movement included white members (Chappell 1996) while Black members in the opposite camp, for example the Ku Klux Klan, would hardly find recognition. In this example, phenotype is the main identifier of the higher status group. But even where boundary definitions are based on less visible identifiers, the higher status group normally defines itself by features that are hard to imitate by lower class members (e.g. dress, manners, taste etc.) the reason being that the higher group developed those distinctions precisely in order to set itself apart (Bourdieu 1984). At the same time, recognition in the group with higher status is often more desirable, e.g. for an immigrant to be recognised as full member of mainstream society, for a middle-class member to be recognised in the polo club, or for a female professor to be recognised as competent member of a male dominated academic board. If we accept these assumptions, then it should be more interesting to focus on the upward permeability of boundaries. Put differently, the question how dominant groups regulate membership is more interesting than how the respective inferior group polishes its upper boundary.¹⁴ In any case, students of symbolic boundaries should have a hunch about what mode of boundary definition seems more likely in their case and is therefore more fruitful to examine.¹⁵

¹² Obviously, negative self-definitions may well mix with positive self-definitions.

¹³ The stigmatization of Swabian newcomers in 2000s Berlin is an interesting case because they are ethnic German. In 2013 the president of the national parliament complained about their deficient willingness to assimilate in the capital (<http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/nazi-references-used-in-anti-swabian-berlin-gentrification-feud-a-900078.html>; last access 27.01.2017).

¹⁴ Obviously, the lower status group of one constellation is often the higher status group in another one.

¹⁵ In his proposition of a multilevel-process theory of ethnic boundaries, Wimmer (2008b) considers actors' political alliances next to institutions and power hierarchies. That is sensitive for a general theory, but those alliances are not as relevant for the case studied here.

Implications of the Boundary Approach

Finally, I want to draw attention to the dynamic of group relations implied by the boundary approach. If Herder's heritage is a primordial understanding of ethnicity, as Wimmer (2009) claims, then Barth's (1969) heritage is the revolution of this static perspective on the social world in the realm of ethnicities. The main advantage of the boundary perspective over classic approaches to immigrant integration is the interactive and dynamic conception of intergroup relations (Brubaker 2009; Jenkins 1997, 2004; Nagel 1994; Ong 1996; Wimmer 2008a). Ethnic groups do not exist per se, but are defined as products of social interaction.¹⁶ This has two important implications. First, both groups are involved in the construction of boundaries. Hence, a comprehensive analysis would explicitly address boundary making on both sides. But, as I have argued above, due to my interest in naturalisation intentions I account for one side only: boundary perceptions. Second, the dynamic perspective implies some autonomy of individuals to define themselves as members of one or the other group. In the words of Laitin (1998), "people are limited by, but they are not prisoners of, their genes, their physiognomies, and their histories in settling on their own identities" (ibid: 21). However, institutions and self-definitions of the groups they want to join impose additional constraints on their choices. A person of Turkish descent living in Germany then is not per se a Turk, but either German, or Turkish, or German-Turkish, or Hamburger, or none of all. In boundary perspective, individuals are structurally constrained but not determined in their affiliations. It is precisely these constraints that this study seeks to elucidate.

Although positive and negative self-definitions are not mutually exclusive, the literature shows negative self-definitions to be of particular relevance to the constellation under scrutiny here. Accordingly, the research design does not account for positive definitions of the majority group. I study the nature of the boundary between both groups by asking members of the lower status group of Turkish residents for the perceived permeability of that boundary. By asking for boundary perceptions, I can still account for the non-existence of boundaries, namely when minority members do not perceive exclusion. Also, by looking at their responses to exclusion, I can account for boundary making of migrants. The focus on boundary perception, however, is particularly suited for understanding how minority members are made subjects of boundaries involuntarily. This perspective has less to say about migrants' active partaking in boundary making, although in reality this could be the case, and it only indirectly assesses majority members' actual boundary making. However, while the focus on perceptions

¹⁶ This also sets the perspective apart from social psychological identity theory that emphasizes self-definitions but ignores the external definition of groups.

misses part of the picture, it is in line with the broader research question of understanding the role of symbolic boundaries for migrants' naturalisation intentions. If intentions are based on *subjective* gains, then it is coherent to consider boundary *perceptions* instead of more 'objective' measures. To take full account of those boundaries, the analytical model includes their institutional support through the legal institution of citizenship. I conceptualise citizenship as a legal boundary that is closely connected to the making and unmaking of symbolic boundaries and argue that both kinds of boundaries should be considered synchronically. Next, I explain the general model of legal and symbolic boundaries, before the implications for the particular case of Turks in Germany are considered.

Table 2.1 illustrates nine hypothetical constellations that result from these two boundary dimensions. Boundaries are either bright, blurred, or shifted (Alba 2005; Zolberg and Woon 1999). They are bright where the location of individuals is discrete and unambiguous, forcing them to opt between remaining at one side and crossing. Legally, that is the case when naturalisation is conditional upon renunciation of the former citizenship. Boundaries are said to shift when "populations situated on the one side are now included on the other" (Alba 2005, 23). The legal implementation of a boundary shift is the unconditional endowment with citizenship as was the case for ethnic German re-settlers.¹⁷ The third category of blurred boundaries applies when the location of a person on either side is ambiguous, for example when two nationalities are acquired by birth as is the case under the new German *jus soli* (see above). How are symbolic boundaries different from legal ones? While Alba's (2005) focus is on the institutionalization of boundaries, Zolberg and Woon (1999) do mention social and institutional elements of boundaries but do not explicitly differentiate between them. As pointed out above, this study is based on a conceptual separation of both elements. In the long run, legal and symbolic boundaries are likely to align. However, this process may sometimes take several generations. Symbolic blurring and shifting may precede legal dismantling of boundaries or the other way around. Therefore, it is sensitive to allow both kinds of boundaries to vary independently, especially in the context of rather recent immigration. For example, where a legal boundary is blurred because dual citizenship is accepted, a naturalised individual may still perceive her action as boundary crossing (B1 in Table 2.1). A possible reason would be peers questioning simultaneous attachment to two nationalities. Also, she might naturalise where the legal boundary is bright, because blurred symbolic boundaries resolve loyalty doubts (A2). What are the implications of this model for the case of Turks in Germany?

¹⁷ See Dumbrava (2014) for a systematic assessment of legal boundary shifting based on ethno-cultural membership in European countries.

Table 2.1 Typology of Boundaries

		Legal boundary			respective definition of belonging
		bright	blurred	shifted	
Symbolic boundary	bright	A1	B1	C1	exclusive definition of belonging
	blurred	A2	B2	C2	hyphenated identities accepted
	shifted	A3	B3	C3	redefinition of identity for the new group as a whole
respective legal rule		exclusive citizenship	dual citizenship	unconditional naturalisation	
examples for Germany		Turkish citizens	Jus soli children	German repatriates from USSR	

Source: Own adaptation from Alba (2005), and Zolberg and Woon (1999).

For the empirical case considered, the model can be simplified. The legal boundary for the constellation is a bright one, because by default, dual citizenship is not tolerated. Namely, Turkish residents who want to naturalise in Germany are required to renounce their former passport.¹⁸ Consequently, in this case, claiming citizenship corresponds to crossing the legal boundary between national groups. Whether symbolic boundaries that come with this bright legal boundary are perceived as bright (A1), blurred (A2), or shifted (A3) remains to be answered empirically. This question is relevant because the answer could explain different inclinations to naturalise. In order to assess symbolic boundary perception it should be made clear what is meant in each case. Bright symbolic boundaries make identities exclusive. For the case studied here, it means that individuals are considered either German or Turkish, not German-Turkish. In this case, symbolic membership is not an individual choice alone, but preconditions are defined by the current members who regulate access. If boundaries are bright, the regulation of membership tends to be rigid and therefore, bright boundaries are less permeable than the other types. Non-exclusive definitions of identities correspond to blurred boundaries. Where blurred boundaries prevail, hyphenated identities are legitimate. Whereas the distinction of blurred and bright boundaries is straightforward, blurred boundaries are more difficult to distinguish from shifted ones.

¹⁸ There are exceptions to this rule (see BMI 2009 for the then relevant exceptions, more recently BMI 2015, but the model refers to the typical case. As pointed out above, the legal boundary may vary according to the country of origin and the country of birth.

The former are often the antecedent of the latter. Shifting of symbolic boundaries requires a fundamental redefinition of the new group. Three German journalists of non-German descent recently formulated a redefinition of German identity that fits the concept of boundary shifting: “We are part of this society. We are different. Hence difference in kind is part of this German society”¹⁹ (Topçu, Pham, and Bota 2012, 13). In other words, shifted boundaries imply inclusive re-definitions of belonging that allow for greater diversity inside the new group.

In order to clarify the empirical implications of the theoretical concept, I want to illustrate the process of legal and symbolic boundary blurring and shifting towards ethnic minorities by considering the historical examples of Italians and Africans in the US, and of Polish miners in the German West. In these cases, social categories that originally defined distinct groups either became part of national self-definitions or simply disappeared. For example, Blacks are doubtlessly Americans today but the category of Black has not disappeared, whereas Italians have altogether lost their stigma of the darker whites (Guglielmo and Salerno 2003). Similarly, after decades of distinct national identity and ethnic political organization Polish workers in the Ruhrgebiet largely abandoned a distinct Polish identity starting after WWI (Lucassen 2005; McCook 2007). However, they are different from Turkish migrants in two crucial aspects. First, they do not deviate from the phenotypical norm. Second, they have the same (Catholic) religion as natives in that region. In the case of Turkish migrants, dismantling of both aspects as markers of difference is more likely than change of Turks’ complexion and religion. So far Germans’ phenotypical boundary definition has been steadfast, as if there was an unspoken norm that only fair people can be German, whereas traditionally ethnically heterogeneous countries like Brazil or the US have relaxed phenotypical norms over the course of time (Lamont and Bail 2005). Next to skin tone, Islam is perceived by Europeans as a threat to their only common cultural ground (Foner and Alba 2008; Zolberg and Woon 1999). That may explain why the accommodation of Muslims in a German identity seems particularly difficult (Amir-Moazami 2005). Alba (2006) argues that the example of Jewish assimilation in the US after WWII through institutional boundary blurring could be instructive for European countries when it comes to accommodation of Islam. Although this study cannot provide an answer, the historical examples support the notion that symbolic boundary transformations are a matter of time. However, the transformation processes can be accelerated by political and institutional incorporation.²⁰ The examples illustrate

¹⁹ Translation by author. German original: „Wir sind Teil dieser Gesellschaft. Wir sind anders. Also gehört die Andersartigkeit zu dieser deutschen Gesellschaft.“

²⁰ Notably, since Poles were citizens of Prussia, political incorporation preceded socio-cultural assimilation. However, according to McCook (2007) assimilation succeeded only after WWII when

that “we can assume no simple one-to-one relationship between ethnic units and cultural similarities and differences. The features that are taken into account are not the sum of ‘objective’ differences, but only those which the actors themselves regard as significant” (Barth 1969, 14). In line with the boundary concept, these time varying definitions of difference are understood as boundary blurring and shifting.

If boundary definitions evolve over time, how is the difference between symbolic Germans and persons of Turkish descent defined today? By default, crossing, blurring, and shifting are expected to occur in this sequence. The process may take several generations and there can be backlashes against accommodation of newcomers. Today, the boundary between persons of Turkish descent and German majority seems to be bright and sometimes blurred but rarely shifting.²¹ While members of the majority group have not been interviewed for this study, findings of other researchers point to bright boundary definitions by the majority group in the German context. Also, political mobilization for legal enforcement of symbolic boundaries gives some impression of common boundary definitions. In 1999, the conservative party CDU collected five million signatures against the introduction of dual citizenship toleration. In this case, petitioners expressed their will to uphold the institutional support of a symbolic bright boundary (Holmes Cooper 2002).²² This example illustrates the point that the separation of legal and symbolic boundaries is conceptual. In fact, rules of citizenship acquisition (legal boundaries) mirror at least to some extent the popular constructions of symbolic boundaries. According to Lamont (Lamont 1992, 71), subjective boundaries are a necessary but insufficient condition for the construction of objective boundaries. It remains to be seen how legal and symbolic boundaries against Turkish residents develop under the impression of new arrivals from countries that are not only more distant but often culturally more different from Germany than Turkey and certainly more different than most second generation Turks. This study gives a snapshot of the current state of affairs.

The causal connectedness of legal and symbolic boundaries has several implications for individual motives. As argued above, the institutional make-up

new arrivals from Southern Europe filled their place as lowest in the hierarchy. Also, only because Italians were officially defined as white they were eligible to naturalise before 1952 (Guglielmo and Salerno 2003).

²¹ Members of the national football team and German politicians of Turkish descent may pave the way to future boundary shifting. Recently, demonstrations surfing the wave of German *Überfremdungsangst* and Islamophobia are countered even by conservative politicians. There is evidence for more inclusive and denationalizing definitions by the German elite compared to lower classes (Teney and Helbling 2014).

²² According to a representative survey 52% of Western Germans and 59% of Eastern Germans opposed toleration of dual citizenship in 1996 (Wasmer and Koch 2003).

implies a bright legal boundary that is crossed upon naturalisation. Eventually, this transition is conducive to crossing the symbolic boundary as well. If that holds, immigrants who do not want to cross the symbolic boundary should be less inclined to naturalise unless they have rights-oriented motives to naturalise. In that case, they can be expected to devalue citizenship and conceive of it as a mere legal status without symbolic value, often depreciating citizenship as ‘just a piece of paper’. If instead, they do want to cross the symbolic boundary, they are more likely to naturalise while recognizing the symbolic value of citizenship. Finally, sometimes migrants may devalue German citizenship because they do want to naturalise but find the procedure too expensive. The renunciation requirement in particular could be perceived as costly. In order to reduce cognitive dissonance (Festinger 1957) they may downgrade German citizenship, a mechanism that has been labelled the “sour grapes” phenomenon (Elster 1983).²³ In that case, it is virtually impossible to tell whether citizenship has become a sour grape, or if the person in question is actually uninterested in naturalisation. Still, it is important to keep in mind that expressions of disinterest may in fact be a reaction to the preconditions for naturalisation. In the next section, I elaborate micro-level implications of the macro-boundary concept more systematically.

2.1 Individual Legal and Symbolic Membership

It is assumed that individuals who consider naturalisation evaluate the costs and benefits of legal and symbolic aspects. This perspective is straightforward when it comes to the consequences of legal status and its change. I argue that legal boundaries affect migrants’ perception of costs and benefits, for they define both preconditions for naturalisation and rights endowment of citizens and non-citizens. However, when it comes to symbolic membership, the language of costs and benefits is more debateable. Still, as I will argue, symbolic membership aspirations can be accommodated in a model of rational choice. From the perspective of the migrant, the crucial difference between symbolic membership and legal membership is its predictability. Legal membership is predictable while symbolic membership is not. German citizenship endows every citizen with the

²³ Topcu’s (2007) story of a Turkish couple that applied for German citizenship may serve as an illustration. The woman’s application was refuted on grounds of poor language skills. “She was rather happy, that she »failed« the exam. »I don’t want to become German after all«, she says. In fact, she is »upset« that her husband renounced his Turkish passport” (ibid., 96; translation NW).

same rights.²⁴ Individuals may differ in how much they value the endowment with a particular right, e.g. franchise, but each migrant attains this right at the moment of naturalisation.²⁵ However, German citizenship does not endow every citizen with symbolic membership. Some feel accepted irrespective of citizenship, some will feel accepted once they naturalised, and some will not feel accepted although they are German citizens. For the naturalisation intention, the difference in *expectations* is more relevant than what *actually* happens after naturalisation. How can we understand that some migrants expect naturalisation to be conducive to symbolic membership and others do not expect this instrumentality? Before naturalisation, persons can but conjecture their future recognition upon citizenship acquisition. Their forecast draws on experience. Perceptions of recognition vary among non-citizens depending on how they are usually addressed; as German or as foreign. Also, they find examples of (un-)successful symbolic membership acquisition among their peers and family in different numbers. Along these lines, the assumption of an instrumentality of citizenship for symbolic membership should be more likely for persons who feel recognised and for persons who find many examples of naturalised symbolic members among their peers and family. In short, the attractive ness of legal membership increases with the distance between actual rights as a non-citizen and rights-aspiration through naturalisation. The appeal of symbolic membership decreases with the distance between actual and aspired recognition as a symbolic member. Accordingly, the strongest inclination results from symbolic recognition of non-citizens who are at stark legal disadvantage compared to citizens. The rationale behind the conceptual separation of macro-boundaries from their consequences for micro-perceptions is to provide a micro explanation of varying naturalisation intentions.

The relation of legal and symbolic membership is complicated through their factual amalgamation. While symbolic membership does not guarantee legal recognition, legal membership may in some situations support symbolic recognition. Obviously, naturalised persons are not likely to present their German ID in everyday interactions as a claim to symbolic membership. However, in official situations (e.g. border control, public office, voting) legal status may fulfil a social function next to the legal one. First, legal status defines the treatment that is foreseen for a certain legal category of persons (e.g. EU-passports in a different line than non-EU at border control). Second, it defines the situation socially

²⁴ My theoretical reflections focus on the particular constellation of Turks with eligibility for German citizenship. For a broader reflection on motives for naturalisation in various constellations of host and origin countries see Bauböck (1994b, 71).

²⁵ Of course, there are limitations to the exercise of certain rights, for example referring to age and mental accountability, but they equally apply to all citizens.

and frames social interactions with official personnel. This is the case because legal statuses are not only different in kind, but also different in the implicit or explicit valuations they receive. For example, border controls of third country nationals at EU borders are more thorough and time-consuming than controls of EU citizens. This becomes particularly apparent for family members with different legal statuses, for example, when those with EU citizenship have to wait for their Turkish parents behind the border. Both, the thorough control through border police and the social situation that makes the differentiation apparent to anyone queuing in one of the two lines, devalue Turkish citizenship as opposed to German citizenship in that particular situation.²⁶ Similar differentiations in public office can be imagined and are known from empirical studies (see Wunderlich 2005). Voting is another socially relevant expression of legal membership with implications for symbolic membership. While in everyday interactions citizenship is hardly visible, the practice of voting makes legal membership *visible* to others and it implies an *involvement* in society. That is how it becomes an expression of symbolic membership. The consequence of the intertwining for my theoretical model is a difficulty to define citizenship acquisition per se as *either* a motive for symbolic recognition *or* a motive to exercise rights (e.g. have a say in politics), when in fact it might be either or both at the same time. For the sake of conceptual clarity, I treat all legal aspects as rights-oriented motives. Nevertheless, it is important to keep in mind that in reality legal and symbolic membership are intertwined.

A Model of Frame Selection for Naturalisation

The intention to naturalise is theorized in terms of the Model of Frame Selection (MFS), assuming that actors maximize their subjectively expected utility (SEU). Sociologists usually do not go along with neoclassical versions of rational choice theory (RCT) (Boudon 2003; Kroneberg and Kalter 2012). Instead, sociologists have further developed RCT in order to account for behavioural patterns that escape a simple cost-benefit-logic like hiding Jews in the German ‘Third Reich’ (Kroneberg 2012) or participation in general elections (Kroneberg, Yaish, and Stocké 2010; Edlin, Gelman, and Kaplan 2007; Hechter and Kanazawa 1997).²⁷

²⁶ At the Russian border the situation could be rather different. But for the case studied here the chosen example has more empirical relevance.

²⁷ Kroneberg (2012) understands this behaviour to result from the variation of individual prosocial orientations and situational incentives and opportunities. Edlin et al. (2007) point to social preferences to explain voting while Kroneberg et al. (2010) emphasize norms of civic duty. For an overview of successful RCT applications in fields that are often deemed inapt see Hechter and Kanazawa (1997).

Rationality of actors is described by these scholars as ‘bounded’ or ‘variable’. One of the most promising adaptations of RCT is the Model of Frame Selection (MFS) (Esser 2009; 2002b, 2002a; Kroneberg 2005). It systematically accounts for the ‘variable rationality’ of social actors by differentiation of two modes of information processing that are activated unconsciously. One mode is automatic-spontaneous (as) and the other one reflective-calculating (rc). The first one refers to situations that are familiar and situations where subjective opportunities to reflect are scarce. Opportunities to reflect are defined by restrictions of time and cognition. The second mode refers to situations that allow for more extensive calculations of costs and benefits and situations where the alternative that can be activated automatically is not ideal. In that mode, rationality assumptions have more explanatory power than in situations of the first kind. Actors may unconsciously switch between these two modes of information processing at three stages of selection: Selection of an interpretational frame, selection of a behavioural script, and selection of an action. The first selection is analogous to the classic definition of the situation that shapes social behaviour and is to a certain extent guided by social norms. Frames are actors’ mental representations of typical situations. The second selection refers to actions that are adapt to, or regularly expected in, such situations. Scripts are manuals that guide behaviour in defined situations. The third selection is the decision to either follow a known script or to deviate from the known. Although the MFS claims to be a general theory of action, I go along with the more flexible approach of the self-proclaimed school of ‘analytical sociology’ that is in favour of pragmatic use of behavioural mechanisms suited to the respective phenomenon (Hedström and Ylikoski 2010). And the MFS is a useful framework to structure the behavioural assumptions that explain naturalisation intentions.

As an intermediate step, it is important to consider differences between the intention to naturalise and actual naturalisation and their implications. Do motives that explain the intention also explain actual naturalisation? The short answer is: sometimes but not necessarily. However, this substantial question is interwoven with practical issues of data collection and that is why an exhaustive answer is given in the next chapter. For the moment, it may suffice to say that pragmatic reasons tipped the balance in favour of naturalisation intentions.

There is a range of simplifications of the MFS for the application to naturalisation intentions in this project. First, migrants have no time pressure to come up with a decision and the decision is consequential, which implies the reflecting-calculating mode of selection. Second, a common script is not likely to exist because individuals typically naturalise only once in their lifetime.²⁸ Hence, this

²⁸ Those who want to re-naturalise after 2000’s unintended dispossession are a noteworthy exception are (see Ch.4). In their case, it is indeed possible, but not to be taken for granted, that they resort to

application does without the automatic-spontaneous mode and without script-selection. What remains to be defined then are frame-selection and action-selection. In accordance with the differentiation of legal and symbolic membership, I assume one of the following four frames to be selected: Naturalisation is framed as legal membership change, as symbolic membership change, as both legal and symbolic membership change, or as consequential neither for legal nor for symbolic membership. The MFS predicts a selection of the frame that promises the largest SEU. The same applies to the action-selection. Here, the model-adaptation remains simple since there are but two basic (mental) actions: Naturalisation intended vs. not intended.²⁹ The calculation of the SEU of a frame must account for legal and social costs and benefits. They are expected to choose a frame that is in line with the (mental) action. For example, a person who is interested in the legal benefits of German citizenship but is under high social pressure from peers not to betray Turkish loyalty by passport renunciation is likely to frame naturalisation as legal membership change. In such cases, citizenship is downgraded to 'just a piece of paper', a framing that secures legal benefits of the German passport and reduces social costs of renouncing the Turkish one.³⁰ I have pointed to the consequences of this interconnectedness of legal and symbolic motives above. The explicit hypotheses for subjectively expected legal and social costs and benefits are articulated and tested in Chapter 4.

Next to naturalisation intentions, the MFS has some implications for 'responses to stigmatization'. In this application, the MFS cannot be simplified as has been done in the case of naturalisation intentions. For once, each stigmatizing situation is different in nature and second, actors differ in their experiential background in the sense that some have had experiences with stigmatization in the past and others have not. For these reasons, none of the two information-processing modes is more likely per se. Also, the three selections of frame, script, and action are not pre-defined. However, regularities can be expected within individual actions. Experiences of stigmatization lead to social learning (Bandura 1977) and thereby make frames, scripts, and actions more easily available in repeated interactions. As a consequence, actors may attribute being treated unfriendly to their ethnicity and frame situations as racial stigmatization when the behaviour should more accurately be attributed to the situation.³¹ Along the

their familiar script of action. Another hypothetical exception would be a script like 'I do everything to accommodate here'. However, the formalization always accounts for the typical case.

²⁹ My operationalization measures these two actions gradually as tendencies towards one or the other end.

³⁰ Kahneman and Tversky (1986) show how alternative wording of the same scenario leads to different decisions of those judging and dealing with the scenario.

³¹ Social psychologists describe this tendency to underestimate external causes of social behaviour as the fundamental attribution error (for critical review see Sabini, Siepmann, and Stein 2001).

same lines, those who are successful in conciliatory responses may frame social behaviour as context-given even where it is indeed racially stigmatizing. Systematic analyses of responses to stigmatization are given in chapter 5 along with interpretations in terms of the Model of Frame Selection.

Although not the focus of this study, it would be worthwhile to analyse of naturalisation dynamics among friends or families as Street (2014, 2013) has done. In terms of the MFS, observation of peers and family helps individuals to reduce insecurity in calculations of SEU through naturalisation. Since symbolic membership after naturalisation is not predictable, 'vanguard naturalisers' are particularly helpful in reducing the insecurity about recognition upon naturalisation. Individuals can simply observe whether their naturalised peers are recognised as symbolic members or not. Further, naturalised peers reduce information costs since they can easily help with administrative procedures. In the realm of families, the law may encourage collective decision-making. Naturalisation of minor children with their parents reduces aggregate opportunity costs and, depending on the law, financial costs. In other words, naturalisation may become cheaper if several family members apply jointly. I do assess the impact of naturalised peers and family members, but I have insufficient information on the timing of naturalisations to address the aggregational dynamics adequately.

The hypotheses for multivariate analyses and the guiding questions for the interviews are introduced in chapters 4 and 5 respectively. The hypotheses are the specification of the MFS that I put forward in this chapter. I present them at the beginning of chapter 4 in order to be consistent throughout both empirical chapters. Similarly, guiding questions are introduced in chapter 5 since they emerged only once the multivariate analyses were finished. Following the epistemological logic of my qualitative research, I reflect responses to stigmatization in the light of the MFS once the analyses are finished. For these reasons, I open the quantitative empirical chapter with the formulation of hypotheses and oscillate between theoretical concepts and interview analyses in the qualitative empirical chapter. In this way, implications of the theoretical foundation for the quantitative and the qualitative part of this study are tailored to the analytical need of each application respectively and the presentation of the argument is aligned with the chronological order of the research project.

To sum up, legal and symbolic boundaries as structural preconditions of naturalisation intentions have to be analysed in different ways. Boundaries of the former kind refer to institutional conditions represented by the body of law that concerns naturalisation and alien resident rights. The measurement of symbolic boundaries is more difficult as these definitions refer to socially negotiated definitions of belonging. As argued above, the dominant group is in a stronger position to define the symbolic boundary. However, the definition is negotiated in

ongoing interactions among members of the majority group and newcomers. A complete analysis of this 'informal nation membership' (Brubaker 2010, 65) and its symbolic boundaries would therefore encompass boundary definitions and perceptions on both sides: on the part of the majority group and on the part of the newcomers. This study focuses on the boundary perceptions of the newcomers and their descendants who have not naturalised. The role of boundaries for naturalisation intentions is assessed both quantitatively and qualitatively. Multivariate analyses focus on the relative relevance of boundary perception compared to legal aspirations for citizenship acquisition. The analyses of in-depth interviews aim for a demarcation of the varying boundary perceptions of immigrants. Interviews reveal how responses to stigmatization mediate the effect of symbolic exclusion on naturalisation intentions. Since minority members' naturalisation intentions are the point of departure of this study, their perceptions of and reactions to symbolic boundaries are crucial.

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