

Diaspora, National Identity, and Reciprocal Prosperity

UNDERSTANDING ETHNIC RELATIONS

This chapter establishes a conceptual and analytical framework for exploring the formation of a diaspora's national identity from ethnicization and de-ethnicization to build a third type of stabilized national identity in relation to host society, and the dynamic interplay between ethnonationalism and regional development. In this regard, the first task would be to clarify the term "ethnic relations." Studying ethnic relations requires an interdisciplinary approach. Debates and disagreements among scholars in the field of national identity and nationalism studies relate closely to the question of academic discipline, and researchers' own ethnic and/or national backgrounds inevitably influence their perspectives on ethnic relations, particularly in this field of study. "[T]he 'I' who write and speak from a particular place and time, from a history and culture which is specific. What we say is always 'in context,' *positioned*" (Hall in Braziel and Mannur 2003, p. 234). In any case, academic writers' personal experiences and cultural backgrounds should be valuable seeds for their inspiration of authorship. The primary focus of this research is on the diaspora group's national identity and the community's development. However, the diaspora group under investigation does not have an independent political entity (a state). Thus, this group's identity formation and community development cannot be discussed in isolation from its host country and its dominant ethnic group, Han Chinese, which is the legitimate center of official nationalism as opposed to local or minority

nationalisms. Diasporas and other ethnic minorities with nested collective identities in the state comprise a tiny fraction of the population, and they are labeled “minority,” “local,” or “ethnic” groups. Thus, a practical issue for researchers is what and whom exactly to investigate, as “ethnic relations” could mean relationships between individual members of the ethnic groups concerned, between individuals of the dominant group and the diaspora community, between the central government and the community, or between different minority groups. In this research, which is conducted in a subfield of political science, I consider the state–community relationship, which is shaped primarily through the interactions between government policy and the reactions from the community to this policy. If only size (e.g., population size) is considered, minority groups’ aspirations for equality, mutual respect, or interdependency may sound idealistic, particularly in China where the Han Chinese population overwhelmingly dominates the vast multiethnic country. Conversely, from the statist point of view, such a seemingly trivial issue may still be important to justify why a protective approach to ethnic minorities is often necessary given the huge asymmetric power relationship. Governments’ policy in action can easily lead to the suffering of minority groups, which may believe they will eventually disappear or be assimilated. A general tendency is that unless a minority group seriously threatens the security of the host society, such a group may be considered unworthy of attention by policymakers or scholars of ethnic relations.

Approaches to understand ethnic relations in the context of nationalism and migration studies can be grouped into three ‘broad’ categories: socioeconomic (material relationships), politico-cultural, and politics-centered explanations. Diverse research views and focuses exist within these three categories and vary according to what aspects of ethnic relations are highlighted and examined. I do not intent to review the extensive body of research on ethnic relations and related academic discourses, which is beyond the scope of this project. Rather the categorization below is only an attempt to clarify where the case of the *Joseonjok* in China should be situated within academic approaches that directly and indirectly address the asymmetric reality of ethnic relations. Scholarship using socioeconomic approaches particularly offers insights on material relationships such as disparity and asymmetry in the level of development or minorities’ economic contributions in ethnically divided states as the most important causes and consequences of ethnic disturbance and conflicts. Studies under this category have contributed to understanding

neocolonialism, internal material exploitation, conflicts over resources (e.g., Goodman 2012), uneven development (Gellner 1983; Nairn 1981), and competition between ethnic groups in labor markets (Barth 1989; Olzak 1992; Hechter 1975). In this context, it is argued that competition worsens during economic recessions and consequently ethnic conflict is highest when both immigration and unemployment rates are high (Olzak 1992, pp. 32–37). Consequently, the rise of various levels of nationalisms and causes of secessions are explored primarily in the context of competition over scarce resources and economic achievements between ethnic groups, which persistently reshape the uneven or exploitative relationships.

More recently, studies focusing on economic aspects of ethnic relationship much highlight the contributions of migrant labor and their specific ethnic ties to a host country's overall economic development. This group of scholars mostly comprises political economists and scholars of international labor markets and migration studies. These studies reflect the academic trend of merging studies of old and new migration, including colonial diasporas, ethnic groups, and global migration, in view of integrating these groups into their host society. Their research focuses on migrant groups' economic self-sufficiency or instrumental value to mainstream society in cases where integration is the groups' final goal. Those topics include the diaspora's contributions or disturbing factors to broader aspects of development and at times involving immigrants' homelands as a valuable source of economic networking (e.g., Kuznetsov 2006; Bergsten and Choi 2003; Luova 2009; Kokot et al. 2013; Shin et al. 2015).

One of the main arguments underpinning this project is that the instrumental value approach is limited in its ability to explain complicated state–community relationships involving various types of settlers and integrationists from longer-term perspectives. Minority groups' instrumental (mostly economic) contributions to a host society may only explain short-term stability in ethnic relations. Such view may justify the state's strategies of assigning perpetual guest worker status to the groups, the categorization according to their usefulness to the host society, and the creation of a hierarchy between different ethnic minority groups. One of the limits of such an approach is that society's perceptions of “usefulness” as a group change but historical recognition may not.

Studies of politico-cultural ethnic relations vary widely based on different perspectives. Authors of such studies include anthropologists and

sociologists of ethnicity and nationalism (e.g., Armstrong 1976; Smith 1986, 1999) and political theorists who have engaged in controversial debates on the ethics and rationality of nationality and multiculturalism in a liberal democracy (Barry 2001; Miller 1995; Habermas 1992; Parekh 2000; Favell 1998). Their primary concern has been the question of whether the recognition of minorities' identity by a political system that supports positive discrimination can be ethically justified in a liberal democracy and whether it is congruent with the fundamental liberalist value of individual freedom. Fundamentally, the divergent perspectives stem from differing views of the notion of justice as fairness—whether such a view takes into account only generic (neutral and abstract) human interests (primary goods) or emphasizes the liberal state's obligation to focus on different conceptions of good, including culture and identity (immersion rather than abstraction) (Carens 2000, p. 8).

Such debates are not yet appropriate for the Chinese context, but they provide useful references for establishing a China-specific analytical framework. A number of multiculturalist theorists have noted that multiculturalism theory research has centered on developments in Western democracies (Taylor 1994; Kymlicka 1995; Tamir 1993; Young 2000; Gutmann 2003), even though ethnonationalism is universal regardless of political system (Connor 1984) and East–West (communitarian vs. liberal or ethnic vs. civic) over-generalization (Kohn 1994, pp. 162–165) has become a problematic academic trend (Kymlicka 2005, p. 38; Anderson 2001). A notable point is that debates and controversies over multiculturalism theories have enabled researchers and practitioners to pay greater attention to different types of minorities and their aspirations for group rights. In this project, I do not necessarily endorse the moralization of cultural rights of any ethnic minorities' nationalism in favor of unconditional protection by the host state. I only note that the debates between multiculturalism sympathizers and anti-multiculturalists have provided a constructive space in which to seriously discuss the minorities and related political issues. Multiculturalism is better used as a transitory policy tool than as the ultimate goal of a society; thus, it should be useful until the world is achieved in which there remains no hierarchy with implicit discrimination embedded in any ethnic relations. Rationalist anti-multiculturalists do not offer any space in which to reveal the reality (which may be either beneficial for or detrimental to minorities) of deep-seated discrimination and rights abuses, silent suffering, or reverse discrimination. As Taylor illuminates, common misunderstanding is that

reverse discrimination in the West is caused by the widespread multiculturalism discourse that gives weight to the protection of the rights of marginalized populations at the expense of established groups. On the contrary, reverse discrimination is the result of failed policy (mis-implementation) rather than the motivation to implement multiculturalism. European attacks on multiculturalism often blame certain phenomena of ghettoization and alienation of immigrants on a foreign ideology, instead of recognizing the home-grown failures to promote integration and combat discrimination (Taylor et al. 2012). Without endorsing a theory that offers room for openly reflecting on minorities' rights, discussions of official nationalism inevitably reveal limits, as any policy that is justified in the name of universal patriotism and that has purpose, means, and goals as evasive and diverse as those of nationalism often represent only the powerful.

This category also includes discussions on the connection between minority identity and politics relating to the origin/rise of nations viewed through the postmodernist prism and the formation of collective identity and modern citizenship (e.g., Bhabha 1990; Taylor 1994; Soysal 1994). Cultural identity is "not a mere trick of the imagination. It has its histories—and histories have their real, material, and symbolic effects" (Hall 2003, p. 237). Such theories have focused on the multifaceted citizenship and de-territorialized characteristics of national identity and transnationalism in the postmodern world. By dint of globalization, various collective identities are highly interconnected, and the most meaningful interconnectivity involves the inevitable linkage between the memories of the colonizers and those of the colonized. These studies provide an insightful guide for understanding global diasporas in the present world, particularly those that aspire to greater integration into their host societies with sufficient recognition of their cultural and historical diversity.

The final literature group focuses on the political engineering and management of ethnic division and its relationship with political arrangement as reflected in certain state systems, notably federalism (O'Leary 2004, 1997; Adeney 2006) and consociationalism (Finlay 2011), and in the design of state policy for integration (Zolberg 2008), or comprehensive analysis on conflicts and secession (e.g., Horowitz 1985; Lehning 1998; Rata and Openshaw 2009). Discussions have focused on political arrangements directed by state policy to accommodate ethnic diversity through changes in the political system and administrative reforms

for power sharing. This approach informs scholars in this field of the significance of policy design and the state's functional role. An important assumption is that minorities' rights and cultural diversity should be discussed in mainstream politics and in the public policy domain. This goes beyond the notion that minority groups' political rights originate from their cultural and historical particularities, which are "private," rather than from a "public" and "official" source.

A subfield under this category of nationality and nationalism studies conducted by scholars of international relations and international law (Mayall and Simpson 1992; Jacquin-Berdal 2000; Taras and Ganguly 2010; Lobell and Mauceri 2004) emphasizes the external ties or recognition of minority groups by the international community. This group of scholars has focused on secessionist ethnic groups that aspire to self-determination and to build their own independent states—their ultimate collective goal. This group has shown that ethnic groups' choices and actions are not self-perpetuating but exogenous in the sense of the reconsideration of foreign policy, changing international perceptions on minority groups as (potential) independent actors in international relations and ethnic network across the globe, and international human rights efforts to protect group rights. Some insights were derived from this group to analyze the case under this project, Yanbian in China, that is often called "the third Korea" (*Le Monde* 2016; Han 2013),¹ although this community has been as-understudied.

Ethnic Relations in the Chinese Context

The cultural and ideological particularities of ethnic relations in the Chinese context require greater attention, as the discourse on nationalism is essentially different from that on liberal political systems. As a modern multinational state, one of China's major aims is to effectively manage the ethnic divisions within and between its multinational communities. The government seeks to acknowledge the intrinsic value of cultural diversity while ensuring equitable regional prosperity through material affluence. In this regard, valuable research includes the historical and anthropological studies such as Lee (1931), Scalapino and Lee (1972), and Suh and Shultz (1990), who focus on the early history of the integration of Korean minorities into modern China and Chinese state building. Studies of ethnonationalism in China include various views on China's ethnic relations (Harrell 1995; Dreyer 1976; Dwyer 1998;

Mackerras 1994). Focusing on class and ethnicity, theories on the interface between communism and nationalism explore the links between government policy, ethnicity, and equitable development in China (Szporluk 1988; Berberoglu 2000; Lin 2006, 2015; Mevius 2009; Cartier 2011; Saich 2011). Wide variety can be found within these discussions (e.g., developmentalism, essentialism, and reformism), although they are not mutually exclusive. Scholars often compare the Soviet experience of failed federalism and the de-federalization process with China's quasi-federalism (e.g., Tanrisever 2009). Legal approaches to minority rights explain the current disparity between China's legislation and the degree of its implementation and urge greater conformity to international laws that protect minorities' cultural rights (e.g., Wu 2014; Bosely 2007). Such studies are beneficial for understanding the political and legal background of China's handling of ethnic minority issues. The most familiar and frequently cited research on ethnic relations in China includes Mackerras (1994), Gladeny (1991), and Dittmer et al. (1993). More recent directly relevant research on the state–community relationship includes Han (2013), who compares ethnic relations in contemporary China, including the Korean community, to the Uyghurs, Mongols, Dai, and Tibetans. Using a common denominator (the kin relationship), these comparative studies offer valuable insights into why some groups are more rebellious than others under the same regime. Gladeny (1991) questions what determines a certain type of ethnic relation in China in the particular case of the Hui. Making broader comparisons, Mackerras presents a comprehensive picture of China's major minorities (i.e., the Manchus, Tibetans, Zhang, Mongolians, Uyghurs) using a comparative analytical tool of economic development, history, foreign relations, and population to identify the generalizable elements that determine China's particular ethnic relationships. He thus discusses China's state policy on minority groups and the formation of ethnic communities there as a consequence rather than an interaction, which may mean that to some degree ethnic groups can be portrayed as passive and dependent. In contrast, Gladeny's analyses suggest a more interactive relationship, “a dialogical interpretation” (1991, p. 77). Previous well-received case studies (e.g., Mackerras 1994; Herberer 1989) have shown the complexity of the historical roots between the Han Chinese and the groups in question. The shared connotation of previous research seems that how to “manage” ethnic groups with diverse historical and cultural roots may be more relevant than the dichotomized theoretical “liberalism versus Marxism” framework

in explaining ethnic relationships in China. Regardless of the political system, dominant ethnic groups are fundamentally fearful of implementing full multiculturalism, in contrast to the liberal multiculturalist argument that would defend minority groups' self-determination depending on various conditions and circumstances.

A goal of the current project is to provide a deeper understanding of the Korean community in *Dongbei* to offer a fuller analysis of various dimensions of ethnic relations (e.g., causes, descriptions of the current relationship, dynamics, mutual goals, and focuses on various groups within the community). Regardless of the theoretical contradictions associated with the class struggle and ethnic divisions under communist regimes (Szporluk 1988), the CCP was relatively successful in preserving a certain level of ethnic diversity. In this sense, its policy bears a great deal of resemblance between China's multiculturalism policy and those of multinational and multiethnic societies elsewhere. However, multiculturalism has scarcely been discussed explicitly in the context of non-liberal, non-Western democracy. Contrarily, South Korea, as one of the motherlands of the diaspora in this study, has explicitly and officially promulgated multiculturalism as a policy and social vision since the mid-2000s, and the *Joseonjok* comprise the largest majority among the South Korean migrant groups. This promotion of multiculturalism has attracted increasing numbers of *Joseonjok* people to the South Korean labor market and to South Korean society.

Multiculturalism in liberal democracy spreads authority across multiple levels and agencies of government, which encourages direct public participation from a wide cross section of society. Freedom of choice is at the heart of liberal multiculturalism, and the government provides the necessary legal protections and political conditions to realize this freedom of choice. Participation can be analyzed by stage and level. In China, citizen participation is limited to learning and obeying state policies (Woodman 2016, p. 344); thus, multiculturalism in the liberal sense does not serve as a standard framework for analyzing ethnic relations in China. The terms used to define ethnic relations include fusion, amalgamation, assimilation, "additive assimilation" (Barry 2001), communication, autonomy, integration (Dreyer 1976, 2005), interculturalism, acculturation, as well as multiculturalism (as recognition of diversity and guarantee of non-assimilation). All of these terms are used to describe changes due to contact between different cultures. Some tend to be used in a negative sense, such as the use of "acculturation" to refer to political invasion and forced

assimilation. Some express process, policy, or results and interaction. “Assimilation” refers to the process through which individuals and groups of differing heritages acquire the basic habits, attitudes, and mode of life of a culture. “Amalgamation” is a milder term used to mean a blending of cultures (closer to the Chinese term *ronghe*) rather than one group eliminating another (acculturation) or one group mixing itself into another (assimilation) (Merriam-Webster). Although any of these words universally defines ethnic relations, at the policy level, within China’s historical context, most of these processes have occurred, and more or less coexist.

The term “cultural diversity” (*wenhua duoyangxing* in Chinese) is widely used in China, but little reference has been made to the Western concept of multiculturalism as a political vision and policy. However, as Zhao (2011) explains, “Chinese intellectuals keenly use the theoretical lens of multiculturalism to analyze the situation of ethnic minorities in China’s educational system, referring to the series of preferential policies” (pp. 48–49). The term multiculturalism can be used in daily life (particularly in official propaganda and media) and in academia. Chinese people are hearing this term more often from news reports on national television. Students may learn this term in their civil/moral education classes or geography classes in primary school, where multiethnic compositions of Chinese population and the government’s related policies are introduced. Chinese people may use “-isms” in both casual and academic ways. The suffix “-ism” can be translated into two different terms in Chinese according to the context: *xing* (meaning “nature”) or *zhuyi* (meaning “doctrine”). In the case of multiculturalism, the “-ism” is usually translated into *xing*, which contains a neutral meaning of “nature” (Interview). However, ethnic relations are explained in terms of *ronghe* (intermingling, amalgamation, fusion) or *tonghua* (assimilation), with the former preferred by Beijing. Thus, both liberal multiculturalists and Chinese ethnic policymakers officially emphasize non-assimilation. However, non-assimilation is often limited to political rhetoric, and the Chinese setting creates many barriers to implementing *ronghe* in practice. The recognition of a third hybrid identity (Bhabha 1996) as opposed to a single hegemonic identity is an outcome of amalgamation rather than assimilation. “Nevertheless, considering the immense asymmetries between China’s Han Chinese majority and ethnic minority groups in both population size and actual power relations, minority groups may interpret intermingling as a euphemism for assimilation” (Park 2017, p. 42).

The ethnic relations observed between the Han Chinese and minority groups in both the region under study and elsewhere in China suggest that the Chinese government has endeavored to find an effective way to manage multiethnicity and multiculturalism (effectively rooting out multiethnic tensions in Manchuria before the end of the Second World War) that encourages cultural diversity and a self-governing system, a method that has been reinforced by the regionalized and territorialized ethnic engineering seen since the Mao era. This approach arguably provides a different model that accommodates the China-specific characteristics of ethnic relations. Regardless of the political system of the host country, there are at least four universally transferrable assumptions in multiculturalist discourse that serve as explanatory variables in a non-liberal context. First and foremost, all modern states are more or less “multinational” and thus naturally “multicultural” in composition, although this multiculturalism does not automatically connote the existence of multiculturalism as a social ideology and political program. Second, cultural historicism is not exclusively applicable to liberal democracies. Public culture is often used as an important motif in instigating national solidarity (by explicitly calling it “nationalism/national identity” or “patriotism”) (Callahan 2006) and culture (applicable to both dominant and minority national groups) and is thus seen as an intrinsic value worthy of preservation. Precisely because of such culture-based solidarity, modern states and societies, whether liberal or non-liberal, have a fundamental fear of the rise of local ethnonationalism and secessionism, while culturally based ethnic groups are increasingly likely to become political. Third, a dominant ethnic group is in a better position to promote and protect its own culture, which minority nationals may also aspire to, particularly when public fields implicitly but exclusively function in favor of the dominant ethnic group. Few liberal democracies have the confidence to explicitly accommodate multiculturalism in the public domain, whereas China’s multicultural ethnic engineering has been a top-down procedure accommodating ethnic aspirations. In this respect, Beijing has been reluctant to recognize China as “multinational,” preferring the term “multicultural” to decouple culture from the political arena. Finally, regardless of its political system, a host country’s options for dealing with ethnic groups are limited—broadly speaking, either assimilation or autonomy—although many derivations and forms of political rhetoric exist between those two options. China’s model of multiculturalism to date can be understood as a centralized government-dominated,

non-participatory, top-down (and thus authoritarian) approach to dealing with the historically evolved multinational composition (multiculturalism) of its people.

Limited participation in ethnic policymaking is an important aspect of China's authoritarian multiculturalism, which is provisionally defined as a model that concentrates authority in a few executive agencies to improve ethnic relations. This tradition has changed from ethnicization (the promotion of diversity within preset boundaries in terms of geography and content) to de-ethnicization. These processes are opaquely governed by powerful officials within the central government with limited and nominal participation by local community.

NATIONAL IDENTITY, DIASPORA, AND GEOPOLITICS

Ethnic Relations Concerning a Diaspora

In light of the preceding, what is the national identity of a diaspora? How does the collective identity of a diaspora, which is attached to more than one nation or state, differ from the identity of non-diaspora citizens? Answering these questions through an empirical case study is somewhat complicated. The term "diaspora," which originates from the Greek word for "dispersion," has certain features distinct from other types of migrant. A dictionary definition of the ancient prototypical diaspora is "the settling of scattered colonies of Jews outside Palestine after the Babylonian exile." The word also refers to "Jews living outside Palestine or modern Israel" (Merriam-Webster). Today, "diaspora" is a generalized term for cases similar to that of the exiled Jews. It may refer to the breaking up and scattering of populations, scattered people who have settled far from their ancestral homelands, or the places in which these scattered people settle. Combining these three elements (spatial particularity), people (part of a certain group), and phenomenon (dispersed), a diaspora can be understood as a group of people with shared cultural characteristics whose dispersal has resulted in long- or short-term geographical re-settlement.

Diasporas are often regarded as groups in transition whose members' identities are inevitably determined by their loyalty to two or more states. For example, considering conventional nationalism theorists' views on minority nationalism (as opposed to official nationalisms), according to Gellner's typology of nationalisms, diaspora nationalism is abnormal

and thus doomed to disappear (O'Leary 1997). Armstrong (1976) observes, "Much of the literature on contemporary diasporas appears to consider them to be anomalies or at least very transitory" (Armstrong 1976, p. 393). In addition, as diasporas usually retain close ties to their motherlands, they are often regarded with suspicion in their host countries, particularly when diplomatic relations between the sending and receiving countries are antagonistic. Once re-settled in the host country, a diasporic group is categorized as an ethnic minority or subnational group and is generally assumed to have migrated less voluntarily than other migrant groups.

A diaspora may form part of an ethnic group, and national historical continuity may be central to an understanding of national identity (Smith 1986, 1999). In discussing national identity and the rise of nationalism, modernists have paid more attention to exogenous phenomena, while ethnosymbolists and perennialists have highlighted the origins and cultural attributes of national identity. For example, Smith emphasizes the distinctive pre-modern cultural and historical bases of the national identity of a political group and defines an ethnic group as "a named human population with myths of common ancestry, shared historical memories and one or more common elements of culture, including an association with a homeland, and some degree of solidarity" (Smith 1999, p. 13). The Korean diaspora can be seen both as part of the Korean nation (with a Korean national identity) and as ethnically Korean in the Chinese context. In essence, they are part of the national group, but only in relation to the host nation, and categorized as minority members of a nation external to the host nation. "[E]thno-national diasporism and diasporas do not constitute a recent, modern phenomenon ... Their identities are intricate combinations of primordial, psychological/mythical, and instrumental elements" (Sheffer 2003, p. 7). This explains the coexistence of "ethnic" and "national" identities in a diaspora population, although their selective exposure is neither accurately measurable nor sufficiently describable. The duality of a diaspora's national identity is vexing to the host state. The multiple ethnic and national identities of diasporas are often problematized and demoralized by mainstream social expectations and behavior in the receiving nations.

Diasporas commonly aspire to recognition and integration at the same time, which complicates ethnic relations when involving a diaspora group. Taylor et al. (2012) suggest two definitions of multiculturalism in accommodating minority identities: "as a generic term for the ensemble

of policies introduced with the combined goals of recognizing diversity, fostering integration and producing/maintaining equality; and then as a word designating a subspecies of such policies, to be contrasted with another subspecies, called “intercultural.” Diasporas seek prosperity, both material and spiritual stability, and security, for both their individuals and their communities. Within this context, minority communities in China have sought to secure opportunities in parallel with the state’s developmental agenda to reposition them in mainstream society and to avoid marginalization and ghettoization, in the terms used by Taylor et al. (2012), due to the regionally clustered nature of China’s geographically designated multiculturalism.

China’s policy toward minorities (both in general and toward the *Joseonjok*) interacts with ethnic minorities until they form a firm and stable collective identity and prosperous community. A collective ethnic boundary (both physical and spiritual collectivity) is an outcome of historical evolution with continuous identity formation. As such a boundary is relational and circumstantial, following the postmodern view on de-territorialized identity, there should be no distinction between the “nationality of a diaspora” and the “ethnicity of diaspora,” as nationality is attached to people rather than to territories. The common understanding of ethnic boundaries is that they are cultural as opposed to racial or national, with “national” meaning something relational *vis-à-vis* official nationalism and nations with states. In this study, rather than discussing those cultural attributes, given that a great deal of research has been produced by South Korean sociologists and anthropologists and by the *Joseonjok* themselves, I focus more on the nexus among policy (top-down), nationality (reaction to policy), and development/prosperity (developmental vision). Here, “national and collective identity” is related to state policy more than anthropological dispositions or general cultural markers of ethnicity, although their interconnectivity is not ignored.

The National Identity of a Diaspora

National identity can be understood as an interpretation of oneself in relation to the nation and is reflected in various forms of communication. There are abundant theories on and terminology for the conditions and elements of national identity. Kymlicka (1995), for example, takes national identity (“societal culture” in his term) as a collective identity formed around language, territory, land ownership, and sometimes

religion. Miller (1995) equates national identity with national character or public culture and explains it as a collective political identity built on common history and national myth. Tamir (1993) discusses the boundary of a nation as a public sphere, but does not specify whether it is identical to Habermas's (1992) conception of the public sphere as an amalgamated culture linked by the civic notion of national identity. For sociologists such as Smith (1986, 1999), the qualifications of a nation are not only public features but also the ethnic bases of a group, which include a comprehensive range of culture, both private and public. The first step toward multiculturalism in a modern multinational society is the recognition of these "national" identities. This project particularly concerns the difference between a national or ethnic group and the dominant Han Chinese. An essentialist interpretation defines an identity as "the attribution of behavior or thinking to the intrinsic, fundamental nature of a person, collective, or state" (Suny 2001, pp. 868–869). Identity is the condition of being the same as something described or asserted. It is also defined as the sameness of essential or generic character in different instances, sameness that constitutes the objective reality of a thing (oneness), or an equation that is satisfied for all of the values of the symbols. When these abstract definitions are extended to the collective level, definitions of identity become more intangible. Psychologists tend to emphasize the inside mechanism of "identity" as a categorization of the human self, whereas sociologists and political scientists focus on the objective conditions and visible qualifications by which various identities are categorized. Sigel succinctly summarizes the common views on identity among social scientists, mostly social psychologists (Sigel 2001, p. 112). First, all consider it a social construct and thus not immutable. Second, it implies a social relation—in other words, it encompasses notions of the self and of the groups in which the self is embedded or identifies with. Third, by group identification, one defines oneself and differentiates oneself from (or at least compares oneself to) groups believed to be different from one's own. A person's sense of self thus includes the *I*, the *we*, and the *not-we*. Fourth, individuals tend to have multiple group identities, but their priorities depend on the salience of the groups to which they attach themselves. Finally, social identities and their manifestations reflect the social structure and culture of which they are a part.

Social identity refers to both the self and the social group, and it provides the link between the two. Although being aware of individual identity entails discovering/knowing oneself in relation to others, awareness

of collective identity means perceiving oneself as a member of a larger group and having the consciousness of this group within the context of (or in opposition to) larger groups. This identification and differentiation process is inevitably accompanied by some degree of understanding of the conditions of the group to which one supposedly belongs. In this sense, “identity ... bridges the gap between the ‘inside and the outside’—between the personal and the public worlds” (Hall 1992, p. 276). The strength of collective identity, however, does not have to do with how many members belong to a group. The discussion has gone further, as the falsity–reality debate has provided little help in understanding problematic ethnic relationships in real political life. Regardless of whether it is an outcome of imagination (Anderson 1983), national identity eventually has become almost real and material in most contemporary societies.

When one is aware of the identity attached to, for instance, family, community, or society, one tends to behave as expected within these boundaries. Some people may behave coherently in opposition to cultural norms, but it is hard to imagine that such people are unaware of their collective identity and live completely in personhood. “Being aware of identity attached to something” is inseparable from how one understands something to which his or her identity is attached. Unless one knows what family, community, or society means to oneself, one can hardly be aware of collective identities. Identity is both intrinsic and extrinsic; it is subjective only in the context of objectivity.

Identity is continuously shaped and constructed. For instance, how people understand the objective conditions of the nation to which they belong explains how they perceive themselves as a part of such a nation regardless of whether they are satisfied with their identity. It can be argued that even people who do not have a strong sense of belonging to the community or nation or who wish to deny their obligation to larger groups still have a shared national identity as long as outsiders categorize and perceive certain groups of people differently. Thus, national identity can be explained and discovered by outsiders even if insiders are unaware of what the nation is or whether it means nothing in particular to them in their daily lives.

National identity coexists with other kinds of identities, and it is neither an essential nor the primary kind of collective identity (Sury 2001).² There are numerous kinds of collective identity that coexist simultaneously in complex layers. Reflecting this diverse understanding of human

categorization, many liberal sociologists have created theoretical frameworks along the lines of “primordialist, modernist, or postmodernist.” Marxist sociologists view the issue of nationalism as class versus nation or as the interaction between the two. “[N]ationalism and national movements are a product of the interests of a particular class or classes (...) who are the direct beneficiaries of this ideology which represents the position of these classes” (Berberoglu 2000, p. 228).³

Whether the culture-based categorization of human beings is useful in understanding the real world is a separate issue from whether such a categorization is normative. Universalistic observers have suggested using citizenship to group people in politics because it implies a culture-free legal individual as the basis of a political entity. Liberal republicans have suggested a more nationalized concept of citizenship, whereas Marxists view class as a fundamental divider of human beings. Culturalists tend to hold that human beings are fundamentally divided by racial, ethnic, and cultural differences. Feminists may view society and politics as being seriously divided by gender. All of these ways of categorizing people are useful as long as they provide a sound framework for understanding the problems of societies in view of resolving those problems. These categorizations are all political, as they provide different views on worldwide problems that can and should be “politically” adjusted.

A diaspora’s national identity is attached to both the nation it has left behind and its new host country, and a diaspora could also identify itself in terms of both nations at the same time. Thus, when I speak of a diaspora’s national identity, I mean its identity as related to both nations regardless of the order or form of the two nations’ coexistence. The history of a diaspora is formed through the collective memory separated from the host society and imagined ancestral homelands and the collective life stories of its members. The process by which diaspora members understand and write the meaning of shared history is also the process of self-justification and of searching for legitimate political membership in host countries. In this process, various visible and invisible cultures (depending on the ethnic groups) are used as means of cognition and recognition. Claims on historical land, vernacular language, customs, values, and religions are only a few examples.

Identity entails people’s understanding of who they are and of their fundamental defining characteristics as human beings, whereas the demand

for recognition is given urgency by the supposed links between recognition and identity. Taylor (1994, p. 29) writes, “The thesis is that our identity is partly shaped by recognition or its absence, often by the misrecognition of others, and so a person or group of people can suffer real damage, real distortion ... Nonrecognition or misrecognition can inflict harm, can be a form of oppression, imprisoning someone in a false, distorted, and reduced mode of being.”⁴ A diaspora’s identity is based on an accumulation of collective memories of recognition, under-recognition, misrecognition, or non-recognition.

The Geopolitics of a Diaspora

In the wake of the end of the Cold War and the disintegration of the Soviet Union, Beijing was concerned about worsening ethnic disturbances due to the increasing openness of society, marketization, social stratification, and changing values. The rise of state-led Chinese patriotism with nationalist elements was the official reaction to the changing ethnic relationship. China’s official nationalism is the mixture of communism (itself a mixture of Marxism and Leninism), multiculturalism, developmentalism, and authoritarianism. How several strong ethnonationalisms survived in this milieu remains a perplexing question. The diaspora case adds one more critical element, geopolitics, which have contributed to the current ethnic relations of *Joseonjok* communities in *Dongbei*. Geopolitics has been used by both agencies and agents, and it is historically rooted in China’s general policy of a “territorialized ethnization” process which later switched to a selective shift between region and ethnicity criteria.

As Mackerras’ analysis informs us, ethnic identity may become stronger when border nationalities are instigated by countries of origin in border areas, which leads to ethnic resurgence caused by frequent communication and interaction (particularly trade) with the countries of origin or the same ethnic group. This is especially true in the case of the Muslims, who also exhibit better economic performance than the Han Chinese in the minority regions partly thanks to increased trade volume with their kin country. However, the case seems opposite for the *Joseonjok*-concentrated areas than for the Inner Mongolia, Tibet, and Xinjiang because of the unpredictable patterns of interaction between the two motherlands and the *Joseonjok*. Ethnicity (Korean-ness) as an imagined nation waned gradually while resentment increased. Korean-ness

intensified with frequent communication and traveling and actual integration into the market; ethnic identity waned, but national identity was strengthened.⁵ In this regard, while “interaction,” “relationship,” and “reciprocal” could be key terms according to Gladney’s category of approaches (1991), “Stalinist,” “culturalist,” and “circumstantialist” do not sufficiently explain diverse China’s ethnic relationships. The “dialogical relationship” is emphasized as a continuous interaction with the understanding that policy in the Chinese context (a circumstantial factor) plays a greater role. Thus, rather than using a top-down (identity determined by policy) or bottom-up (identity determined by ethnic characters and nature) approach, this research intends not to underestimate the continuous micro-level negotiation over the defense of collective identity and community prosperity. Concurrently, unlike other migrant cases, the “foreign policy” variable is insufficient in this case, and macro-analysis of the dynamic geopolitical conditions and historical setting over the last half century is important because of the community’s historical link with regional particularities such as the colonial history of Manchuria, intense multiethnic tensions, the communist revolution, and geopolitical proximity to a divided motherland.

ETHNIC RELATIONSHIPS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT

Developmentalism and the Value of Ethnic Communities

China’s historical model of regional development with ethnic characteristics appears to be changing, partly because of the PRC’s shift to a market economy and the associated changes in regional policies and partly because of the government’s sensitivity to ethnicity-related problems that may lead to political uprisings based on territorial claims. Some experts hold that de-ethnicization and elimination of minority nationality status provide a mechanism for rebalancing regional disparities and rooting out problems related to ethnically divided geopolitics (Ma 2007), in favor of a model of ethnic assimilation. However, as Lin argues, de-ethnicization that involves the dismantling of an existing setting does not guarantee the equality of groups or regions (Lin 2015, p. 67), and the cost of doing so would be very high; thus, status quo may be preferred for the sake of equity, stability, and cost avoidance. Ma argues the adoption of the Soviet model as the root of present problems in China, “but

criticized for praising the norms of Western liberal pluralism and failing to mention debates over ‘multiculturalism’ and other issues that continue to provoke widespread concern (...) (Elliott 2015, p. 187).” While “development” is an ongoing phenomenon and is thus hard to grasp clearly, “developmentalism” has been adopted as a clear national agenda in China—it began with Deng’s pragmatism but was implemented more aggressively by Jang Zemin. China has continued to prioritize its developmentalism agenda. In this sense, it is relevant to consider how developmentalism has affected ethnic relationships. The *Joseonjok* community in *Dongbei* has maintained peaceful ethnic coexistence in spite of many potential ethnic conflicts and has a high potential for regional development. Insomuch that China’s influence is increasing in many aspects, this potential may contribute not only to the development of the *Joseonjok* society and the *Dongbei* region but also to Northeast Asia. The factors that indicate the development level often include interactions between social and political factors that may be visible or invisible and long or short term. These include infrastructure, education, social equality, the global network, the environment, employment, population, and political freedom.⁶ In reality, a gap often occurs between developmentalism and actual development. As a socioeconomic ideology and political agenda, developmentalism provides direction for society to devote its collective energy to the pursuit of prosperity and justifies development at all costs. In China, many conditions must be met, including shifts in the discussion of perspectives on ethnic minorities and in the fundamental perceptions on security and development toward more emphasis on the quality of comprehensive long-term regional development and human-centered security. Considering the current rural–urban disparities and subsequent negative economic and social consequences, revitalizing ethnic communities in rural areas itself is an imminent part of the state’s development agenda.

The *Joseonjok* community is a marginalized case. This ethnic group has received relatively little attention, and it is located in “Far” East Asia, which is often examined by “regional studies” rather than the conventional political science discipline. Moreover, China is in transition from socialist modernization to marketized re-modernization, under which every aspect of society exhibits a complicated mixture of conflicting ideas and values and contradictory practices with policy experiments. One reason for choosing the *Joseonjok* case in this project is to build on current studies of migration and integration (rather than ethnic conflict) in China.

It is insufficient using the theoretical prism of communism to analyze modern China. Class struggles in China did not blur the ethnic divisions of the country, even under the most rigid communism of the Cultural Revolution. On the contrary, because of oppression, the sense of ethnicity in all minority regions was strengthened. Liberal theorists have argued that modernization with capitalism and democratization may lead to the increased pursuit of minority rights. Thus, revival of the sense of ethnicity has more to do with the rise of democracy triggered by a marketized economy, in which individuals have greater rights as citizens. Due to China's hybrid system, marketization has not yet been accompanied by individuals' increased awareness of rights-based citizenship.⁷

AN ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK TO UNDERSTAND THE PRC-YANBIAN, CENTER-LOCAL ETHNIC RELATIONS

In contrast to economic and instrumental approaches to migration, in the global era ethnic diversity, plural cultural affiliations, and multiple nationalities provide value to society and contribute to the progress and development of the community, region, and host society. This should particularly be the case in contemporary China's current ethnic setting. A common misunderstanding on behalf of universal impartial anti-multiculturalists (categorized under the first type of national identity explained in Chap. 4) is that diasporas belong to nowhere and are therefore less committed to their community, less loyal to either state (patriotism by universalists), and less likely to have a special national attachment (nationalized citizenship by particularists). However, "nationalized" diasporas (as opposed to "depoliticized" ethnic groups) can have attachments to multiple nations with appropriate external recognition by states. Being pluralistic in policy design and managing ethnic relations requires approaches tailored to different groups of migrants. Such approaches are likely to be disdained by universalists. Particularists would argue that particularism per se should be universalized due to the interconnectivity of moral and political interests (Parekh 2003). In the real world, human life seems much more complicated and irregular than is portrayed in neat and sophisticated theories on ethnicity and nationalism. No single theoretical approach can adequately explain the complexity of the historical evolution of ethnic relations in China. This is because the period researched, severe

irregularities in external drivers and forces, and the mixture of intended policy and unintended outcomes all heavily and constantly affect the dynamism of ethnic relations.

Several stages of stabilizing diaspora identity are proposed as a framework for analysis. An ideal stage may be where both integration and recognition are satisfactorily achieved. Necessary conditions include the quality of communications between parties, sound knowledge of multiple cultures, and diaspora ethics. This final stage is an effort to achieve a nationalized identity, which is appropriate for nationalism debates in the globalization context and should improve the morale of ethnic minorities including diasporas. An important implication for modern China is that these minority groups are likely to cooperate with shifting state agendas, notably developmentalism. In this regard, a nationality group under this category is a critical asset for long-term development in the region.⁸ Desirable ethnic relations would result in a society in which minority groups and individuals are officially recognized. Accordingly, ethnic minorities would be given equal opportunities in the public domain, while the choice of whether to embrace the national identity (together with entry into and exit from their own minority community) would be left to the individual. Under such circumstances, minority groups highly likely pursue reciprocal prosperity both for the host nation and for their own community. In addition, a minority group's fuller integration into mainstream society should be non-hierarchical at both the public and cultural levels. Such conditions would be nurtured and reinforced by a stable third type of national identity that is strong and prominent yet not antagonistic and that motivates community development and loyalty to their host country. In this regard, there is a substantial gap between multiculturalism as a phenomenon and the implementation of multiculturalism as a vision and an actual state policy. As the following chapters discuss in detail, within the spectrum of multiculturalism and the implementation of multiculturalism, state policy and minority reactions vary for a multitude of ontological and epistemological reasons inside and outside the community. Each chapter describes such changes from both sides.

In a nutshell, this project's core concern is to disentangle the policy–identity–prosperity nexus (Fig. 2.1). China's multiculturalist approach has a state-imposed authoritarian character ever since the integration of Korean communist activists into the CCP in the 1920s, and “policy” has thus had a stronger connection to the evolution of ethnicized collective identity than in cases in liberal democracies. As mentioned in Introduction,




Fig. 2.1 ‘Identity–policy–prosperity’ nexus

the following primary research questions underpin this book. How has the *Joseonjok* national identity evolved? To what extent has the host country’s policy shaped this path, and how is it different from those of other ethnic minorities in China? How does it relate to the community’s long-term prosperity? What are the implications of the formation of ethnic relations for broader regional politics? I answer these questions by demonstrating and elaborating on the outcomes of the interaction between the PRC’s (implicit and explicit) policy and *Joseonjok*’s reactions.

The analysis is conducted within the triad of policy, identity, and prosperity. These three elements explaining *Joseonjok* society are explored in conjunction with the changing patterns and outcomes of ethnic relations in terms of ethnicization (Chap. 3), de-ethnicization (Chap. 4), and the struggle to form a stable third (national) identity to re-politicize ethnicity (Chap. 5). A brief analytical framework is summarized in Table 2.1.

CONCLUSION

In the case of the *Joseonjok*, constructing a third type of national identity equates to a transition from viewing oneself as a guest worker (a status imposed by external forces) to one of the principal actors in regional development. This connotes a collective desire to possess a de-territorialized national identity, which is combined with ethnic minority groups’ yearning to refuse the “minority” label. However, its consequence would also mean gradually giving up territorially confined welfare favoritism in

Table 2.1 Analytical framework: ethnic relations in China and the ethnicity–territory–prosperity nexus

	<i>Ethnicization</i>	<i>De-ethnicization</i>	<i>Re-politicization of ethnicity</i>
Recognition	Positive and active recognition	Weakening state intervention	Non-active recognition
Integration	Territorially confined isolation	Re-dispersal and disintegration	Demands of a fuller degree of citizenship
National identity	Formation of ethnicized identity	Destabilized identity formation	Struggle to forming a third type of national identity
Ethnic equality	Hardly tested due to territorial isolation	Growing disparities in seizing opportunity	Growing awareness of collective consciousness
Development and prosperity	State protected stability and community development	De-stabilizing ethnic communities	Increasing potential but losing opportunities

China, resisting government-led multiculturalism-oriented policy measures and the present form of self-governance.

During the era of the planned communist economy, territorialized ethnic management was somewhat efficient, as centralized plans for the allocation and use of resources (e.g., employment, job allocation, development) were easily implementable. However, the dynamic re-modernization of the country as a whole has generated a number of conditions that have steadily worsened social equity. The developmentalist agenda has created and reinforced social (urban–rural; rich–poor) and ethnic (modernity–ethnicity) divisions. Previously isolated ethnic groups have faced the destruction of the historically accumulated collectivity of their community and ethnicity. Due to the overall nationwide increase in social and physical mobility, the influx of the Han Chinese population to previously minority-dominated regions can be considered an overwhelming and uncontrollable phenomenon/threat to minorities given the size of the Han Chinese population and its rapidly increasing overall competitiveness (language ability, education and skills quality, social networks, etc.). Moreover, minority groups with geopolitical advantages (or disadvantages) that are adjacent to their motherlands or former allies face greater pressure and greater opportunities at the same time. As an overlooked missed decolonization case, the *Joseonjok* minority group in *Dongbei* has been continuously involved in and confined to the triangular

host–motherland–diaspora structure with confrontations and tensions over culture (e.g., contradicting interpretations over historical memories), economic instrumentalism (e.g., its role as a trade agency and the accumulation of capital using ethnic networks), and security (inevitable involvement in unresolved disputes and foreign affairs).

Policy failure and the mismanagement of geopolitics by the ROK, the DPRK, and China have resulted in missed opportunities for development potential, which has destabilized the community and hampered the establishment of a stable third type of national identity. In the following chapters, I further elaborate on what this national identity signifies as well as on the generalizable conditions for forming and maintaining such an identity. This intends to contribute to the development of a tool for understanding diasporas and minorities in the globalized world, as how to manage ethnic relations and how to integrate diverse migrant populations into host societies have become common challenges. Mainly due to China's aggressive developmentalist agendas followed by rapid urbanization and re-modernization, traditional communities gradually disintegrate. Besides, due to the ethnicization of the rural–urban division in China, the disruption of rural livelihood is directly linked with the disintegration of ethnic communities. For this reason, ethnic issues in China increasingly resemble those of other multinational states, as the core of any ethnic relation is the intrinsic human relationship. A common theme in migration studies is the question of selection and integration, and China is no exception. Thus, ethnic/national theories implying Chinese exceptionalism could gradually become less persuasive in this field.

NOTES

1. “Yeonbyeon, prosperity of the little Korea in China: in spite of its geographical proximity with North Korea, Beijing is cold-hearted toward their alliance” [*Yanbian, la petite Corée chinoise prospère: Malgré sa proximité géographique et politique avec la Corée du Nord, Pékin est en froid avec son allié*] (Le Monde, January 7, 2016) http://www.lemonde.fr/asiе-pacifique/article/2016/01/07/yanbian-la-petite-coree-chinoise-prospere_4843231_3216.html?xtmc=yanbian&xtcr=2. Accessed January 8, 2016.
2. “Essentialism may be defined as the attribution of behavior or thinking to the intrinsic, fundamental nature of a person, collectivity, or state.

Identity theory proposes an alternative to essentialist models of people or social groups by claiming that rather than having a single, given, relatively stable identity, persons and groups have multiple, fluid, situational identities that are produced in intersubjective understandings” (Suny 2001, pp. 868–869).

3. Berberoglu’s grouping of academic camps in this field is a useful guide to refer. Nationalism and national movements are products of class relations and class struggles at the national and international levels. In his theoretical article on nationalism, he divides nationalism theorists into the liberal bourgeois camp and the Marxist rationalist camp rather than using the conventional primordialist-versus-modernist framework. The liberal nationalism theorists are followers of Ernest Renan and Max Weber, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Johann Herder, Johann Fichte, Giuseppe Mazzini, Hans Kohn, Carlton Hayes, Louis Snyder, Elie Kedourie, Ernest Gellner, Walker Connor, Karl Deutsch, John Breuilly, Charles Tilly, Anthony Giddens, and Anthony D. Smith. Berberoglu argues that liberal mainstream nationalism scholars commonly stress the subjective and idealist abstraction emerging from the collective imagination of nation and nationalism and over-emphasize ethnic and cultural phenomena when explaining their origins and development, overlooking the class struggle as the fundamental force of historical development. The academic camp of Marxist nationalism theorists includes Tom Nairn, Benedict Anderson, Ernesto Laclau, Ephraim Nimni, Horace B. Davis, Eric Hobsbawm, Berberoglu, and Berch (Berberoglu 2000, p. 228).
4. Patrick (2000) noted that “conviction that political recognition is accomplished through the extension and completion of the Enlightenment project of toleration is shared by some of the most influential political theorists of our time” such as Charles Taylor (1994), and Will Kymlicka (1995), “all formulate the issue of recognition as if it were a corollary of the principle of toleration based in equal liberty or dignity.” (Patrick 2000, p. 29).
5. An important difference in the Joseonjok case relates to China’s agenda to “enlighten and modernize” minority nationalities while emphasizing regional development, the purpose of which is to mitigate any possible ethnic tensions to reduce the economic gap between Han Chinese and the regions of ethnic minorities. However, this process is less applicable to establishing ethnic relations in the Korean case. This may mean that modernity and modernization are not crucial to explaining the rise (or consolidation) of ethnic consciousness in the Korean minority case. This diaspora’s national background is mainly based on the Korean peninsula as an independent state that underwent modernization and industrialization before the diasporization.

6. However, Mackerras (1994) suggests that the rural economy, industry, infrastructure, health delivery, labor, gender equality, and other additional problems are economic indicators of the development of minority regions (pp. 198–232).
7. See, for example, the discussion of “rights consciousness” in China by Lorentzen and Scoggins (2015).
8. Balanced rural and urban development in Quebec is an example of the political accommodation of the francophone group with a strong national identity apart from the one attached to Canada.

REFERENCES

- Adeney, Katharine. 2006. *Federalism and ethnic conflict regulation in India and Pakistan*. London: Macmillan.
- Anderson, Benedict. 1983. *Imagined communities: Reflections on the origins and spread of nationalism*. London: Verso.
- Anderson, Benedict. 2001. Western nationalism and eastern nationalism: Is there a difference that matters? *New Left Review* 21 (9): 31–42.
- Armstrong, John A. 1976. Mobilized and proletarian diasporas. *American Political Science Review* 70 (2): 393–408.
- Barry, Brian. 2001. *Culture and equality: An egalitarian critique of multiculturalism*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- Barth, Fredrik. 1989. The analysis of culture in complex societies. *Ethnos* 54 (3–4): 120–142.
- Berberoglu, Berch. 2000. Nationalism, ethnic conflict and class struggle: A critical analysis of mainstream and Marxist theories of nationalism and national movements. *Critical Sociology* 26 (3): 205–231.
- Bergsten, Fred C. and Inbom Choi (eds.). 2003. *The Korean diaspora in the world economy*. Peterson Institute for International Economics, Special Report No. 15.
- Bhabha, Homi. 1990. DissemiNation: Time, narrative and the margins of the modern nation. In *Nation and narration*, ed. Homi Bhabha. London: Routledge.
- Bhabha, Homi. 1996. Culture’s in-between. In *Questions of cultural identity*, ed. Stuart Hall and Paul du Gay. London: Sage.
- Bosely, Corey. 2007. The ethnic minority policies of the People’s Republic of China: Patronage and prejudice. *Rutgers Race and Law Review* 8 (2): 291–319.
- Braziel, Jana Evans, and Anita Mannur (eds.). 2003. *Theorizing diaspora*. London: Blackwell.
- Callahan, William A. 2006. History, identity, and security: Producing and consuming nationalism in China. *Critical Asian Studies* 38 (2): 179–208.

- Carens, Joseph H. 2000. *Culture, citizenship, and community: A contextual exploration of justice as evenhandedness*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Cartier, Michael. 2011. Thirty years of economic reform and workforce transformation in China. *China Perspectives* 2: 27–33.
- Connor, Walker. 1984. *The national question in Marxist-Leninist theory and strategy*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Dittmer, Lowell, and Samuel S. Kim (eds.). 1993. *China's quest for national identity*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
- Dreyer, June Teufel. 1976. *China's forty millions*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Dreyer, June Teufel. 2005. China's vulnerability to minority separatism. *Asian Affairs: An American Review* 32: 69–86.
- Dwyer, Arianne M. 1998. The texture of tongues: Languages and power in China. In *Nationalism and ethnoregional identities in China*, ed. William Safran. London: Frank Cass.
- Elliott, Mark. 2015. The case of the missing indigene: Debate over a “second-generation” ethnic policy. *The China Journal* 73: 186–213.
- Favell, Adrian. 1998. *Philosophies of integration: Immigration and the idea of citizenship in France and Britain*. London: Macmillan Press.
- Finlay, Andrew. 2011. *Governing ethnic conflict: Consociation, identity and the price of peace*. London: Routledge.
- Gellner, Ernest. 1983. *Nations and nationalism*. Oxford: Blackwell.
- Gladney, Dru C. 1991. *Muslim Chinese: Ethnic nationalism in the People's Republic of China*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Goodman, Bryna. 2012. Colonialism and China. In *Twentieth-century colonialism and China*, ed. Bryna Goodman and David Goodman. London: Routledge.
- Gutmann, Amy. 2003. *Identity in democracy*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Habermas, Jurgen. 1992. Citizenship and national identity: Some reflections on the future of Europe. In *The condition of citizenship*, ed. Bart van Steenbergen. New York: Sage.
- Hall, Stuart. 1992. The question of cultural identity. In *Modernity and its futures*, ed. Stuart Hall, David Held, and Anthony McGrew. Cambridge; Oxford: Polity Press.
- Hall, Stuart. 2003. Cultural identity and diaspora. In *Theorizing diaspora*, ed. Jana Evans Braziel and Anita Mannur. London: Blackwell.
- Han, Enze. 2013. *Contestation and adaptation: The politics of national identity in China*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Harrell, Stevan (ed.). 1995. *Cultural encounters on China's ethnic frontiers*. Seattle: University of Washington Press.

- Herberer, Thomas. 1989. *China and its national minorities: Autonomy or assimilation?* New York: M.E.Sharpe.
- Hechter, Michael. 1975. *Internal colonialism: The Celtic fringe in British national development*. New Brunswick: Transaction.
- Horowitz, Donald L. (ed.). 1985. *Ethnic groups in conflict*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Jacquín-Berdal, Dominique. 2000. State and war in the formation of Eritrean national identity. In *The state and identity construction in international relations*, ed. Sarah Owen Vandersluis. Basingstoke: Macmillan Press.
- Kohn, Hans. 1994. Western and eastern nationalism. In *Nationalism*, ed. John Hutchinson and Anthony D.Smith. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Kokot, Waltraud, Christian Giordano, and Mijal Gandelsman-Trier. 2013. *Diaspora as a resource: Comparative studies in strategies, networks and urban space*. Berlin: Verlag.
- Kymlicka, Will. 1995. *The rights of minority cultures*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Kymlicka, Will. 2005. Liberal multiculturalism: Western models, global trends, and Asian debates. In *Multiculturalism in Asia*, ed. Will Kymlicka and He Baogang. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Kuznetsov, Yevgeny, ed. 2006. *Diaspora networks and the international migration of skills: How countries can draw on their talent abroad*. World Bank Development Studies.
- Lehning, Percy B. (ed.). 1998. *Theories of secession*. London: Routledge.
- Lee, Hoon Koo. 1931. *Korean immigrants in Manchuria*. Pyeongyang: College of Pyeongyang Sungsil, previously Union Christian College Press.
- Le Monde. (2016, 7 January). Yeonbyeon, prosperity of the little Korea in China: in spite of its geographical proximity with North Korea, Beijing is cold-hearted a toward their alliance" [*Yanbian, la petite Corée chinoise prospère: Malgré sa proximité géographique et politique avec la Corée du Nord, Pékin est en froid avec son allié*] http://www.lemonde.fr/asia-pacifique/article/2016/01/07/yanbian-la-petite-coree-chinoiseprospere_4843231_3216.html?xtmc=yanbian&xtcr=2 Accessed January 8, 2016.
- Lin, Chun. 2006. *The transformation of Chinese socialism*. Durham: Duke University Press.
- Lin, Chun. 2015. Modernity and the violence of global accumulation: The case of ethnic question in China. In *Global modernity and social contestation*, ed. Breno Bringel and Jose Mauricio Domingues. London: Sage Publication.
- Lobell, Steven E., and Philip Mauceri. 2004. *Ethnic conflict and international politics: Explaining diffusion and escalation*. London: Macmillan.
- Lorentzen, Peter and Suzanne Scoggins. 2015. Understanding China's rising rights consciousness. *The China Quarterly* 223: 638–657.
- Luova, Outi. 2009. Transnational linkages and development initiatives in ethnic Korean Yanbian, northeast China: "Sweet and Sour" capital transfers. *Pacific Affairs* 82 (3): 427–446.

- Ma, Rong. 2007. A new perspective in guiding ethnic relations in the 21st century: 'De-politicization' of ethnicity in China. *Asian Ethnicity* 8 (3): 199–217.
- Mackerras, Colin. 1994. *China's minorities: Integration and modernization in the twentieth century*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Mayall, James, and Mark Simpson. 1992. Ethnicity is not enough: Reflections on protracted secessionism in the third world. *International Journal of Comparative Sociology* 33 (1–2): 5–25.
- Mevius, Martin. 2009. Reappraising communism and nationalism. *Nationalities Papers* 37 (4): 377–400.
- Miller, David. 1995. *On nationality*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Nairn, Tom. 1981. *Break-up of Britain: Crisis and neo-nationalism*. London: Verso.
- O'Leary, Brendan. 1997. On the nature of nationalism: An appraisal of Ernest Gellner's writings on nationalism. *British Journal of Political Science* 27: 191–222.
- O'Leary, Brendan. 2004. *The Northern Ireland conflict: Consociational engagements*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Olzak, Susan. 1992. *The dynamics of ethnic competition and conflict*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
- Patrick, Morag. 2000. Liberalism, rights and recognition. *Philosophy and Social Criticism* 26 (5): 28–46.
- Parekh, Bhikhu. 2000. *Rethinking multiculturalism: Cultural diversity and political theory*. London: Macmillan Press.
- Parekh, Bhikhu. 2003. Cosmopolitanism and global citizenship. *Review of International Studies* 29: 3–17.
- Park, Jeongwon Bourdais. 2017. Ethnic relations in Northeast China: ethnic revival or de-ethnicization in the Korean diaspora?. *European Journal of East Asian Studies* 16: 36–66.
- Rata, Elizabeth, and Roger Openshaw. 2009. *The politics of conformity in New Zealand*. Auckland: Pearson.
- Rawls, John. 1996. *Political liberalism*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Saich, Tony (ed.). 2011. *Governance and politics of China*. London: Macmillan.
- Scalapino, Robert A., and Chong-Sik Lee. 1972. *Communism in Korea, Part I: The movement*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Sheffer, Gabriel. 2003. *Diaspora politics: At home abroad*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Shin, Gi-Wook, Joon Choi, and Joon-Nak Cho. 2015. *Global talent: Skilled labor as social capital in Korea*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
- Sigel, Roberta. 2001. An introduction to the symposium on social identity. *Political Psychology* 22 (1): 112.
- Smith, Anthony D. 1986. *The ethnic origins of nations*. Oxford: Blackwell.
- Smith, Anthony D. 1999. *Myths and memories of the nation*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

- Soysal, Yasmin. 1994. *Limits of citizenship: Migrants and post-national membership in Europe*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Suh, D.S., and Edward J. Shultz (eds.). 1990. *Koreans in China*. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press.
- Suny, Ronald Grigor. 2001. Constructing primordialism: Old histories for new nations. *The Journal of Modern History* 73 (4): 862–896.
- Szporluk, Roman. 1988. *Communism and nationalism; Karl Mark versus Friedrich List*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Tamir, Yael. 1993. *Liberal nationalism*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Tanrisever, Oktay F. 2009. Why are federal arrangements not a panacea for containing ethnic nationalism? Lessons from the post-Soviet Russian experience. *Japanese Journal of Political Science* 10 (3): 333–352.
- Taras, Raymond C., and Rajat Ganguly. 2010. *Understanding ethnic conflict*. London: Routledge.
- Taylor, Charles, Alessandro Ferrara, Volker Kaul, and David Rasmussen. 2012. Interculturalism or multiculturalism? *Philosophy and Social Criticism* 38 (405): 413–423.
- Taylor, Charles. 1994. *Multiculturalism: Examining the politics of recognition*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Woodman, Sophia. 2016. Local politics, local citizenship? Socialized governance in contemporary China. *The China Quarterly* 226: 342–362.
- Wu, Xiaohui. 2014. From assimilation to autonomy: Realizing ethnic minority rights in China's national autonomous regions. *Chinese Journal of International Law* 13 (1): 55–90.
- Young, Iris Marion. 2000. *Inclusion and democracy*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Zhao, Zhenzhou. 2011. Multiculturalism in China: Conflicting discourses in universities. In *Minority students in East Asia*, ed. JoAnn Phillion, Ming Tak Hue, and Yuxiang Wang. New York: Routledge.
- Zolberg, Aristide R. 2008. *A nation by design: Immigration policy in the fashioning of America*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Identity, Policy, and Prosperity

Border Nationality of the Korean Diaspora and Regional
Development in Northeast China

Park, J.B.

2018, XV, 193 p. 2 illus., Hardcover

ISBN: 978-981-10-4848-7